








Interrogating the Future:  













This thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the 
degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the University of Portsmouth. 
 
29 September 2020 




This thesis asks new questions of material dedicated to imagining the future of war, 
written between the Franco-German War of 1870 and the start of the First World War.  
It investigates what civilian and military writers meant by ‘the future’, and what 
methods they used to forecast the character and duration of a great war in Europe.  With 
foundations in the rich historiography on the subject, the thesis has centred on a 
systematic evaluation of British periodicals in the period of interest, counterpointed by 
an assessment of key military journals, and literature identified as significant by 
previous historians.   
The thesis has advanced the historiography by identifying the Russo-Turkish War 
(1877-78), and the Battle of Plevna in particular, as the starting point of a recognition 
that new weapons would revolutionise warfare, leading to a widespread apprehension 
over the consequences of a European war in the 1890s.  It has also provided strong 
evidence to support the view that the British military understood the lessons of the 
South African War (1899-1902) and developed rational tactics to meet the challenge of 
more effective rifles.  It has also determined that the cavalry, which faced the same 
challenge, sought excuses as to why their arm performed poorly in recent wars, rather 
than accepting its slide towards obsolescence on the battlefield. 
Above all, however, the thesis has demonstrated the need to recognise the challenge 
commentators faced when they tried to forecast the future at a time of unprecedented 
technological change.  Their means of predicting the future were immature, and the vast 
majority of civilian or military writers defined the future of war as something imminent; 
or focused on the effect of new weapons on the battlefield, rather than speculating on 
their strategic impact.  The two main exceptions, Jean de Bloch and H. G. Wells, lie at the 
core of the thesis, because they are the exceptions which proves the rule.  Their 
predictions were not necessarily altogether ‘right’, but they stand out as having  
developed new methods of interrogating the future.  Military conservatism, however, 
including resistance to the adoption of scientific methods, prevented their approaches 
from gaining traction, leading to a widespread failure to foresee how the interaction of 
new technologies would lead to the deadlock of the First World War.   
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The causes of the First World War have intrigued historians for more than a century.  It 
is hard not to see why, as Europe, at the apex of its global power and after nearly a 
hundred years of relative peace, plunged into a costly and destructive war.  The 
extensive historiography on the causes of the war is testament to the rigour with which 
historians have dissected its origins.  Margaret Macmillan, in her recent synthesis, The 
War That Ended Peace, assesses the causes suggested in the historiography, and 
concludes that one factor which contributed to the collapse of peace was a willingness, 
or even eagerness, to go to war.1  There were countervailing arguments, but there was a 
widespread belief that war was a legitimate tool to further national self-interest, which 
went hand in hand with a conviction that a European War would be controllable, swift 
and decisive.  It was not the case, either, that imagining war in the future – and 
specifically a great war in Europe – was neglected by contemporaries.  Quite the 
opposite was true, and yet, to quote Clarke, “the great paradox running through the 
whole of [the] imaginary wars between 1871 and 1914 was the total failure of army and 
navy writers to guess what would happen when the major industrial nations decided to 
fight it out.”2  This failure extended to the output of most civilian writers as well, and this 
thesis has developed a new understanding of why there was a general failure to 
envisage, and still less predict, the character and duration of a great war in Europe.   
This thesis has asked a new question of the sources: what did writers of the time mean 
by ‘the future’, and what methods did they use to forecast its character?  This question is 
significant because this was the period of early ‘scientific’ – to use the contemporary 
term - scrutiny of the future.  In the early twenty-first century, predictions of future 
technology and social trends are part of the intellectual furniture.  Accurate or not, there 
is a deluge of material on the future, with an implicit recognition that it will be different 
 
1 Margaret Macmillan, The War That Ended Peace: How Europe Abandoned Peace for the First World War 
(London: Profile Books, 2014), 605.  While Macmillan does not regard the War as inevitable, she contends that 
the likelihood of conflict increased with each of the international crises that affected Europe in the early 
twentieth century, leading to widespread complacency that the July crisis would successfully be managed in 
1914. 
2 I.F. Clarke, Voices Prophesying War 1763-3749 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 81. 
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to the present.   Although change was already a fact of life by the mid-nineteenth 
century, the decades around the turn of the century saw the beginning of the discovery 
of the future, to borrow a phrase used by H. G. Wells in 1902, who explicitly called for a 
discipline to predict the future.3  This illustrates the point that the methods of engaging 
the future were embryonic at the time, against a background of accelerating 
technological and social change.  Philipp Blom entitled his study of the period 1900-14 
as The Vertigo Years, emphasising the headlong change that contemporaries 
appreciated, wondered at, and feared.4  The prediction of future war was therefore no 
longer just a case of political prophecy (such as which powers might be in conflict) but 
also technological forecasting (what weapons would be used in conflict, and with what 
effect).5  Faced with the novelty of rapid change, the art of predicting the future had 
itself to be invented.   
This thesis has therefore examined what futures were being discussed, and how they 
were being interrogated.  Historical predictions of the future are often critiqued on what 
was ‘right’ and what was ‘wrong’, and while this is informative of the intellectual 
perspectives of the time (as well as being entertaining), it is important to understand 
that those engaged in looking at the future between 1870 and 1914 were pioneers in an 
age of unprecedented change, struggling towards a conception of what war would be 
like, without the benefit of either hindsight or recognised methods of forecasting the 
future.  In fact, this thesis has demonstrated that specific aspects of future war were 
often examined with diligence and accuracy, but what was missing – with the exception 
of a few key works – was a synthesis of the parts into a whole.  In short, the novelty of 
trying to peer into the future led most observers to focus on ‘the trees’ and not ‘the 
wood’.  Wells was one of the few who attempted to build a coherent picture of the future, 
including war, as did Jean de Bloch, whose compendious work War of the Future in its 
 
3 H.G. Wells, The Discovery of the Future: a Discourse delivered at the Royal Institution (New York: B.W.  
Huesch, 1913), accessed April 5, 2017, https://www.archive.org. 
4 Philipp Blom, The Vertigo Years (Philadelphia: Basic Books, 2008). 
5 Clarke, “Voices Prophesying,” dedicates three chapters to the period 1870 to 1914.  The first focuses on The 
Battle of Dorking, which is widely credited with starting the genre of ‘invasion literature’, which saw numerous 
writers imagining invasions of Britain by France, Germany, Russia and others over the decades to come 
(including Wells’ Martians in The War of the Worlds).  The second and third cover the years from 1880 to 1914 
in parallel, split into ‘science and wars-to-come’ and ‘politics and the pattern of the next great war’.   
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Technical, Economic and Political Relations, published in 1898, adopted an 
unprecedented – as well as remarkably prophetic - approach to predicting what would 
happen in a future Great War in Europe. 
This is not to say that change was understood or embraced by all.  The European 
military establishments of the decades before 1914 tended to the conservative, as 
witnessed by their hostility to Bloch’s work, which was seen as an attack by an amateur 
on their professional integrity.  Their failure to grasp the magnitude of the change in 
warfare brought about by new weapons, became evident during the First World War.  In 
fact, their perceived inability to overcome the challenge of trench warfare has become 
the ‘Blackadder myth’, applied particularly harshly to British Generals.6  As with all 
myths, there is truth underlying this assertion, but the British military establishment 
was not alone in failing to adapt to the unprecedented change in military affairs in the 
decades before 1914.  War had been transformed by new weapons in less than two 
generations, and this thesis demonstrates that while their failure was exacerbated by 
conservatism, those civilians who imagined new weapons also tended to present grossly 
simplified visions of their likely impact on war.  As noted above, this thesis has identified 
Bloch and H. G. Wells as striking examples of writers who attempted a more mature 
synthesise of the future.  Although their predictions were not entirely accurate, what 
differentiated them were their methods, which were so precocious that it would take 
two world wars to establish them as widely accepted approaches to interrogating the 
future. 
This thesis has built on the extensive body of previous historical analysis, but adopted 
the  novel approach of conducting a systematic survey of British periodicals from the 
Franco-German War to the outbreak of the First World War.  This has been essential to 
understanding how the debate on the future of war evolved over the period, as well as 
how commentators reacted to contemporary conflicts.  The research has shown that 
there is no shortage of relevant material, demonstrating intense interest in the subject of 
 
6 Gary Sheffield and Dan Todman have used the term as a reference to the TV comedy series Blackadder Goes 
Forth, released in the 1980s, which uses the stereotypes of trench warfare to comic effect, and particularly the 
myth that British Generals were universally incompetent, callous and remote from the fighting.   
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future war.  To provide context to this assessment, the same periodicals have also been 
examined for material on forecasts of the future in general, as have relevant military 
writings in both journal and book form, and fiction focused on future war.   The research 
has been deliberately concentrated on warfare on land, as this is most relevant to a great 
war in Europe.  This thesis does, however, touch on war at sea within the context of 
strategy - such as the impact of commerce raiding on the supply of food to Britain.   
The periodicals are significant as they were being published during a period when 
literacy rose dramatically, illustrated by newspaper readership doubling between 1896 
and 1906; and then again to 1914.7  This was the culmination of a trend identified by the 
Routledge Handbook of Nineteenth Century British Periodicals and Newspapers, such that, 
“over the course of the nineteenth century, periodicals and newspapers became a 
ubiquitous feature of daily life.”8  It also highlights the fact that periodicals defined 
themselves against newspapers in terms of being ‘class’ or ‘specialist’ publications, 
rather than those which centred on news, or were miscellanies.9  It is these periodicals, 
with their more ruminative and discursive articles on contemporary issues, that have 
delivered the majority of primary sources in this study.   They provide insight into the 
intellectual currents and concerns in Britain between 1870 and 1914,  aimed squarely at 
an upper-class and middle-class readership which was assumed to have a knowledge of 
the Empire, war and European politics.   The British periodicals - and the military 
journals - also show a keen interest in writing on future war from other countries, and 
above all Germany, which was increasingly seen as a future adversary in the years 
before 1914, providing insights into contemporary European thinking on war.   
 
7 Simon Heffer, The Age of Decadence: Britain 1880 to 1914 (London: Random House, 2017), 541. 
8 Andrew King, Alexis Easley and John Morton, eds., Routledge Handbook to Nineteenth Century British 
Periodicals and Newspapers (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), 1, estimates that 125,000 titles were published in 
England alone between 1800 and 1900, including local and national publications.   Alvin Sullivan, British Literary 
Magazines: The Victorian and Edwardian Age, 1837-1913 (London: Greenwood Press, 1984), xiii, gives a figure 
of 50,000 titles, less than that given in the later source, but still considerable. 
9 Laurel Bale, “Markets, Genres, Iterations,” in The Routledge Handbook to Nineteenth Century British 
Periodicals and Newspapers, ed. Andrew King, Alexis Easley and John Morton, 237-248 (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2016), 237. 
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Alvin Sullivan’s three volume study of British ‘literary’ periodicals contains an 
exhaustive assessment of contemporary sources.10   Of the twenty periodicals cited more 
than once in this thesis (excluding those from military journals, or from professional, 
religious or non-British sources), sixteen are described in Sullivan’s work, which is 
significant for two reasons.  Firstly, the vast majority of articles interested in the future – 
and that of war – sit within what can be considered ‘literary’ periodicals, many of which 
are considered by Sullivan to be ‘quality’ publications with significant social and 
intellectual impact, showing how the future was a topic of considerable interest to the 
elites at the time (Appendix A contains a more detailed assessment of the periodicals 
most cited in this thesis).  Secondly, as this study has relied heavily on searching through 
digitised collections, the correlation with the titles in Sullivan’s work shows that they are 
not a narrow collection but representative of many of the most significant periodicals of 
the time.  This answers the challenge posed by the Routledge Handbook, that “although 
only a small fraction of the estimated total of 50,000 periodicals and newspapers has 
been digitised readers usually focus disproportionally on titles available due to ease of 
access.”11  The methodology section at the end of Chapter One describes the approach to 
the research which has been undertaken, primarily through interrogation of the 
digitised ProQuest Periodicals Archive Online (including what was formerly British 
Periodicals Online).   
One barrier to understanding the period is that many of the writers of the articles in the 
periodicals are anonymous, or represented by non-de-plumes such as ‘Eques’, ‘Cavalry’ 
or ‘Nauticus’.  This ‘veil of anonymity’, as Mann calls it, becomes less of an issue as the 
period advances, although shorter pieces, such as those in The Review of Reviews (the 
periodical most cited in this thesis) are never ascribed authors.12  This can be 
frustrating, given that many of the writers were significant figures of the period, such as 
 
10 Sullivan, “Victorian and Edwardian,” xiii.  In terms of definition, he concludes that “the greater proportion of 
[periodicals] would not be judged literary by most definitions, but one is still left with an astonishing number 
that carried at least some reviews, reflective prose, poetry or fiction.”  Put another way, the literary periodicals 
also contain many articles on other subjects, such as the future of war. 
11 Bale, “Markets, Genres, Iterations,” 237. 
12 Fiona Mann, “Lifting the ‘universal veil’ of Anonymity: Writers on Art in the Periodical Press 1850-1880,” The 
British Art Journal, Vol XV No.2: 33.  Although Mann’s article is specifically focused on art, many of the 
periodicals she mentions are sources in this thesis, such as The Spectator, The Athenaeum and Blackwood’s.  
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Arthur Conan Doyle or Field Marshal Frederick Roberts, and anonymity hides identities.  
Having said this, many prominent writers do identify themselves, and no less than 
sixteen authors appear in the Oxford National Dictionary of Biography, emphasising the 
prominence of writers on the future of war.13  As Macmillan says, the decision to go to 
war in 1914 was made by a surprisingly small number of men from the upper classes, 
whether they be from the landed aristocracy or the urban plutocracy, and a number 
from that elite were writing on the subject of war in the future.14   
The thesis is structured into seven chapters, followed by conclusions.  The first chapter 
is a review of the extensive historiography on the future of war, and forecasting the 
future, relevant to the period between 1870 and 1914.  The second examines the 
attention paid by the British periodicals in the future in general over the period of 
interest, illustrating their growing interest in what new technology would offer, and 
potential effects on society, as well as the beginning of an interest in ‘scientific’ 
forecasting.  The third and fourth are, respectively, focused on the way the British 
periodicals examined the future of war between 1870 to 1899 (marking the beginning of 
the South African War); and from 1899 to 1914.15  The third chapter identifies the way 
in which the Russo-Turkish War, and particularly the Battle of Plevna in 1877, revealed 
the power of new weapons to change war, with the consequent emergence of 
widespread dread about the prospect of a future European War.  The fourth chapter 
centres on how the debate on war changed with the South African War, becoming more 
parochial – given Britain’s involvement – with an attendant loss of focus on what a 
general European war might bring.  Taken together, they demonstrate the great interest 
in future war in the periodicals, but also show how their focus was usually on very 
particular aspects, or in contrast somewhat diffuse, reflecting a general fear of what a 
Great War would be like. 
 
13 Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, www.oxfordnb.com.  
14 Macmillan, “War That Ended Peace,” 230. 
15 The contemporary periodicals referred to the war as the South African War, the Transvaal War, the Boer War 
or simply ‘the war in South Africa’.  As probably the most common identifier, the conflict is referred to as ‘the 
South African War’ throughout this thesis, except where a different name is used in a contemporary reference.  
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The fifth chapter focuses on the military journals of the period, which have been 
specifically assessed in terms of what questions they asked of the future.  Once more, the 
wealth of material on the future of war has been clearly identified, as is the way the 
military tended to be conservative in its analyses, seeing new technologies as 
augmenting military practice, rather than revolutionising its conduct.   The sixth chapter 
turns to fiction, including both short stories and novels, and shows how authors 
reflected the concerns and interests of writers in the civilian periodicals and military 
journals.  Like these, they tended to either offer a conservative view of future war, or 
alternatively a view that new technologies would change war, albeit in very specific and 
dramatic ways.  The seventh and final chapter is centred on the work of the two writers 
who, more than any others, applied new different methods to the treatment of the 
future: Bloch and Wells.  It shows that their approaches aimed to develop syntheses of 
technological, social and military change, while most writers struggled even to conceive 
of the way in which change would transform warfare.  As outliers for the majority of 
those writing on the subject, they highlight the general failure of commentators to 
forecast the First World War. 
The conclusion of this thesis has been driven, throughout, by asking the central question 
of what the writers of the time meant when they discussed the future of war, and how 
they attempted to tackle its prediction.  They lived in a new world of accelerating 
technological and societal change, which meant the future would be shaped by 
technology in a way to render it different to the present.  Although this had been the 
case earlier in the nineteenth century, it was the decades under scrutiny which 
recognised its profoundly dislocating potential.  Some, especially in the military, 
attempted to resist the inevitable conclusions of change, but all struggled to build a 
picture of future war through the sheer intractability of predicting things to come in an 
age of furious change.  As Tom Smallways, the father of the protagonist, Bert Smallways, 
puts it in Wells’ The War in the Air, when facing the dizzying change he had seen in his 
life:  “This here Progress, it keeps on.  You’d hardly think it could keep on”.16 
 
16 H.G. Wells, The War in the Air (London: Penguin Classics, 1946 [First Published 1908]), 5. 
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Chapter One  Historiography 
It is easy to find photographs of the various European armies in 1914 which seem to 
belong to a distant, antediluvian age.  Generals with ornate uniforms, cavalry armed with 
lances, tethered airships, and an overwhelming impression of stiff formality all signify 
remoteness to a contemporary observer.  In contrast, images of the military taken only 
thirty years later, near the end of the Second World War, do not look too dissimilar to 
their contemporary equivalents.  Pictures can, of course, be deliberately selected to 
convey a particular tone and those of 1914 can be used to reinforce a perception that as 
that year of crisis unfolded, “the protagonists were people from another, vanished 
world”.1  Indeed, part of the historiographical fascination for the origins of the First 
World War is a sense that the Europe in 1914 was a lost world on the brink of 
catastrophe.2  In contrast, writers such as Philipp Blom have emphasised the 
disconcerting and exhilarating nature of social and technological change in the decades 
before the First World War.3  Indeed, the cover of the paperback version of his The 
Vertigo Age contains a picture of a racing car speeding past spectators, emphasising 
modernity and dislocation, in riposte to the idea of a distant belle epoque.  These 
different perspectives illustrate the debate at the heart of much of the historiography 
about what happened when the armies of the Great Powers went to war in 1914.   One 
perspective, as put by Stephen Van Evera, is to suggest that “the gulf between myth and 
the realities of warfare has never been greater than in the years before World War I”?4  
Other historians, however, believe that the military establishments of the time were 
attempting, albeit with decidedly mixed results, to find rational solutions to the 
 
1 Christopher Clarke,  The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 (London: Penguin Books, 2013), xxv.   
2 Charles Emmerson, 1913: The World Before the Great War (London: Vintage, 2013), 456. 
3 Philipp Blom, The Vertigo Years (Philadelphia: Basic Books, 2008), 2. 
4 Stephen Van Evera, “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War,” International Security 9 
(1984): 58.  
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challenges of half a century of technological and economic change which had completely 
altered the character of conflict.5   
Expressing the historiographical debate as a dichotomy is a simplification, of course, but 
this thesis has added weight to the view that contemporary military theorists, in Britain 
and elsewhere, were aware of the changes brought about by increased firepower on the 
battlefield, and sought ways to factor it into the successful execution of war.  It will also 
demonstrate, however, that the intellectual framework did not exist to fully understand 
the impact of new weapons and technologies on warfare.  Military theorists sought 
answers within the traditional structure of warfare, with new technologies seen as 
augmenting, but not revolutionising, military practice.  They focused on tactical 
battlefield solutions, but almost entirely failed to understand how increased defensible 
firepower would affect strategy.   What further restricted their comprehension was that 
strategy was seen as having eternal fixed rules, with only tactics requiring adaptation in 
the face of new weapons.6  This division contributed to a failure to understand what 
would happen when a European war between coalitions of great powers unfolded, 
leading as it did to the trench deadlock of the First World War. 
Civilian commentators did see technology as making war more uncontrollable and 
revolutionary, with writers responding emotionally to the power of new weapons, 
particularly as a consequence of the Battle of Plevna in 1877, which demonstrated the 
destructive power of breech loading rifles and led to an outpouring of fear as to what a 
future European War might be like, which was as acutely felt as it was vague in detail.  
Such dread reflected contemporary intellectual pessimism, at a time when the future 
 
5 John Terraine, White Heat: the New Warfare 1914-18 (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1982): 328 and Andrew 
Liaropoulus, “Revolutions in Warfare: Theoretical Paradigms and Historical Evidence: The Napoleonic and First 
World War Revolutions in Military Affairs,” Journal of Military History 70 (2006): 377. 
6 The modern definition of tactics is “the art or science of deploying military or naval forces in order of battle, 
and of performing warlike evolutions and manoeuvres,” Oxford English Dictionary, definition of ‘tactics’ (noun), 
accessed 25 May 2020, www.oed.com.  In contrast, that of strategy is “the art or practice of planning or 
directing the larger movements or long-term objectives of a battle, military campaign, etc,” Oxford English 
Dictionary, definition of ‘strategy’ (noun), accessed 25 May 2020, www.oed.com. In essence, tactics might be 
seen as what happens on a battlefield, while strategy is concerned with bringing those forces to the battlefield.  
The same distinction was used in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, along with debate as to 
where or when the two overlapped.   
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was increasingly seen to belong to science.  The emphasis of military theorists on 
battlefield tactics, and the unease felt by civilian commentators, however, actually reflect 
different aspects of the same problem.  Social and technological change was accelerating 
in the last decades of the nineteenth century, and the weapons available to the armies 
and navies of the time was transformed between the 1850s and the 1890s.  It is too easy 
to forget how unprecedented this change was, and while the turn of the century saw the 
first pioneers begin to develop new ways of interrogating the future, the climate did not 
exist  to establish an intellectual framework to forecast the future.  In short, prophecy 
was not easy, and the historiography can be too critical of how contemporaries reacted 
to changing military technology, by failing to see the scale of the challenge which they 
faced. 
To support this argument, which lies at the heart of this thesis, five strands of historical 
discourse have been explored.  Three of these relate directly to different aspects of 
military thinking, the first being an examination of the historiography on military 
attitudes to war in the decades before the War.   This explores the way in which 
European military establishments responded to the reality of increased firepower on the 
battlefield, with historians divided as to how they sought to overcome the challenge of 
new technologies.  On the one hand there are those like Van Evera, who believe that they 
sought moral solutions to overcome increased firepower on the battlefield, sometimes 
to the extent of developing irrational answers based on national fervour or strength of 
will.  On the other are those who see them as developing new tactics and approaches, 
such as inculcating greater initiative into troops, based on battlefield experience.  The 
second strand of debate is about the British Army and its place in society; with the 
historiography asking to what degree social attitudes contributed to a failure to prepare 
for the War.   This is particularly relevant to the attitudes shown in the periodicals and 
military journals, which were often the subject of debate between conservatives and 
reformers regarding the need to change military practice.   
The third strand of debate cuts across both of the above and highlights the wider 
historiographical discussion of ‘rational’ or ‘irrational’ responses to change in warfare 
through debate on the armament and role of the British cavalry in the years before 
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1914.  Cavalry, British or otherwise, proved to have limited utility in the War itself, but 
were the subject of intense debate from the 1870s to the 1910s, acting as a ‘lightning 
rod’ for contemporary debate and subsequent historiographical assessment.   Much 
criticised in twentieth century historiography for being hopelessly conservative, 
revisionist historians have sought to rehabilitate the cavalry and demonstrate that they 
too responded intelligently to the changing circumstances of war.  The fourth strand 
discusses the historiography on the fiction of the period dedicated to wars of the future, 
written by both military and civil writers.  This is, once more, entwined with the three 
themes discussed above, as writers such as Arthur Conan Doyle wrote on military affairs 
in the periodicals, and military writers were sometimes authors of the ‘invasion 
literature’ of the time.   
The fifth and final strand is the historiography around the increasing importance of 
science and quantification at the time, including the development of methods for 
predicting the future.  This historiography is significant as contemporary debate 
recognised that science was becoming more important in civilian and military life, and 
there were often calls for its methods to be applied more vigorously to professional life.  
In practice the appeals for its use outweighed its application, but – as emphasised above 
- the failure to predict the character of the War cannot be understood without 
recognising the challenge of rapid change in military technology.  Although somewhat 
separate to the other four intersecting historiographies, it sites discussion of the future 
and the role of science in the wider intellectual climate of the time, which increasingly 
leaned to the pessimistic as the decades advanced.   This chapter concludes with a 
description of the methodology used for the research which underpins this thesis. 
Before going on to investigate the historiography in detail, it is necessary to clarify the 
use of the term ‘moral’ – and ‘morale’ in writing of the period.  In modern usage ‘moral’ 
means “Of or relating to human character or behaviour considered as good or bad; of or 
relating to the distinction between right and wrong, or good and evil, in relation to the 
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actions, desires, or character of responsible human beings; ethical.”7  In contrast 
‘morale’ means “The mental or emotional state (with regard to confidence, hope, 
enthusiasm, etc.) of a person or group engaged in some activity; degree of contentment 
with one's lot or situation.”8  In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
however, ‘moral’ was sometimes used as a synonym or replacement for ‘morale’, in a 
way the Oxford English Dictionary now considers to be obsolete or rare.9  Throughout 
this thesis, quotations from primary sources use the contemporaneous spellings and 
meanings, while the remainder of the text uses the modern meanings of morale and 
moral, except where an anachronistic usage is signalled thus: ‘moral’. 
The Cult of the Offensive 
In 1984 the political scientist Van Evera used the term ‘the cult of the offensive’ to 
explain the behaviour of European armies at the outbreak of war.10  His thesis was that 
the militaries of the time responded to the increasing power of the defensive in warfare, 
evident in both the South African and Russo-Japanese Wars, by developing an irrational 
belief in the ability of aggressive action to overcome technological barriers.  Military 
establishments in Europe developed offensive doctrines which, in some quarters, verged 
on the mystical, permeating both tactical and strategic thinking, leading Van Evera to 
conclude that “the cult of the offensive was a principal cause of the First World War.”11  
He related the emphasis on achieving success through greater morale and nationalist 
fervour to the prevailing contemporary formulation of Social Darwinism, in that nations 
must compete violently to avoid eclipse by their more dynamic neighbours.  The drive 
 
7 Oxford English Dictionary entry for ‘Moral’, accessed 25 May 2020, www.oed.com.  There are several further 
definitions of the adjective, but the quote in the main body captures the essence of the definitions. 
8 Oxford English Dictionary entry for ‘Morale’, accessed 25 May 2020, www.oed.com.   
9 Oxford English Dictionary, entry for ‘moral’ (noun and adjective), accessed 25 May 2020, www.oed.com.  The 
entry for the noun explicitly uses a quotation from the Westminster Gazette in 1900 to illustrate this 
anachronistic use, “the force investing Mafeking is daily being shaken in moral.” 
10 Van Evera, “Cult of the Offensive,” 58.  John Shy, “The Cultural Approach to the History of War,” Journal of 
Military History 57 (1993): 20, identifies Van Evera as having recently coined the phrase ‘the cult of the 
offensive’, although it originated with Marshal Joseph Joffre in Memoires du Maréchal Joffre (Paris: Librarie 
Plon, 1932): p. 33.  Joffre speaks of "le culte de l'offensive" and "d'une mystique de l'offensive". 
11 Van Evera, “Cult of the Offensive,” 58-59.  
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for offensive action then reinforced the need for rapid mobilisation and pre-emptive 
action to win wars, leading to disaster in 1914.12 
Jack Snyder, writing in the same edition of International Relations as Van Evera, 
presented a parallel argument that the doctrines behind ‘the cult of the offensive’ were a 
significant cause of the war.13  His specific thesis was that a pathological pattern of civil-
military relations underpinned its development, culminating in war in 1914.14  In 
France, for example, he considered that the officer corps developed the doctrine of 
‘offensive á outrance’ (offense to excess) to support the maintenance of a professional 
army, in opposition to the use of short-term service soldiers and reservists favoured by 
the government.15  This distrust was rooted in the specific toxic atmosphere of military 
and civil relations following the Dreyfus affair, but other European armies suffered from 
similar dislocations.  Synder concluded that, for a range of individual reasons, the armies 
of the time sought decisive results through offensive action, to justify their own 
existences and to deliver imagined economic benefits to their nations.16  Synder did not 
blame the military establishments for the war, but suggested that their institutional 
interests ‘unhinged’ doctrine from military reality, with disastrous consequences in the 
War. 
The ideas of Van Evera and Snyder may be contrasted with those historians who have 
sought a more nuanced view of military thinking before the First World War.  Tim 
Travers, for example, extensively researched the attitudes of the British Army to war 
between the South African War and the First World War, during the 1970s and 1980s, 
and concluded that the emphasis on offensive action was rooted in an understanding of 
 
12 Van Evera, “Cult of the Offensive,” 72-76. 
13 Jack Snyder, “Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive,” International Security 9 (1984): 108-146.  
Synder is another political scientist – at the time he was an Assistant Professor in the Political Sciences 
Department of Columbia University – and he cited Van Evera as one of the commentators on his paper.  Snyder 
and Van Evera had collaborated before the publication of their 1984 articles and were to do so again, later in 
their careers. 
14 Snyder, “Civil-Military Relations,” 109. 
15 Synder, “Civil-Military Relations,” 110. 
16 Synder, “Civil-Military Relations,” 119. 
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the way new weapons were changing warfare.17  Travers’ forensic examination of 
British Army papers of the time highlighted the way in which the shock of the South 
African War drove home lessons about the realities of contemporary warfare to an 
institution more used to fighting poorly armed and organised ‘native’ armies.  Tactics 
continued to evolve after the Russo-Japanese War had demonstrated the ability of a 
well-motivated attacker (the Japanese) to cross the fire zone and achieve decisive 
success on the battlefield, albeit with high casualties.  His thesis was that the Army knew 
how costly and difficult offensive actions would be, and so sought to drive their troops 
on to success by emphasising the importance of morale.18  Travers, while presenting the 
Army’s response as rooted in a rational reading of battlefield tactics, related this to a 
contemporary Edwardian reaction against scientific rationalism, and concerns over a 
‘degenerate’ nation which had been highlighted by the poor quality of recruits to the 
colours in the Boer War.  He noted, for example, commentators such as Lieutenant-
Colonel Ian Hamilton, who preached in terms of victory going to the nation with the 
stronger will.19  For all its attempt to develop tactics fit for the new weapons available to 
the armies of the time, he nonetheless concluded firmly that social and cultural factors 
prevented the British Army from achieving a full understanding, while observing that 
similar institutional problems affected the French and German armies during the first 
few years of the War. 
Michael Howard, writing at the same time as Van Evera, put forward a similar 
interpretation to Travers, concluding that the conflict which most affected military 
practice in the First World War was the Russo-Japanese War, with the South African War 
seen as an aberration due to its colonial nature and the small size of the British Army.  
 
17 T. H. E. Travers, The Killing Ground: The British Army, the Western Front & the Emergence of Modern War 
1900-1918 (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2009 [first edition 1987]); T. H. E. Travers, “Technology, Tactics, and 
Morale: Jean de Bloch, the Boer War, and British Military Theory,” Journal of Modern History 51 (1971): 264-
286 and T. H. E. Travers, “The Offensive and the Problem of Innovation in British Military Thought 1870-1915,” 
Journal of Contemporary History 13 (1978): 531-553.  Van Evera, “Cult of the Offensive”, p.59 explicitly 
acknowledges Travers work.  Travers used the phrase ‘a cult of initiative and dash’ in 1979, but when he 
published The Killing Ground in 1987 he explicitly used the term ‘Cult of the Offensive’ for the title of one of his 
chapters.   
18 Travers, “The Offensive,” 546. 
19 Travers, “Technology, Tactics and Morale,” 281.  As Travers’ drily observes, Hamilton was to realise for 
himself the power of defensive entrenchment when he commanded the British forces at Gallipoli in 1915. 
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European Armies adopted the idea of offensive action while ignoring the careful tactics 
used by the Japanese to achieve success against Russian trenches.20 Howard also 
stressed that contemporary observers recognised the contribution of Japanese morale 
and discipline in achieving victory, and that while this could be translated – by observers 
such as Hamilton – into irrational calls for national regeneration, it was rooted in 
military reality.  Howard nonetheless remained convinced of the important role that 
political and social factors had in the military culture of the time.  For example, French 
soldiers went to war in 1914 in blue tunics and red trousers because political 
conservatism delayed the adoption of camouflage, which had been used by the British 
Army in the 1880s.21  Even more damagingly, a corrosive political culture of national 
chauvinism led to the French emphasis on the ‘offence á outrance’, resulting in very 
French heavy casualties in Alsace-Lorraine in August-September 1914.22 
Douglas Porch, who has written extensively on the French Army between the Franco-
German War and the First World War, has been critical of Snyder’s view of the French 
Army as a bureaucracy choosing offensive action to justify its existence.23  Like Howard, 
he recognised that a discussion of morale in warfare is not irrational, and concluded that 
the French Army lacked the tactical ability to achieve its aims.24  Specifically, Porch 
identified ‘institutionalised anarchy’ within the French Army as leading to a lack of any 
doctrine other than the generalised development of the offensive at all cost.25  Partly, 
this arose from looking back to the Napoleonic period and citing revolutionary fervour 
as a way of defeating a more populous and industrialised Germany.26  In addition, the 
Republican Government did not trust the high command and feared strong Army 
leadership, foisting upon it a programme of education aimed more at social change than 
 
20 Michael Howard, “Men Against Fire: Expectation of War in 1914,” International Security  9 (1984): 56. 
21 Howard, “Men Against Fire,” 53. 
22 Howard, “Men Against Fire,” 57. 
23 Douglas Porch, “The Marne and After: A Reappraisal of French Strategy in the First World War,” The Journal 
of Military History 53(4) (1989): 376.  Synder references Porch in his work on ‘the cult of the offensive’. 
24 Porch, “Marne and After,” 368. 
25 Douglas Porch, “The French Army and the Spirit of the Offensive,” in War and Society: A Yearbook of Military 
History, eds. Brian Bond and Ian Roy (London: Croom Helm, 1975), 118. 
26 Porch, “French Army,” 120. 
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military effectiveness.27 This climate led to a detachment from military reality, with 
British observers a few years before the War observing – from the perspective of 
fighting in the South African War – that French infantry and cavalry did not seem to 
know how effective modern rifle fire was in the field.28   
A. J. Echevarria, writing in 2010, considered that the ‘cult of the offensive’ had become 
conventional wisdom, which is perhaps going too far, given the work of Howard, Travers 
and others.  Notwithstanding this, he modified the position of van Evera and Synder by 
considering that the discussion of morale and psychological factors in warfare was not 
ridiculous in itself, but that it could be misused or oversimplified, identifying the danger 
of allowing the language used by contemporary writers – terms such as ‘will to conquer’ 
– to obscure the subtleties of their arguments, in a literary equivalent of the distancing 
effect of images of the military in 1914.29   Echevarria did not downplay the significance 
of cultural influences but identified their place alongside reasoned, if erroneous, military 
debate based on the Russo-Japanese War, closing the historiographical gap, as it were, 
with Howard, Travers and Porch. 
Lauren Wilcox – writing at around the time Echevarria published his reassessment – 
examined the ‘cult of the offensive’ from a feminist perspective.  She argued that a focus 
on masculine values in warfare led to an “over-estimate of the importance of the spirit 
and honour in offensive warfighting”.30  She concluded that gender, as well as class and 
racial ideologies, led to an emphasis of chivalric values and heroic combat, against the 
backdrop of a crisis of masculinity in Edwardian Britain.31  These attitudes led to the 
portrayal of offensive action as being masculine, and therefore positive, leading to 
disastrous consequences in 1914.  Wilcox is not alone in seeing a dangerous 
undercurrent in the heroic depictions of war which affected Europe before the War, as 
 
27 Porch, “French Army,” 118. 
28 Porch, “French Army,” 134. 
29 A. J. Echevarria, “The Cult of the Offensive’ Revisited; Confronting Technological Change Before the Great 
War,” Journal of Strategic Studies 25 (2002): 201. 
30 Lauren Wilcox, “Gendering the Cult of the Offensive,” Security Studies 18 (2009): 222. 
31 Wilcox, “Gendering,” 227. 
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seen below in the section on contemporary attitudes to the British Army.32  Certainly, 
the spirit of ‘heroism’ was evident in contemporary artillery tactics, which emphasised a 
need to close with the enemy and conduct direct fire attacks, and the reluctance to 
abandon cavalry shock action on the battlefield. 
More recently, Bowman and Connelly’s extensive analysis of the Edwardian army 
explicitly set its goal as “determining just how far the British Army managed to digest 
the lessons of the South African and the Russo-Japanese Wars and integrate modern 
firepower into its understanding of battle.”33  Their conclusion was that the period, 
through a desire to understand the experience of those wars, saw the publication of a 
significant volume of well-informed debate on infantry firepower and the use of 
artillery.34  Specifically, they highlight the fact that the need for offensive action was not 
irrational, but founded on a recognition that troops going to ground under fire in the 
South African War had suffered high casualties; so maintaining the attack was tactically 
sensible.35  Their assessment, while recognising limitations in the British Army, such as 
its failure to develop an adequate General Staff, was emphatic, such that “no one can 
accuse the British Army of failing to address the problems caused by modern 
firepower….obvious in the impressive list of reports, articles, lectures and discussions 
produced across the period.”36 
The discourse between these historians goes to the root of military culture in 1914, 
which is to understand the extent to which the armies of the time were responding 
rationally to the changed conditions of warfare.  Howard, for example, provides 
examples of reasoned, if sometimes incorrect, assertions over tactics, and Porch notes 
that while the French insistence on advancing in close order was to have suicidal effects, 
 
32 See, for example, Glenn Wilkinson, “The Blessings of War: the Depiction of Military Force in Edwardian 
Newspapers.” Journal of Contemporary History 33 (1989): 97-115; and John Tosh, “Masculinities in an 
Industrialising Society: Britain, 1800-1914,” Journal of British Studies 44 (2005): 330-342. 
33 Timothy Bowman and Mark Connelly, The Edwardian Army: Recruiting, Training and Deploying the British 
Army, 1902-1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 5. 
34 On infantry fire, see Bowman and Connelly, “Edwardian Army,” 66; on the debate about direct and indirect 
artillery fire, Bowman and Connelly, “Edwardian Army,” 83. 
35 Bowman and Connelly, “Edwardian Army,” 86. 
36 Bowman and Connelly, “Edwardian Army,” 104. 
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it was partly driven by a reasonable fear of dispersion on the battlefield making 
command impossible.37  Bowman and Connelly demonstrate the efforts to which the 
British Army went to dissect the lessons of the South African and Russo-Japanese Wars.   
All of the theorists were, in reality, battling with the fact that offensive action was 
becoming more difficult because of the power of defensive fire.  This view has been 
developed by historians since the 1960s, of which John Terraine was one for the first, 
leading to a widespread conclusion that it was the state of contemporary military 
technology which led inevitably to the dominance of the defensive in the First World 
War, manifested in trench deadlock.38  The effect of increased firepower was recognised 
by contemporaries, at least at the tactical level, but a period of relatively long peace, 
coupled with prevailing ideas of masculinity and heroism, sometimes led to attitudes 
being expressed which verged on the irrational. 
There is also a need to more clearly separate tactical and strategic thinking.  The ‘cult of 
the offensive’ has been applied to both, but given the weight of evidence, it is hard not to 
disagree with Dan Todman and his conclusion that the British Army was tactically 
“mistaken, but trying to deduce solutions from the evidence available to them."39  Far 
less thought was given to strategy, and specifically what might happen during a general 
coalition war.  Although the British Army planned intervention on the Continent, David 
Morgan-Owen, in his study on pre-War planning, concludes that “Britain’s political 
leadership did not articulate a coherent vision for how it envisaged bringing a future 
Great Power conflict to a conclusion before the outbreak of the First World War.”40  The 
same was true of Germany, reflecting the fact that few contemporaries were thinking in 
terms of anything but a short war.  Echevarria notes how military theorists, such as the 
German Colmar von der Goltz, recognised how technology had changed warfare and 
 
37 Porch, “French Army,” 135. 
38 John Terraine, The Smoke and the Fire: Myths and Anti-myths of War 1861-1945 (London: Sidgwick & 
Jackson, 1980). For examples of later writing on the subject, see Dan Todman, The Great War: Myth and 
Memory (London: Continuum International, 2007) and Niall Barr, “Command in the Transition from Mobile to 
Static Warfare, August 1914 to March 1915,” in Command and Control on the Western Front: The British Army’s 
Experience 1914-18, eds. Gary Sheffield and Dan Todman (Stroud: Spellmount, 2007), 13.     
39 Todman, “The Great War”, 75. 
40 David Morgan-Owen, The Fear of Invasion: Strategy, Politics, and British War Planning, 1880-1914 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2017), 6. 
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sought solutions within the framework of current military theory, but remained blind to 
the potential long term consequences of a European War.41   
There are exceptions - Synder refers to the work by Liber, who suggested that the 
German leadership understood that a short war was unlikely, and possessed a more 
realistic view of a lengthy war featuring siege-like conditions.42  Similarly, Herwig has 
researched the German archives and considers that there was some recognition of the 
potential for a long war.43  With these few exceptions, however, the lack of 
contemporary debate on these subjects reveal a widespread belief that it would be  
impossible for nations to sustain themselves through a lengthy war, due to a common 
belief that such a conflict would lead to economic collapse.  This view, as shall be 
explored in subsequent chapters, was shared by peace campaigners and military 
theorists alike.  The idea of the ‘cult of the offensive’ at the strategic level reflected 
thinking that rapid offensive action was necessary to win wars, and that to fail to do so 
would result in disaster as nations would be unable to sustain their war efforts as their 
economies faltered. 
In all the careful analysis of tactics by the British Army, what was missing was 
extrapolating from the tactical to the strategic; to take the step from appreciating the 
difficulties of maintaining an offensive on the battlefield, to its conclusion of strategic 
stalemate.  A few isolated thinkers were able to make the leap and predict deadlock, but 
the contemporary British Army did not possess the institutions or attitude to even 
 
41 Interwar military writers who were critical of what they saw as the reactionary nature of the generals of the 
First World War had, of course, the advantage of hindsight.  It is noteworthy, for example, that J. F.C. Fuller, 
who was immensely critical of the British Army for failing to respond to trench warfare, did not foresee the 
problems of the offensive before 1914.  See T.H.E. Travers, “H.G. Wells and British Military Theory 1895-1916,” 
in War and Society: A Yearbook of Military History, edited by Brian Bond and Ian Roy (London: Croom Helm, 
1975), 67.  Similarly, Fuller stressed the relevance of the American Civil War to modern war, as it had 
demonstrated the importance of technological change, but after the First World War, Tal Nimrod. “The 
American Civil War in British Military Thought from the 1880’s to the 1930’s,” Civil War History 60(4) (2014): 
431.   
42 Jack Synder and Keir Liber, “Defensive Realism and the ‘New’ History of World War I,” International Security 
33(1) (2008): 174-194.  It should be noted that their dialogue is actually centred around international relations 
theory, and Liber’s criticism is of only one of the pillars of the ‘cult of the offensive’ – that of strategic offensive 
action. For a more comprehensive treatment of Germany’s view of a ‘short war’, see Holger Herwig, “Germany 
and the ‘Short-War’ Illusion: towards a New Interpretation,” Journal of Military History 66 (2002): 681-693. 
43 Herwig, “Germany and the ‘Short-War’,” 692. 
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explore such thinking.  Like its equivalents in Europe, a period of rapidly changing 
technology had overwhelmed the ability of the military establishments to forecast the 
future and adapt to change.   
The British Army and Society 
Individual nations responded differently to the challenges of changing technology and 
industrialisation, and Britain’s response was conditioned by its geography.  The armies 
of the Continental Great Powers were based around universal conscription and 
numbered in the hundreds of thousands, or even millions, while the British Army was 
made up of a relatively small number of volunteer soldiers who were deployed primarily 
to police the Empire.  This situation was made possible because Britain possessed the 
most powerful navy in the world, making the Channel an effective barrier against 
invasion (even in the last decade before the War, at a time when aircraft were relatively 
primitive).  The Navy also possessed a strong political lobby in its favour and when 
‘invasion scares’ occurred, it was they who received new battleships, rather than the 
Army being expanded.44   
Edward Spiers has explored attitudes to the Army in British society, including their 
effect on policy, and identified rising interest in the late Victorian and Edwardian press 
in the exploits of the Army in its role of colonial policing.45  This was paralleled by an 
increase in the volume of fiction on the Empire from writers such as Kipling, although 
the evidence is that all of this interest did not, in practice, lead to an increase in 
enlistment.46  Expansion of the contemporary press provided a forum for increased 
interest, with the occasional dramatic incident - such as the bloody charge of the 21st 
Lancers at Omdurman in the Soudan (sic) in 1898 - examined at length.47  When such 
 
44 Edward Spiers, The Army and Society 1815-1914 (London: Longman, 1980), 220. 
45 Spiers, “Army and Society,” 211. 
46 Spiers, “Army and Society,” 219. 
47 The contemporary spelling of what would now be called the Sudan was Soudan, and is used throughout this 
thesis.  The Battle of Omdurman saw Lord Kitchener’s British Army annihilate a much larger force of ‘Dervishes’ 
(as the follower of the Mahdi, Muhammad Ahmed, were known to the British).  The British and Egyptian-
Sudanese forces used massed rifle, machine gun and artillery fire to inflict 23,000 casualties on the army of 
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setbacks occurred, however, they were not allowed to undermine an overall impression 
of British triumph through superior leadership, arms and morale.48   
John Tosh’s study of the construction of masculinity in the nineteenth century also 
identified a rising preoccupation in the adventure fiction of the 1870s and 1880s with 
colonial conflict such that “overseas violence became more attractive as the legal and 
social suppression of male violence proceeded at home.”49  What he termed the 
‘middling sort’ became more closely engaged with colonial exploits, and jingoistic, in the 
late nineteenth century, which he considered to be a reaction to feeling their masculinity 
threatened at home.  Aggressive language was often used at the time, such as seeking 
‘vengeance for Gordon of Khartoum’ in the Soudan.50  Ultimately, his view is that the 
colonies became perceived as a sphere where military aspirations could be indulged, 
although this led to a dangerous misconception of what a European War could be like.51  
As Spiers’ says, there was a focus on heroism and the superiority of British character and 
morale, while not necessarily grasping that the slaughter inflicted on the Dervish 
attackers (as the followers of the Mahdi were called in Britain) at Omdurman might be 
recreated in a European War.52   As shall be explored below, however, some 
contemporary commentators in the periodicals did recognise the power of modern 
weapons in that battle, and understood that the consequences in a European war could 
be very serious indeed. 
The South African War had a huge effect both on the Army, and the way in which it was 
portrayed in the press and fiction.  The conflict proved traumatic to a nation used to its 
Army delivering swift victories over poorly organised and armed indigenous peoples, 
such as happened in the Soudan.  In South Africa the Boers inflicted a series of 
 
50,000 Dervishes, for a loss of 47 killed and 382 wounded.   Later in the battle the 21st Lancers, numbering 400 
men, encountered some Dervishes and conducted a cavalry charge, which ended successfully but at a heavy 
cost when they ran into a large force hidden in a defile, resulting in 70 dead or wounded.  See John Ellis, The 
Social History of the Machine Gun (London: Pimlico, 1992), 86. 
48 Spiers, “Army and Society,” 213.   
49 Tosh, “Masculinities,” 340. 
50 Tosh, “Masculinities,” 341. 
51 Tosh, “Masculinities,” 342. 
52 Spiers, “Army and Society,” 212. 
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devastating reverses on the British Army in 1899-1900, and victory was only achieved 
in 1902 by sending almost its entire strength to Africa and raising additional volunteer 
forces.  For a nation that possessed the largest Empire in the world, the War “triggered 
absolutely fundamental questions about patriotism and national character.”53  The Army 
found that the weaponry available to the Boers, and the tactics they adopted, had 
changed warfare beyond recognition, for which it had been unprepared, and which in 
turn fed into debate about future European war.54   
The reverses experienced by the Army in the Boer War forced the press to adopt highly 
specific language to explain events in South Africa.  Glenn Wilkinson’s review of the way 
in which Edwardian newspapers portrayed war notes that contemporary accounts used 
the term ‘murderous fire’ to describe Boer rifle fire, setting them as both criminals but 
also ‘cowards’ for refusing to stand and fight, reinforcing Wilcox’s thesis that military 
mores were focused around a heroic conception of warfare and its masculinity. 55 This 
echoes comments of Kitchener, who disapproved of the fact that the Boers did not stand 
and fight (thereby allowing themselves to be mown down like the more accommodating 
Dervishes at the Battle of Omdurman), which is symptomatic of the way in which 
generals of the period can be quoted to comic effect.56  Wilkinson’s conclusion is that, 
regardless of the setbacks of the Boer War, the press was able to portray war as 
something beneficial and desirable to Britain, reinforcing prevailing attitudes towards 
conflict.57  Like Tosh, Wilkinson considers that this led to a positive and deeply 
misguided attitude to conflict in 1914.58 
Steve Attridge concludes that the Boer War was to fundamentally affect the way in 
which the soldier came to be defined, through popular literature and the music hall.  It 
led to the name ‘Tommy Atkins’, as a moniker for the ordinary British soldier, which 
 
53 Steve Attridge, Nationalism, Imperialism and Identity in Late Victorian Culture, Civil and Military Worlds 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 188. 
54 Attridge, “Nationalism, Imperialism and Identity,”, 2. 
55 Wilkinson, “Blessings of War,” 107. 
56 Attridge, “Nationalism, Imperialism and Identity,” 162. 
57 Wilkinson, “Blessings of War,” 98. 
58 Wilkinson, “Blessings of War,” 115. 
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became close to a motif for the British ‘race’.59  Just as the Army was forced to change its 
tactics to accommodate modern firearms and an enemy which refused to fight according 
to the precepts of nineteenth century European warfare, literature responded to the war 
by reconstructing the image of the hero.  Attridge considers that the novels of the period 
began to portray the soldier as a form of what the twentieth century would come to 
know as an ‘anti-hero’, a rugged individual closer to their Boer enemies, than a 
mechanistic cog in a military machine.60  In the face of its defeats early in the conflict, 
these accounts allowed criticism of the officers and organisation of the Army, and 
promoted heroes with individuality and initiative. 
The upsurge in interest in the Boer War was not limited to literature or the national 
press; Brad Beaven notes that local newspapers became interested in the exploits of 
County regiments and published first-hand accounts of ‘heroic’ behaviour in the field to 
bolster local pride.61  This amounted to a greater engagement with imperial adventure 
by the working class, signifying the development of ‘bottom up’ associations between 
local pride and warfare, as opposed to the ‘top down’ presentation of the South African 
War by the national press.62  This represented a profound change in the way the 
provincial press responded to Imperial endeavours, and perhaps enabled the 
acclimatisation of a broader range of society to warfare.  What the work of Tosh, 
Attridge, Wilkinson and Beaven all show is the importance of the Boer War in the 
portrayal of conflict, which - regardless of the shock it induced - actually contributed to 
the idea of warfare seeming acceptable, controllable and heroic. 
The Army went through a period of reflection and change after the Boer War, and Spiers 
believes that the reforms of Lord Roberts and later, Haldane, demonstrated that the 
Army could – and did - change in the face of new challenges.63  He is positive about the 
state of the British Army in 1914, considering that the Haldane Reforms had made the 
 
59 Attridge, “Nationalism, Imperialism and Identity,” 50. 
60 Attridge, “Nationalism, Imperialism and Identity,” 162. 
61 Brad Beaven, “The Provincial Press, Civic Ceremony and the Citizen-Soldier During the Boer War, 1899-1902: 
A Study of Local Patriotism” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 37 (2009): 217. 
62 Beaven, “Provincial Press,” 224. 
63 Spiers, “Army and Society,” 246. 
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British Expeditionary Force (BEF) the most effective Army that Britain had ever put into 
the field.64  Spiers is, however, careful to note that in certain areas, such as the use of  
artillery, which was to prove so significant in the First World War, the Army was not as 
effective as its French equivalent.65  Ian Beckett and Keith Simpson are also supportive 
of the effectiveness of the Edwardian Army, although they point out that the Army 
remained socially exclusive, with only 2% of the officers drawn from the ranks.66  They 
support Travers’ view that the officer corps prized amateurism, pursued the traditions 
of the country gentleman, and “refrained from any vulgar displays of militarism.”67 
In contrast to Spiers, Beckett and Simpson, Gerald DeGroot is unremittingly harsh 
regarding the Army, concluding that during the period 1899 to 1914, changes to its 
character had been negligible.68  DeGroot also considers that the Navy was also resistant 
to change, and that the Army was dominated by a notion of character over intellect.69  
He holds that class stratification in the Army was even more pronounced than in civilian 
life, with the cost of being an officer – as well as the social exclusivity – ensuring that it 
remained the preserve of upper and middle-class families.70  Like many historians, he 
draws on Travers’ work and considers that the emphasis on achieving success through 
morale solutions was the consequence of fighting colonial small wars.71   DeGroot’s 
assertion that the Army learned nothing from South Africa must, however, be contrasted 
with military historians described above, like Travers, Bowman and Connelly, who see it 
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as being central to the development of ‘fire and movement’ which remained the bedrock 
of British Army tactics throughout the First World War.72  DeGroot plays down the 
impact of reform after the South African War and does not compare the relatively 
‘modern’ tactics employed by the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) in 1914 with those 
of the French and German armies, who also struggled in the face of the changed 
conditions at the beginning of the War. 
DeGroot holds that social inertia acted as a barrier to the reform of the Army, but Spiers 
points to another prosaic reason: finance.  Even after the Boer War, the Government, and 
particularly the Liberal Party, fiercely opposed increases in spending on the Army.73  For 
example, during the formation of the BEF, which was developed as a force to intervene 
quickly on either the Continent or India, it proved impossible to raise the Army 
Estimates beyond £28m, although Haldane wanted to increase them to around £30m.  
The BEF was, therefore, the largest it could be, given the available budget, rather than 
being designed to meet the needs of the nation or any potential Continental 
engagement.74  This reinforces the point made by Morgan-Owen that the government 
lacked a coherent strategy for fighting a European War, and even if it had, funding was 
likely to be inadequate.75  Another aim of the Haldane Reforms was to develop a trained 
reserve capable of supplementing the Regular Army, but for all the intermittent fear of 
invasion evident in the literature of the time, the Territorial Army, failed to reach its 
planned size, reaching 302,000 in 1908, which was only a third of its envisaged size, 
before declining further after 1909.76  In this case the problem was not financial, but 
another example of how interest in imperial adventure and fear of invasion failed to 
materialise into increased recruitment.  
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Beckett and Simpson also identify the financial motivations which underpinned the 
Haldane reforms.77  They also raise the difficulties the Army had in recruiting officers, 
despite the establishment of the Officer Training Corps (OTC), noting that there was 
little take up from universities.78  This was down to the narrow social base from which 
the Army drew its officers, the need to have a private income (particularly in the 
cavalry), which puts into question its professionalism.79  While the standard of technical 
and scientific education in the Royal Engineers was seen to be high, there were often few 
chances to train in other branches of the Army, with little professional development 
available to officers.80  Therefore, while there was debate on the changing nature of war 
in the face of new rifles and artillery, as discussed above, an air of amateurism continued 
to hold sway over parts of the Army.81  Nonetheless, Aimee Fox, in her study Learning to 
Fight concludes that the British Army before the War was moving towards a more 
intellectual engagement with military practice.  For example, she notes that the Field 
Service Regulations of 1909 were deliberately abstract, through a deliberate decision to 
avoid dogma and inculcate initiative in the Army. 82   
Tellingly, at the outbreak of war, there were no plans on how to expand the volunteer 
Army beyond its current size, indicative of a lack of strategic planning and the faith – 
shared with many other nations – that a European war would have to be short.83  Yet, 
while funding for the Army remained lower than reformers would have liked, and 
recruitment a challenge, the South African War also led to more profound reflections on 
the state of British society and the Empire.  As Van Evera noted in his formulation of the 
‘cult of the offensive’, many contemporary intellectuals were affected by the ideas of 
Social Darwinism, such that nations would ‘rise’ or ‘fall’ based on their ability to compete 
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globally.84  The poor physical quality of many volunteers to the Army during the Boer 
War led to a fear that the ‘Anglo Saxon race’ was degenerating through a failure to 
maintain ‘civilising ethics’.85  This led, as Beaven reports in his survey of attitudes to 
youth in the Edwardian period, to the formation of a number of organised youth 
movements with an emphasis on outdoor activities.86  He identifies a historiographical 
debate as to whether the Scouts represented a paramilitary organisation, reflecting a 
contemporary debate which highlighted the deep rooted British fears over 
conscription.87    
Putting aside DeGroot’s harsh view of the British Army, the historiography is clear that 
the South African War resulted in reform, at least by as much as its social structure could 
allow.  The result was a BEF which is considered to have been a more capable force than 
its Continental equivalents, except for the fact that it was relatively small and therefore 
irreplaceable, with no plans on how to build a larger army.  Although the Army focused 
on practical measures such as ‘fire and movement’, there was a popular perception, 
reinforced through colonial conflicts, that war was a controllable, beneficial and decisive 
endeavour.88  The reality of a European general war, fought between industrial powers 
faced with trench deadlock and required to mobilise all their resources for a lengthy 
conflict, was to prove otherwise, but such a war was not considered, emphasising the 
way in which contemporary debate was focused on tactics and not strategy.  As shall be 
discussed in the main body of the thesis, the Army lacked the intellectual framework to 
engage with how firepower on the battlefield would affect the outcome of a Great War in 
Europe. 
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One vigorous strand of contemporary debate reinforces the debates on tactics and the 
attitudes of the British Army, and that was the armament and role of the cavalry.  
During, and after, the Napoleonic Wars, cavalry were used for scouting and for ‘shock’ 
effect on the battlefield, using the charge to break wavering infantry formations or to 
turn a victory into a rout by pursuing a retreating army.  By the mid-nineteenth century, 
however, military commentators had begun to question its role on the battlefield 
because of the emergence of rifles which enabled infantry to fire more rapidly and at 
longer ranges, calling into question the cavalry’s ability to deliver a successful charge.89  
As the decades passed and technology delivered ever more effective rifles, followed by 
machine guns and quick-firing artillery, this debate intensified, with some military 
commentators, such as Ian Hamilton in the 1880s, going so far as to suggest that cavalry 
should be replaced completely by fast-moving light infantry.90  In the face of no realistic 
alternative,  however, the majority of commentators thought cavalry were essential to 
allow troops to move rapidly away from railheads, although many argued that they 
would have to dismount and fight with rifles, just as the Boers had in South Africa.91  Yet 
the British cavalry, like its European contemporaries, went to war in 1914 armed with 
lance and sword, as well as rifle, and every intention of conducting charges on the 
battlefield.   
In practice, however, the opportunities for decisive action on the Western Front were 
limited to short periods in 1914 and 1918, apparently demonstrating that the 
proponents of the arme blanche (literally, ‘white steel’, which was the contemporary 
term for the use of edged weapons on the battlefield) had been guilty of refusing to 
accept the realities of modern war.  This view of the cavalry as backward looking, 
unimaginative and culpable in the deadlock of trench warfare was taken up by post-War 
military writers and historians such as J. F. C Fuller and Basil Liddell Hart, who were 
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both advocates of mechanised warfare and scathing of the cavalry in 1914.  Many later 
historians have agreed with their verdict, such as Taylor, who wrote in 1964 that 
“military history had not prepared the generals for the warfare of 1914-1918. The 
cavalry was not alone in this dilemma, but it certainly was eclipsed by the other services 
in corrective measures.”92  More recently, John Ellis and DeGroot have been critical of 
the cavalry and its inability to develop tactics appropriate to 1914, as well seeing in 
them a wider symptom of the failure of armies to recognise the nature of the war into 
which they were to plunge.93  DeGroot considers that this arose out of both the high 
social standing of the cavalry and the cultural conception of the arme blanche, with its 
man-to-man combat, which personified the “gentlemanly qualities and moral fortitude 
which the army prized.”94 
The last two decades have seen a number of historians challenge these views.  Gervase 
Phillips, for example, goes so far as to consider that they have become a 
historiographical scapegoat and criticises Taylor, Bond and Spiers, amongst others, for 
failing to engage closely enough with contemporary military documents.95   Phillips 
considers that the treatment of the cavalry – and the British cavalry in particular – forms 
part of the mythology of the First World War and that historians have failed to 
appreciate how contemporary cavalrymen drew lessons from previous wars and 
evolved their tactics to meet new challenges.96  Phillips points out that several historians 
use a quote from the 1907 British Cavalry Training Manual as evidence of the 
conservative and irrational nature of the cavalry:  “it must be accepted as a principal that 
the rifle, effective as it is, cannot replace the effect produced by the speed of the horse, 
 
92 William Taylor, “The Debate over Changing Cavalry Tactics and Weapons, 1900-1914” Military Affairs 28 
(1964): 182. 
93 Ellis, “Social History,” and DeGroot, “Blighty”.  See also William McElwee, The Art of War: Waterloo to Mons 
(London: Purnell Book Services, 1974). 
94 DeGroot, “Blighty”, 21 
95 Gervase Phillips, “Scapegoat Arm: Twentieth-Century Cavalry in Anglophone Historiography,” The Journal of 
Military History 71 (2007): 63.  
96 Gervase Phillips, “The Obsolescence of the Arme Blanche and Technological Determinism in British Military 
History,” War in History 9(1) (2002): 40. 
PhD Thesis  Interrogating the Future David Bangert 
 
30  
the magnetism of the charge, and the terror of cold steel.”97  Phillips, however, notes that 
the manual also stated that "thorough efficiency in the use of the rifle and in dismounted 
tactics is an absolute necessity."98   
Stephen Badsey has also examined the role of the British cavalry in the South African 
War and its doctrinal development from the 1880s to the First World War, and 
suggested that it was the best equipped in Europe to face the challenges of the War99  He 
identifies the fact that contemporaries such as Lord Roberts, Commander-in-Chief of the 
Army after leading Britain to victory in the South African War, who was a critic of the 
arme blanche, and later historians, failed to recognise that the tactics of the charge also 
included attacking in open, ‘skirmish’ order, with smaller formations, reflecting changed 
battlefield conditions.  Badsey is, however, still careful to note that the traditional close 
order ‘knee to knee’ charge also performed a social function and agrees with Bond that it 
approached being a way of life to the cavalry.100  Badsey’s analysis echoes that of the 
broader debate between historians who see the irrational ‘cult of the offensive’ at the 
heart of military strategy and tactics in 1914, and those who see a more rational attempt 
to meet the technological challenges of the time.   
Phillips and Badsey provide numerous examples of successful British cavalry charges in 
the First World War, both on the Western Front and in other theatres, providing 
evidence for their theses that their pre-War doctrine of using both the rifle and the arme 
blanche was justified in practice.  Nikolas Gardner, however, is one historian who 
believes that Badsey (and Terraine) have written too uncritically about the effectiveness 
of the British cavalry in 1914.101  He researched how the British Cavalry Division 
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effectively disintegrated during the retreat in 1914, and considers that social and 
intellectual factors contributed to its failure to operate successfully.  The cavalry prided 
itself on what contemporaries called ‘cavalry spirit’, a mix of independent thinking, 
boldness and intuition which meant that senior officers tended to disagree with one 
another and even to ignore orders.  As a consequence the different Brigades of the 
Division lost contact with one another when retreating in September 1914, and did not 
act effectively, placing the whole of the BEF in jeopardy.102   
Although Badsey and Phillips present convincing evidence that the British cavalry in 
1914 were thinking intelligently about their role, cavalry were not central to the 
outcome the First World War.  Indeed, the War is considered to have been dominated by 
massed artillery fire, as Bailey’s work demonstrates.103  What the volume of 
contemporary debate illustrates forcibly is the high social standing of the cavalry, which 
is a point of agreement between historians with widely different perspectives on their 
utility, such as DeGroot and Badsey.  The much discussed issue of cavalry ‘fire vs shock’ 
mirrors, and forms a microcosm of, the debate on ‘the cult of the offensive’.   
Contemporary military writers, as shall be explored later in this thesis, expended a lot of 
ink on the future of the cavalry,  and the debates of the contemporary theorists continue 
to engage historians, out of proportion to the actual importance of the arm at the time.  
The cavalry may have unfairly become a scapegoat for some later historians, but in 
reality they were becoming less significant on a battlefield where their freedom of action 
was rapidly reducing.   Their failure to see that they would become obsolescent reflects 
the way in which contemporary military establishments saw technology as only 
augmenting, or modifying, the practice of war.  What the thesis will show is that motor 
vehicles and aircraft, which would come to replace them, were seen only as adjuncts to 
horsed cavalry in the decades before the First World War.  The eternal principles of war, 
as seen by contemporaries, were to remain unchanged. 
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Imagining the Next War 
As noted above, there was intense interest in the defence of Britain, and the role of its 
Army, during the period.  Contemporaries understood that they were living through a 
period of profound political, social and technological change, and this contributed to an 
outpouring of fiction dedicated to imagining future war in the period between 1870 and 
1914.  Although such accounts had been written as early as the eighteenth century, it 
was only in the last thirty years of the nineteenth century that the impact of changing 
technology on conflict was recognised.104   In Britain, in particular, this form of literature 
would become irrevocably linked to the threat of invasion, and I. F. Clarke, in his survey 
of imagined wars, considers George Chesney, whose The Battle of Dorking was published 
in 1871, to be the first writer to create a recognisably modern account of future warfare. 
Chesney imagined the defeat of Britain by German invaders, whose discipline and 
military ability contrasts with the amateurism and weakness of the British defenders.  In 
the light of the recent defeat of France by Prussia and its German allies, which had 
changed the European balance of power, Chesney’s purpose was polemic and led to a 
flood of European -  and later American – writing on ‘the next war’.105 
Clarke has written extensively on the literature around imaginary wars, including the 
period 1870-1914.106  In this period he distinguishes between primarily political works 
and those interested in the impact of technological change.  The former were those 
stories which responded to contemporary concerns over the perceived rise of Germany 
or relative decline of Britain, including examples of the ‘invasion scare’ genre, such as 
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The Great War of 189-: A Forecast  (1892) written by a panel of writers led by Admiral P. 
Colomb.  The latter were instead focused on technological change and its potentially 
disruptive effect on future war, such as Arthur Conan Doyle’s short story Danger!, which 
was published on the eve of the First World War, postulating an enemy of Britain 
successfully conducting unrestricted submarine warfare on its merchant shipping.107  As 
well as providing entertainment, these accounts either criticised the Government for a 
lack of attention to the threat of invasion, or attacked the War Office for its conservatism 
and failure to engage with new means or weapons for waging war.108   
Another writer who has written a lengthy analysis of the treatment of future war in the 
period is Echevarria, whose analysis includes military writers such as the German 
theorists Goltz and Friedrich von Bernhardi, who penned factual treatises on the future 
of war.  He draws a distinction between military and civilian writers, concluding that the 
former tended to present warfare within the framework of contemporary military 
practice; while the latter tended to focus on new technologies for a variety of reasons, 
including entertainment value.109  Echevarria is careful, however, to highlight the 
overlap, and links between, these categories, and points out how military writers – often 
retired – wrote extensively in the civilian press.110  Overall, he concludes that while 
there was plenty of imagination on display in the accounts of war on land, sea and in the 
air, the more technologically focused stories tended to be illogical, or at least failed to be 
convincing.111   Paris shares Echevarria’s views on civilian writers, also concluding that 
while there were accounts of spectacular new weapons, most vividly evident in the use 
of airships and aerial bombardment, they did not necessarily display a great deal of 
realism.112  Yet in contrast to the technological novelty on display, most accounts are 
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based around conventional views of heroism and chivalry, which Paris – like Wilkinson, 
Wilcox, Tosh and Attridge – believes contributed to a willingness to go to war in 1914.113   
Samuel Hynes specifically links contemporary intellectual concerns over the degeneracy 
of the nation – so evident after the Boer War - to ‘invasion literature’, with William Le 
Queux’s Invasion of 1910, published in 1906, including statements to the effect that the 
peasantry, who he saw as the backbone of the nation, had been replaced by weak, 
excitable civic populations.114  Le Queux’s work illustrates the ways in which politicians 
engaged with, and used, the genre of invasion literature to pursue their own agendas, 
with Heather Streets noting that Lord Roberts provided advice to the Invasion of 1910 as 
well as the predecessor, The Great War in England in 1897, published in 1894. 115  Streets 
points out that Roberts engaged frequently with the press, as did other leading military 
figures of the time such as Field-Marshals Wolseley and Kitchener, and after resigning as 
Chief of Imperial Defence (CID) in 1905, became the President of the National Service 
League, with the aim of building up a trained force of riflemen to resist invasion.116   
Gooch recognises that while many works which examined future warfare were technical 
in nature, they tended to lead on to moral and philosophical discussion, with the 
prominent view that war could be a ‘medicine’ to cure the ills of a society which was 
seen as decadent; it being something a obsession to look on the ruins of Rome, Carthage 
and Greece and see in them a prediction of the fall of contemporary civilisation.117  One 
prominent intellectual view was that war could be a positive force to regenerate 
civilisation and avoid moral collapse, although Gooch does identify alternative views of 
warfare, such that that it could ultimately be destructive through economic dislocation 
and a diminishing of their civilising value.118  Whatever the viewpoint, however, as 
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Hynes says, “anxiety and the expectation of war were part of Edwardian 
consciousness.119  Gooch is in broad agreement, considering that the ‘rationalists’ of the 
time, as he calls them, had been losing ground in the years before the War making 
Britain, like most of Europe, all too willing to plunge into war in 1914.120    
Much has been written about two writers whose work lies at the heart of this thesis, H. 
G. Wells – especially - and Jean de Bloch (also known as Ivan Bloch).  Wells remains 
famous to this day, as author of some of the most prominent and influential works of 
science fiction, and social commentator, as well as a contentious figure for his views on 
eugenics and the construction of an ideal society.121   Bloch, who is today far less well 
known, was a Polish industrialist and banker who became prominent at the turn of the 
century.  His chief claim to fame was that, in 1898, he published a six volume tract 
entitled War of the Future in its Technical, Economic and Political Relations, abridged to 
only the final volume in English and entitled Is War Now Impossible?   Bloch analysed the 
impact of technological and economic change on warfare, and concluded that a future 
European war would lead to stalemate and the collapse of nations.122  His reasoning was 
that technology had come to favour the defender, and that the longer range of 
armaments and growing size of national armies would lead to deadlock on the 
battlefield.  Bloch also concluded that the inter-related nature of the economic system 
would lead to an inability to finance wars over anything but a short period.  His work 
was widely discussed across Europe and is considered to have played a role in 
persuading Czar Nicolas II to call the First Hague Peace Conference in 1899.   
Historians differ in their verdicts on Bloch; Echevarria, for example, considers his 
arguments to be rather one-sided, noting that he was wrong in his assessment that the 
global economic system would collapse in a matter of months, or that such fears would 
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act to prevent war. 123  Howard, on the other hand, cites Bloch’s work as a systematic 
endeavour and he calls it the first work of operational research – the discipline of 
applying mathematical techniques to wartime operations which was developed fully in 
the Second World War.124  Ferguson, although not without criticism, acidly concludes 
that what Bloch wrote was “singularly prescient, the more so when one compares it with 
the rubbish written by the scaremongers.”125  As this thesis will demonstrate, Bloch’s 
work was fiercely debated in Britain at the turn of the century, particularly as its 
publication coincided with the outbreak of the South African War.  Bloch was not writing 
fiction, but was, as Echevarria notes, a civilian writing outside the accepted structure of 
military thinking, and criticised for it by commentators from the British Army.  It is the 
novelty of his approach, recognised by some contemporaries, that marks him out from 
other writers who attempted to predict the future of war. 
Wells stands somewhere between the analytical approach of Bloch and the bulk of the 
invasion literature of the time.  Travers considers Wells to have been a serious student 
of warfare and one who – along with Haldane, who led the reforms of the British Army 
after South Africa – formed part of a group of military reformers called the ‘co-
efficients’.126  Wells believed, after absorbing Bloch’s work, that a future war would 
begin with trench deadlock, but saw new technology such as the aircraft (envisaged in 
The War in the Air) and armoured vehicles (Wells’ story The Land Ironclads portrayed an 
early imagining of tanks) as enabling a breakthrough.  More emphatically, he saw the 
stress of war creating a new form of state dominated by a technological elite capable of 
pursuing its conduct to eventual victory.127  He believed that any future general war 
would be immensely destructive but welcomed it as an opportunity to bring about the 
transformation in society, in a viewpoint not dissimilar to those who saw war as ending 
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the perceived decadence in contemporary society.128   Hynes considers that Wells was 
engaging fully with the future of war, albeit concluding that his analysis was based less 
on radical thinking than the melancholy which infected much of the literature at the 
time.129  This thesis will also focus, in particular, on Wells’ Anticipations, a systematic 
forecast of the future first published in 1901.  Although often a focus for 
historiographical analysis of Wells’ views on eugenics, Anticipations was the first 
coherent attempt to predict the future, including that of war, foreshadowing the 
development of the discipline of ‘futures studies’ in the later twentieth century. 
The rich literature – and factual excursions - dedicated to future war, whether it was 
from military or civilian contributors, provides an insight into cultural anxieties brought 
about by rapid changes in technology and the European balance of power.   The 
imagination exhibited by some writers was considerable, and with so much to pick from, 
it is possible to find accurate predictions, amongst a great deal of unbounded 
speculation.  Much of the historiography is concerned, understandably, with what 
writers and commentators got ‘right’ or ‘wrong’, which provides a useful framework for 
understanding social attitudes, but what can go unremarked are the methods used to 
interrogate the future.  As this thesis will demonstrate, few writers – and particularly 
military writers - ventured very far into the future, and the two who approached its 
interrogation with true novelty were Wells and Bloch, whose approaches stand in 
contrast to the majority of their contemporaries. 
Science and Quantification 
Bloch’s Is War Now Impossible was greeted by contemporaries as a work of ‘science’; 
Wells wrote extensively on the need for society to become ‘efficient’ through its practice.  
They were not alone - many others considered that they were living in an age of science, 
or at least one that was witnessing its ascent.   Peter Bowler, in his History of the Future, 
considers that the twentieth century marked the point where it was widely accepted 
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that the future would be different to the present, through the increasing influence of 
science and technology, although this thesis shows that there was a growing recognition 
in the periodicals that this was the case in the decades leading to the turn of the 
century.130   Just as society was changing in response to new technology, so was the way 
in which the future was being interrogated.  There is a considerable historiography, 
which is explored below, on the way methods of prediction became more ‘scientific’, in 
the parlance of the time, encompassing economics, weather forecasting and other 
disciplines, which are linked by the rise in quantification and the increasing impact of 
the scientific method.  In other words, while Wells and Bloch stand out for the novelty of 
the ways in which they sought to understand the future, they were living in a time when 
science was becoming more important across a wide range of disciplines. 
Meteorology is a good place to start, because Katherine Anderson’s work Predicting the 
Weather places its development within the broader social context of prophecy and 
forecasting in the late nineteenth century.  The concept of looking to the future within a 
framework of religious prophecy was well understood in Victorian times, such that 
“prophecy was simply a commonplace of Christian experience, the subject of texts 
regularly encountered by a church or chapel-goer.”131  What emerged alongside this 
religious view of prophecy, however, was the conviction that science could provide an 
alternative way of predicting the future.   More profoundly, scientists came to see that 
their ability to provide accurate predictions demonstrated the powers of science.132  
Emerging out of astronomical predictions – such as the discovery of a ‘new’ planet, 
Neptune, in 1846, through the analysis of orbital trajectories – science began to be seen 
as offering the promise of successful prediction, perhaps even of human nature.  
Meteorology, so important to Britain’s maritime trade and power, was a clear target for 
the application of scientific prediction, and it was in August 1861 that the first Director 
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of the Meteorological Department of the Board of Trade adopted the new term ‘forecast’ 
for a prediction of the weather.133 
As Anderson puts it, the period saw a philosophical debate to understand the 
relationships between astronomical prediction, geological science, astrology, Biblical 
prophecy and the interpretations of contemporary politics.134  As science sought to 
establish itself more firmly in the matter of prediction, meteorology became an area of 
investigation for scientific forecasting.  The way forward was, however, far from 
straightforward or successful, and although it advanced through the communication of 
information by telegraph from remote stations, the use of quantification to successfully 
make predictions proved more difficult.  In fact, as Kristine Harper says, it was not to be 
until the middle of twentieth century that meteorology was able to make use of 
electronic computing to accurately generate weather forecasts.135  This was due to the 
sheer amount of data required, and when Lewis Fry Richardson attempted the 
numerical analysis of the weather during the First World War, he concluded that it took 
six weeks to predict six hours of weather.136   Until the introduction of computers, 
accurate forecasting was simply impossible. 
Just as meteorology was attempting to apply quantitative methods in the second half of 
the nineteenth century, so too was economics.  As Roger Backhouse says in his general 
history of economics, the discipline began to make use of ideas from science, such as the 
mechanics of Newtonian physics or Darwinism, so that “economics moved, or at least 
appeared to move, away from its origins in political philosophy.”137  Just as Darwin was 
seen as moving science into the realm of what had previously been religion, Backhouse 
sees parallels with the increasing professionalisation of economics, as with many other 
disciplines, noting the emergence of specialised journals such as the Quarterly Journal of 
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Economics, which commenced publication in 1886.138  More specifically, as with 
meteorology, the 1870s saw a rise in the use of mathematics in economics, although it 
remained a minority activity, and it was not until the 1930s that they became widely 
used as a tool in the prediction of economic trends.139   
Marx was explicitly interested in forecasting the future shape of society, or rather in 
suggesting the way in which history would develop in the future.   Wendell Bell, in his 
evaluation of the development of futures studies, considers  Marx as a key figure who 
foreshadowed the development of this discipline, who sought to base his work on 
analysis and to “condemn utopias and [deny] his own utopian intentions.”140  Marx 
certainly considered his work to be based on scientific principles and was critical of 
other socialist writers for their utopianism, although Bell considers that his work 
remained a mix of the analytical and prophetic.141  Nonetheless, Marx used evidence, 
formulated theories and developed reasons behind his predictions into the future, and 
did not consider the future uncertain.142  John Kenneth Galbraith, in his history of 
economics, acknowledges his commitment to the application of the scientific method.143   
Bell considers futures studies to have emerged as a discipline in the 1950s, but reaches 
back to Marx and those utopians who wrote about the future as a place where an ideal 
society may come to exist.  He makes the point that the placement of utopias at a future 
time, rather than in a distant place, came into being towards the end of the eighteenth 
century as part of a general recognition of change being directional rather than cyclic.144  
He identifies the ‘first futurist’ as being the Marquis de Condorcet, who advocated the 
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application of statistical methods to the study of society.  During the nineteenth century 
many more utopian writers, who were also often socialists, wrote about the future, 
which in turn prompted Marx to try and distance himself from their efforts.   
Clarke, in his historical examination of imagined futures, cites Karl Pearson, the pioneer 
of biometrics and propagandist of eugenics, as an early thinker who considered it 
possible to make forecasting into a science.145  Clarke also identifies a number of other 
writers working around the turn of the century who sought to apply statistical methods 
to forecasting, such as Prince Kropotkin.146  Another was Charles Richet in 1892, with 
Dans cents ans, which put forward a view that war would soon become impossible due 
to the casualties accompanying modern warfare.147  As shall be seen below, he was not 
alone in making this assertion, which became prominent in the 1890s, but Clarke notes 
that Richet used ‘straight line prediction’ – the linear projection of trends into the future 
- to accompany his views.148   
The period was one of growing awareness of the impact of science and technology on 
Britain and the wider world.  As Peter Broks points out, contemporaries understood that 
they lived in the first mass industrial society.149  David Edgerton agrees that that the 
nineteenth century saw the emergence of the idea of science and technology advancing 
more quickly than the ability of human society to adapt to its impact; although his study 
The Shock of the Old challenges the conventional model of rapid technological 
adoption.150  What is more important for this study is, however, the contemporary 
perception of scientific advance and impact on society, which was a preoccupation at the 
turn of the nineteenth century, although Broks nonetheless identifies a twenty-five 
percent fall in editorial space given over to science, across all publishers and titles in the 
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period.151  Broks attributes this to the collapse in early Victorian optimism due to the 
trauma of the South African War, and concludes – echoing Hynes and other historians – 
that disquiet over the rise of science was a feature of the Edwardian period.152  An 
example lies in an attack launched on Pearson’s Magazine in 1900 on Wells’ vision of a 
mechanised utopia, critiquing the dangers of technology.153  He also points to another 
example of contemporary fears: Cassell’s Saturday Journal contained an article stating 
that time-saving machinery would lead to job losses in 1902.154  This must be 
contrasted, however, with Bowler’s view that  the period saw the emergence of popular 
science magazines, most successfully in the USA, which tended to portray the more 
mechanical advancements of science in a positive light.155 
Harold Perkins’ study The Rise of Professionalism emphasises the way in which various 
disciplines were becoming more quantitative by charting the way in which a 
professional class emerged and expanded in Britain after 1880, as a fourth category 
separate to the traditional divisions of aristocracy, capitalists and workers.156  Perkins’ 
thesis is that “professional men were the theorists, apologists and propagandists for the 
major classes of the new industrial society.”157  He provides illuminating statistics about 
the rise of the middle class as the government and industry required new administrators 
and supervisors, quoting a rise in the percentage of non-manual workers from 17% in 
1880 to 27% in 1913.158  Even more tellingly, from the perspective of the rise of science 
and quantification, he quotes an increase of more than 400% in professionals over the 
same period, a higher rate of increase than any other category of profession, albeit still 
only making up 3% of the total at the end of the period.159 
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Perkins explicitly contends that this increase in professionalism was accompanied by a 
rise in quantification, such that – for example – in relation to poverty, “what was new in 
the 1880s was determination to get at the statistical facts, to quantify the precise effect 
of poverty and its causes.”160  Clarke, noted above, also discusses the rise of 
quantification in the nineteenth century, placing this within the context of the 
emergence of ‘deep time’, through geological enquiry, in the 1830s.161  More broadly, 
and later, Clarke identifies the emergence of the first social workers, town planners, 
statisticians, civil servants and sociologists; citing as an example of their impact the 
work Des Agglomerations urbaines dans l’Europe Contemporarie by Paul Meuriot in 
1898.162 Specifically he notes that “the principal periodicals responded to the interest in 
the future by providing an increasing number of articles in which statisticians joined 
with sociologists and politicians in forecasting the shape of things to come.”163 
Operational research, the application of mathematical methods to management 
problems, including those of war, is considered to have originated in the 1930s and to 
have come into regular use in the Second World War.164  The earliest origins of 
operational research are, however, traced to 1905 by Maurice Kirkby, who cites the 
work of Rear Admiral  J. V. Chase of the US Navy.  This work prefigured that of 
Lanchester in 1916, who set out his mathematical ‘Laws of Combat’ which are still 
debated today.165  Kirkby demonstrates that the roots of the discipline emerged in the 
period, although he does not cite Bloch’s work.  Kirkby also identifies precursors who 
applied scientific methods, noting that, for example, private companies such as Vickers 
were already, from the 1880s onwards, applying 6-12% of their annual profits to their 
scientific departments.166  It was not until the First World War, however, that the 
stresses of industrial war moved Governments to apply scientific methods to the 
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problems of warfare, and began a process of the official recruitment of scientists, closing 
the divide between private sector scientists and the armed forces.167   Fox, in her study 
of the process by which the British Army went through to learn how to fight in the 
altered circumstances of the First World War, notes that Isaac Marcosson, a US observer, 
believed that Britain had become highly scientific in its treatment of the war, and had 
built on pre-War developments, such as the formation of the Railway Executive 
Committee in 1912, whose purpose was to plan rail movements during the war.168    
Wargaming is explicitly concerned with prediction, and although its origins can be 
traced back far into antiquity, came to prominence in modern Europe through the 
Prussian Kriegspiel in the first half of the nineteenth century.169   John Curry defines 
Kriegspiel as a system of wargaming with rules and an umpire that continued to gain 
adherents within the Prussian military throughout the middle of the nineteenth century 
- without significant interest outside the country until the German victories of 1864-
70.170  Kriegspiel continued to be used in Germany throughout the years leading up to, 
and during, the First World War.  Alfred von Schlieffen, architect of the plan for the 
invasion of France by the German Army in 1914 was a particular advocate of 
wargaming, as well as of field exercises and staff rides.171  The British Army adopted 
wargaming in the 1870s, and the Navy embraced a form of maritime wargaming in 
1878, although there was much antipathy towards it, which Curry sees as being a 
product of the British Army’s opposition to professionalism.172  Nonetheless, they 
continued to be used and had an effect on the formation of the BEF in the years before 
the First World War.173  The significance of wargaming is that it is explicitly concerned 
with forecasting the outcome of future tactics or strategy, and its development parallels 
other forms of quantification and professionalism that were developing over the same 
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period.  Tellingly, it gained little traction within the British military establishment, at a 
time when it’s use of quantitative or ‘scientific’ methods were also in their infancy.  
The diverse historiography described above shows powerfully how the period saw the 
rise of quantification and an increasing recognition of the importance of science in 
society.  The very idea of ‘scientific’ prediction gained ground during the period, 
paralleling attempts to introduce mathematical techniques into weather forecasting and 
economics.  It shows that the works of Bloch and Wells, and their novel approaches to 
forecasting the future, were part of a broader social trend, albeit one that was resisted as 
much as it was welcomed, with increasing foreboding of what science would bring, 
evident in much of the gloom with which a European war was envisaged before the turn 
of the century.  In addition, Bloch’s predictions were met with much resistance from the 
British Army, on the grounds he was an ‘amateur’ concerned with ‘ballistics’, a synonym 
for quantification, and therefore unable to grasp war as practised by professionals.  
Summary 
All of the historiographical strands above are clear that contemporaries understood that 
they lived in an age of change, and it was affecting war.  The concept of the ‘cult of the 
offensive’ is interesting, but the evidence points more firmly towards the British Army 
attempting to find tactical solutions to the problems created by the changing nature of 
warfare.  Some military theorists did approach the mystical in their views of ‘moral’ 
force in the offensive, and they are highly quotable, but the historiography shows that 
the armies of the time – and not just the British - attempted to draw lessons from the 
South African and Russo-Japanese Wars.  The First World War was to show them to be 
mistaken, at least on a strategic level, but this failure illustrates the challenge they faced 
with the headlong pace of technological change.   It necessitated new methods of 
investigation, and while the notion of military conservatism can be overstated, the 
historiography demonstrates that there was little consideration of how radically 
different a general European war would be when it finally came.   
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There was, however, certainly no lack of interest in the future, as the historiography 
demonstrates.  There was an outpouring of fiction which, especially from civilian 
commentators, showed a great deal of imagination as to how future war might be fought.  
Only isolated writers, however, attempted to create a comprehensive prediction of what 
war would bring, foremost of who were Wells and Bloch.  A vague sense of disquiet over 
the future was more common, which became most prominent around the turn of the 
century.  The periodicals offer an opportunity to deepen the investigation, enabling the 
development of a greater understanding of change across the period, and exploring the 
ways in which the future of war (and more generally the future) was investigated, as will 
be shown in the succeeding chapters.   This is important because the challenge facing 
military theorists and their civilian counterparts can be underestimated in the light of a 
subsequent century of change; and this can do a disservice to those who tried, by 
labelling them as simply irrational, conservative or myopic. 
Methodology 
The research which forms the backbone of this thesis has come from searches, using 
relevant terms, through digitised British periodicals published between 1870 and 1914.  
The bulk of citations in Chapters Two, Three, Four and Seven are from the periodicals, 
along with a significant number of reviews of the works of fiction explored in Chapter 
Six.  The exception, discussed below, is Chapter Five, which instead focuses on the 
review of selected military journals.  Examining the periodicals in this way has enabled a 
systematic analysis of changing attitudes to the future, and the future of war in 
particular, to be undertaken.  The primary source for the research has been British 
Periodicals Online, which includes around 500 digitised periodicals dating from between 
the seventeenth and twentieth centuries.174  This was supplemented by selected 
searches, largely focused on specific conflicts, through the British Newspapers Archive.175  
Biographical information was, where necessary, drawn from the Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography, reflecting the political or social significance of some of the writers 
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published in the periodicals and military journals.176  Definitions of words, which have 
required occasionally to explore terms such as ‘morale’ or ‘strategy’, have been drawn 
from the Oxford English Dictionary.177 
Articles from 47 different periodicals have been referenced, with a total of 234 specific 
citations, in contrast to only eighteen from newspapers.  Alvin Sullivan’s three volume 
study of British ‘literary’ periodicals contains an exhaustive assessment of contemporary 
sources, and if the handful of professional, religious and non-British periodicals cited are 
excluded, then no less than 40 remain.178  Removing those titles which are cited only 
once, twenty periodicals remain, and they have 207 citations between them – 88% of the 
total from periodicals included in this thesis  In fact, only four titles do not figure in 
Sullivan’s study and the correlation with the titles in Sullivan’s work shows that the 
digitised collections are not a narrow set, but representative of many of the most 
significant periodicals of the time.   The set of core periodicals cited has also not changed 
during the long period over which this research was conducted (2014-20), 
demonstrating stability in the material being researched (given that more sources are 
being digitised all the time).  Appendix A, it should be noted, contains a detailed 
assessment of the periodicals, drawing on Sullivan’s work, to provide context for the 
research.   
Turning to specific searches undertaken; Chapter Two is focused on writing on the 
future in general, and not just on warfare.  Searches were made across the whole period 
of interest, from 1870 to 1914, and included (throughout all searches, including these, 
capitalised and lower cases terms were searched) “Future AND (World OR Britain)”; 
“Tomorrow OR Future”; “Future”; and “Future AND Science”.  They also included more 
specialised searches, to explore the situation at the turn of the century, such as “New 
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Century AND Forecast”; and “New Century AND Prophecy”.  As with all the searches 
mentioned here, this list is not exhaustive. 
Chapter Three is focused on writing on the future of war from 1870 to 1899, up to the 
start of the South African War.  Searches included ‘Future’ AND ‘War’ AND/OR 
‘Army’/’Armies’; ‘War’ AND ‘Lessons’; ‘Future War’; and other combinations of these and 
‘Plevna’ or ‘The War of 1870’.   Chapter Four is focused on writing on the future of war 
from the outbreak of war in South Africa in 1899 to 1914.  Searches through the 
database included ‘Future’ AND ‘War’ AND/OR ‘Army’/’Armies’; ‘War’ AND ‘Lessons’; 
‘Future War’; and other combinations of these and ‘Russo-Japanese’ or ‘South African’ 
[Wars]. 
Chapter Five is focused on writing from the military journals, for which a different 
approach was adopted; the sources for this chapter were largely constrained to two of 
the most significant British military journals of the period.  Concentrating on these 
journals across the period of interest made it possible to construct a consistent view of 
military thinking, paralleling the assessment of civilian journals across the same time 
frame.  Foremost of the two was the Journal of the Royal United Services Institution, the 
organ of Britain’s most significant military and naval society.  Every edition of the 
Journal published between 1870 and 1914 has been inspected, to identify articles 
dealing with the future of war, without the use of keyword searches.  Over 110 articles 
were found using this method, with the majority coming later in the period.  This is 
partly because, from 1870 to 1890, the Journal was published quarterly, before moving 
to monthly publication until the outbreak of War in August 1914, after which it was 
produced more sporadically.  This research has been supplemented with a similarly 
intensive search through the Cavalry Journal, which was first published in 1906 before 
temporarily ceasing publication in 1914.  The Cavalry Journal is not digitised, so the 
research was conducted at the current RUSI Library, which holds an extensive collection 
of military journals and papers from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  The 
systematic evaluation of the RUSI Journal and The Cavalry Journal has been 
counterpointed by sampling a number of editions from the Journal of the United Service 
Institute of India, to add depth to the research.  Established in 1872, it was published 
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quarterly throughout the period and three sample editions were assessed for this 
research, from 1900, 1906 and 1912.179  Works by the prominent German military 
writers Goltz and Bernhardi, much discussed in the journals, have also been examined. 
Chapter Six focuses on works of fiction about future war, and their responses from the 
periodicals.  The selected works of fiction analysed in this chapter have been drawn 
from the lengthy treatises on the portrayal of future war written by Clarke and 
Echevarria, supplemented by searches through the digitised periodicals on the titles of 
the works or their authors, to find contemporary reviews.   
Chapter Seven is focused on the works of Bloch and Wells, and reactions to them, so 
used a number of articles identified in the research underpinning previous chapters, 
augmented by new searches such as ‘Bloch’ AND ‘War’; and ‘Wells’ AND ‘War’.  The 
chapter also included the analysis of works by Colonel Maude, a notable critic of Bloch, 
and the peace campaigner Norman Angell, Goltz and Schlieffen. 
Two figures are presented below which summarise the total number of citations in this 
thesis, broken down by year.  Care must be taken with interpreting the figures, as the 
method of selecting articles was only partially objective, relying as it did on 
interpretation to determine what was relevant.  In addition, entries from The Cavalry 
Journal only begin in 1909, creating more citations in the last few years of the period of 
study.   Figure 1 shows the total number of citations (407) from newspapers (18), 
periodicals (234) and military  journals (155).  It shows clear peaks in 1870-71 (during 
the Franco-German War) and 1877-78 (during the Russo-Turkish War), and then 
growing references to the future – and the future of war – in the 1890s.  There is then a 
huge spike in citations during the South African War, between 1899 and 1902, before 
the figure settles down to a reasonably high level of interest in the years from 1903 to 
1914 (there is a single entry for 1915, associated with an article looking back to one of 
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the works of fiction, Arthur Conan Doyle’s Danger!) with less of a marked peak 
associated with the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-05.  
 
Figure 1 Total Number of Articles (1870 to 1915) 
Figure 2, below, is the same, but excludes articles from the military journals.  It also 
differentiates between those articles concerned with the future of war (in blue) and the 
future in general (orange).  This figure shows the same pattern as Figure 1, with peaks in 
interest in the future of war in 1870-71, 1877-78 and especially 1899-1902.  It also 
highlights the large number of articles from 1898, representing interest in the Battle of 
Omdurman and the campaign in the Soudan.  The figure shows clearly the rising interest 
in the future of war in the 1890s, and also a peak of interest in 1905-06, overlapping 
with the end of the intense interest in the South African War.   
The pattern of ‘non-war’ articles is also interesting.  There are a handful of articles in 
1871 and then no others before 1889, followed by a steady number in the 1890s, 
increasing towards the turn of the century, undoubtedly reflecting a focus on the future 
as the turn of the century approached and then passed.  The number of articles on the 
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future then continues through to 1914, not rising, but showing consistent interest in the 
subject. 
 
Figure 2 Number of Articles from non-Military Sources (1870 to 1915) 
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Chapter Two  Facing Progress 
This thesis is concerned at how war in the future was envisaged by civilian and military 
writers between 1870 and 1914.  This must be contextualised, however, with how the 
future in general was discussed over the period of interest, and this chapter investigates 
how the periodicals imagined and debated the future, in advance of Chapters Three to 
Five, which explicitly look at how the future of war was envisaged.  Its conclusion is that 
the period saw a rise in ‘scientific’ prediction, interest in both technological and societal 
change, and increasing concerns over where ‘progress’ might lead.  As set out in Chapter 
One, the methodology used was to search through digitised periodicals using a variety of 
keywords, to identify articles engaged with the future.  Twenty different periodicals 
were identified in this way, demonstrating that there was considerable interest in the 
future during the period.  Nonetheless, the number of articles identified varies 
considerably by decade, with few articles cited before 1889, rising interest in the 1890s, 
a peak in 1900-02, due to interest in what the new century would bring, and somewhat 
fewer articles thereafter.  As will be seen in Chapters Three and Four, there was also a 
peak of interest in the future of war in the periodicals in the 1890s and early 1900s, 
although the latter period was largely a product of the South African War (1899-1902).  
The 1890s can therefore be identified as the decade where there was a recognition of 
accelerating change, in both the civil and military spheres.   
It would be wrong, however, to assert that the 1890s, or indeed the 1870s, marked the 
first time that social and technological change were affecting Britain; far from it, as 
people had been living through - and reacting to - tumultuous change since the 
Industrial Revolution.1  Nonetheless, the pace of change was quickening and the years 
between 1880 and 1914 saw staggering demographic and social change, as indicated by 
the population of Britain and Ireland rising by ten million between 1881 and 1911, to 
over 45 million.2  Technological change is indicated by the fact that in 1914 there were 
132,000 motor vehicles on the roads, less than twenty years since the first vehicle had 
 
1 Simon Heffer, The Age of Decadence: Britain 1880 to 1914 (London: Random House, 2017), 244. 
2 Heffer, “Age of Decadence,” 31 
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been imported into the country.3   As Heffer says, this belle epoque can be seen as an age 
of refinement, but it was in fact one of upheaval, radical change and challenge to the 
social order.4   Rapid change made society uneasy about itself across Europe, creating a 
troubled atmosphere in a continent at the apex of global power.5  By the mid-1890s the 
pace of change was perplexing and unsettling, leading to a mood of retrenchment in the 
established ruling classes, alongside nostalgia for a more settled past.6   
Domestic change was matched with shifts in the relative industrial and military strength 
of the great powers, bringing instability to international relations.7  Britain, which had 
been the leading power since 1815, was in relative industrial decline, particularly when 
compared to Germany and the United States, and intensely concerned with what the 
future might bring, even though it retained leadership in global finance and possessed 
the largest navy in the world .8  The 1880s also saw the development of Social 
Darwinism, which transposed Darwin’s theory of evolution through natural selection to 
competition between states or, in the vernacular of the time, ‘races’.  Social Darwinism 
was at work around the turn of the century, seeing competition between nations as a 
matter of survival of the fittest, with powers classed as ‘rising’ or ‘falling’.9  In parallel, 
Galton had developed the concept of eugenics in 1883, to battle the perceived decline of 
the ‘race’ through selective genetic manipulation, including the sterilisation of the 
weak.10  In this pessimistic and febrile intellectual climate, there was also a fear of 
emasculation, with Britain and Germany fearing for the fitness of their men, along with 
concern in the rise of women.11  One response to these perceived crises was to turn to 
 
3 Heffer, “Age of Decadence,” 34. 
4 Heffer, “Age of Decadence,” 32. 
5 Margaret Macmillan, The War That Ended Peace: How Europe Abandoned Peace for the First World War 
(London: Profile Books, 2014), “War That Ended Peace,” 231. 
6 Heffer, “Age of Decadence,” 442. 
7 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (London, Unwin Hyman, 1988), 198. 
8 Heffer, “Age of Decadence,” 442. 
9 Kennedy, “Great Powers,” 195. 
10 Heffer, “Age of Decadence,” 427. 
11 Macmillan, “War That Ended Peace,” 32. 
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militarism and a view that war could cure the perceived ills of society.12  War could 
therefore be seen positively, as discussed at length in Chapter One. 
Science had advanced hugely throughout the nineteenth century, bringing with it 
greater rationality, leading to increased faith in its ability to better the world, and a 
sense of positivism through the mid-Victorian era.13  By the turn of the century, 
however, this conviction had begun to falter, adding to pessimism about the future, 
which was particularly noticeable in Britain after the South African War, which had fed 
into concerns over the fitness of recruits for the Army, and therefore the British ‘race’.14  
Around the turn of the century new theories were overturning the foundations of 
physics, with Einstein’s theory of relativity, and quantum theory, undermining the 
notion of a predictable and comprehensible universe. 15   Coupled with the beginnings of 
psychoanalysis, science itself seemed less certain, feeding into a more widespread 
movement towards unreason, and increased interest in emotion, mystical truth and 
instinct.16   
Nonetheless, while there was a reaction against the ability of science to cure the ills of 
the nation and the world, society itself was steadily becoming more ‘scientific’ in nature, 
as discussed at greater length in Chapter One.  Britain was already a predominantly 
industrial nation by 1914, with four-fifths of the population being urban.  As the need for 
technical expertise grew, there was an increase in the number of engineers, 
administrators and teachers, as well as lawyers, doctors and those working in 
commerce.17  The shift was dramatic, such that white collar jobs in Britain increased 
from 144,035 in 1851to 918,186 in 1911.18  Contemporaries saw their world as 
becoming more ‘scientific’, even as there was a reaction against it, with a recognition of 
 
12 Macmillan, “War That Ended Peace,” 260. 
13 Macmillan, “War That Ended Peace,” 14. 
14 Heffer, “Age of Decadence,” 431. 
15 Philipp Blom, The Vertigo Years (Philadelphia: Basic Books, 2008), 54. 
16 Blom, “Vertigo Years,” 403. 
17 Heffer, “Age of Decadence,” 118. 
18 Heffer, “Age of Decadence,” 118. 
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the growing importance of experts, scientists, engineers and statisticians.19   The 
dichotomy between the growth of scientific expertise and a reaction against it runs 
through the way in which future war was seen. 
Unlike articles on the future of war, those which address it more widely often look 
further than a few years into the future.  Most of those interested in war, as shown in 
Chapters Three and Four, tended to see the future as something fairly imminent, while 
those on civil technologies, society and politics often looking decades in the future.  War 
was seen as an immediate problem to be faced, while other subjects allowed their 
authors the scope to be more discursive.  One of the themes of this chapter is the 
growing appreciation of the ability – or inability - of forecasters to predict the future, 
which developed as the period advanced.  Just as the number of articles taking an 
interest in the future increased from the 1890s onwards, so did the number of writers 
engaging with the philosophical question of whether it was possible to accurately 
forecast the future.  Questions were raised on the ability of scientists and others to 
predict future technologies or social changes, demonstrating increasing intellectual 
engagement with the subject.   
The chapter begins with an examination of religious prophecy, which had historically 
been seen as the only way of foreseeing the future, and which continued throughout the 
period.  Nonetheless, the importance of scientific prediction was becoming more 
recognised, as the increasing number of articles from the 1890s onwards on the subject 
demonstrates.  The chapter first looks at those articles interested purely in technological 
progress, before moving onto those which looked at how it – along with demographic 
change – could affect society more widely.  It should be noted that when war is 
mentioned in articles concerned with the more general future, it is discussed in this 
chapter, including discussions on both technological and societal change.  It concludes 
with the interest shown specifically in the future of Britain, at a time when there were 
considerable anxieties about its place in the world, which were greatly heightened 
because of the South African War.   Before moving onto the main content of the chapter, 
 
19 Blom, “Vertigo Years,” 403. 
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however it is necessary to highlight the work of H. G. Wells on predicting the future, and 
his series of nine articles, with the overall title Anticipations: An Experiment in Prophecy.  
These were published in 1901 in The Fortnightly Review, and later brought together in 
book form.20  Wells’ comprehensive work on a future fifty to a hundred years ahead was 
discussed in the periodicals, but Anticipations is discussed in Chapter Seven, as Wells’ 
work stands out as being of a different magnitude to most writers of the time, through 
its scale, range and approach.  This final chapter focuses on his work, and that of Jean de 
Bloch, and counterpoints them with the approaches taken by the bulk of civilian and 
military writers.  What this chapter will show, however, is that there were plenty of 
other commentators interested in what the future would bring, and that they saw 
‘scientific’ prediction as essential for interrogating the future. 
Religious Prophecy 
Prophecy, historically, meant the religious or mystical revelation of the future.  
Therefore, while interest in scientific forecasting increased throughout the period, there 
was no shortage of religious prophecy being published in parallel, albeit often in more 
specialist Christian publications, such as The Quiver, a periodical for a middle-class 
audience with the stated aim of acting as “a defence of biblical truth and the 
advancement of religion in the homes of people.”21  An article from The Quiver in 1897 
explicitly saw the decline of the Ottoman Empire as being foreseen by Biblical scripture, 
such that “the prophet David predicted the rise and fall of the Moslem power.” 22  Its 
author, W. Preston, referred to the Ottoman Empire as the ‘sick man’ of Europe, the 
 
20 Starting with H. G. Wells, “Anticipations: an Experiment in Prophecy – I – Locomotion in the Twentieth 
Century,” The Fortnightly Review, April 1901, 747-760.  The most relevant article to the discussion in this 
chapter is H. G. Wells, “Anticipations: an Experiment in Prophecy – VI – War,” The Fortnightly Review, 
September 1901, 538-554.  The ninth and final article was H. G. Wells, “Anticipations: an Experiment in 
Prophecy – IX – The Faith, Morals, and Public Policy of the New Republic,” The Fortnightly Review, December 
1901, 1063-1082. 
21 The Quiver was published from 1861 to 1926, having been founded by John Cassell, an evangelist and 
member of the temperance movement, although the periodical was moderate and initially supported scientific 
enquiry.  See Alvin Sullivan, British Literary Magazines: The Victorian and Edwardian Age, 1837-1913 (London: 
Greenwood Press, 1984), 331. 
22 W. Preston, “A Wonderful Prophecy Wonderfully Fulfilled; or Turkey and Palestine in the Light of Prophecy 
and Present Events,” The Quiver, January 1897, 1-6. 
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geopolitical implication of which was a subject of serious interest in Britain, but his 
focus is on how this event had been foretold in the Bible.  The article concluded with a 
view that the restoration of Jerusalem to the Jews would presage the Second Coming, 
and that contemporary Jewish interest in a homeland was a clear sign of what was to 
come.23 
Another article with a direct interest in religious prophecy was published in The 
Wesleyan-Methodist Magazine two years later, in 1899.24  This saw “prophecy [as] a 
living force – there are still young men who see visions and old men who dream 
dreams!”25  The thrust of the article was to first, rhetorically, question the efficacy of 
prophecy.  W. Burkitt Dalby, its author, saw it as a valid and relevant ‘living force’, and 
questioned the materialism of the age.  His article is suffused with a sense of 
contemporary concern over the future, and he was pessimistic about what progress 
would bring.  Dalby did not, however, see science as necessarily the enemy, stating that 
“the great influences which come from science are now being recognised as not 
necessarily materialistic.”26  The article saw prophecy as something with divine origin, 
and Dalby considered that the discoveries of science illuminated divinity at work.27 
Another article, this time in The Speaker, and also written in 1899, was not directly 
prophetic in its outlook, but alluded strongly to a religious view of the future.  The 
author was a correspondent in Constantinople (the city which figured so prominently in 
the article in The Quiver) and focused on the danger and likelihood of a “world-war.”  
The author referenced what was – to judge by the articles above – a contemporary view 
that: 
 
23 Preston, “Wonderful Prophecy,” 6. 
24 The Wesleyan-Methodist magazine ran from 1778 to 1969.  See Laura Brake, ed., Dictionary of Nineteenth 
Century Journalism (London: Academia Press & British Library, 2009), 670. 
25 W. Burkitt Dalby, “Prophecy A Living Force,” The Wesleyan-Methodist Magazine, November 1899, 806. 
26 Dalby, “Prophecy,” 808. 
27 Dalby, “Prophecy,” 808. 
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those who believe that the last days are to be ushered in by a period of universal 
war have much reason to think that the last days have come, that the universal 
war is not far off, and that it will bring such calamities as the world has never 
seen.28  
This parallels, albeit with added mysticism, the fear of war evident in the 1890s and 
reported at length in Chapter Three.  The author referenced religious views on a number 
of occasions, including the conviction that a period of disaster could lead to the Second 
Coming of Christ.  The author referred specifically to the danger posed by a general 
European War, , such that “Europe will have conquered the world only to destroy herself 
and spread ruin and desolation over all the earth.”29  As with many articles of the time, it 
also alludes to a “world-state” managed by an Anglo-American alliance. 
The terminology of the period is interesting; prophecy has a meaning associated with 
religious or mystical foretelling, while terms such as ‘forecast’ stand for a more scientific 
interpretation of the future.  In practice the two terms were used interchangeably, as can 
be seen in the mixture of terms used in an article entitled ‘Two Dips into the Future’ in 
The Review of Reviews in 1899, such that “the forecast of finalities, imperial and 
international, with which Hebrew prophets and apocalyptic seers made us familiar, are 
very much in fashion at present.”30  This author saw parallels between religious and 
scientific approaches to interpreting the future, and the term ‘forecast’ is used in both 
senses in his article.  This identifies the period as one of transition and identifies 
scientific prediction as a relatively new phenomena.  The same article also referenced 
another prominent debate on the future used in religious interpretations: a possible 
Jewish homeland in Palestine.31  As noted above, the articles by Preston and Dalby both 
saw the foundation of a Jewish homeland as one of the preconditions for the calamities 
which would presage the apocalypse, which was seen as something likely to happen in 
 
28 “The World-State and the World-War,” The Speaker, January 14, 1899, 49. 
29 “The World-State,” 49. 
30 “Two Dips into the Future,” Review of Reviews, September 1899, 295. 
31 “Two Dips,” 295. 
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the near future.32  This shows the interest in the subject of a Jewish homeland around 
the turn of the century, and its relationship to religious prophecy. 
An article in The New Century Review, again written in 1899 (reflecting general interest 
in forecasting the future at the turn of the century), was dedicated to ‘France and her 
Future’, and contains an emphatic statement that the age of religious prophecy was at an 
end: “the age of prophecy has passed away, and the race of prophets is extinct - unless 
we accept the cultivated seers attached to Mr Alfred Harmsworth’s omniscient 
journal.”33  This was a satirical reference to Lord Northcliffe, Alfred Harmsworth, 
proprietor of The Daily Mail and, later, The Daily Mirror.  The actual article itself is more 
parochially concerned with the future of France in the light of the Dreyfus affair and its 
likely impact on the French Army.  Notwithstanding the notion of their extinction, 
religious prophecy was to continue into the twentieth century, but so would scientific 
forecasting, which would grow in significance as the new century passed. 
Technological Progress 
Some of the ‘scientific’ predictions of the future were focused purely on technological 
change, rather than considering their social impact.  These are of interest, however, as 
they demonstrate a growing understanding of how quickly technology was changing.  An 
early example is an article entitled ‘The Future and What It Hides In It’, based on 
predictions originally made in The North American Review by the American scientist 
Professor Thurston, reported in The Review of Reviews in 1890.34  He predicted faster 
travel by train and ship in the future and was confident that flight would become “as 
common as tramcars in the twentieth century.”35  He forecast that electricity would have 
a significant impact in the future, and specifically predicted hydroelectric power and the 
 
32 “The Future of the Jew,” The Outlook, December 29, 1900, took a different view, considering that Jews ‘in 
England’ (many contemporary sources used ‘England’ as shorthand for ‘Britain’) were being absorbed into the 
broader culture and that English tolerance would prove too great a temptation for them, such that .  Zionism 
would remain an unfulfilled dream. 
33 Liberticus, “France and Her Future,” The New Century Review, October 1899, 282. 
34 “The Future and What It Hides In It,” The Review of Reviews, February 1890, 115. 
35 “The Future and What It Hides,” 115. 
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use of wires to transit electricity, as well as foreshadowing – in broad terms – what 
would become radio (research was underway later in the 1890s) and television (early 
work began even before the First World War).  Another of Thurston’s predictions was 
that ever more powerful armaments, such as the submarine, would lead to universal 
peace, which once more resonates with articles emphasising the fear of war in the 
1890s.  The predictions are, with hindsight, prescient, although - at least in the report in 
The Review of Reviews -  they are not closely linked to specific time periods in the future.  
Although Thurston was not reported as showing much interest in the social impact of his 
technological predictions, he did suggest that the distribution of electricity and 
mechanical devices to each home would give rise to working at home, rather than in the 
factory system.36   
Three years later and further predictions from Professor Thurston were being reported 
in The Review of Reviews.37  They are similar in scope to the earlier report, although 
there are more specific predictions, such as that powered flight would be achieved in ten 
years’ time and that steam locomotion would give way to “direct conversion of the 
energy of chemical forces into mechanical power without enormous thermodynamic 
losses.”38  Thurston seems to be forecasting the rise of the internal combustion engine, 
although the reference may be more general.  The summary in The Review of Reviews 
also reported discussions between Thurston and Professor Graham Bell in McClues 
Magazine, covering topics such as a form of information transmission which is 
recognisably like television. 
The Review of Reviews excitedly reported another set of predictions of the future in 
1897, this time from Edison, as reported to G. P. Lathrop.  The “prophecies” – again 
noting the use of the term for a scientific forecast - of Edison are framed through the 
eyes of someone who has slept for three hundred years and then awoken, with the sleep 
engendered by scientific use of ‘chlorophony’ and antiseptics, rather than any mystical 
 
36 “The Future,” 115. 
37 “On the Edge of the Future,” The Review of Reviews, July 1893, 40. 
38 “On the Edge,” 40. 
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means, another sign of shifting emphasis towards technology as providing agency.39  
The specific predictions in the article included airships (albeit powered in what would 
soon be seen as an unrealistic fashion), and the widespread use of electrical motors, also 
foreseen by Thurston.40  The article also described a number of societal changes, 
including a statement that alcohol and meat eating had been abandoned in the future, 
along with cities.  In a rare prediction of more radical social change, the author also 
stated that “one of our most brilliant scientific men is an African named Mwanga, for 
Africa is now largely civilised and enlightened.”41   
In 1900, Chamber’s Journal published an article reporting on the predictions of Nikolas 
Tesla, originally recorded in The Century Magazine under the title ‘The Problem of 
Increasing Human Energy’.  Tesla considered that the coming of aircraft (once more, this 
is seen inevitable) would lead to control of the air being as important as control of the 
seas.42  He predicted the rise of automation and in one remarkable phrase stated that in 
the future “mere machines will meet in a contest without bloodshed, the nation’s being 
simply interested, ambitious spectators.”43  Tesla is predicting warfare between 
machines, and many of his other forecasts are remarkably farsighted, such as 
predictions of wind power, solar power and even geothermal energy – the extraction of 
energy from the Earth’s interior.44  He also discussed the possibility of meat being 
artificially grown, rather than being the product of farm animals.45 
Moving forward to 1904, and The Strand reported on a symposium of some of the most 
eminent scientists of the time, including Lord Kelvin, into the “factors, food and forces of 
the future”.46  The article had a clear agenda and stated that “nobody who reads the 
 
39 “The Prophecies of Edison; or, Visions of Things to Come,” The Review of Reviews, March 1897, 246. 
40 “Prophecies of Edison,” 247. 
41 “Prophecies of Edison,” 247. 
42 “Some Forecasts of Science,” Chambers’s Journal, August 18, 1900, 593. 
43 “Some Forecasts,” 593. 
44 “Some Forecasts,” 594. 
45 “Some Forecasts,” 594. 
46 “The Promise of Science: a Symposium of Eminent Scientists on the Factors, Food and Forces of the Future,” 
Strand Magazine, December 1904, 668. 
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newspapers nowadays can fail to be struck by the new role which science is playing in 
the great drama of the world.”47  The predictions of the scientists included, like Tesla, 
geothermal energy and solar power, although they added wave power to the list.  The 
scientists also discussed the possibility – again like Tesla - of growing meat rather than 
using farmed animals.  The article was, however, couched with doubts and measured 
practical considerations, underlying the fact that the scientists were well aware of the 
risks of predicting the future.  War was even covered briefly, with a statement from 
Professor Berthelot that “new generations simply will not tolerate it at any rate.”48  Once 
again, the point that new weapons could make war unpalatable, to the point of its 
abolition, is being made. 
A final and much more limited article in this category of technological forecasting comes 
from The Athenaeum in 1912, which discussed oil as a ‘future fuel’ in the context of three 
books on the subject.49  The article is a review of contemporary work and only obliquely 
concerned with the future per se, but evaluated the increasing importance of petroleum 
and the potential difficulties of maintaining and increasing its production.  It was 
pessimistic in terms of achieving this goal, which was to be proven wrong in the decades 
to come, but the article is interesting – as are the books it is reviewing – in being based 
on the numerical evaluation of resources and their evolution. 
These six articles, dating between 1890 and 1912, demonstrate interest in the future 
and the way science and technology would influence the twentieth century.  They show 
a keen appreciation of current scientific developments, drawing upon articles or books 
by scientists or panels of scientists.  As a consequence, they show considerable foresight 
in predicting the coming of flight and the increasing significance of electricity.  Other 
predictions, such as the use of solar power, were not to be achieved for many decades to 
come, as the underlying technology was far too immature to be effective for many 
decades.  What is more significant, however, than the actual predictions, is the 
framework in which they are made.  Firstly, they demonstrate the curiosity in the period 
 
47 “Promise of Science,” 668. 
48 “Promise of Science,” 672. 
49 “Science: Fuel,” The Athenaeum, March 9, 1912, 286.  
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towards the future and what science could offer.  Secondly, they appear from 1890 
onwards, showing a greater appreciation of what the future could bring.  Thirdly, they 
are largely technical exercises with only limited extrapolation into the social changes 
which might occur due to the impact of science.  Finally, they are usually optimistic or 
neutral in their opinions of new technologies, and signal that the perceived pessimism of 
the age should not be overstated. As Bowler says, there remained a great interest in the 
practical scientific and technical advances of the age, which can be overlooked.50 
Social and Political Forecasts 
Other articles went further than simply discussing likely technological advances and 
showed an interest in social change, as well as discussing the feasibility of forecasting 
the future.  Chambers’s Journal published a piece on the future in 1895 which looked 
back to an earlier attempt to do so, written in 1852, and considered that its predictions 
had been remarkably astute.51  This reinforces the point that the 1880s and 1890s were 
not the first decades to notice the impact of change, although its rate was accelerating.  
The article sets out the huge differences between the present time and the beginning of 
the nineteenth century, before moving on to more philosophical matters:52   
To some it appears that we have, in various science directions, already nearly 
reached that boundary beyond which the human intellect cannot pass; while 
others see in the success which has followed past endeavour, the promise and 
potency of still greater triumphs.  Besides, how many discoveries Nature reveals 
to us unexpectedly and unsought for! while each one in succession assists in 
explaining mysteries yet unsolved.53   
 
50 Peter Bowler, A History of the Future: Prophets of Progress from H.G. Wells to Isaac Asimov (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2017), 17. 
51 “In the Future,” Chambers’s Journal of Popular Literature, Science and Arts, April 6, 1895, 209. 
52 “In the Future,” 209. 
53 “In the Future,” 209. 
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This statement affirms the likelihood of future scientific advances, at least in many areas, 
but is followed by a more prosaic catalogue of predominantly scientific forecasts and 
conjectures, including the potential – again – of growing food from sources of 
‘protoplasm’.  The articles considered this important, as it could provide a way of 
reducing Britain’s reliance upon food imports, which was a subject of concern whenever 
a future European war was discussed.  The article also discussed the rising significance 
of electricity and hoped that new forms of energy generation such as hydroelectrical 
power could fill the gap left with the hypothetical exhaustion of coal.  The article 
concludes on a positive note that “science is only at the beginning of its career.  The 
prospects of the future invite to present humility.”54  Once again, here is another 
statement providing more positive engagement with what technology might offer. 
A longer article by Quail, written in 1902, had a specific interest on the feasibility of 
foreseeing the future, and explicitly referenced Wells’ Anticipations.  Quail wrote that 
there has been something of a change in the way the future is being treated in that “not 
only the Utopian romancers…but even more sober and practical minds are, at the 
opening of fresh eras, tempted to make experiments in prophecy.” 55  Here, he is not 
differentiating between religious and scientific forecasting, but between Utopian 
accounts and those which he considered to be logically presented, such as by Wells.  
Quail was, however, unconvinced by Anticipations, and thought that Wells’ predictions 
had “no better prospect of realisation than the mechanical social arrangements devised 
by the late Mr Edward Bellamy for the New Boston of the year 2000.”56  Quail went on to 
make predictions entirely in line with other writers of the time; such as the replacement 
of steam by electricity as the chief motive force of the future, or that ‘air cars’ would 
become common before the end of the twentieth century.  These suggestions were – to 
be fair to the author - treated as being commonly appreciated. 
 
54 “In the Future,” 211. 
55 Quail, “Forecasts of the Future,” Jesse Macmillan’s Magazine, January 1902, 219. 
56 Quail, “Forecasts,” 219.  He is referring to Bellamy’s Utopian work Looking Backwards, first published in 
1888. 
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Quail then focused on the future of Britain, and discussed the erosion of the country’s 
position as manufacturing centre of the world.57  He drew on the work William Clarke, 
discussed below in more detail, and considered that while the future might lie with New 
York rather than London, manufacturing overseas could lead to British artisans 
traveling to generate revenue – what has now become known as globalisation.58  Quail 
does not provide timescales for these events to happen, but he does use Dolman’s data 
to drive these extrapolations, such that: 
Analysing the census figures of the occupations of the people in 1891, [Dolman] 
shows that the proportion of the population which lives by making goods for 
exportation is only ten to twenty percent, and as this percentage was then 
decreasing, it is probably much less now.59   
This form of analysis can only be achieved through the availability of census data and an 
understanding of mathematical extrapolation.  What is evident here is the way in which 
statistics are enabling, and influencing, more quantitative forms of forecasting.  Quail’s 
article, seen as a whole, is an example of the systematic evaluation of present trends and 
their future impact on society.  Although he undoubtedly saw himself as forecasting 
logically,  he concluded with a cautionary note that “though some of the predictions of 
our social and political seers may be fulfilled, or partially fulfilled, very few will be 
carried out wholly, nor is any one of them likely to be realised to the letter.”60  Here is 
recognition that forecasting the future is a hazardous business. 
Another article from 1902 also emphasised the difficulties of predicting the future, this 
time in direct reference to Wells’ lecture on ‘The Discovery of the Future’, at the Royal 
Institute, given a year after the publication of Anticipations and discussed at length in 
Chapter Seven.  The article spoke positively of Wells’ work but was sceptical of the 
possibility of predicting the future, which Wells believed feasible, because: 
 
57 Quail, “Forecasts,” 222. 
58 Quail, “Forecasts,” 223. 
59 Quail, “Forecasts,” 222. 
60 Quail, “Forecasts,” 225. 
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We are not to consider society, as said Mr. Wells in his lecture, as static but 
kinetic.  True, and that is the very reason why it is impossible to prophesy even in 
the new fashion on the basis of scientific fact; because the facts are changing 
while we look at them; and so our prophecy will be constantly changing.61   
The anonymous author is suggesting that the sheer complexity of the predicting the 
future would confound the forecaster, foreshadowing the difficulty of prediction in the 
face of unknown technologies and their interaction with social trends.  This is 
exemplified by his statement about a specific prediction that:  
not so many years ago the industrial and therefore the whole social and political 
future of England seemed to turn on the geological question of how long the coal 
fields would last, and the prophecies were doleful.  Now [they] are cheerful 
because our new basis of fact is the discovery of electric power.62   
It should be noted that the article in Chamber’s Journal from 1895, only seven years 
earlier, thought that the coal fields would be exhausted, emphasising the point that 
predictions could change quite strongly. For all these doubts, however, the author is at 
pains to state that prophecy now lay in the domain of science, and that a failure to 
predict the future was based on human error and not divine will.  His concern is the 
practicality of effective prediction, even though he expressed admiration for Wells’ 
thinking.  What this illustrates is the emergence of debate about the ability (or inability) 
to predict the future, showing writers beginning to grapple with the problem of 
predicting the future during a period of accelerating change. 
There is another example of debate on ‘scientific’ forecasting in an article in The Idler in 
1896, entitled ‘Cities of the Future’.   This begins with an explicit reference to the 
analogy between weather forecasting and the prediction of the future, with the author, 
F. L. Oswald, stating that: 
 
61 “Foreseeing the Future,” The Saturday Review, February 1, 1902, 136. 
62 “Foreseeing,” 135. 
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The main secret of weather prophecies is the plan to ascertain the drifts of clouds 
and winds, and then calculate the probable result of their movement in a given 
time.  It has often occurred to me that the same method may be applied to all 
other sorts of prediction.  It would indeed, not be difficult to trace the progress of 
scientific discoveries in certain directions.63   
Oswald explicitly sets out the notion of a mathematical or scientific evaluation of the 
future, which he seems to consider novel.  He is (to borrow a phrase) anticipating the 
ability to forecast the future, just as Wells’ did six years later in his lecture to the Royal 
Institution.  Oswald’s specific predictions cover more than just cities; like almost 
everyone else quoted in this chapter he stated that it is “more probable that the 
construction of navigable airships will be accomplished before the end of the next 
twenty years.”64  Oswald also mentioned the growth of the world’s armaments and 
considered, as common at the time, that this was likely to make war unpopular and 
unlikely.65  Some of his other forecasts were more specific and unusual: he predicted the 
coming of air conditioning and that hotels a hundred years in the future which did not 
have it would struggle.66  He also discussed the possibility of free newspapers being 
possible through the power of advertising.  These predictions were, of course, to come to 
pass in the twentieth century, albeit many decades later.  Oswald and his 
contemporaries were certainly not afraid to predict the future decades in the future, 
albeit often without risking guesses as to when new innovations would be introduced. 
Another example of an attack on the predictability of the future is to be found in a 
review of Karl Pearson’s 1893 work, National Life and Character, which was to become 
famous at the time for raising fears of the rise of the ‘Yellow’ race to challenge the 
‘White’ race.  I. F. Clarke, in his study of writers attempting to predict the future, 
considers Pearson as one of those who believed that a science of forecasting could be 
developed.   A hostile reviewer in The Edinburgh Review was, however, critical of 
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Pearson’s conviction in this area, noting that “the means of forecasting the future of the 
human race seem to us so imperfect, that the most thoughtful and best informed 
prophet is only a little better finished for the task than the ephemera of our fables.”67  
The reviewer was also critical of Pearson’s view that science had discovered all that it 
can, emphasising that the rapid progress in sciences such as astronomy and geology 
demonstrated the opposite. 68  Another article which borrowed from Pearson and moved 
along a similar Social Darwinist trajectory stands out against the more positive tone of 
articles on the predictions of Thurston, Edison or Oswald.  Here, in ‘A Senile World’, was 
pessimism, and the author focused on Pearson’s prediction of an aging population and 
concluded that it would eventually lead to a collapse of civilisation. 69  The article 
contextualised the ‘Yellow Peril’ through fear that Chinese labourers would work for 
lower wages than Europeans or North Americans, and the author ended with a 
pessimistic retrospective that “twenty years or so ago most of us were filled with hope 
and confidence in the future of mankind.”70  This statement very much parallels the 
negativity of those who wrote about war at the time, and is part of the doubt exhibited 
by European culture at the turn of the century.    
Pearson’s book and the articles which review it are examples of writing interested in the 
way demographics and social change would shape the future.   A further one from 1910, 
entitled ‘The City of the Future’, was focused on an examination of the future city, 
including a statement that more cosmopolitan city centres such as London, Paris and 
New York were becoming more interchangeable, which the author saw as a trend for the 
future.71  It compared Britain’s laissez faire attitude to planning to Germany’s more 
rigorous approach, and favoured the latter, stating that “the futility of disorganised 
industrial effort has at last been realised.”72  More broadly, the author predicted that 
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cultural change was inevitable in the future, and a move towards a future rooted more 
firmly in scientific principle. 
The Future of Britain 
This anonymous author’s concern over the apparent superiority of Germany in town 
planning is part of a considerable outpouring of material on the position of Britain at the 
turn of the century, demonstrating increasing anxiety over the rise of the United States, 
Germany, and even Russia.  It was a topic of vigorous debate in the press which  
attempted to forecast the future and to provide warnings and suggest ways in which 
Britain could be reinvigorated or renewed.  The Review of Reviews was at the forefront of 
this debate, with Stead, its longstanding editor, producing a series of supplements to his 
periodical on the subject from 1896 until at least 1906.  The series began with the title 
‘Wake Up! John Bull’.73  The title sometimes shifted to ‘How to Wake Up John Bull’, then 
to ‘Cheer Up John Bull’, and finally to ‘Go Ahead! John Bull’ when Stead felt that his 
campaign had gained some traction.74 
Typical of the articles in these supplements is a report on an article by Andrew Carnegie, 
the American industrialist, who Stead noted emphasised the economic superiority of the 
United States over the United Kingdom in 1902, as well as predicting – correctly with 
hindsight – that within ten years Germany would also surpass Britain.75  Carnegie stated 
that the only solution lay in the need for Britain developing a workforce as efficient as 
that in Europe, but also that the United States could only be compared to Europe as a 
whole, which could only respond effectively by forming “some form of political and 
industrial union.”76  The Review of Reviews clearly saw the merit in Carnegie’s ideas and 
his view that if Britain faced a federated Europe bound by “Free Trade”, then it should 
seek a union with the United States; which was a discussion shaped in racial terms 
 
73 See, for example, “Wake Up! John Bull,” An Illustrated Supplement to the Review of Reviews, March 10, 1900, 
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common to contemporary discourse.77  A similar report in The Review of Reviews drew 
on an  article in the New York Journal in 1899, which predicted the partition of the world 
divided between Great Britain, the United States and Russia, with the future Europe 
likened to Ancient Greece before Macedonia.78  The alternative, the article reported, was 
the union of the ‘English Speaking Nations’, an idea much in vogue at the time.   
Yet another report in the Review of Reviews was entitled ‘How the World Takes 
Americanisation’ and reported on the international response to a book entitled The 
Americanisation of the World, written by no other than W. T. Stead himself.  Stead’s 
thesis was that the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ nations would one day be united, which was reported 
as having  been met with hostility by the colonies of the British Empire, such as 
Canada.79  The review, which can hardly be considered unbiased, stated that the book 
had also met with much negativity from Continental Europe, alongside fear, although 
some commentators had concluded that Stead’s foresight was admirable and 
impressive.80  This interest in Anglo-American alliance or alignment is evident in many 
other articles, such as one entitled ‘The Twentieth Century Peacemakers’ in The 
Contemporary Review.  Referencing a speech by Joseph Chamberlain, then Secretary of 
the Colonies, which the article saw as having been received very positively on both sides 
of the Atlantic, it suggested the value of a union between the two nations, and 
considered that it had the potential to enable peace-making across the globe.81   
Many of these articles speak positively about the future of such an alliance, but they 
betray unease about the relative position of Great Britain and the United States.  An 
article by Clarke, who was a politically radical socialist and journalist, in 1900, forecasts 
the  future by comparing Britain with the rising industrial power of the United States 
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and Germany.82  The article specifically notes that coal production in the United States 
had passed that of Britain, and that iron and steel production were now double that of 
Britain, which are more examples of the analysis made possible through the availability 
of national statistics.  Clarke went further and attacked the notion - common at the time 
– of a colonial-imperial union, by suggesting that those former colonies would become 
manufacturing centres of their own.83  More remarkably, Clarke provided an incisive 
forecast of what could happen to Britain, forecasting the rise of leisure and holiday 
resorts, with American and Australians buying estates in Britain.  In summary, “England 
will prove an attractive spot to the rich…situated as she is close to the historic lands of 
Europe…with an old and well-ordered society, a secure Government.”84  He predicted 
the value of tourism and universities and conceives of England (Britain) as Athens to the 
Rome of the United States, decades before Macmillan’s statement to the same effect in 
the 1950s.85   
An article in The Review of Reviews attacked Clarke’s article, however, casting scorn on 
his suggestions regarding Britain’s inevitable decline.86  This is to be expected, as Stead 
was delivering robust warnings about the danger to John Bull, aiming to reinvigorate the 
nation, rather than to admit defeat.  Clarke himself may be found critiquing a book by 
Brook Adams entitled America’s Economic Supremacy, in The Speaker, which set out an 
economic projection of the rise of the United States and how the West Indies – then part 
of the British Empire – would fall under the influence of its larger Continental 
neighbour.87  Although Adams paralleled Clarke’s own scepticism of British union with 
its colonies, he was critical of what he saw as Adams’ ‘economic interpretation of 
history’ which he thought overshadowed ethical and political events.   It is clear that 
statistical information on the leading powers of the time was driving Adams’ 
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assessment, as he also discussed the potential of Russia and Germany.  Such hard facts, 
or at least data, drove concerns about Britain’s position in the world, and were difficult 
to argue away, regardless of the vigour of writers like Stead.  They fed predictions of the 
future, of decline and calls for renewal - statistics were driving argument and debate. 
Not all forecasts of the future were purely concerned with the position of Britain and its 
rivals.  Others looked at the future of continents, nations or regions, such as in a book 
review in The Speaker.  The book reviewed was Africa from South to North Through 
Marotseland by a Major Gibbons, although the reviewer, L. March Philipps, spends more 
than three quarters of his review disregarding the book and instead discussing the 
future of colonisation.88   His thesis was that Africa and South America were ‘hotel 
annexes’ for the “enterprising, expanding, multiplying, dominating races of the North.”89  
He attacked a French theory that Africa should be the property of the ‘Latin races’ and 
instead saw the Continent as the domain of Europe, and South America that of the 
United States.  As a forecast it is little more than a statement of colonial intent, and the 
future as seen by Phillips is one of continued European dominance. 
An article penned five years later also discussed the future of the people of Africa, once 
more as subjects divorced of agency and to be managed by Europeans,.  ‘The Religious 
Future of the Negro’ appeared in The Review of Reviews in 1910, reviewed an article by 
Harry Johnstone in The Nineteenth Century which considered that Christianity would be 
adopted by ‘the Negro’.90  The article concluded with the suggestion that the practice of 
Christianity would lead to universal peace and enable humanity to achieve: 
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the elimination of disease, of famine, of darkness; the conquest of the air and of 
the water…; the restoration of the world’s beauty in forest and fauna; the 
abolition of the Glacial periods at the North and South Pole.91   
It is not explicitly clear whether the author is adopting a providential tone in this 
assessment, although there seems to be a blurring the boundaries between religious and 
scientific methods of prophecy.  Another article, this time from 1900, also discussed 
Africa, although its focus was shorter-term and concerned with the development of the 
continent as the ‘Scramble for Africa’ came to a close.   What is interesting about the 
article, however, is its use of statistics with regard to revenues, which provided the 
foundation for its forecast of future development.92  Largely, however, the article 
followed the traditional contemporary model of colonial expansion and the development 
of industries such as rubber and palm oil production using ‘Negro labour.’93   
The articles discussed above were supplemented by many others concerned with the 
future, on subjects including the church, drama and fiction.94   Many of these are 
parochial, short term or limited in scope, but illustrate the range of readership 
interested in the subject.  The number of periodicals with articles dedicated to the future 
is telling, as it includes specialist publications and a large number of the literary 
periodicals.  The future of society, politics, religion and professions are all discussed, but 
they are only rarely brought together.  For example, when the future of Britain and other 
nations in the world are discussed, the forecasts are largely unconcerned with 
technological and social change.  Similarly, when Africa is discussed, continued 
colonisation is assumed with no consideration that it might end at some point in the 
future, however distantly.  The articles on Britain’s future focus on the potential dangers 
of the changing balance of power between it and its rivals, founded on an understanding 
of the shifting economic position globally, which – like population censuses – can only 
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come from the capture and recording of information.  The period from the late 1880s to 
1914 was one when statistics were becoming more commonly used in forecasts, and 
‘scientific’ prophecy was increasing in importance.  Nonetheless, full syntheses of how 
technology would affect society are uncommon, with the exception of Wells’ 
Anticipations, which will be discussed in Chapter Seven. 
Conclusions 
A number of conclusions arise from this examination of how the periodicals interrogated 
the future.  Firstly, the period saw a rise of scientific forecasting, as distinct from 
religious prophecy, along with a healthy debate on the feasibility of such prediction.  
While Wells and others believed that scientific prediction could discover the future, 
others were more sceptical in the face of complicated technological and social changes.  
Secondly, the articles in the periodicals reinforce I. F. Clarke’s assertion that there were 
indeed many commentators interested in forecasting the future before Wells.  In fact, it 
was the 1890s and early 1900s which saw the publication of a large number of such 
forecasts, which fade somewhat after 1902.  Thirdly, there was an interest both in 
scientific advances for their own sake and their possible impact on society and the 
international order.  The former tended to be optimistic, or neutral, while the latter 
tended to be more pessimistic, especially around the vexed question of Britain’s future 
role in the world.   
The assessment has also provided context for those articles specifically interested in the 
future of war.  The 1890s saw a peak of fear about the potential consequences of a 
European Great War, as discussed in Chapter Three, at precisely the point predictions of 
the future were at their most numerous in the periodicals.  Similarly, there is also a 
parallel between the way in which there are fewer articles on the future after the mid-
1900s, with a decrease in the number of pieces on the future of war at the same time, as 
shown in Chapter Four.  There is a contrast, however, between the two; general articles 
on the future would often look decades into the future, while those on the future of war 
tended to be focused on the immediate future.  As will be explored in the chapters which 
follow, military commentators rarely looked into where technology might take war 
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beyond the immediate future.  Civilians interested in its broader impact ventured 
further into the future, being unconcerned about their readiness to face what could be 
an imminent conflict. 
Overall, quantification was becoming more important in prediction during the period, 
alongside the unstated fact that without relevant information, forecasting is more 
difficult.  Just as the age was coming to be seen as ‘scientific’, so too were the means of 
forecasting the future.  Although the use of statistics was by no means common, there is 
a sense of a new discipline beginning to take shape.  The predictions themselves are 
often individually accurate, but are usually not accompanied by specific forecasts as to 
when they might happen, and even the social commentaries tend to focus on particular 
issues.  Here, it was Wells’ Anticipations which stood out, as a synthesis of the effects of 
technology on future society, as will be discussed in Chapter Seven.  Nonetheless, it did 
not exist in a vacuum, being instead situated among widespread intellectual engagement 
on forecasting the future. 
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Chapter Three  The Dread of War 
The years between the Franco-German War and the Boer War have been described as 
“the climax of materialism”.1   At a time of precocious technological innovation, the 
weaponry available to the armies of the time changed beyond recognition in little more 
than a generation, such that when Britain went to war in South Africa in 1899 against an 
enemy armed with modern rifles and artillery, it found its Army unprepared for the 
conflict.2   This chapter will explore how contemporary accounts in the British 
periodicals - and to a lesser extent the newspapers - responded to change during this 
period, and how they imagined the wars of the future would be fought.  It will 
demonstrate that recognition of the way in which new weapons were changing war 
came, not after the Franco-German War, but with the Russo-Turkish War.   Interest in 
the changing nature of war increased after that point, and by the last decade of the 
century there was a widespread expectation that a European war was imminent, 
coupled with a fear of its consequences, brought about by the pace of technological 
change and growth in the size of armies, which resulted in an unsettling ‘dread of war’.   
The research underpinning this chapter has been centred on a search through digitised 
British periodicals between 1870 and 1899, using the methodology described in Chapter 
One.   Almost all of the articles identified are concerned with the future of a European 
conflict, with relatively little interest even in the United States and Japan, which were 
both still seen as geopolitical outsiders at the time.  Similarly, colonial war was usually 
ignored when discussing new weapons and ways of waging war, with the exception of 
the1898 campaign in the Soudan.  Technical novelty and its implications for the future 
were instead seen through the prism of a future ‘Great War’ in Europe.  The authors of 
the articles throughout this thesis – and not just this chapter - are almost invariably 
men, with rare female voices.3  Similarly, most are British, albeit with substantial 
representation from Germany, the United States and other European nations, through 
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PhD Thesis  Interrogating the Future David Bangert 
 
77  
translations of articles in their periodicals.4  Names indicating a different ethnic origin 
are vanishingly small, although there is one example cited in this chapter, in a discussion 
on the Battle of Omdurman in the Soudan campaign.5  Future war was largely a concern 
of the elites, although it was promulgated more widely through the newspapers and in 
fictional accounts of future conflict.  As noted in the Introduction, this is illustrated by 
the fact that sixteen of the writers cited in this thesis appear in the Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography.6  A few remain household names, such as Arthur Conan Doyle and 
H. G. Wells, with the majority of the others being military leaders and journalists, many 
of the latter being also mentioned in the Historical Dictionary of War Journalism.7   
This chapter begins with a discussion on the response of the periodicals to the Franco-
German War, in terms of how it signalled a change in the conduct of war, as opposed to 
discussion of its political significance.  There were a significant number of articles on the 
subject (it marks one of the peaks in the number of articles written about the future of 
war between 1871 and 1899) but they were exclusively interested in narrow technical 
developments.  The chapter then moves on to reaction to the Russo-Turkish War, when 
recognition of the power of new weaponry emerged in force, and the Battle of Plevna 
became a touchstone for debate on the future of war, which was to resonate for the 
remainder of the century.  The chapter goes on to cover discussion over the two decades 
following that war, which focused most strongly on apprehension of what a European 
conflict would bring, as witnessed by the increasing number of articles in the 
periodicals.  It concludes with a discussion of the Soudan campaign, which was widely 
reported as it involved British forces, and where it was again recognised what the 
advances in weaponry could mean to a European conflict, amongst the triumphalism in 
the destruction of the Mahdi’s armies with precisely those same weapons.  The Soudan 
 
4 For the only example, see Ahmad Rafiuddin, “The Battle of Omdurman and the Mussulman World,” The 
Nineteenth Century, October 1898, 688-696. 
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campaign happened only a year before the South African War began, which is discussed 
in Chapter Four.8 
One of the conclusions of this chapter is that when ‘the future of war’ was discussed, it 
was generally seen as something which would happen in the immediate future.  In 
almost all of the articles cited in this chapter, the focus is not really not the future, even a 
few years distant, but the present.  After the Battle of Plevna there was a growing 
recognition that technology was changing war, but they are unlike the articles on the 
more general future, discussed in Chapter Two, which usually looked decades ahead.  
Even in articles focused on technological change, the emphasis is on how weapons 
entering service would change tactics, rather than what new inventions might come to 
pass in the future.  As will emerge throughout this thesis, here is an example of writers 
seeing ‘the trees’ and not ‘the wood’ when facing technological change.   
Reflections on the Franco-German War 
The outcome of the Franco-German War of 1870 came as a profound shock to Europe, 
and was reported widely in the British press, both at its outset and during hostilities.9  
Although the war was fought with infantry, cavalry and artillery not dissimilar in 
appearance to those of the Napoleonic Wars, new weapons were deployed which had 
begun to change the character of conflict.  There was some appreciation of these changes 
at the time, such as in an article written only a few days after France had declared war 
on Prussia.  The anonymous author stated that it was neither possible, nor fruitful, to 
predict its outcome, citing writers passing judgement before the outcomes of the 
American Civil War and the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, and who were subsequently 
proved wrong in their judgement.10  One of the contributing factors to this uncertainty, 
the author suggested, was the effects of new armaments, citing the decisive effect of the 
 
8 Britain was not involved in either the Franco-German War of 1870-71 or the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, 
although towards the conclusion of the latter it sent a fleet to deter Russia from further advances.   
9 The Franco-German war saw a new form of war journalism being practised, with the widespread use of the 
telegraph to send accurate and up-to-date reports to newspapers.  Reporters from six nations, including 
Britain, provided reports to their home countries. Roth, “Historical Dictionary,” 109. 
10 “The War of 1870,” The Saturday Review,  July 23, 1870, 100. 
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Prussian breechloading ‘needle rifle’ in the war of 1866 as an example of a weapon 
whose effectiveness had not been appreciated before the conflict.11  This is one of the 
earliest recognitions of the way in which technology could impact war in an 
unpredictable manner, but it also one of the few articles of the time to show an interest 
in such philosophical considerations, with most focused on the future of war being more 
narrowly focused on new weapons. 
Primary amongst these weapons was the French mitrailleur, an early form of machine 
gun, which excited considerable debate in the contemporary periodicals.  This included 
the article cited above, published before the war had really begun, which summarily 
dismissed its value: “all recent experience tends to lessen expectation of great results 
from complicated forms of light artillery.”12   An article published shortly after the Battle 
of Sedan in 1870, which saw the defeat of the French Army in the field, concluded that 
the mitrailleur “would not bring about a revolution in tactics.”13  This judgement was 
based on its disappointing performance on the battlefield, largely due to its novelty 
leading to the French Army failing to deploy it effectively.  The author was, however, 
more broadly sceptical of such innovations, citing many failed attempts to build effective 
“revolving or many barrelled cannon, multiple guns and rifle batteries of endless 
variety.”14 His conclusion was that such devices could usefully augment artillery and 
infantry, but do no more.   The view that new technologies could only support current 
practice and tactics, rather than being revolutionary, reoccurs up to the First World War 
itself, as will also be reinforced in later chapters. 
The countervailing point, also made throughout the period to 1914, was that new 
technology could transform war, as evident in an article written later in 1870.  It 
concluded that the year would be marked by history as the first time an effective 
mitrailleur had been used in the field, before describing its use in British trials, along 
 
11 Four out of ten articles on the Franco-German War cited here were published in The Saturday Review, which 
showed a consistent interest in the future of warfare throughout the period, see Alvin Sullivan, British Literary 
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13 “The Place of the Mitrailleur in War,” The Saturday Review, September 3, 1870, 297. 
14 “The Place of the Mitrailleur in War,” 296. 
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with the contemporaneous Gatling gun.15  The unnamed author explicitly pointed to the 
disruptive impact of new technology and stated that “the wars of the last ten years have 
given a wonderful stimulus to inventive genius for improving old and designing fresh 
instruments of destruction.”16  The debate between those who were sceptical of the 
impact of new weapons, and those who saw them as agents of profound change, is 
evident at the very start of this period.  It is interesting, however, that while the 
mitrailleur was the subject of debate, there was little immediate discussion of the way 
that the development of other weapons – such as infantry rifles and artillery – had 
impacted the conduct of warfare.   A rare example that did was a review of a collection of 
lectures to the Literary and Historical Society of Quebec, dedicated to examining artillery 
tactics in the War, written in 1876. 17  The author, W. W. Knollys, discussed the 
mitrailleur, and reported  that the increased power of the defence could be more 
important in the future, leading potentially to siege like operations, although Knollys 
himself did not agree with this judgement.18  This is an early and unusual example of 
thinking beyond the immediate tactical implications of new weaponry. 
Other writers focused on the wider military implications of the War, which had seen the 
leading military power in Europe, France, defeated comprehensively by Germany.  The 
short article ‘Military Lessons of the War’ was published in August 1870, a few days 
before the Battle of Sedan and the capture of Napoleon III, concluded that the German 
success to date was due to the quality, training and discipline of its soldiers.19  The 
anonymous author was even more convinced that it was the character of the German 
Army, as a force of conscripts reflecting the nation, which had driven their success, and 
considered that the concept of a narrowly constituted professional army to be past.20  An 
article published in Blackwood’s Edinburgh Review later in the year also focused on 
German success and used it as the basis of a call to arms for Britain, driving at the need 
 
15 “The Fighting of the Future,” The Examiner and London Review, December 10, 1870, 786. 
16 “The Fighting of the Future”, 785. 
17 W. W. Knollys, “Artillery Retrospect of the Last Great War, 1870, with its Lessons for Canadians,” The 
Academy, September 16, 1876, 281-282. 
18 Knollys, “Artillery Retrospect,” 282. 
19 “Military Lessons of the War,” The Examiner,  August 27, 1870, 553. 
20 “Military Lessons,” 553. 
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for the nation to change its attitude to war, and criticising its national unpreparedness, 
considering that historically the nation “has not got herself into fighting condition till 
towards the end of a severe war.”21  The use of the threat of war to underpin a polemic 
on British unpreparedness was to be a repeated theme throughout the decades which 
follow, as a warning associated with fear of the decline of the nation and its Empire.    
The notion of change in warfare was resisted vigorously in some quarters, as can be 
seen strongly from an article entitled ‘The Military Officer of the Future’ from 1873, 
written two years after the end of the Franco-German War and the vindication of the 
more professional approach of the German Army.22  The article implied that dramatic 
change has come to the recent recruitment of officers, brought about through a stated 
‘recent revolution’ in military matters, alluding to the Franco-German War.23  The author 
was, however, entirely critical of the change to recruitment, disparaging ‘book learning’ 
and concluding that “unless some change is made, there is nothing to prevent the army 
being inundated with a class of persons who may be ‘officers’ but certainly will not be 
‘gentlemen’.”24  The author strongly believed in the need and benefits of a strict class 
divide between officers and men and remained confident of the superiority of British 
officers as leaders.  From the perspective of future warfare, it simply disregarded any 
change in technical conditions or a need for officers to become more educated in 
response to changes in weaponry.  Such conservatism, albeit rarely presented so firmly, 
was to be a feature of some writers up to 1914, who refused to believe that new 
technology or social changes affected the fundamentals of the Army and the practice of 
war. 
The countervailing argument was expressed in the same year in The Saturday Review, 
which carried a critique of military practice, this time regarding an official publication 
from the War Office entitled ‘A Precis of Modern Tactics.’25  Like so many other reports 
 
21 “Thoughts Suggested by the War,” Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine, December 1870, 775. 
22 “The Military Officer of the Future,” The Saturday Review, July 5, 1873, 17. 
23 “Military Officer,” 17. 
24 “Military Officer,” 18. 
25 “The War Office Guide to Tactics,” Saturday Review, November 15, 1873, 640-641. 
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in the periodicals, this takes a military publication as its starting point, and 
demonstrates an understanding of similar works on tactics published in Germany.26  In 
contrast to the previous article, it applauded the ‘Precis’ and its support for the 
development of ‘scientific’ officers.27   The terms ‘science’ and ‘scientific warfare’, are 
widely used throughout the period, especially towards the end of the century.  This can 
be seen as early as 1870, with the appropriately titled ‘Science in War’, written during 
the Franco-German War, commenting that the war had already demonstrated “the 
superior importance of what we may call the higher mathematics of war, compared with 
military mechanics.”28  The article from Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine cited above 
made a similar point, stating that “time and space….have been greatly restricted in 
power by advancing science.”29   
Plevna 
For all the occasional comments on science in warfare, however, reaction to what the 
new weapons used in the Franco-German War were somewhat mixed and muted.  There 
was certainly no consensus that war in the future would be different, but all this was to 
change with the reaction to the Russo-Turkish War.  Weaponry itself had evolved 
considerably in the six years since the conclusion of the former conflict in 1871, and so 
did the response from the periodicals.  The latter war itself was extensively reported in 
Britain and the impact of new weapons on its conduct was understood from the 
beginning.  For example, one article from The Saturday Review, published in 1878, 
concluded that:  
In those twenty-five years [since the Crimean War] has been compressed without 
any exaggeration the ordinary progress of centuries.  Since the Crimean epoch 
the tactics of each arm have been transformed.  The functions of each arm have 
been greatly amplified.  The old drill formation, manoeuvres, mode of attack and 
 
26 “War Office Guide,” 641. 
27 “War Office Guide,” 641. 
28 “Science and War,” The Athenaeum, September 3, 1870, 312. 
29 “Thoughts Suggested,” 775. 
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defence by infantry, the ponderous mass employment of cavalry, the 
conventional figuring of artillery, are now only to be found in historical records.30   
The author’s intent was to awaken the British establishment to the need to reform, so 
the quotation – like the article – verges on hyperbole.  Nonetheless, the emphasis is 
clear: the pace of technological change had accelerated and war was transformed.  After 
a lengthy assessment of the need to improve the quality and training of British 
volunteers, the author noted that the use of entrenchments in warfare had grown in 
importance, adding that this had already been demonstrated by the American Civil War, 
which had concluded thirteen years earlier.31  The power of rifles and entrenchment 
were, indeed, the chief points raised in relation to the one battle of the war which 
received heavy coverage in the press, the Battle of Plevna, a five month struggle between 
Russian attackers and Turkish defenders.  The Russians suffered huge casualties at the 
hands of the Turkish defenders, who were entrenched and armed with modern rifles, 
and the siege only ended when the Russians were able to bring up greatly superior 
numbers of men and force the Turks to surrender.   
Plevna was widely reported in the press, with more than 80 correspondents visiting the 
front line, including detailed coverage by the experienced journalist Archibald Forbes 
(one of the authors of the fictional Great War of 189- discussed in Chapter Six).32  The 
nature of the Battle was made clear to readers, as shown in this example from 
September 1877, published in The Lancaster Gazette, drawing on the testimony of a 
correspondent from The Daily Telegraph, described the Battle and how the Russian dead 
numbered 8,000 and “lay in even lines, just….as swathes of corn lie in the cornfield.”33  
 
30 “Lessons of the War,” Saturday Review, February 23, 1878, 235. 
31 “Lessons,” 236. 
32 Roth, “Historical Dictionary,” 107.  Archibald Forbes had been in the Army and was someone who admired 
Prussian military effectiveness, although liberal in his politics.  One of his article on the future of war, written in 
1891, is cited below, which was written contemporaneously with the publication of The Great War of 189-, of 
which he was one of the authors.  Biographical details from The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
www.oxfordnb.com, entry for Archibald Forbes (1838-1900), https://doi.org/10/1093/ref:odnb/9815.   
33 “The Russo-Turkish War,” Lancaster Gazette, September 22, 1877, 5.  Parts of the Turkish Army were 
equipped with Winchester Model 1866 repeating rifles, a derivation of earlier examples used during the 
American Civil War; Graeme Rimer,  Firearms: An Illustrated History (London: Dorling Kindersley, 2014), 118. 
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Although mass casualties were undoubtedly a feature of battles in the first half of the 
nineteenth century, the author was quick to pin the blame of this scene on the “deadly 
nature of the musketry fire which the Turks had fed with the almost perfect weapon 
which had been put into their hands for this war.”34  Here is recognition of the change in 
warfare brought about by the widespread introduction of the breech loading rifle, which 
was capable of firing at a rate several times faster than the muzzle loading rifles with 
which most armies of the mid-century had been armed.35 
Other articles make the same point, albeit in a somewhat more sober fashion; in The 
Examiner, published on the same day as the report in The Lancaster Gazette, the author 
concluded that “if there is one lesson which taught more strongly than another by this 
miserable war it is that the breech-loader gives the defence in [defensive] positions a 
much greater superiority over the attack than it possessed in muzzle-loading days.”36  
The remainder of the article concentrated on the lack of relevance of the ‘barbarous’ 
Russo-Turkish war to the British Army, although the author recognised a need for it to 
adapt to changing circumstances.  The article ‘Under Fire’, written in January 1878 in 
Chamber’s Journal, is more explicit in its analysis, and stated that traditional massed 
assaults in column could only lead to disastrous casualties when breech loaders are 
used, citing the huge Russian losses by way of example.37  The author then drew a 
parallel with the Franco-German War, noting how the Prussian Guard lost heavily in its 
assault on Gravelotte, when they too attacked in column.  This illustrates lessons of the 
war of 1870 being brought into clearer focus by the Russo-Turkish War.  The article also 
noted the importance of entrenchments and the relatively high losses incurred by 
officers, which were both to be salient features of the First World War. 
 
34 “Russo-Turkish War,” 1. 
35 As will be seen, much of the discussion in the periodicals concerned the introduction of breechloading rifles, 
which enabled soldiers to load and fire rounds rapidly, in contrast to the older muzzle loaders used as late as 
the American Civil War, which like the Wars of 1866 and 1870 in Europe, saw their widespread introduction.  
By the 1880s and 1890s armies were being re-equipped again with magazine rifles capable of firing up to 
twenty rounds a minute, such as the British Lee-Enfield which was entering service in 1898, and was to remain 
the Army’s main infantry arm, with minor modifications, until the 1950s. 
36 “Some Lessons of the War,” The Examiner, September 22, 1877, 1194. 
37 “Under Fire,” Chamber’s Journal, January 19, 1878, 44.  Columnal formations had been used since the 
Napoleonic period, to mass troops for an attack.  They had always been vulnerable to defensive fire, but 
provided the attackers with an advantage in morale and control by keeping the troops in close order.  
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Plevna was to feature in the narratives of war right through to the end of the nineteenth 
century, demonstrating its importance as the event which marked the widespread 
recognition of the power of breechloading rifles.  For example, the battle is referenced in 
an article in 1897 in Chamber’s Journal, entitled emphatically as ‘Science and 
Slaughter.’38  Even later, when writing on the South African War, which was then in 
progress, a writer in The Nineteenth Century stated that, “unfortunately the training of 
our officers in military tactics has been directed rather to the study of the Franco-
German War than to that of the Russo-Turkish campaign.”39  The emphasis here is that – 
even after 22 years – Plevna and the wider war were the moment warfare changed, with 
the author criticising the British Army for its conservatism, as part of the long tradition 
of articles by civilian writers attacking the military establishment.  What is evident here, 
again, is the way in which Plevna and the Russo-Turkish War highlighted lessons from 
the American Civil War and Franco-German War, neither of which had been the subject 
of such vigorous debate eight years earlier. 
Articles relating to tactics in the light of the Russo-Turkish War resonated through the 
decade or so after 1878.  An example is an article on field artillery, written in 1881, 
where the author draws on the lessons of both the Russo-Turkish War and the War of 
1870 to theorise that artillery had become more vulnerable to rifle fire, as well as being 
less useful due to the wider use of entrenchments and dispersed infantry formations.40  
The author based his assessment on statistics from the Franco-German War and, as an 
advocate of artillery (it seems likely he was a serving officer), put his hope in new forms 
of guns, including what would now be termed machine guns, to restore the value of 
artillery on the battlefield in future.41  This illustrates an understanding of change and 
he put far more faith in new invention than was typically expressed ten years earlier 
with the discussion of the mitrailleur.42  It also illustrates the difficulty which military 
 
38 “Science and Slaughter,” Chamber’s Journal, May 22, 1897, 326. 
39 Thring, “Lessons of the War,” The Nineteenth Century, November 1900, 696. 
40 “The Future of Field Artillery,” Saturday Review, November 19, 1881, 633.   
41 “Future of Field Artillery,” 634.  This includes a reference to Colonel Brackenbury’s suggestion for the use of 
metal shields to protect gunners against infantry fire, as discussed in C. B. Brackenbury, “Ironclad Field 
Artillery,” The Nineteenth Century, July 1878, 40-50.  
42 For example, see “The Place of the Mitrailleur in War,” 296. 
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theorists faced at the time – change was rapid and reasonable inferences from one 
conflict, such as diminishment of artillery, could be rapidly overturned by the 
development of new weapons.43  Hindsight makes it possible to criticise contemporary 
writers for what seem like eccentric views, but rapid change was disorientating, 
especially at a time when weaponry was evolving with frightening rapidity. 
Two further articles written at the turn of the 1880s usefully summarise the state of 
debate on tactics at the time; they draw on military papers or lectures and are alive to 
the changes brought about by new technology.  They are emphatic as to the effect of long 
range rifle fire, once more quoting heavy Prussian casualties in the Battle of Gravelotte 
in 1870, and the range at which Turkish infantry engaged Russian attackers at Plevna.44  
There is also agreement that the way in which cavalry, infantry and artillery – the classic 
divisions of a nineteenth century army – acted on the battlefield would have to change, 
with infantry becoming the dominant arm.45  It contains a call, echoing the article above, 
that artillery should be abolished after Plevna.46  There is also recognition that while 
close order infantry attacks were no longer viable, dispersed order will lead to 
difficulties commanding troops in loose order.47  To re-iterate, these articles show how 
military thinking, and its reporting in the press, had changed in the decade since the 
Franco-German War, as well as illustrating a keen understanding of how great the effect 
of new weapons would be on future European warfare.  Nonetheless, they do not move 
on to discuss the impact of such changes on the feasibility of war in future, and do not 
synthesise their findings from a tactical level to a strategic level.  These articles imagine 
war continuing to be fought along the same broad lines, rather than being changed at a 
fundamental level. 
 
43 At the time the range of rifle fire had increased so rapidly that it threatened artillerymen, reducing its 
effectiveness, and yet later in the century, this position changed again with the introduction of longer range 
artillery.  For a view on artillery typical of the time, see Dyke’s Lectures on Tactics,” Saturday Review, April 15, 
1882, 472-474. 
44 For the comments on Gravelotte, see “Long-Range Infantry Fire,” Saturday Review, December 18, 1880, 765, 
and “Art IV. Gunpowder & Modern Warfare,” The Dublin Review, October 1879, 392.  For comment on Plevna, 
see “Long-Range Infantry Fire,” 765. 
45 “Dyke’s Lectures,” 472, and “Gunpowder and Modern Warfare,” 383. 
46 “Dyke’s Lectures,” 473. 
47 “Gunpowder & Modern Warfare,” 389 and “Dyke’s Lectures,” 472. 
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Even more than the artillery, there was considerable debate on cavalry during the 
period, with the War of 1870 leading to some military commentators suggesting that the 
use of cavalry on the battlefield was no longer feasible in the era of breechloading rifles, 
and that only by becoming mounted infantry – or ‘dragoons’ to use the term familiar 
from the Early Modern – could they still be of value.  It is far easier to find articles about 
cavalry than artillery at this time, and as noted in Chapter One, debate on the role of the 
cavalry went on throughout the period 1870 to 1914, with disproportionate interest 
being shown in it, because of its associations with class, chivalry and notions of man-to-
man combat.  The discussion on the cavalry after 1878 also highlights the uncertainty 
felt in forecasting the future, which can be seen in two reviews of the same work, A 
History of Cavalry from the Earliest Times by Colonel Denison.  The reviewer in The 
Athenaeum was highly critical of Denison’s suggestion that the majority of the cavalry 
should be rearmed as dragoons, taking a conservative view of military practice.48  In 
contrast C. W. Wilson, writing in The Academy, agreed strongly with Denison’s positive 
view of mounted infantry, although considering that ‘true’ cavalry could still have a role 
conducting charges with small units.49   
One anonymous author writing in The Saturday Review took a middle road, suggesting 
that it was impossible to predict the best role for cavalry in the future, and that a mix of 
‘true’ cavalry and mounted infantry is the best response when “in this age of change, it is 
dangerous to adopt any fixed, unalterable, standard.”50  He is making explicit the 
difficulty of forecasting the future, and of the dangers of making changes to military 
practice on the basis of such unstable foundations.  Such voices were rare, however, and 
much of the cavalry debate continued with entrenched (to borrow an appropriate 
phrase) positions on whether or not to fight mounted, which used evidence from recent 
wars to their own ends.  More widely, however, these articles show recognition that the 
 
48 “A History of Cavalry from the Earliest Times: with Lessons for the Future,” The Athenaeum, June 2, 1877, 
698.   
49 C. W. Wilson, “A History of Cavalry from the Earliest Times: with Lessons for the Future,” The Academy,  
September 8, 1877, 239. For another conservative view, see Keith Fraser’s vociferous calls for the retention of 
cavalry armed with swords or lances, in his lengthy article on ‘European Cavalry’ in 1884; Keith Fraser, 
“European Cavalry,” The Fortnightly Review, Oct 1884, 502.  Another article which is highly critical of the 
concept of mounted infantry, is “Mounted Infantry,” Saturday Review, September 24, 1881, 388-389. 
50 “Cavalry Tactics,” The Saturday Review, April 20, 1878, 505. 
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idea of rapid and open-ended change was beginning to be appreciated in the light of the 
Russo-Turkish War.   
The War also generated broader debate on what the new weapons would mean for the 
future, as in an article written in 1878 entitled ‘War and Science’, which remarked that 
the breechloader had taken away the ‘heroism’ of previous conflicts, although the author 
managed to inject considerable sarcasm into the phrase, noting that “scientific soldiers 
are on the outlook for some means of circumventing the new modes of defence.”51  The 
author also looked forward to more terrible means of destruction on the battlefield, 
imagining the use of poison gas and aerial bombardment, and suggested that while the 
use of poison-shells may seem less chivalrous than breechloading rifles, both 
represented scientific methods of killing with an equal standing in ethics.52  The author 
was looking further than the immediate future than most writing at the time, and while 
his forecasts are vague, they show a growing understanding of change, and the 
implications of the continued development of weapons to uncertain ends.   
A different sort of speculation is evident in a rather diffuse article written by Keningdale 
Cook slightly earlier in 1877, although it too states that “war has become a scientific 
problem.”53  Cook also suggested that the future will see the use of chemical – or 
electrical – weapons capable of annihilating  a battalion from miles distant.54  He goes 
further, however, concluding that “we have seen such vast changes in the methods of 
war that there is no antecedent improbability against the advent of changes still more 
vast.”55  Cook even wondered if science might eventually lead to war being so terrible 
that it will not be waged.56  He looked back to more chivalrous times, as he saw them, 
with affection, and hoped for a peaceful future, with an obvious sense of horror for the 
 
51 “War and Science,” The Examiner, February 9, 1878, 168. 
52 “War and Science,” 170. 
53 Keningdale Cook, “The Logic of the Methods of War,” Dublin University Magazine, November 1877, 515. 
54 Cook, “Methods of War,” 518. 
55 Cook, “Methods of War,” 522. 
56 Cook, “Methods of War,” 522. 
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way new weapons had changed war.   As will be seen below, he was not alone in 
wondering if the increased power of armaments might eventually bring an end to war. 
Further appreciation of the effect of new technology on war on the whole is evident in 
two articles from more than a decade later.  Knollys, who penned the 1876 review of the 
effectiveness of artillery cited above, presented a lengthy summary, in 1890, of ‘War in 
the Future’.57  Key to his thesis was the idea that change would continue, such that “it is 
the opinion of thoughtful officers that some at [sic] all events of the new factors will 
produce a startling modification in the art of war.”58  Knollys creates - or has drawn from 
other sources – a remarkably astute vision of the future which is close to the First World 
War, such that an attack would be conducted as follows: 
I therefore see nothing for it, when it becomes absolutely necessary to attack a 
deliberately occupied position of fair strength, but to advance  by a succession of 
stages, the assailants entrenching themselves at the end of each stage under 
cover of their artillery. Such being the case, I consider that the defence, if 
conducted by resolute troops, is now superior to the attack.59   
Knollys is suggesting that war would resemble the siege warfare of the seventeenth 
century, stressing the importance of railways to bring up troops, and that cavalry would 
have to demonstrate a greater level of initiative for their arm to operate successfully.  He 
even considered the possibility of dirigible balloons and searchlights being used widely 
in warfare in the future.60  What differentiates his assessment of the future of warfare 
from the articles discussed above is that it is an unusual synthesises of observations 
from recent conflicts. 
Archibald Forbes, writing in 1891, also argued that the introduction of magazine rifles 
represented a revolution in military matters, in a more historically focused article which 
 
57 W. W. Knollys, “War in the Future,” The Fortnightly Review, August 1890, 274-281. 
58 Knollys, “War in the Future,” 274. 
59 Knollys, “War in the Future,” 279. 
60 Knollys, “War in the Future,” 276. 
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contrasted their use with muskets of the ‘smoothbore’ era.61  Forbes contended that the 
introduction of smokeless powder would further strengthen the defence, and that 
entrenchments would play a significant role in future wars.62   His assessment was less 
profound than Knolly’s, as it was largely based on a discussion on small arms, but he also 
mused on the build-up of European armies such that: 
In conclusion, it may be worthwhile to point out that the current impression, that 
the maintenance by states of ‘bloated armaments’ is a keen incentive to war, is 
fallacious.  How often do we hear, ‘There must be a big war soon; the powers cannot 
long stand the cost of looking at each other, all armed to the teeth.’  War is infinitely 
more costly than the costliest preparedness.63 
. 
Forbes was saying that the sheer cost of war deterred conflict, and went on to suggest 
that the shadow of national bankruptcy hung over the great powers.  His article is one of 
those which exhibited a deep fear for what a war could bring, which will now be 
explored in more detail.   
A Great War in Europe 
The perceived imminence and terrible consequences of a Great War in Europe were 
discussed in numerous articles in the late 1880s and 1890s.  This trend is illustrated by 
two pieces written by authors with very different political positions, both of who 
expressed deep fears of a future war in Europe.  ‘Progress and War’ was written by 
Goldwin Smith and suggested that “science is now changing the fundamental beliefs and 
through them the life of man.” 64  He held that although armies were being driven to fight 
at greater distances, in the end war could become so destructive as to be impossible.65  
He retained some optimism, in the sense that the wounded were being treated better in 
 
61 Archibald Forbes, “The Warfare of the Future,” The Nineteenth Century: A Monthly Review, May 1891, 782. 
62 “Warfare of the Future,” 789. 
63 “Warfare of the Future,” 795. 
64 Goldwin Smith, “Progress and War,” Macmillan’s Magazine, July 1889, 235. 
65 Smith, “Progress and War,” 236. 
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modern warfare, but his tone was that science is changing the world and warfare, and 
not for the better.66  Smith was a noted journalist with liberal views, radicalised by the 
cause of anti-slavery during the American Civil War, who opposed British imperialism in 
the late Victorian period, including the South African War.67  In contrast, Frederick 
Greenwood, who published the aptly titled ‘Great War: or Civilisation its own 
Executioner’ in Macmillan’s Magazine in 1893 was a Tory and anti-liberal (as well as the 
inaugural editor of The Pall Mall Gazette).68  He wrote that, if anything, the fear of war 
was so widely held that: 
Wherever there is an intelligent or tolerably instructed mind in Europe, then you 
are pretty sure to find something like a settled belief that though the disaster may 
not arrive next year, nor the next, a war more sweeping and terrible than as yet 
recorded is almost a matter of certainty. 69   
Greenwood’s article is extremely pessimistic, and it is interesting that both he and the 
liberal Smith shared fear of what a Great War in Europe would bring.  Greenwood’s 
article in particular is eerily prophetic, writing that a coalition war was likely, and that 
“the Great War of universal prophecy will be waged by groups of nations, so that groups 
of nations may be crushed almost irretrievably.”70  His comment was, with hindsight, 
prophetic, as 1917-18 saw the collapse of the Russian, German and Austro-Hungarian 
Empires.  Greenwood was also fearful of what progress could bring, including aerial 
bombardment, writing at a time when only very limited controlled flight had been 
achieved, but alive to the fact that technological change would dominate future 
 
66 Smith is derisive towards cavalry, suggesting that they “have been rendered as useful as elephants except in 
the character of mounted riflemen”, from Smith, “Progress and War,” 236. 
67 Biographical details from The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, www.oxfordnb.com, entry for 
Goldwin Smith (1823-1910), https://doi.org/10/1093/ref:odnb/36142.  
68 Biographical details from The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, www.oxfordnb.com, entry for 
Frederick Green (1830-1909), https://doi.org/10/1093/ref:odnb/33544.  
69 Frederick Greenwood, “The Great War: or, Civilisation its own Executioner,” Macmillan’s Magazine. October 
1893, 414. 
70 Greenwood, “The Great War,” 416. 
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conflict.71  Care must be taken, of course, to pick out such examples of accurate 
prediction, especially amongst a wealth of sources, but what runs through these fearful 
predictions is the anticipation of continued, unstoppable future invention.   As 
Greenwood put it, “war has not been presented yet with its deadliest equipment.”72   
Similar sentiments are also reflected in ‘Armed Europe’ written by A. Alison in 
Blackwood’s Magazine in 1893, with its picture of the five European powers in a state of 
constant armed preparation.73  Another article written by an anonymous contributor in 
The Speaker in 1894, entitled ‘The Next War’, also suggests that the fear of an imminent 
war was widespread, such that:   
Horror of the unproved, unknown, but imagined effects of modern armaments 
has hitherto, it is generally believed, helped to keep the Powers from conflict; but 
if the inventors go on meeting attack with defence, and if the critics go on 
propounding the most contradictory estimates of what is likely to happen, it is 
possible that sheer curiosity, piqued before endurance, may in the end neutralise 
the vague dread which is now so operative, and that the nations may find 
themselves deciding the great question of peace and war, as of old, at the naked 
promptings of passion and interest. 74  
The author is suggesting that the balance of power had so far held, due to the very 
uncertainty of the effects of new weaponry, but that irrational self-interest could drive 
Europe to war.  He also wondered if a generation unused to the realities of war could 
bring about its onset through ignorance of its likely consequences, which Chapter One 
 
71 A significant milestone in controlled flight was achieved on 2 July 1900 by the airship Zeppelin LZ-1, four 
years before the Wright Brothers became the first to make a successful flight with a heavier than air craft.  
Fourteen years after their first successful flight, Zeppelins were indeed used to bombard enemy cities from the 
air. 
72 Greenwood, “The Great War,” 417. 
73 A. Alison, “Armed Europe: How Coming Events Cast Their Shadows Before,” Blackwood’s Edinburgh 
Magazine, December 1893, 755-764.  The five European Powers, it can be assumed, are France, Germany, 
Austro-Hungary, Russia and Italy. 
74 “The Next War,” The Speaker: the Liberal Review, June 9, 1894, 634. 
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does suggest was one contributing factor towards war in 1914 being welcomed by 
many.75 
Other writers also pointed to rapid change as the root of pessimistic predictions, both in 
terms of the baleful effect of ‘science’ on armaments, and in the rapidly expanding size of 
contemporary armies.  For example, from 1893, again from The Speaker, “The New Year 
opens with Europe at peace.  But six armies, huger than any the world has ever seen, 
armed with a deadlier enginery of scientific efficiency hitherto unprecedented, stand 
watching one another…”76  A year later and Charles Roberts wrote that the number of 
Europeans under arms had risen from 2.2 million in 1869 to 3.2 million in 1892.77  Yet 
another, G. Osborne Morgan, also spared little in his description of what would happen 
in a conflict between France and Russia on the one hand, and the Central Powers on the 
other: “a war between States capable of mobilising such enormous masses of men and 
wielding such tremendous engines of destruction…..is one from which the imagination 
recoils.”78  Morgan’s article, like others, focuses on the realities – and dangers  - of the 
contemporary European political position, with the Dual Alliance of France and Russia 
facing the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austro-Hungary and Italy.79 
Although grounded in the contemporary diplomatic position, Morgan’s article also 
recognised that the specific potential trigger for conflict could and would change, such 
that the true threat was simply the existence of “some twenty-seven millions of men 
ready to spring to arms in a fortnight.”80  Equally importantly, material progress in 
armaments had a direct bearing on international relations, making the Powers reluctant 
 
75 “The Next War,” 634.  The author writes positively of the work of Forbes, author of “The Warfare of the 
Future.” 
76 “Peace Prospects in Europe,” The Speaker: the Liberal Review, January 7, 1893, 7-8. 
77 Charles Roberts, “European Militarism and an Alternative,” The Economic Review, January 1894, 87-101.  
Figures presented in “Armed Europe” broadly support these figures, although the author suggests that the 
peacetime strength of the five powers is 2.5 million, with a much higher figure for wartime strength. 
78 G. Osborne Morgan, “Peace or War,” The Contemporary Review, October 1891, 475. 
79 See also, for example, Alison, “Armed Europe” and Greenwood, “The Great War.” 
80 Morgan, “Peace or War,” 469.  His figure seems high, even including the use of wartime reserves, but his 
point matters more than the precise figures.   The disparity in weapons is echoed in Morgan, “Peace 
Prospects,” 8, with the author thinking it likely that Russia would not attempt any aggression until its armies 
were equipped with magazine rifles.  
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to start conflict out of the uncertainty of what new weapons might do, which is the same 
point made in ‘The Next War’, quoted above.81  There was, however, uncertainty over 
this point as well, and Greenwood, in his article ‘The Great War’, wondered if a new 
weapon could actually precipitate war, citing the role the Prussian needle gun had had in 
the nation’s victory over Austro-Hungary in 1866, and suggesting that an aggressor 
believing they had an advantage in weaponry might start a war, albeit with uncertain 
and possibly terrible consequences.82   
These articles are all alive to the uncertainty brought about by advances in weaponry, 
which might arrest the likelihood of conflict, but could equally cause one nation to attack 
another on the basis of a perceived superiority in armament.  They also take the lessons 
of Plevna and expand them into a strategic context, linking the power of weaponry with 
the vast expansion in the size of armies seen in Europe.  The crucial exception to the 
growth of armies in Europe was Britain, which commentators considered had a special 
and distinct status amongst the European powers.  While the impartiality of the writers 
is questionable, their views reflect the British Government’s policy of staying out of 
Continental alliances, and they assumed that the nation would not be involved in a 
future European War.83   In his analysis of the strength of European armies, for example, 
Alison wrote that Britain “will remain neutral so long as her interests are not directly 
threatened.”84  Greenwood suggested that there was danger in Britain being drawn into 
a war on mainland Europe, with “the British Empire [being] doomed to go to pieces in 
the Great War which otherwise might have been avoided.”85  Similarly, Charles Roberts 
considered that there was a danger of Britain being drawn into a European War, 
worrying that the country was “helplessly drifting into the European competition in 
 
81 Morgan, “Peace and War,” 472.  Morgan makes a prescient point later in his article, when discussing any 
invasion of Australia, claiming that a colonist once told him that, ‘I do not envy the force which attempts a 
landing in a country where every man can ride and every man can shoot straight,’ from Morgan, “Peace and 
War,” 476.  Apocryphal or not, this assertion was to prove true in 1899, when the British Army invaded the 
Boer Republics and began the South African War against an army of farmers armed with modern rifles. 
82 Greenwood, “The Great War,” 418. 
83 Morgan, “Peace or War,” 476. 
84 Alison, “Armed Europe,” 763. 
85 Greenwood, “The Great War,” 424.   
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military armaments.”86  Their concerns were right, of course, and the early twentieth 
century saw the end of the policy of ‘splendid isolation’, the Entente Cordiale with 
France, and involvement in the First World War from the start. 
The 1890s also saw a wider apprehension towards the future of the British Empire, with 
a number of writers discussing the possible impact of a war on Britain’s food supply.87  
T. A. Le Mesurier recognised that the increase in Britain’s population over the past 
century, as well as higher living standards (criticised through people being too used to 
luxuries), had made the country more vulnerable to attack by ‘privateers’.88  Other 
writers looked at different aspects of Britain’s position, such as Breton, whose ‘Thoughts 
on Imperial Defence’ suggested that given the size of the Empire, defence was now 
required, rather than further territorial acquisition.89  A growing sense of vulnerability 
is also evident in articles suggesting a closer relationship with America, and it is hard 
not to see desperation in articles seeing the United States as a growing power with 
cultural and historical links to Britain and its Empire.90  These articles are not concerned 
directly with technological change, although they often grapple with the effects of wider 
change – such as with food production or the growth of armies in Europe.  
There are fewer articles on war in the future towards the end of the decade, perhaps 
reflecting the fact that a Great War had not happened, although two later articles present 
both a fear of war and hope that conflict could lead to a moral revival.  H. W. Wilson, 
writing in 1898, presented the same familiar fears as earlier writers, such that “the 
growing expenditure on armaments and the prevalence of militarism…are the object of 
 
86 Charles Roberts, “European Militarism and an Alternative,” The Economic Review, January 1894, 87. 
87 See T. A. Le Mesurier, “Our Food Supply in Time of War,” Westminster Review, June 1897, 658-668.  See also 
G. S. Clarke, “War, Trade and Food Supply,” The National Review, July 1897, 756-769. 
88 Le Mesurier, “Food Supply”, 659.  He writes of privateers, looking back to commerce raiders such as the 
Confederate raider ‘Alabama’ in the American Civil War, but his commentary could equally be applied to the 
threat for submarines, which were not to enter widespread service until the first decade of the twentieth 
century.   
89 H. D’Arch Breton, “Thoughts on Imperial Defence,” Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine, May 1895, 665-688. 
90 See Frederick Greenwood, “The Anglo-American Future.” The Nineteenth Century, July 1898, 1-11; and also 
Le Mesurier, “Food Supply”.  Breton instead discusses closer ties with the dominions of the Empire, which was 
an idea much discussed at the turn of the century, in response to concerns over its future in response to ‘rising’ 
powers such as Germany.  Chapter Four discusses the vogue for Anglo-American cooperation in more detail. 
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solicitude and alarm in this country.”91  Wilson also wrote, however, that war could 
counter the ‘degeneration’ of the physical condition of city dwellers such that “it may be 
the salvation of our race.”92  Sydney Low, in the same year, also wrote favourably of war, 
criticising the possibility of disarmament, and suggesting that it alone drives “the 
highest excellence in art, science, learning and industry.”93  He further feared that 
disarmament would mean that the ‘Aryan race’ could face a threat from other ‘races’ 
“possessed of that amount of intelligence necessary for the handling of scientific warlike 
appliances.”94  He called for Britain to increase spending on armaments, and believed 
that future wars will be short but terrible, a commonly held assumption of the time 
discussed at more length in Chapter Seven.  His concerns over degeneration, conflict 
between races and the purifying nature of war are not untypical of the time, although 
many more articles regard war with deep concern.  In one regard Wilson is eccentric, 
suggesting that modern armaments had made no difference to warfare, and that they 
were effectively a costly nuisance.95   
The period 1878 to 1898 saw a growing recognition that war in the future would not 
necessarily resemble war in the past, bringing with it a somewhat vague but unsettling 
dread, because of the very uncertainty new technology was introducing to warfare.  This 
realisation is evident in the way history was not used to bolster the arguments put 
forward in the periodicals.  There are relatively few articles on land warfare which draw 
on history to underpin their arguments, instead focusing more on future change. 96  
There are isolated exceptions, such as when discussing cavalry, or in the lengthy 1879 
 
91 H. W. Wilson, “The Growth of the World’s Armaments,” The Nineteenth Century: A Monthly Review, May 
1898, 716. 
92 Wilson, “Growth of the World’s Armaments,” 716. 
93 Sidney Low, “Should Europe Disarm,” The Nineteenth Century: A Monthly Review, October 1898, 523. 
94 Low, “Should Europe Disarm,” 524.  He goes on to conjure up a vision of a Mongolian horde pouring across 
the Continents, comparing it to Wells’ “clever fantasy of the inhabitants of Mars swooping …upon the green 
fields of Earth.”  This is ironic in that Wells’ partly conceived The War of the Worlds as an analogy  of Europeans 
with superior weapon conquering more ‘primitive’ opponents. 
95 “Should Europe Disarm,” 530. 
96 There are also articles which discuss technological change, history, and warfare at sea.  Nauticus, “Sea 
Power: Its Past and Future,” The Fortnightly Review, December 1893, 849-868, contains a lengthy discussion of 
the Napoleonic Wars.  H. Geffcken, “The Future of Maritime Warfare,” The Contemporary Review, January 
1894, 29-45, discusses the impact of steam power on maritime  
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discussion on the evolution of gunpowder weapons, but they are relatively rare.97  Only 
one subject with a historical perspective relating to land warfare was discussed at 
length, and that was what casualties might be expected in future conflicts.  Here there is 
a surprising contention: namely that they would be lower in the future as a result of the 
introduction of more powerful weapons.  In 1878, for example, an analysis of the Russo-
Turkish War noted that the losses in recent wars had been lower than in Napoleonic 
times, as a proportion of the size of armies “notwithstanding (or perhaps in consequence 
of) improved armaments.”98  The author concluded that this has happened because of 
fighting in loose order, and through an understandable reluctance of troops to stand in 
the face of fire, while noting that Plevna was an exception to this rule because the 
Russians attacked in heavy columns and paid the price for what he saw as antiquated 
tactics.   
Other articles make the same point about casualties, with the author of the lengthy 
historical treatise ‘Gunpowder and Modern Weapons’ commenting that “there is no 
doubt that a smaller number are killed now than formerly was the case before 
gunpowder was invented, and a still smaller number now than in the wars at the 
beginning of the century.”99  Knollys, in his article on the future of war, presented a 
similar argument but commented that the losses of individual units in an army could 
well be higher, seeing them almost annihilated, whereas the proportion of total 
casualties in an army might fall, in many ways foreshadowing the shattering losses 
incurred by individual battalions in the First World War.100  The same argument was 
made towards the end of the 1890s, still using Plevna as a point of reference, saying that 
casualties would “deter any general in the future from attempting to storm fortified 
 
97 For example, “A History of Cavalry,” and “Gunpowder & Modern Weapons.” 
98 “Under Fire,” 45. 
99 “Gunpowder & Modern Weapons,” 394.  A similar point is made in “The Next War”, 634, quoting work from 
Forbes. 
100 Knollys, “War in the Future,” 281. 
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positions held by troops armed with breech-loaders until the defenders have been 
thoroughly demoralised by artillery fire.”101 
As with much of the discussion of future war in this period, there is a detachment in 
these articles, amounting to coldness.  There were exceptions, such as Knollys, for 
example, who commented on the ‘moral’ effect of future combat and the trial of crossing 
a hostile fire zone in loose order, suggesting that it would require considerable 
discipline and esprit de corps, which he considered ‘English’ troops to possess.102   
Further, the author of ‘Under Fire’ ended his piece with a very humane statement on the 
effect of war: “terrible it is to think that when men meet in battle the rapid fire of the 
rifle is doing its work not only in the field, but far away in distant cities and villages 
where the sound of the fighting cannot be heard; and where there are women and 
children and old men to whom that fight will bring sorrow and pain and even 
death….which our statistics cannot touch.”103  Such sentiments were rare in the articles 
on the future of war, but the article shares with the others a recognition that warfare 
was changing due to improvements in weaponry.104  A few commentators saw the 
chance for national or cultural renewal in a Great War, but most saw disaster. 
Imperial Overkill 
One colonial war figured heavily in the periodicals and press in 1898, a year before the 
South African War, and that was the campaign in the Soudan.  Technological advances in 
weaponry and medicine, coupled with imperial rivalry, resulted in the European powers 
establishing formal empires over the vast majority of Africa, as well as Oceania and 
 
101 “Science and Slaughter,” 326. 
102 Knollys, “War in the Future,” 281. 
103 “Under Fire”, 46-47. 
104 Engels, who was so interested in warfare that he earned the nickname ‘the General’ from Marx,  predicted 
the likely outcome of a European War in apocalyptic but prescient terms in 1888: “eight to ten million soldiers 
will destroy one another and bleed Europe white. .. .the destruction of the Thirty Years War will be 
concentrated into three or four years.” Engels’ prediction is almost precise, but he was not alone in voicing his 
fears, as articles from the periodicals illustrate.  See a letter from Engels on 7 January 1888, quoted in Martin 
Kitchen, “ Friedrich Engels' Theory of War,” Military Affairs, 3 (1977): 122. 
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South-East Asia, between 1881 and 1914.105  Modern breechloading rifles and Maxim 
guns – the first true machine guns – enabled small numbers of disciplined European 
troops to defeat far larger indigenous armies, which perhaps reached its culmination on 
2 September 1898 at the Battle of Omdurman, described by Ferguson as “imperial 
overkill”.106  The Battle was fought between the army of the Mahdist State in the Sudan, 
commanded by its ruler Abdullah al-Khalifa, and an Anglo-Egyptian army commanded 
by Sir Herbert Kitchener, who sought to overthrow the State and exact vengeance for the 
death of General Gordon in 1884.  The Mahdist army, estimated to have a strength of 
50,000, was larger than Kitchener’s, which was made up of some 8,000 British troops 
and approximately twice as many Egyptian and Sudanese soldiers.  At dawn the 
Dervishes’ conducted a charge against the Anglo-Egyptian army, which possessed 
magazine rifles, machine guns and quick firing artillery on land and on gunboats on the 
Nile.  The result was a one-sided slaughter, with contemporary reports recording 47 
British and Egyptian dead, and 389 wounded, as against an estimated 10,800 Dervish 
dead and 16,000 wounded.107   
The Battle was treated as an event by the British press “that will live long in the memory 
of the British nation.”108  There was an almost desperate triumphalism in many of the 
contemporary accounts, such as a full page illustration in Fun! of the British lion 
savaging a Dervish enemy, presumably al-Khalifa himself, accompanied by the caption 
‘Gordon Avenged.’109  There was also a vigorous debate on the mistreatment of 
prisoners after the Battle, ignited by an accusatory article in The Contemporary Review 
by Bennett.110   It was this periodical, and The Saturday Review, in which Omdurman was 
 
105 Niall Ferguson, Empire (London: Penguin, 2003), 222. 
106 Ferguson, “Empire,” 267.   
107 Wentworth Huyshe, “The Omdurman Victory,” The Saturday Review, September 10, 1898, 333.  
108 “Lyddite – The New Explosive,” Chamber’s Journal, December 31, 1898, 72.  This article is largely technical 
and discusses the impact of Lyddite, a novel, powerful and easily handled explosive used in shells by the British 
Army 
109 “Omdurman” Fun!,  September 13, 1898, 84.  It should be noted that the accompanying verses to the 
illustration also contain an element of contemporary concern over the state of the British Empire, with lines 
regarding the British ‘lion’ such as “That he is old and sickly/ Is constantly averred/ But where are his traducers/ 
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110 Ernest N. Bennett, “After Omdurman,” The Contemporary Review, January 1899, 18-33.  Bennett’s report 
criticises not only the treatment of wounded prisoners, but also alleged widespread theft in the town of 
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most vigorously discussed; Bennett was a Tory politician and journalist who was critical 
of the Mahdist regime but angry at the perceived treatment of prisoners; he was later to 
go on to praise British troops in South Africa.111 
A number of articles, however, focused on devastation wrought by modern weapons and 
the resulting disparity in casualty rates between the two armies.  F. Maurice, writing 
three months after the Battle, gave an account which emphasised the dangers which he 
considers that the Anglo-Egyptian army faced before Omdurman, responding to 
criticism that it had been such a one sided conflict as to count it barely a battle at all.112  
Nonetheless, towards the end of the article, he highlighted “the appalling power of our 
new weapons – notably of the effect of rifled shrapnel, of an approach to quick-firing 
guns, of the long-range volleys of infantry, and, above all, the howitzers with their high-
explosive shells.”113  He concluded that the next European War, which like so many 
others he thought certain to happen, would be fought under conditions utterly dissimilar 
to the Franco-German War, and that those who thought war unchanged by technology 
dangerously misguided.  Tellingly, in response to those who considered morale in 
warfare to be paramount, he commented that “if any accumulation of numbers or any 
supreme readiness to sacrifice life would enable a body of attacking troops to advance in 
front against modern infantry and artillery fire, beyond doubt the Dervishes would have 
broken into our ranks at Omdurman.”114 
Maurice was not alone in his conclusion; in a letter to The Saturday Review, a fortnight 
after the Battle, the correspondent dismissed it as anything but a one-sided affair and 
concluded that “looked at dispassionately, what is it but scientific slaughter on a gigantic 
 
Omdurman, as well as attacked the shelling and destruction of the tomb of the Khalifa, who had established 
the Mahdist State.  The article was widely reported in the press, such as in “At Omdurman,” Dundee Evening 
Telegraph, January 4, 1899; and “Omdurman,” Nottingham Evening Post, January 7, 1899, 4.  It also elicited an 
angry rebuttal from The Review of Reviews, exemplified by articles such as “British Atrocities in the Soudan,” 
The Review of Reviews, January 1899, 47-48; and  “The Alleged Atrocities in the Soudan,” The Review of 
Reviews, February 1899, 138. 
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scale?”115  A third article is more explicit still on what this would mean in a future 
European War, concluding that Omdurman has uncovered the effects of thirty years of 
relentless advancement in armaments.116  Echoing the notion of those who perceived 
the uncertain effects of change, the author is clear that “the Lyddite shells, Maxim guns 
and repeating rifles of today may tomorrow be discarded for instruments still more 
diabolical in their power of destroying human life.”117  The article also highlighted the 
growing scale of European armies and the difficulties that this would impose on 
commanders trying to direct them in battle.118  The article nonetheless concluded with 
the suggestion that disarmament, regardless of its appeal, could lead to an increased 
chance of war, because the sheer destructive power of modern weaponry, coupled with 
large armies, would act to discourage conflict, as other writers had thought earlier in the 
1890s.   
These three articles, and others, express a combination of horror and awe at the power 
of the armaments available to the British Army at Omdurman, but also admiration for 
the bravery of the Dervishes (undoubtedly tempered by the relief of a complete British 
victory), as in the quotation from an author calling himself B. C. S.:  
who with all their faults have shown themselves gallant and devoted warriors – 
trying vainly to get at the enemy, and succeeding only in swelling the heaps of the 
slain and wounded piled up by the Maxims, Lee-Metfords and other infernal 
machines which modern science has placed at the disposal of a modern army?119   
An account in The Daily News set out the “magnificent spectacle” of the Dervish attack 
while also concluding that “it typified in every sense the final desperate struggle of 
barbarism against civilisation, of dogged unreasoning fanaticism against the massed 
 
115 B. C. S., “The Battle of Omdurman,” The Saturday Review, September 17, 1898, 383. 
116 “The Next War in the Light of Omdurman,” The Saturday Review,  September 17, 1898, 369.   
117 “The Next War,” 370. 
118 “The Next War,” 370. 
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triumphs of modern science.”120  The hyperbole extends to a comparison of those 
Dervishes who died around the Khalifa’s standard with the Spartans at Thermopylae, 
which must count as high praise indeed by the Classically educated elite of late 
nineteenth century Britain.121 
The discourse is based firmly around a stark contrast between the barbarian Dervishes 
and their civilised, superior British (or British led opponents), but one correspondent – 
whose name, Rafiuddin Ahmad, indicates a different perspective to most writers – 
pointed to the need for Muslim people to re-arm along European lines, and that “I should 
not be surprised to hear very soon that the gunmakers of Birmingham were extremely 
busy with orders from different parts of the Mohammedan world.”122  Although 
Rafiuddin ends his article with praise for the British Empire and its rule over Muslim 
subjects, in the name of educational and cultural advance, he also made the point that to 
be effective in warfare – and thereby to influence international relations  – re-armament 
with modern weapons was essential.   
Yet, amongst the accounts of scientific slaughter, there remained a yearning for “real 
hand-to-hand fighting of the old sort.”123  This is evidenced by considerable attention 
being focused on the charge of the 21st Lancers, which occurred after the main battle at 
Omdurman.124   This is despite – or perhaps because of – 40 of the British casualties (out 
of 105), including 19 (out of 25) deaths occurring directly because of the charge.125  
Nonetheless, it is described as dashing even in a letter that pointed out the huge scale of 
the scientific slaughter of the Dervishes.126  An account in The South Wales Daily News is 
typical, described in detail by Colonel Martin, who led the regiment, recounting with 
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evident pride that “hardly one of my officers or men got through the charge without a 
wound of some sort”.127  A later article on the Army Estimates notes that the popularity 
of the lancers and other light cavalry had been enhanced by memories of Omdurman.128  
What this shows is that there was an audience for heroism associated with ‘fighting of 
the old sort: here was chivalry contrasted with scientific slaughter. 
Conclusions 
Four conclusions emerge from this chapter.  Firstly, the future of war, sometimes based 
on  papers and lectures from the military, was widely discussed in the periodicals, and 
gained increasing prominence in the 1890s.  Secondly, and this has not been remarked 
upon in the current historiography, it was the Russo-Turkish War, and specifically the 
Battle of Plevna, which galvanised discussion on the way new weaponry had effected 
war.  The impact of science on war, and especially of ‘scientific war’ became widely 
recognised after 1878, although the debate was divided by those who considered that 
war was still likely to be fought on the same lines as it had been previously, and a larger 
number of writers who saw it was being revolutionised.   This leads onto the third point 
– the narrow assessments of the wars that had been fought earlier in the century 
transformed into a widespread dread of war in the 1890s.  Writers extrapolated from 
the casualties incurred at Plevna, and the increasing sizes of European armies, and 
concluded that war would be uncertain, unpredictable and highly damaging.  The 
possible consequences of rapid scientific change began to be discussed in widespread, 
persistent and apocalyptic terms.  Although often short of detail, these articles indicate a 
recognition of the destabilising effect of progress, and that change was inevitable.  
Finally, this uncertainty reflected the very novelty of rapid change and a need to find 
ways of constructing the future, with little or no experience.  In this light the vagueness 
of some of the articles is understandable – what emerges is fear of what the future 
would bring, in the face of uncontrollable and frightening progress.  As Alison put it in 
the title of his work fearful of a future Great War, events ‘cast their shadows before 
 
127 “Omdurman,” South Wales Daily News,  October 13, 1898, 5. 
128 “The Army Estimates,” The Saturday Review, March 11, 1899, 293.  The article also mentions an action at 
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them’, even if the specific way in which modern weapons would lead to Armageddon 
was unclear.129 
The year 1898 marked a watershed for Britain.  Across the previous three decades 
British commentators had watched conflict in Europe and an intervention in a contest 
between the Great Powers on the Continent was thought unlikely.  Omdurman was a 
colonial adventure, as it seemed the war in South Africa was when it started, but from 
1899 onwards the realities of war under changed circumstances were to unfold in the 
Transvaal, and to promote vigorous debate on what it meant for a general European 
War.  The next chapter begins with the South African War, and then moves through the 
remaining years through to 1914, when, as so many had feared two decades before, 
dread turned to grim reality. 
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Chapter Four  Sleepwalking to the Precipice 
This chapter explores how future of war was discussed in the British periodicals 
between 1899 and 1914.  The early part of this period was dominated by fierce debate 
on the South African War and the future of the British Army.  The debate sharpened the 
dichotomy between those commentators who saw future war being fundamentally 
different because of the introduction of ‘modern’ weapons, and those who saw it instead 
as merely modified.  The War also narrowed the debate to tactics on the battlefield, and 
with the Russo-Japanese War, which began in 1904,  largely swept away the more 
apocalyptic discussion on a Great War in Europe, muting the dread felt at such a 
prospect.  Debate on the future of war after the Russo-Japanese War became even more 
particular and diffuse, with a focus on specific issues like the armament of the cavalry 
dominating the periodicals to the eve of the First World War.   
As with Chapter Three, the research underpinning this chapter was centred on a search 
through digitised British periodicals.  The starting point of this chapter is the beginning 
of the South African War, with its end point being the last articles published on the 
future of war as the July crisis unfolded in 1914.   The period saw new periodical titles 
appearing, while others went out of publication, reflecting the vigorous and growing 
market for print journals discussed in Chapter One.  Nonetheless, there was much 
continuity from the late nineteenth century, and many articles continued to draw on 
contemporary military lectures and papers.   Equally, as was evident in the last chapter, 
the future of war usually meant what war would like be like if it was fought today or in 
the imminent future.  This period saw some recognition that material change was 
accelerating, especially regarding the novelty of war in the air, but this chapter shows 
that more writers clung to a view that the essential foundations of war would remain the 
same.  Debate also remained focused heavily on the tactical aspects of war, so that when 
strategy was discussed, there tended to be a focus on using comforting historical 
antecedents to demonstrate the continuity of essential strategic principles.  
The period saw the crystallisation of Germany as Britain’s likely enemy of the future, 
rather than France or Russia, which is also very evident in the broad shift in the fiction 
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of war in this period, as explored in Chapter Six.  The period saw fierce antagonism 
between Britain and Germany, and the height of the Anglo-German naval race.1  
Accordingly, German military writers, more than that of any other nation, featured in 
translation in the British periodicals of this period, reflecting keen interest in their 
views; especially about what they thought about the performance of the Army in the 
South African War.  Just as the war was covered by foreign military establishments, 
around 300 correspondents – mainly but not exclusively from Britain – reported from 
the war in South Africa, including Arthur Conan Doyle, Winston Churchill and Rudyard 
Kipling; the new innovations employed by correspondents included newsreel footage.2 
The chapter begins by discussing the response to that war, before focusing on the Russo-
Japanese War, and then the way both wars were, with hindsight, compared and 
contrasted.  Finally, it covers the increasing diffusion of the debate on the future of war 
which became dominant in the periodicals in the eight or so years before the First World 
War.  Two specific themes are covered in detail: debate on the armament of the cavalry, 
and the use of historical antecedents to predict the future, or implore Britain to be 
renewed amidst Social Darwinism rhetoric.  Other topics were discussed, such as 
introducing conscription in Britain, and with the benefit of hindsight there is much in 
these later developments which echoes the title of Christopher Clarke’s study of events 
leading up to the First World War, The Sleepwalkers.3  The focused debate on the 
potentially ruinous nature of a European War, so evident in the late 1880s and 1890s, 
and the forensic evaluation of the wars in South Africa and Manchuria, increasingly fade 
into disjointed and parochial discussion, until the precipice of 1914 is reached. 
Before beginning the chapter properly, it is necessary to discuss the work of the Polish 
industrialist Jean de Bloch, who is one of the subjects of the final chapter of this thesis. 
 
1 Rapid advances in naval technology dominated the period.  In 1906 Britain launched the revolutionary capital 
ship HMS Dreadnought, leading to renewed competition globally, but no more fierce than between Britain and 
Germany.  By 1914, only eight years later, Britain had 28 capital ships and Germany 18, which had grown larger 
and more powerfully armed with every successive design. 
2 Mitchel P. Roth, Historical Dictionary of War Journalism (London: Greenwood Press, 1997), 33. 
3 Christopher Clarke, The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 (London: Penguin Books, 2013 [First 
Published 2012]). 
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Bloch published his six volume work in Paris in 1898, followed by an English language 
summary (the sixth and final volume of the full work) in 1899, Is War Now Impossible?4   
Bloch’s work was much discussed in the periodicals, particularly as it was published in 
English on the eve of the war in South Africa.  As the subject of Chapter Seven, his work 
is not discussed here in detail, but by way of context, Bloch developed an approach 
towards predicting future war which contemporaries saw as ground-breaking.  For 
example, G. Gale Thomas, who was an admirer of Bloch’s work, concluded that it was 
“the declaration of a scientist announcing the discovery of an existing, yet hitherto 
unrecognised, law.”5   In it, he analysed the impact of technological and economic change 
on warfare, and concluded that a future European war would lead to stalemate on the 
battlefield and the subsequent collapse of nation states unable to feed their populations 
or continue to pay for the war.  His reasoning was, firstly, that technology had come to 
favour the defender, such that the longer range of armaments and growing size of 
national armies would lead to deadlock on the battlefield.  Secondly, he concluded that 
the inter-related nature of the contemporary economic system would lead to an inability 
to finance a lengthy war.  What set Bloch apart was less his conclusions – he was after all 
not alone in predicting disaster should a European War be fought in the 1890s – than his 
method and the detailed work which underpinned his conclusions, which made his work 
stand out from his contemporaries. 
Bloch’s predictions were largely to be proven correct in the First World War, as the  
Western Front solidified into trench deadlock by the end of 1914, where it would remain 
until 1918.  One strand of largely discredited historiography holds that this was due to 
the inability of the generals on all sides to adjust to new conditions, through 
 
4 J. S. Bloch, Is War Now Impossible? Being an Abridgement of “War of the Future in its Technical, Economic and 
Political Relations” (London: Grant Richards, 1899).  In Jean de Bloch, “The Wars of the Future,” The 
Contemporary Review, September 1901, 305, he gives the original title of the sixth volume as Summing up the 
Mechanism of War and its Working.  The Case for an against the possibility of settling peaceably by means of 
an International Tribunal the Disputes that crop up between European States. 
5 G. G. Thomas “The Bloch Museum of Peace and War,” Chambers Journal LXXX (1903): 258, quoted in   
Michael Welch, “The Centenary of the British Publication of Jean de Bloch’s Is War Now Impossible (1899-
1999),” War in History 7 (2000): 275.  The complete Future of War was an immense work in its full form, 
running to 3,084 pages; Bloch, “The Wars of the Future,” 1, specifically mentions the scale of his analysis.  Even 
in the shorter Is War Now Impossible?, the contents pages of maps and tables runs to four pages. 
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conservatism and a fixation with outmoded methods of waging warfare.6  Dan Todman, 
Gary Sheffield and other historians do, indeed, point towards conservatism from some 
generals impeding learning how to fight in the War, while recognising that the speed of 
technological change had transformed the battlefield and the strategy needed to 
overcome the defence.  As Bloch had predicted in 1898, the introduction of long range 
rifles, machine guns and rapid firing artillery, made it possible for small numbers of 
defenders to use entrenchments and cover to inflict devastating losses on attackers.  At 
the same time, defenders could rapidly move reserves into position using railways, 
while attackers had difficulty controlling their troops at a time before portable radios 
were available.  Those who had feared the prospect of a general European War in the 
1880s and 1890s had been right to be afraid, even though their doubts had been vague.  
The South African and Russo-Japanese Wars demonstrated the challenges attackers 
faced with modern rifles, machine guns and artillery, leading to much debate, although 
as this chapter demonstrates, it focused almost exclusively on tactics on the battlefield, 
and not its effect on a coalition war in Europe. 
War in South Africa 
The South African War began in the same year that Bloch’s abridged War of the Future 
was published in Britain, a little over twelve months after the devastating firepower of 
modern weapons had been turned on the Mahdi’s armies at Omdurman.   With 
campaigns such as that of the Soudan, and colonial conflicts fought throughout the 
nineteenth century, the British Government, Army and public opinion expected a swift 
victory over the Boers when the South African War began.7  Instead, what followed was 
 
6 Terraine was one of the first historians to conclude that it was the state of contemporary military technology 
which led inevitably to the dominance of the defensive, see for example, John Terraine, The Smoke and the 
Fire: Myths and Anti-myths of War 1861-1945 (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1980).  For examples of more 
recent writing on the subject, see Dan Todman, The Great War: Myth and Memory, (London: Continuum 
International, 2007) and Gary Sheffield, Forgotten Victory, The First World War: Myths and Realities (London: 
Headline Books, 2002).   
7 The War is generally considered to have three phases.  The first, from October to December 1899, saw the 
Boer republics take the offensive, lay siege to several towns and repulse the British.  The second saw huge 
numbers of British reinforcements arrive, leading to Boer reverses between January to September 1900.  
Finally, as victory seemed assured, the Boers adopted guerrilla war tactics until their eventual defeat in May 
1902. 
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a prolonged, expensive and destructive conflict against an enemy armed with modern 
rifles and artillery, and capable of using them to deadly effect.  As Pakenham says, “it 
proved to be the longest, the costliest, the bloodiest and the most humiliating war for 
Britain between 1815 and 1914.”8  It also provoked intense soul searching amongst 
contemporary writers as to Britain’s place in the world, its ability to fight a war and the 
quality of the recruits available to it once conflict began.9  Needless to say, it also 
provoked an outpouring of interest in how future war would be fought. 
In the circumstances of the shocking defeats in the first few months of the war, it is not 
surprising to find that the British periodicals contain a huge volume of articles dedicated 
to the war, with many expressing criticism of its conduct.10  This was not generally 
directed at the rank and file of the Army, who were typically described as brave and 
committed to the fight, but to poor leadership and preparation for the War.  The conflict 
led to a widespread desire to find reasons – or scapegoats – and this included a forensic 
examination of the way ‘modern war’ or ‘Boer fighting’ was conducted.  As a result 
writers discussed the way in which rifles strengthened the defence, the importance of 
entrenchments, the difficulties of executing command across a dispersed battlefield, the 
need for greater individual initiative amongst soldiers, and above all the coming of 
‘science’ to dominate the practice of warfare.  Chapter Three demonstrated the 
increasing emphasis on ‘scientific warfare’ in the last decades of the nineteenth century, 
although the discussion during the South African War was on its effects rather than of its 
potential to change warfare.  In other words, ‘scientific warfare’ was seen to have come 
of age. 
This chapter has organised writing on the South African War and its meaning for the 
future of war into three topics which were debated at the time.  The first was around the 
 
8 Thomas Pakenham, The Boer War (London: Abacus, 1992 [First Published 1979]), xv. 
9 There are numerous studies on the reaction of Britain to the war and the concerns it raised.  For example, see 
Brad Beaven, Leisure, Citizenship and Working Class Men in Britain 1850-1945 (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2005), and Steve Attridge, Nationalism, Imperialism and Identity in Late Victorian Culture, Civil 
and Military Worlds (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). 
10 Eleven different periodicals contain at least one article on the South African War and its meaning for the 
future of war. 
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impact of the rifle on war, including the increased use of entrenchments.  The second 
was the recognition that troops needed to show greater initiative to cope with the 
changed circumstances of war.  The third was a more strategic discussion on the 
effectiveness of Britain’s defences, arising from the lessons of the war.   Beginning with 
the first, a number of writers in the periodicals were quick to point out the part modern 
weapons had played in the early British reverses of the War.  A good example is F. C. 
Ormsby-Johnson, who wrote in The New Century Review in June 1900, nine months after 
it had begun: 
the South African campaign has lasted long enough to clearly demonstrate the 
fact that the checks, disasters, investments and ambuscades initiated and carried 
out by the Boers are the results of a scientific study of the long-range rifle and 
artillery and the quick firers….more particularly in the defensive line of battle.11   
As the title of his article, ‘The Loose Order of Battle’, suggests, Ormsby-Johnson 
advocated the necessity of loose order formations to avoid annihilation during an attack, 
and contended that frontal attacks could never be successful against an unshaken 
defence.12  He also considered that while infantry had gained immensely in defence 
through the adoption of improved rifles, cavalry had lost much of its effectiveness, and 
that in general warfare now favoured the defensive.13  The article is hard headed, but is 
not unusual in its honest – and even scathing – treatment of British training and 
tactics.14  Ormsby-Johnson makes a very pointed use of the term ‘scientific’ and implied 
that it was the British Army which had failed in its duty to properly evaluate the changes 
brought about by ‘modern’ firearms. 
 
11 F. C. Ormsby-Johnson, “The Loose Order of Battle,” The New Century Review, June 1900, 420. 
12 Ormsby-Johnson, “Loose Order,” 425. 
13 Ormsby-Johnson, “Loose Order,” 430. 
14 Britain entered the South African War using the tactics used by all of the Continental armies, modelled on 
those of the Franco-German War, although some of the British Generals did adopt loose order from the start of 
the war having seen the power of magazine rifle fire in colonial conflicts, including General French, later to be 
commander of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) in 1914.  For an extensive description of some of the early 
engagements and the tactics used by the British Army, see Pakenham, “Boer War,” 125-141. 
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Lonsdale Hale, who also wrote in the military RUSI Journal (see Chapter Five), also 
identified the main reason for British reverses to have been “the influence of that fatal 
mistake……the undervaluing of the power of modern rifle fire.”15  The main thrust of his 
article was that peace-time training had failed in the face of the reality of war, something 
also mentioned by Ormsby-Johnson.16  Hale regarded success in previous colonial 
conflicts as having worked against the development of effective training, as well as 
criticising peacetime manœuvres on Salisbury Plain as being laughably unrealistic.17  
Hale also criticised tactics used by other European nations, suggesting that it was the 
very adoption of Continental tactics which ran “the risk of annihilation in the first few 
days of a campaign.”18  Hale also criticised the belief that force of will would be enough 
to carry an attack:  
There has always existed an insane idea that the rank and file must have 
unshaken belief in their power of closing on the enemy, and that to do so was an 
easy task.  Of course, this was only practicable by the non-recognition of the 
power of the defenders’ fire, so the training grounds have been fools’ paradises 
indeed for our army at home; so many things it there was led to believe possible, 
it has now found impossible. 19 
This statement explicitly attacks the attitudes underpinning what historians Van Evera 
and Synder termed ‘the cult of the offensive’, described at length in Chapter One, which 
they consider was the mistaken notion that solutions based on morale could overcome 
the technological barriers produced by modern firearms.20  Hale is clear that the 
contemporary belief that improved rifles favoured the attack had been shown to be 
erroneous in South Africa, and that a belief in ‘moral’ fervour or parade ground 
 
15 Lonsdale Hale, “Our Peace Training for War. Guilty or Not Guilty,” The Nineteenth Century, February 1900, 
237. 
16Hale, “Peace Training,” 237. 
17 Hale, “Peace Training,” 237. 
18 Hale, “Peace Training,” 237. 
19 Hale, “Peace Training,” 237. 
20 See Stephen Van Evera, “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War,” International 
Security 9 (1984): 58-107; and Jack Snyder, “Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive,” International 
Security 9 (1984): 108-146 
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rehearsal simply led to disaster.  What these articles demonstrate is the opposite of the 
notion of ‘the cult of the offensive’, with commentators instead recognising the challenge 
of modern firepower and suggesting that rational answers were required to surmount 
the problem of a greatly strengthened defence. 
Others echoed the points made by Ormsby-Johnson and Hale, as shown by an article 
which appeared in The Review of Reviews with the clear title: ‘The Conduct of the War: 
Severe Criticism’.21  As with many such articles in that publication, it reviewed work 
from other periodicals, which in this case criticised the use of obsolescent drill and 
frontal attacks which were doomed to fail in the face of rifle fire, regardless of the 
bravery of the attacking soldiers.22  Several articles are referenced in this piece, but what 
united the writers – who came from both civil and military backgrounds - was a clear 
critique of British tactics in the face of the changed circumstances of war.  A particularly 
excoriating analysis of the South African War was written by the already famous Arthur 
Conan Doyle in October 1900.23  The article – although not identified as such – is the last 
chapter of his book The Great Boer War.24  He launched an attack on the British Army 
with the assertion that the Boers had demonstrated that “the advantage of the defence 
over the attack, and of the stationary force against the one that has to move, [which is] 
enormous”.25   
One of Doyle’s conclusions was that the changed capabilities of modern warfare meant 
that “every brave man with a rifle is a useful soldier.”26  He argued that a citizen army – 
akin to that of the Boers – could defend Britain from invasion with ease, undermining 
what he saw as the irrational fear of invasion from overseas, so long as such a trained 
 
21 “The Conduct of the War: Severe Criticism,” The Review of Reviews, May 1900, 453-454. 
22 “Conduct of the War,” 453. 
23 A. Conan Doyle, “Some Military Lessons of the War,” The Cornhill Magazine,  October 1900, 433-446. 
24 A. Conan Doyle, “The Military Lessons of the War: A Rejoinder,”  The Cornhill Magazine, January 1901,  43.  
Doyle also wrote The War in South Africa: Its Cause and Conduct in 1902; he was an enthusiastic supporter of 
the British war effort in South Africa but critical of its conduct, biographical details from The Oxford Dictionary 
of National Biography, www.oxfordnb.com, entry for Arthur Conan Doyle (1859-1930), 
https://doi.org/10/1093/ref:odnb/32887.    
25 Doyle, “Some Military Lessons,” 434. 
26 Doyle, “Some Military Lessons,” 433. 
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force could be assembled.  Even more remarkably, with hindsight, Doyle went on to 
conclude that “[the presence of balloons] will become more essential as the trench and 
the hidden gun become universal in the battles of the future.”27  Essentially Doyle is 
suggesting – albeit in a brief phrase - the importance of indirect fire, which is seen by 
military historians as the key tactical development in the First World War – and the 
centre of the Revolution in Military Affairs.28   Doyle is putting forward a 
transformational view of future warfare, as opposed to those who saw only gradual 
change in its conduct, a dichotomy which had already emerged in previous decades. 
Many of Doyle’s arguments were paralleled by Thring, writing a month later in The 
Nineteenth Century.29  Like so many writers before him, Thring singled out the 
significance of the Battle of Plevna and the Russo-Turkish War in 1878, highlighted in 
Chapter Three, and stated that: “unfortunately the training of our officers in military 
tactics has been directed rather to the study of the Franco-German War than to that of 
the Russo-Turkish campaign.”30  He identified the impact of improved magazine rifles, 
smokeless powder and quick firing artillery to war in South Africa, and also attacked, 
like Hale, the Army’s adherence to outmoded drill ill-suited to facing magazine rifle fire.   
The inevitable consequence of improved rifle fire, the increased adoption of 
entrenchment, is also mentioned in several articles in the periodicals.  Doyle, in his 
lengthy polemic, referred to the need for every infantry soldier to be ready to dig 
trenches.31  Like Hale, he was particularly scathing of pre-war manoeuvres, noting that 
in the 1898 exercise on Salisbury Plain he had seen men standing and firing, which 
proved suicidal in South Africa.32  A similar view was expressed by a French writer 
 
27 Doyle, “Some Military Lessons,” 442. 
28 Jonathan Bailey, “The First World War and the Birth of Modern Warfare.” In The Dynamics of Military 
Revolution 1300-2050, edited by Knox Macgregor and Murray Williamson, 132-153 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001). 
29 Thring, “Lessons of the War,” The Nineteenth Century, November 1900, 695-701. 
30 Thring, “Lessons,” 696. 
31 Doyle, “Some Military Lessons,” 436.   
32 Doyle, “Some Military Lessons,” 436.  Although accurate in terms of what was to come in the First World 
War, Doyle’s suggestion that a ‘portable bullet-proof shield’ could provide troops with cover proved inaccurate, 
at least until the coming of the tank. 
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reported in The Review of Reviews in 1902, whose article concluded that henceforth 
“shelter and adherence to the soil are necessary conditions.”33   
Another cause identified for the stalemate in the First World War was the inability of 
commanders to control troops on the extended battlefield created by longer range 
firearms, as they lacked a means to direct their soldiers before the availability of 
portable radios.34  This was clearly recognised by writers early in the South African War, 
such as Hale who, in another article, made a perceptive point about the scale of the 
battlefield reducing the ability of commanders to influence events, such that “the 
supreme leader [of the army] has been dethroned from his position as an autocrat 
whose will suffices and is law.”35  He pointed out that criticism of the British Army was 
valid, but had to take account of the way new rifles and artillery had affected the 
battlefield.  The French writer quoted in the Review of Reviews in 1902 made a similar 
point, referring to the fact that “commanders have little control over troops once 
seriously engaged.”36 
What is clear from this material is that contemporaries writing in the periodicals fully 
grasped the importance of rifles in transforming warfare, just as Plevna had been seen 
as a turning point in 1878.  Even those writers who did not put these changes centre 
stage, as in a piece for the National Review in August 1900, still noted the importance of 
long range rifle fire.37   All of the writers mentioned above were publishing articles in 
1900 (excluding the unnamed French writer in The Review of Reviews), as the War was 
going on, and present a hard-headed recognition that warfare had been changed by the 
introduction of new weapons.  In fact, the parallels with articles published during and 
after the Russo-Turkish War is striking, and it is evident that writers were aware of the 
contributing factors which would lead to stalemate on the Western Front in the First 
World War, although their focus was on tactics on the battlefield and not what the 
 
33 “Last Lessons of the War,” The Review of Reviews, July 1902, 67. 
34 Gary Sheffield and Dan Todman, eds., Command and Control on the Western Front: The British Army’s 
Experience 1914-18 (Stroud: Spellmount, 2007), 7. 
35 Lonsdale Hale, “The Staff Work in the War,” The Nineteenth Century, September 1900, 363. 
36 “Last Lessons,” 67. 
37 “Some Lessons of the Boer War,” The National Review, August 1900, 1035. 
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increased power of the defensive would mean at the strategic level in a Great War in 
Europe. 
Many thought that the solution to the problems created by the extended battlefield was 
for troops to show more intuition on the battlefield.  Doyle, for example, concluded that 
modern warfare demanded intelligence and individuality.38   Thring reserved his most 
scathing attacks reserved for the emphasis on drill and its effect on reducing individual 
initiative.39  Similarly, an article in the National Review, grounded in practical solutions 
to the War, was critical of the lack of initiative shown by the cavalry, noting that the lack 
of education of its officers was particularly serious for an arm where intelligence was of 
overwhelming importance for it to perform its reconnaissance role.40   
Much of the criticism that the British Army lacked initiative was centred on the issue of 
peacetime training, as with an article written by Arthur Griffiths more than a year after 
the end of the conflict, reporting on the War Inquiry.  His article was primarily an attack 
on what he saw as Government parsimony against expanding the Army, and reported 
many of the matter-of-fact conclusions of the Inquiry. 41  This included the findings that 
marksmanship was imperfect, fire discipline too tightly controlled, and taking cover had 
not been stressed strongly enough.42  He also reported that the Inquiry stated the need 
for training in smaller groups of soldiers – and of the need for imposing greater 
distances between units and individuals.   Others adopted a more comprehensive view 
of the failures of British training.  Perry, in 1901, wrote what amounted to a paean to 
German intellectual efficiency in an article in The Nineteenth Century.43  He wrote that 
“the innate rottenness of the British Army, its deficiency in that intellectual light and 
learning which is at once the most refined and the most awe-inspiring feature of modern 
 
38 Doyle, “Some Military Lessons,” 455. 
39 Thring, “Lessons,” 696. 
40 “Some Lessons of the Boer War,” 1030. 
41 Arthur Griffiths, “The Future of the Army,” The Fortnightly Review, October 1903, 627-637. 
42 Griffiths, “Future,” 635. 
43 Charles Copland Perry, “Our Undisciplined Brains – the War Test,” The Nineteenth Century, December 1901, 
904. 
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warfare.”44  He was critical of the amateurism of British soldiering, including a broader 
cultural contrast between its amateur sportsmen with German professions.  Although 
suffused with a discussion of ‘races’, in line with much of contemporary thinking, he was 
clear that “no modern army can hope to be efficient which is not based on intelligence as 
well as the pride of a people.”45  Initiative was required of soldiers to operate across 
extended battlefields, and solutions relying upon willpower alone were not sufficient to 
ensure victory. 
A similar view can be seen in an article by Robert Sturdee, written a year later, which 
was very anti-war in tone.46  It supported the use of history as a tool for understanding 
previous conflicts, but was clear that “the present being so different from the past we 
cannot now claim for war the services she rendered then…in the past progress was 
through war, in the future progress will be through peace.”47  Sturdee viewed the 
present age as one of mind rather than physical prowess, and that in an age of standing 
armies the benefits of civic duty conferred by war in ancient times was no longer 
possible.48  Once more, intelligence rather than strength or obedience, was emphasised.  
Sturdee remained, however, nostalgic for the past and the article comprises a lengthy set 
of examples from history, concluding that “in the bygone days there was glory of war in 
personal prowess, but now there remains only the ignominy of it in the unseen influence 
of the Stock Exchange.”49  Sturdee harked back to the ancient or chivalric past, regretting 
the shift to a more impersonal form of warfare, and suggested that the contemporary 
armaments race would lead to Armageddon, thereby echoing the apocalyptic language 
of many of the articles of the 1890s.  His assessment, however, was rare in the era of the 
South African War.    
 
44 Perry, “Undisciplined Brains,” 897. 
45 Perry, “Undisciplined Brains,” 899. 
46 Robert Sturdee, “The Teaching of History on War,” Westminster Review, August 1902, 124-134. 
47 Sturdee, “Teaching of History,” 124. 
48 Sturdee, “Teaching of History,” 125. 
49 Sturdee, “Teaching of History,” 134. 
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Recognition of the slaughter at Plevna had led to much speculation over a future 
European War, much of which was highly pessimistic, as discussed in Chapter Three.  
With the South African War, a similar recognition was evident, but the focus was 
generally more parochial, with only a few exceptions, such as Sturdee’s article.  As the 
conflict directly involved Britain, the emphasis of most writers was on ways to improve 
the Army’s performance or to manage the challenges of modern weapons; the focus had 
become narrower and more tactical.  The tone had also become very self-critical and 
filled with doubt, even when defending the nation against German criticism, as shown in 
an article published two years after the conclusion of the war in The Monthly Review, 
covering the German Staff’s report on the South African War.50  Given the trauma that 
the war had generated in Britain, and Germany’s place as the main rival for the nation, 
the article is charged and has a nationalistic, defensive tone.  Whenever the German 
report was positive towards the Army the article was supportive, such as when British 
behaviour had been considered chivalrous.51  Elsewhere, the article was critical, such as 
when the German report berated the performance of specific generals or that of the 
Army as a whole in particular engagements with the Boers.  The anonymous writer of 
the review concluded that Britain was:  
not a military nation; we are amateurs.  With every qualification for soldiering, 
our men will have none of it till the supreme moment comes, and then they must 
learn in action the more mechanical part of the lessons which the professional 
has taught himself at leisure.  The consolation is that we are so much the safer 
from the hideous national disease of militarism; and that we preserve an open 
mind to receive the instruction of circumstance.  If we may judge from the 
comments of the German Staff professionalism, too has its own dangers: science 
is a broke reed if its inductions are unsound….[if they] bend facts till they fit the 
theories of the lecture-room.52   
 
50 “The German Staff on the Boer War,” The Monthly Review, April 1904, 1-10. 
51 “German Staff,” 2. 
52 “German staff,” 10. 
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The author stands against what he perceived to be German militarism and paints a 
picture of their Staff being hidebound to theory.  He was criticising a perceived reliance 
on theory as opposed to practical lessons of the battlefield, although a nationalistic 
stance undoubtedly coloured his judgement.   
Taken as a whole, the debate in the periodicals on the South African War was for the 
great part hard-headed, unafraid to criticise the British Army, and focused on the way 
new technology has changed warfare.  A considerable number of articles contended that 
modern rifles had radically changed the conditions of warfare; and that there was a need 
for troops to show greater initiative, to take cover and entrench.  To a modern reader 
many of the tactical features of the First World War are clearly signposted in the 
descriptions of the South African War.   Perhaps no stronger testament to the 
incisiveness of writing in the face of war with the Boers is the report in the Review of 
Reviews from the 1902 French article.53  It is worth quoting the following paragraph in 
full, which presents a powerful description of the tactical realities of the First World War 
on the Western Front: 
Infantry must in future fight lying down, and at short distances can only approach 
in a creeping position.  Officers must be dressed like their men, and showy 
uniforms are out of the question.  Invisibility is a new factor.  Shelter and 
adherence to the soil are necessary conditions.  The duration of battles will lead 
to exhaustion and exclude pursuit  Commanders have little control over troops 
once seriously engaged.54 
War in Manchuria 
The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, fought in Manchuria, which broke out two years 
after the end of the South African War, is seen by historians as the conflict which the 
European military establishments used as their intellectual benchmark for thinking 
 
53 “Last Lessons,” 67. 
54 “Last Lessons,” 67. 
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about war until 1914.55  Unlike the South African War, which many European 
commentators considered unusual and relevant only for demonstrating the 
shortcomings of the British Army, this war was the first significant conflict involving two 
major powers since the Russo-Turkish War of 1878.  It was widely reported in Britain, 
with discussions on many of the same themes on the future of war raised during the 
South African War, which was also re-evaluated in the light of the latter war.  As shall be 
seen, many observers thought that the latter conflict had overturned, or at least 
significantly modified, the lessons of the South African War; while others saw parallels.   
For the British periodicals at least, the earlier conflict maintained a particular 
fascination and relevance, and was never far from discussion about the war in 
Manchuria. 
An example of clear thinking about the war in Manchuria and its relevance to the future 
may be found in the Review of Reviews, which summarised an article by Thomas Milliard 
from Scribner’s Magazine.  The article repeated many of the conclusions on future war 
reached during the South African War, such as commanders having to operate far from 
the battlefront, and of magazine rifles greatly extending and attenuating battlefields.56  It 
went further, however, and this passage manages to convey the impression of both 
continuity and change in war: 
The present war, he says, is a far better test of the effect of modern weapons than 
any that has yet been waged.  Strategy - the art of manoeuvring an army within 
the theatre of operations so as to increase the probability of and advantages to be 
anticipated from victory, while lessening the disadvantages of defeat-remains 
 
55 Michael Howard, “Men Against Fire: Expectation of War in 1914,” International Security  9 (1984), 56.  The 
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following a long siege, in January 1905.  Russia sent its Baltic Fleet around the world to engage the Japanese, 
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September 1905.  Russia was humiliated and the defeat contributed to the Revolution of 1905, which shook 
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First World War (London: Profile Books, 2014), “War That Ended Peace,” 160-163. 
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much the same as in Hannibal's days.  Tactics, however - the art or handling and 
directing the fighting of troops on the battlefield - are practically 
revolutionised.57   
This article emphasised tactical change, like so many on the South African War, while 
holding that strategy remained unchanged.   There was little challenge to the lessons of 
the former conflict, with the article instead presenting a view that they had been 
deepened and broadened.  An article published in the same month, in The Quarterly 
Review, took a different view and used the war in Manchuria to challenge the 
conclusions of the South African War, stating that “the great campaign in the far East 
comes as a timely reminder that all knowledge of the art of war was not to be learnt on 
the illimitable veldt.”58  There is a sense of retreat in the assertion that “certain of the 
lessons in military tactics provided by the Boers received undue prominence in the text 
books and unofficial writings which were published during or after the war.”59  This 
criticism was founded on the adoption by the British Army of ‘Boer tactics’ - spreading 
troops widely across the field and seeking cover, with the anonymous author 
considering instead that the German theories of infantry attack had been vindicated by 
the Japanese, which consisted of wave after wave of attacking soldiers advancing, 
followed by fire engagement, until the Russian defenders were overwhelmed.60  The 
author concluded that both conflicts had reinforced the need for initiative amongst 
individual soldiers, but was convinced that decisive action remained possible on the 
battlefield. 
Decisive action was certainly something considered possible in The German Official 
History of the War in South Africa, the second volume of which was translated into 
English in 1906,  after the Russo-Japanese War had ended.  Two articles responding to 
this official history, published in that year, are suffused with wounded national pride in 
their defence of the British Army.  The article in The Speaker reported the German view 
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that British attacks in South Africa had been insufficiently determined, which had caused 
the war to drag on, and that frontal attacks, although bloody, were necessary to ensure 
victory. 61  The author was critical of the German view and thought that an irregular 
army such as that fielded by the Boers would always require attacks in the flank or rear.  
Walter James, in his piece in The Bookmen, made the same point and argued that German 
performance in Manchuria or in manoeuvres would result in heavy casualties through 
adhering to “old methods.”62  The author of the article in The Speaker went further and 
attacked the German critics for having come to regard war as something wholly 
technical and mechanical.63  Both articles are also, with hindsight, correct in the 
assertion that ‘Boer tactics’ would come to dominate tactics in the First World War, and 
echo the historiographical point that erroneous conclusions were often drawn from the 
Russo-Japanese War, simplifying the success of Japanese attackers into a general 
emphasis on decisive action.64 
These were not the only articles of the time which showed an interest in the German 
Army, which was increasingly seen as the enemy Britain would find itself fighting 
against since the Entente Cordiale had been established in 1904.  The Review of Reviews, 
for example, reported on a piece in the Royal United Services Magazine on the German 
manoeuvres of 1906.65  In it, the German infantry were still reported as manoeuvring in 
dense formations, in the face of evidence from the South African and the Russo-Japanese 
Wars, which the reviewer considered to have shown that heavy casualties would result 
from such formations.  The article stated that the German Army had not adapted to the 
conditions of recent warfare, before going further and portraying it as a “mechanical 
fighting force” which lacked the initiative necessary to be successful in war.   What is 
evident here, and from the articles discussed above, was a widespread reaction against 
perceived German militarism, and too rigid attention to ‘scientific warfare’. 
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Not all the views expressed in the periodicals were, however, so supportive of the 
military lessons of the South African War; as demonstrated in an article of September 
1905 in The Saturday Review.  This piece concluded that “both the Japanese and Russians 
have fought according to Continental and not English ideas, and he would be a bold man 
who will contend that any other methods but those used would have been equally 
successful.”66  That author thought – in this case in the same way as the German General 
Staff – that British fear of casualties had prevented a decisive outcome in the battles in 
South Africa.  It also contained a statement bordering on a mystical and reflecting a 
belief in the pre-eminence of morale in combat: “what makes the Japanese army 
probably the most formidable in the world today is its spirit.”67  Such an attitude was 
also on show with the reports from Lieutenant-General Hamilton, Britain’s military 
attaché to the Japanese in 1904-5, who was convinced that the strength of the Japanese 
lay in their primitive character which was of a “more natural, less complex, and less 
nervous type.”68  Hamilton was one of those who believed in the power of morale in 
combat, although he was not alone in viewing the Japanese in a favourable light, as a 
dedicated and ‘virile’ people.69  These views demonstrate the contemporary views of 
Social Darwinism that the battle between nations was a matter of ‘survival of the 
fittest’.70 
These articles show a shift away from, or at least a questioning of, the hard-headed 
reports of the South African War, which had severely disoriented the British Army’s 
view of its own ability to fight war in the future.  The Russo-Japanese War, by apparently 
demonstrating the ability of the Japanese Army to press home attacks and achieve 
success (albeit it with high losses), provided the British Army with a more positive view, 
as Howard puts it, “after the miasmic doubts engendered by the Boer War.”71  The 
periodicals echoed this change, moving away from very precise and forensic discussion 
of war in South Africa to a more diverse and remote view of warfare in Manchuria 
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between Russia and Japan.  Although war correspondents and military attaches were 
present in Manchuria, it is inevitable that their reports sometimes feel more disengaged 
than those from South Africa, without the greater frisson of involvement as a combatant 
nation. 
The period from 1900 to 1906, therefore, is one of retreat from the more general debate 
in the 1890s to more specific discussions.  While the articles on the South African War 
are filled with astute observations on the tactical nature of contemporary conflict, they 
still avoid – or are not interested in – general considerations of a European War.  By the 
time of the Russo-Japanese War the tactical conclusions from the South African War are 
already becoming watered down, making decisive war seem achievable.  Nonetheless, 
the latter war also did not result in any wider discussion of how a future European War 
might be fought, and with what result.  Also, for nationalistic reasons, many writers were 
reacting against ‘scientific’ warfare by linking it to perceived German mechanical 
adherence to parade ground rules and rigid manœuvres.  A minority of writers admired 
the German way of war, but most were opposed to it, a position enhanced through their 
criticism of the British Army in South Africa. 
Diffusion 
There were to be no other major conflicts before the First World War; and although two 
Balkan Wars (1912 and 1913) were to be fought after 1905, neither of these conflicts 
were reported nearly as widely as the South African and Russo-Japanese Wars in the 
British periodicals.  In the absence of a concrete conflict to discuss, writing on future war 
became less focused, and broke into separate debates around specific issues such as the 
role and armament of the cavalry.  In these latter years it is as though the scale and 
consequences of a general conflagration could not be discussed as a whole: a future 
European war had become the proverbial elephant in the room, which may only be 
addressed by discussing particular features, such as the trunk or the tail.  Also, the war 
which everyone had expected in the 1890s did not happen; there was no apocalypse 
and, human nature being what it is, the dangers of conflict receded from the periodicals.  
The last part of this chapter will focus on two of the most prominent themes that filled 
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the periodicals in the years to 1914 – debate on the armament of the cavalry and the use 
of historical allusion to reinforce conservative views on future war.   
The extensive debate on the armament of the cavalry in the early twentieth century, 
which began with the South African War, continued until 1914.  As discussed in Chapter 
One, the debate was about whether the cavalry should remain a mounted force 
primarily focused on shock action with lance and sword, or instead adopt the rifle as its 
primary weapon and become mounted infantry.  This debate was taken up in the 
periodicals with enthusiasm, although of the thirteen articles cited here on the subject, 
however, it is worth noting that seven are from The Saturday Review, generally 
supporting the traditional use of the lance and sword, as opposed to the adoption of the 
rifle as the weapon of choice for the cavalry.   
The British cavalry entered the South African War with an emphasis on traditional shock 
action, but found itself facing a Boer enemy which used its horses to move, and who 
fought on foot with rifles.  This produced soul searching amongst observers and the 
cavalry themselves, with one side of the argument expressed succinctly by a 
contemporary writing at the time of the South African War, “the smallest troop of 
cavalry can no longer show itself in close formation…shock tactics with cavalry are 
dead.”72  The author favoured the use of horses for mobility and then to dismount and 
fight as infantry, as the Boers had done so successfully, but as will become clear below, 
the view that the war marked the end of shock tactics was not shared by all observers.   
Hindsight on the limited role of cavalry in the First World War makes it easy to see those 
who wanted to maintain the traditional role of cavalry as misguided conservatives, 
although historians such as Badsey and Philips have suggested that the British cavalry 
did modify their tactics in the light of experience in South Africa, reducing the scale of 
charges and delivering them in loose extended order to reduce casualties, as described 
in Chapter One. 73   Care must be taken, therefore, to see the arguments presented in the 
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periodicals within their contemporary context, with – as always – an inability to see the 
future. 
Doyle was one commentator who believed that the British Army as a whole needed to 
change, but who reserved some of its fiercest criticism for the cavalry:  
Passing on to the cavalry, we come to the branch of the service which appears to 
me to be most in need of reform.  In fact, the simplest and most effective reform 
would be one which should abolish it altogether, retaining the Household 
regiments for public functions.  One absolutely certain lesson of this war is that 
there is – outside the artillery – only one weapon in the world, and that weapon is 
the magazine rifle.  Lances, swords and revolvers only have one place  - the 
museum.  How many times was the lance or the sword fleshed in this war, and 
how many men did we lose in the attempts, and how many tons of useless metal 
have our overburdened horses carried about the country?  But if these weapons 
are discarded, and we come down to the uniformity of the rifle, then of course we 
must teach the trooper to use his rifle on foot and dress him so that he can do so.  
So in an automatic and unavoidable way he becomes mounted infantry.74 
Doyle clearly presents the argument for revolutionary change, suggesting that the old 
ways of war no longer had any relevance, and that the only solution for the cavalry was 
to transform their role and adopt the rifle as their primary armament.   
Others held a more evolutionary position, such as the anonymous author of an article in 
Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine in 1901.  It was a lengthy discussion of all aspects of 
the cavalry, such as the weight of equipment carried, training and recruitment, as well as 
its armament.  The author stated that “many people, many practical soldiers indeed, 
hold that the days of charging with the arme blanche in the face of modern firearms have 
gone forever.” 75  Nonetheless, he concluded that there could still be opportunities for 
 
74 Doyle, “Some Military Lessons,” 437. 
75 “The Future of Our Cavalry,” Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine, May 1901, 715-726. 
PhD Thesis  Interrogating the Future David Bangert 
 
126  
charges, and noted that the morale effect of the threat of a charge had been of some 
importance in South Africa.  The author argued that for reasons of weight only one 
melee weapon should be carried, and concluded that it should be the lance.  Like Doyle, 
however, he saw the rifle as the primary armament of the cavalry. 
A more extreme response to the idea of abandoning shock action may be found in the 
outpourings of a writer calling himself ‘Grey Scout’, who penned a series of short articles 
in 1903 for The Saturday Review, putting forth the position that the cavalry should be 
armed traditionally, and show elan and dash to close with their enemies.76  At times the 
author veers towards the eccentric in his appeal to ‘the cavalry spirit’, but makes points 
on the need for greater initiative which echo others writing on warfare at the time.  
‘Grey Scout’ can be found still expressing this view nine years later in The Saturday 
Review, continuing to advocate that cavalry act as the arme blanche.77  Even he, 
nonetheless, stated that they should also be capable of dismounted action throughout 
his articles, although it is clear where his sentiments lay. 
As a result of the War, Lord Roberts, who had commanded the British Army in South 
Africa, instituted reforms which placed the rifle as the primary weapon of the cavalry.78  
He also stripped the lance from those regiments which used it as their primary weapon, 
although all of them retained the sword.  His actions lie closest to the moderate views of 
the author in Blackwood’s, but there was a reaction against Roberts’ reforms once he left 
the Army in 1904, with more traditional cavalry soldiers arguing for the primacy of the 
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lance and sword.79  A fascinating example of this debate can be found over the course of 
three issues of The Monthly Review in 1903-4, where two cavalry officers put forward 
their views at some length, both writing under pseudonyms.  Firstly, ‘Eques’ argued 
vigorously against the withdrawal of the lance and the primacy given to the rifle, 
criticising Roberts on the grounds that “the preponderance of European military opinion 
[is] against him.”80  ‘Eques’ supported his argument by the selective use of evidence 
from military history and concluded that Roberts’ reforms would soon be consigned to 
oblivion.81   
Two months later, ‘Cavalry’ responded by supporting Roberts’ reforms and stated that 
“the opportunities for the use of the arme blanche [are likely] to be rare.”82  On the 
contrary, he considered that the use of the rifle would enhance its capabilities in the 
future.83  Finally, with even more rhetorical flourish, ‘Eques’ responded in April 1904 
with statements firmly supporting the use of the lance and quoting the German 
retention of this weapon as justification of his position.84  Another article in the same 
issue, discussing the report on the Boer War by the Historical Section of the German 
General Staff, pointed out that both of these writers use the same historical event, the 
charge at Klip Drift, outside Kimberley, “in which we believe both these distinguished 
soldiers took part [to] support his own argument.”85 
There was a more muted response to the issue of cavalry armament in the periodicals 
during the Russo-Japanese War, although as Chapter Five will show, there was more 
debate in the military journals, with a lot of criticism of the cavalry on both sides of the 
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conflict for their perceived lack of initiative and effectiveness.86    Nonetheless, the 
debate did continue, as can be seen from reaction to the publication in English of a new 
edition of Cavalry in Future Wars by the leading German military writer Bernhardi, in 
1906, which had a foreword written by the cavalryman Sir John French, later to be 
commander of the BEF in 1914.87  It was reviewed in The Athenaeum, in an article which 
reported it as having decided that the analysis of the South African War to be false and 
that cavalry could conduct flank attacks and raids.88  This optimistic view was not to 
prove possible in the First World War, especially on the crowded Western Front, 
although it was commonly thought at the time that cavalry would be of more importance 
in the future, owing to the need for strategic action in the face of battlefields extended 
because of longer range firearms. 
In 1910, Erskine Childers, author of the famous novel Riddle of the Sands, which had 
been published nine years earlier, wrote War and the Arme Blanche, a ferocious attack 
on the traditional armament of the cavalry and their use of the charge.  A piece in The 
Saturday Review, ever the defender of the traditional view, was highly critical of the 
book, with the author responding with invective to Childers’ language and spelling, as 
well as using selective arguments to bolster the validity of the arme blanche.89  A similar 
attack was made by the Military Correspondent of The Times - to which Childers himself 
responded with a letter where he labelled the arme blanche as prehistoric.90   What is 
interesting about this debate is the use of selective facts on both sides, although Childers 
argued that the debate should be based on facts.  He attacked the proponents of the 
arme blanche for always suggesting that the failure of cavalry to use the charge was due 
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to deficiencies in foreign cavalry, rather than recognising the innate redundancy of 
shock action.  He applied this to the Russo-Japanese War, as had previous writers, where 
it is significant that so many excuses were found for the failures of cavalry. 
This tendency to criticise foreign cavalry may also be seen in a rare article referencing 
the First Balkan War, in 1913, which focused on “the failure of the Bulgarians to render 
their victory complete in consequence of the inadequacy of their cavalry.”91  The piece 
also considered the South African War as being exceptional, and criticised the cavalry on 
both sides in the Russo-Japanese War for being insufficiently bold, in yet another 
example of trying to find excuses for the failure of the cavalry to act in their arme 
blanche role.92  More interestingly, however, is the author’s explicit mention of motor 
transport: 
The extensive employment of motor power as a means of traction, with its 
inevitable sequel, the growing scarcity of horses, has led a certain school of critics 
to the somewhat premature conclusion that the horse is destined to disappear 
from the scene, and that in its place will be substituted, with even greater 
efficiency, mechanical methods of locomotion as embodied in the automobile, the 
motor cycle, and the ordinary bicycle.  The success achieved by the employment 
of these machines in set manoeuvres over a stipulated area where the roads are 
favourable and conditions generally ideal would seem to lend weight to the 
theory thus advanced. 93 
Although the author argued for the continued primacy of the horse, it is interesting to 
see even a comment on motor transport for military use.94  Although there were a 
number of articles on this subject in the military journals, the concept of using motor 
transport in war appears in only two articles in the periodicals, penned by a common 
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author, compared to the vast swathes of ink expended on the argument over the 
armament of the cavalry.95 
One article, written by John Percy in 1900, provides insight into the underlying social 
and cultural reasons for why so much was said about the cavalry.  They had always been 
an elite arm and those who argued for its continued relevance exhibited defensiveness 
in the face of challenges from rifles, motorised transport and the ‘scientific’ conduct of 
war.   This article was not concerned with the South African War, but instead discussed 
cavalry in the round, noting that the days of shock action were now rare, and that (using 
the familiar phrasing of the time) “science in its working holds the compass of war.  
Romance has given way to utility.”96  His thesis was one of the dominance of planning 
and that while dismounted cavalry had value, “buried are banners and battle-axe; no 
more for romance is war.”97  His explicit reference to the romance of war is evidence of 
what historians have seen as a need to cling on to a more human form of conflict, as 
Bond says: “although the motives were perhaps subconscious, such phenomena as the … 
arme blanche may now be seen as the last desperate effort to withstand the 
depersonalisation of war.”98   
Another theme in the periodicals of the twentieth century, most evident after 1905, was 
an increased emphasis on the use of historical examples when discussing the future of 
war, particularly in The Fortnightly Review (four out of seven articles cited come from 
that source), a publication which tended to include intellectual articles discussing 
contemporary matters.99  While Doyle and others argued that modern warfare marked a 
break with the past, many saw parallels with former conflicts, and often used them to 
justify conservative positions.  An early example is an article by Sibly from 1900, which 
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is interesting for the weight of historical allusions applied to the South African War.100  
The article itself was rather opaque and was not directly concerned with the way in 
which it had been fought (and was still being fought).  Instead, comparisons were made 
with numerous historical events such as Napoleonic guerrilla warfare in Spain.101  
Similarly, Sibly compared the numbers of volunteer regiments raised for South Africa 
unfavourably with the number achieved for the American Revolutionary War.102  
Overall, he used history to frame the circumstances of the current War, and to present a 
comforting set of parallels.  While such analogies might have had some relevance, they 
avoided the issue that the war in South Africa was different to those in the past due to 
the impact of new technology. 
J. Ellis Barker’s article in 1906 carries some of the apocalyptic character of many of the 
article of the 1890s, including the statement that for the nation “the eleventh hour has 
arrived.”103  Yet its character is very different to those earlier articles, as it is specifically 
concerned with the future of Britain rather than with Europe as a whole.  Further, it is 
framed with a lengthy analysis of the rise and fall of previous maritime nations, from the 
Phoenicians to the Netherlands, with the view that “if we wish to understand the 
problems of Great Britain….we must enquire into the history of those states which at 
one time possessed commercial and maritime supremacy.”104  Barker’s conclusion was 
that Britain had to regain its agricultural independence and turn away from reliance on 
foreign trade, as well as rekindling its warlike spirit.  The article fits within the 
atmosphere of declinism which affected Britain at the time, and it is definitely not an 
examination of future war, instead looking back into a comforting past to find analogies 
to the present condition of the country.105 
 
100 N W Sibly,  “Some Issues of the Transvaal War,” Westminster Review, May 1900, 512-516. 
101 Sibly, ”Some Issues,” 515. 
102 Sibly, ”Some Issues,” 515. 
103 J. Ellis Barker, “The Future of Great Britain,” The Nineteenth Century, November 1906, 704. 
104 Barker, “Great Britain,” 690. 
105 For the sentiments of declinism at the time, see Samuel Hynes, The Edwardian Turn of Mind (London: 
Pimlico, 1991 [First Published 1968]), 42. 
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Blennerhassett, writing in 1908, took a similar view, attacking the notion of a peaceful 
nation and comparing the present unfavourably with the past, such that “[Wellington] 
certainly belonged to a generation of men as far removed from the mercenary spirit of 
the age as were the god-like warriors of the siege of Troy.” 106  He considered that 
European War was not at an end, referencing the conflicts of the nineteenth century, and 
discussing previous historical exemplars such as Napoleon and Frederick the Great.  In 
the eyes of Blennerhassett, the past was not only a guide to the future, but a better place.  
A. W. A. Pollock also used history to illuminate his thesis that military education 
required an assessment of history because “brains are indeed essential….and are more 
than ever in the present day, but personality is of almost equal importance.”107  The 
comment on personality is the stuff of moral decline in a time of Social Darwinist 
thinking, and Pollock considered that the current perceived malaise was due to failing to 
read classical sources because “now we read trashy novels and cheap magazines.”108  
Barker was even more explicit, saying that “the law of survival of the fittest and 
strongest, which rules the whole animal and vegetable creation, applies with equal force 
to man and his political associations.” 109  His solution was a return to antique belief, 
echoing Hamilton’s writing on the Russo-Japanese War; a call for modern nations to 
return to a more atavistic and less city-bred past, or fail in warfare of the future; in 
complete contrast to the idea of science coming to dominate warfare.  As well as 
Blennerhassett and Pollock, these views were echoed by Lawton in a piece from 1913, 
which praised the “staying power of spartan people like the Bulgarians and the Japanese, 
imbued though both of  them were with an almost fanatical zeal.”110 
Two years later and Cecil Battine, who also wrote for the RUSI Journal, as discussed in 
Chapter Five, is to be found using historical allusions, albeit in a less extreme way, to 
support his point about the need to preserve the ‘balance of power’ in a debate on 
 
106 Rowland Blennerhassett, “Aspects of Strategy and Tactics,” The Fortnightly Review, August 1908, 233. 
107 A. W. A. Pollock, “Military Education,” The Fortnightly Review, February 1907, 341. 
108 Pollock, “Military Education,” 344. 
109 Barker, “Future of Great Britain,” 704. 
110 Lawton, “German View,” 985. 
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Britain’s responsibility to help France in a war.111  As a final example, there is an article 
from 1911 in The Academy, which reviewed Beca’s A Study in the Development of Infantry 
Tactics.112  The author of the article considered the book interesting and welcomed its 
rich discussion of previous conflicts.  The book advocated columnal assaults on the 
Napoleonic model and stated that the Russo-Japanese War had demonstrated the 
decisive effect of mass action, but the reviewer noted that the Beca was at odds with the 
views of most of the British officers who had fought in the South African War.  The use of 
historical examples here, as elsewhere, provides a comforting framework against 
change, instead looking backwards to rely on unchanging principles of war. 
Overall, therefore, the use of increased historical allusions can be seen as a conservative 
reaction to change.  As with the debate on the cavalry, there is a reaction against the 
coming of ‘scientific’ warfare, with calls for the need for a more warlike spirit, coming 
from the countryside and not the city.   Articles on the likely calamity that a European 
War would bring, which peaked in the early 1890s, were largely absent from this latter 
period.  There were some articles which examined the balance of power, such as one 
written by J. L. Garvin in 1909, who stated that “the equilibrium of great armaments 
gives stability to peace.”113  Battine, mentioned above in relation to his article on France, 
also used the idea of the balance of power as a bulwark against war, noting that changes 
in the balance of power had driven Britain to closer engagement in European affairs, 
driven by factors such as the rise of the United States.114   
It is worth discussing one final article, from no less an authority than Field Marshal Lord 
Roberts, who retired as Commander-in-Chief of the British Army in 1904 and published 
an article in The Quarterly Review in January 1905, during the Russo-Japanese War, 
giving his thoughts on ‘The Army – As it Was and As It Is’.  His aim was “to note the great 
changes which have taken place in the conditions under which war is carried on since 
those days [50 years earlier] and to point out the alterations in the training…which these 
 
111 Cecil Battine, “Our Duty to Our Neighbour: the Defence of France,” The Fortnightly Review, June 1909, 1059. 
112 “Infantry Tactics,” The Academy, April 29, 1911, 517. 
113 J. L. Garvin, “Imperial and Foreign Affairs,” The Fortnightly Review, February 1909, 197. 
114 Battine, “Our Duty,” 1060. 
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new conditions render imperatively necessary.”115  Roberts, who was to become 
intensely involved in the campaign for conscription in the face of the perceived German 
threat of invasion, was most concerned with delivering training to inculcate 
individuality into soldiers.   As someone who had seen the need for change after the 
South African War, it is not surprising that he also stated that “no thought seems to have 
been given to the necessity for scientific preparation to meet the stern test of war.”116  
Later in the article he repeated his point about the fundamental change that had come 
over war, “daily becoming more and more scientific, [with] a far higher level of 
individual intelligence demanded from both officers and men.”117  He contrasted the 
firearms which the Army used when his career began – still a modified version of the old 
Brown Bess musket used in the Napoleonic War – with contemporary rifled arms firing 
with smokeless powder, and emphasised how inaccurate the old arms were.  As with 
many of the articles that came out of the South African War, he made incisive points 
about contemporary war, such as the redundancy of volley power and the dominance of 
fire over the bayonet; and the importance of command being passed down to lower 
ranking officers due to the dispersed nature of the battlefield.  Yet, once again, Roberts 
did not extend his arguments to the impact of these changes on a European War, but 
focused on improving the performance of the British Army.  This is not surprising, as he 
was concerned with making the army able to fight and win a war, rather than reaching 
more abstract conclusions about what would happen when the Great Powers decided to 
go to war.   
The debates on the importance of ‘scientific warfare’ contrast with the use of historical 
exemplars to show the unchanging nature of strategy.  Whether suggesting a need for 
Britain to be renewed, or looking to models from the past on which to base future 
foreign policy, there is a sense of conservatism on display.  The same is true for those 
writers who sought to defend the use of the arme blanche by the cavalry.  The 
excoriating soul-searching of the South African War has gone, replaced by a more 
abstract sense of retrenchment and unreality in the face of modern war. 
 
115 Frederick Roberts, “The Army – As It Was and As It Is,” The Nineteenth Century, January 1905, 1. 
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The South African War focused interest on Britain, its army, and on the battlefield.  The 
more discursive works on the potentially apocalyptic character of a Great War in Europe 
largely disappear from the periodicals.  Even when discussing matters of the balance of 
power in the decade before the First World War, the attention is firmly on Britain and 
not Europe as a whole.  History also became something of a comfort blanket, and there is 
a noticeable reaction against science and professionalism in many of the articles, 
bringing with them pessimism and fear for the future.  The writers of the 1890s focused 
on the dangers of a European war, albeit with little more than formless dread, but the 
wars of 1899 to 1905 turned attention to matters of detail, while losing sight of the 
bigger picture.   With hindsight, reports on the South African War are highly accurate in 
their portrayal of the tactics which would be adopted in the First World War, and 
anything but formless, but there is little to no discussion of what modern weapons 
would mean for a coalition war in Europe.  The ‘trees’ were in focus, but the ‘wood’ had 
gone.   
By the later part of the 1900s, however, even the debate on tactics had begun to 
dissipate with the end of commentary on the Russo-Japanese War.  The attention on the 
armament of the cavalry reflected similar pieces in the military journals, and says much 
about contemporary military culture, but it is of very narrow focus.  Because a ‘Great 
War’ had not happened, discussion of it disappeared from the periodicals, to be replaced 
with more specific debates.  Fear of the future was shifted to Britain’s role in the world 
and need for reinvigoration, and those articles which discussed matters of strategy 
tended to see it as unchanging; their emphasis was continuity and not change.  Above all, 
a general European War, which was often seen to be imminent in the 1890s, had 
receded – until it happened.
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Chapter Five  The Military Response 
The attitudes and expectations of the European military establishments before the First 
World War have been the subject of debate amongst historians.   As Chapter One sets 
out, some have singled out the British Army for particular criticism of its social 
conservatism impeding reform, while others consider that it one of the best prepared 
armies for war in 1914.  The previous three chapters have focused on writing in the 
periodicals about the future, and of war in particular in Chapters Three and Four.  This 
chapter complements them by examining how the British military establishment 
interrogated the future of war in its own journals.  There was certainly an outpouring of 
articles in these journals discussing the impact of new weapons on warfare, including 
lengthy debates on what Howard termed ‘men versus fire’ and the utility of the cavalry 
in ‘modern’ warfare.  In the light of this wealth of material, this chapter continues the 
theme of examining how the future was interrogated by military writers and will show  
that what engaged them was the question of what war would be like in the immediate 
future.  It will also demonstrate that while technical advances were scrutinised, 
conservatism dominated debate on their broader impact on warfare.  When new 
technologies were discussed, such as aircraft, they were seen as augmenting current 
military practice, rather than having the potential to transform war.  In fact, detailed 
technical descriptions of new advances acted to obscure the wider effect they might 
have on the practice of war. 
The sources for this chapter have been largely constrained to two of the most significant 
British military journals of the period, to better focus on the pattern of change in 
discussion about the future war.  Concentrating on these journals across the period of 
interest has made it possible to construct a consistent view of military thinking, 
paralleling the assessment of civilian journals across the same time frame.  Foremost of 
the two is the Journal of the Royal United Services Institution (RUSI Journal), the organ of 
Britain’s most significant military and naval society.  The Royal United Services 
Institution (RUSI) had already been established for 39 years in 1870, and remains active 
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today.1  Every digitised edition of the RUSI Journal published between 1870 and 1914 
has been inspected manually to identify articles dealing with the future of war, without 
the use of keyword searches.  Over 110 articles were found using this method, with the 
majority coming later in the period.  This is partly because, from 1870 to 1890, the RUSI 
Journal was published quarterly, before moving to monthly publication until the 
outbreak of War in August 1914, after which it was produced more sporadically.  
Nonetheless, even taking account of its increased frequency of publication, interest in 
the future of war grew much stronger from the 1890s onwards, as it did in the civilian 
periodicals.  Aside from reviews or shorter pieces, most of its articles comprised written 
reports on lectures given to a panel of military and naval officers a few months 
beforehand, including the result of question and answer sessions which were usually 
held at their conclusion. 
The scope of the Journal remained relatively consistent across the five decades under 
study.  Articles (and the lectures from which they usually originated) came ordinarily 
from military and naval authors of varying levels of seniority, but were occasionally 
written by civilians.  Most articles related to reports on contemporary or near 
contemporary campaigns waged by Britain or other (predominately European) nations; 
were historical examinations of previous campaigns, largely from British history; or 
were reviews of books.  There were numerous translations of foreign articles, especially 
German, but also including French, Russian and Italian examples.  By 1900 each 
individual edition contained sections at the back entitled Naval Notes, Military Notes, 
Naval and Military Calendar, Foreign Periodicals and Notes of Books.  While this 
research has focused on military writing, a few articles on naval topics have been 
included where they relate to the theoretical analysis of future war.   Although historians 
such as Travers have considered the Army to be profoundly anti-intellectual, by 1914 
around a quarter of its regular officers were members of RUSI, which often published 
technically challenging articles, as shall be demonstrated below.2  It promoted 
considerable debate about future tactics, especially after the South African War, and 
 
1 Since 2004 it has been named the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies. 
2 Aimee Fox, Learning to Fight: Military Innovation and Change in the British Army 1914-18 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 2018), 45.   
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contained many articles interested in motor transport and aviation from the 1890s 
onwards.   It is noteworthy that in the opening address by Colonel James Lindsay, the 
new chair of RUSI, of a lecture in 1897, emphatically stated that military and naval 
science had been hitherto underrepresented, and called for it to be better recognised.3 
This research has been counterpointed with a similarly intensive search through The 
Cavalry Journal, which was first published in 1906, financed primarily by officers serving 
in the British cavalry.  Editorial staff provided their time for free and premises were 
rented by RUSI for a nominal amount.   The Cavalry Journal is not digitised, so the 
research was conducted at the current RUSI Library, which holds an extensive collection 
of military journals and papers from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  The 
Cavalry Journal was published quarterly from 1906 to the outbreak of War in 1914, 
when publication ceased until the conclusion of hostilities.  The subjects and themes of 
many of the articles in the Cavalry Journal were similar to those in the RUSI Journal, 
although its tone is generally less intellectual.4  Alongside articles on contemporary and 
historical cavalry campaigns and translations of foreign articles, there were Sporting 
Notes and articles on the more practical side of cavalry matters, such as riding schools.5  
The Cavalry Journal was something of a hybrid between the RUSI Journal and another 
contemporary publication, The Royal Engineer Journal which was the ‘house’ publication 
of that branch of the Army and resembled more of a newspaper than it does a journal, 
with regular entries on Births, Deaths and Marriages, Corps News and Notices.6   
Nonetheless, whatever the merits of the interminable debate on the cavalry and its 
armament between 1900 and 1914 -  see Chapter Four for its treatment in the civilian 
 
3 Rosemary T. van Aradel and Don J. Vann, eds. Victorian Periodicals and Victorian Society (Toronto: University 
of Toronto, 1995), 68. 
4 The first edition sets out the purpose of the journal, which was to debate matters of interest to the British 
cavalry, and has its first article by the Inspector-General of Cavalry, then a Major-General; Robert Baden-
Powell, “What Lies Before Us,” The Cavalry Journal, January 1906, 2.  Baden-Powell was one of the founders of 
the Cavalry Journal, from “Robert Baden-Powell,” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/ref: odnb/30520. 
5 There are a number of articles with subjects which, to a modern reader, seem anachronistic and indicative of 
the myth of the contemporary British cavalry, such as Major A. E. Wardrop, “Pig Sticking,” The Cavalry Journal, 
April 1913, 221-226. 
6 For example see The Royal Engineer Journal, January 1902, No 362.  This journal was not used as a source for 
this research due to its more parochial character. 
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periodicals - the fact that The Cavalry Journal was established in 1906 shows that the 
arm did show a level of intellectual engagement on military matters.7   
The systematic evaluation of the RUSI Journal and The Cavalry Journal has been 
counterpointed by sampling a number of editions from the Journal of the United Service 
Institute of India, to add depth to the research.  Established in 1872, it was very similar 
in character to the RUSI Journal, albeit with an emphasis on warfare in the Indian sub-
continent.  Like RUSI in the UK, the United Service Institute still operates in India.  The 
journal was published quarterly throughout the period and three sample editions were 
assessed for this research, from 1900, 1906 and 1912.8  Finally, works by the prominent 
German military writers Colmar von Goltz and Friedrich von Bernhardi, much discussed 
in the journals, have also been examined, demonstrating the relevance of articles in the 
RUSI Journal and The Cavalry Journal to wider intellectual engagement with the future of 
war. 
One hundred and fifty articles have been identified from these sources as having some 
relevance to ‘the war of the future’.  Such a distinction is, necessarily, somewhat 
arbitrary, and the theme includes many articles discussing technical advances with the 
potential to effect conflict in the future.  As noted above, however, almost all of these are 
concerned with the impact of technical developments on the contemporary armed 
services.  Articles looking further into the future are far less common, and speculation is 
emphatically frowned upon in several articles.  This is a profound point which will be 
expanded upon below, but it reinforces the fact that what later generations would term 
futures studies – looking at longer term societal or technological change - were not a 
feature of contemporary military or naval discourse.  Conservatism dominates the 
articles, and early pieces on aviation set out their technical credentials precisely to 
confute those who might see them as fanciful.  Change is seen as something that could 
challenge  military principles and therefore to be controlled, as well as being presented 
as something which would only modify existing practice. 
 
7 Fox, “Learning to Fight,” 49. 
8 The year 1900 was selected as it was the first full year of the South African War, and the others sampled at 
intervals of six years to capture change through the early part of the twentieth century. 
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The period of study sees changes in the number of articles on the future of the military.  
Looking purely at the RUSI Journal (because the Cavalry Journal ran only from 1906 to 
1914, and the Journal of the United Services of India has only been sampled), 15 relevant 
articles have been identified in the period 1870-79, and ten in the period 1880-89.  In 
contrast, 32 have been identified in the period 1890-99; 38 in the period 1900-09; and 
19 over the shorter period of 1910-14.  In other words, there was more interest in the 
changing nature of war from the 1890s onwards, reflecting greater recognition of the 
dramatic improvements that were happening in weaponry in the later period, and 
paralleling rising interest in the civilian press, as discussed in Chapters Three and Four.  
It is also important to note the number of authors whose names appear in both the RUSI 
Journal and the civilian periodicals, either as serving officers or after retirement.  
Similarly, topics debated in the civilian press are paralleled in the military journals, with 
examples including the debate on the armament of the cavalry, so much a feature of the 
1900s, and of concerns over ensuring the food supply to Britain in a war. 9 
This chapter has been divided into three parts to focus on different aspects of military 
engagement with the future.  The first part of the chapter is focused on technical 
developments, which are important as they demonstrate both a healthy interest in new 
technology, but also a refusal to engage – generally – with their revolutionary potential.  
New developments were characterised as augmenting current military practice, and not 
overturning it, such as in the debate on motor vehicles and the role of the cavalry, with 
articles being careful to highlight the limitations of contemporary vehicles.   
The second part of the chapter focuses on articles interested in how the cavalry, artillery 
and infantry perceived the effect of new weapons on their traditional roles.  With great 
interest expressed in new rifles – paralleling articles in the civilian periodicals – many of 
the cited articles cover the Russo-Turkish and South African Wars.  These recognise the 
impact of these new weapons on warfare, and do not downplay their significance on the 
 
9 See, for example; Stewart L. Murray, “Our Food Supply in Time of War, and Imperial Defence,” The Journal of 
the Royal United Services Institution,  June 1901, 656-729; and Stewart L. Murray, “The Internal Condition of 
Great Britain during a Great War,” The Journal of the Royal United Services Institution. December 1913, 1561-
1615.  In the periodicals see G. S. Clarke, “War, Trade and Food Supply,” The National Review, July 1897, 756-
769; and T. A. Le Mesurier, “Our Food Supply in Time of War,” Westminster Review, June 1897, 658-668. 
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battlefield.  Nonetheless, they do not extrapolate from the tactical impact of the weapons 
to their potential at a more strategic level.  This is significant because it goes to the heart 
of the military response to increased fire on the battlefield, which was to change tactics 
to ensure offensive action remained possible, while failing to consider the way in which 
war would be altered strategically.  In practice, these changes led to trench deadlock in 
the First World War, but articles in the journals are overwhelmingly focused on the 
tactical problems of maintaining the offensive in the face of increased firepower.   
The third and final part of the chapter identifies a number of articles which do present 
more revolutionary positions, and are interesting for precisely that reason.  They are 
rare in number, and are the exceptions which prove the general rule of conservatism 
when looking at future developments.  These articles make suggestions that the future of 
war could be different, or engage intellectually with the difficulties of prediction, or 
foreshadow approaches adopted by futures studies.  They show that military thinking 
was not altogether cautious, while demonstrating that it tended to the conservative on 
the whole.   This conservatism, it must be stressed, was not simply a product of the 
social structure of the Army, as military commentators had to deal with the reality of 
war, unlike civilian writers.  Radical civilian writers such as Arthur Conan Doyle, who 
advocated transforming the cavalry into mounted infantry (as described in Chapter 
Four), had the freedom to make suggestions which might prove disastrous in a future 
war.  Hindsight would show that Doyle was broadly correct in his assertion, but at the 
time military writers had to balance risk and not simply make changes which would 
have unknown consequences.   This chapter demonstrates military conservatism at 
work, but it has to be seen within a framework of the unpredictability of war at a time of 
intense technical change.  The future was not known, as the debates on the relative 
effectiveness of airships and aircraft, or of steam and petrol powered motor vehicles, 
demonstrate forcibly. 
Technical Advances 
The RUSI Journal and The Cavalry Journal contain numerous articles on technical 
advances in weaponry and their impact on the Army (and Navy).  With the exception of a 
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group of articles on machine guns in the 1870s, all of the others bar one date from 
between 1892 and 1913.  While remembering that The Cavalry Journal was only 
published from 1906 onwards, this still shows a rising interest in technical advances 
later in the period, with many of those articles concentrating on either motor transport 
or aircraft.  These articles are primarily interested in reporting the latest advances, 
although at their most revealing when discuss their potential impact on tactics, 
organisation, or warfare in general.   
Although the age was seen as one of ‘science’, a phrase used widely in the civilian 
periodicals, very few articles in the RUSI Journal, and none in The Cavalry Journal, 
address purely scientific questions, as opposed to technical advances.  One of the 
exceptions consists of a pair of articles on weather forecasting, with Hepworth’s 1896 
paper discussing its relevance to the Navy and stating that: 
in the naval wars of the future the successful operator will possess a deeper 
knowledge than now generally obtained of the direction and velocity of ocean 
streams; of the height, direction and value of ocean tides [and so on].10    
He underscored the value of such scientific endeavours to enforce the effective blockade 
of enemy ports, and how they would affect the particular capabilities and limitations of 
steam ships.  In 1908 Rawson published a far more technical paper, which again 
emphasised the importance of meteorology to naval and military operations, and 
specifically pointed out the difficulties of forecasting the weather in advance (W. N. 
Shaw, Director of the Met Office, was present at Rawson’s paper).  This shows that the 
RUSI Journal was not afraid of publishing difficult scientific studies, as is also 
demonstrated with lectures on aircraft that contained aerodynamic equations.  
Nonetheless, very few such papers on purely scientific issues were presented as 
 
10 W. H. Campbell Hepworth, “Meteorology: A Factor in Naval Warfare,” The Journal of the Royal United 
Services, June 1896, 670. 
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lectures, and the emphasis was on reporting technological advances instead, as would be 
expected given the practical interests of the armed services.11  
Chapter Three identified a number of articles on machine guns in the periodicals 
following the Franco-German War; and there were several on the same subject in the 
RUSI Journal.  This debate is interesting because it contrasts military conservatism with 
the possibility that machine guns could have a more revolutionary impact on war.  The 
earliest dates from 1870 and is by none other than R. J. Gatling, inventor of the 
eponymous early machine gun.  His article contrasted his invention with that of the 
French mitrailleur, which had been used in the Franco-German War, so cannot be 
considered an impartial assessment.12  As an inventor interested in selling his wares, it 
was not surprising that he also attacked military conservatism, and said that 
“Governments are slow to adapt improvements, even slower than individuals.”13  He 
cited the sluggardly introduction of percussion caps, rifled barrels and breech loading 
rifles to the infantry, although noting that the latter were accepted with alacrity across 
Europe following the demonstration of the effectiveness during the Franco-German War.  
He was an advocate of the scientific age, such that “on the road, in the field, in the 
steamship, and in the factory, we can see the wonders that machinery has 
accomplished.”14  Finally, although he stopped short of suggesting that machine guns 
would revolutionise warfare, he believed that they would rapidly become adopted and 
were likely to form a new arm alongside infantry, cavalry and artillery.15   
 
11 In the 1870s, Laughton argued for scientific training in the Navy in a pair of articles reflecting the changing 
nature of naval warfare.  These are J.K. Laughton, “The Scientific Study of Naval History,” The Journal of the 
Royal United Services Institution. 1874 (Volume 79), 508-527; and J. K. Laughton, “Scientific Instruction in the 
Navy,” The Journal of the Royal United Services Institution. 1875 (Volume 81), 217-241.  There is also an article 
which advocated the establishment of a permanent commission on scientific questions of importance to the 
state, by a Fellow of the Royal Society and military officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Strange, A. Strange, “On the 
Necessity for a Permanent Commission on State Scientific Questions,” The Journal of the Royal United Services 
Institution, 1871 (Volume 64), 537-566.  The idea was not taken up, as an example of ‘scientific’ thinking failing 
to achieve acceptance by Government.  
12 R. J. Gatling, “Machine Guns: the Gatling Battery - the Agra and Claxton Guns – the French and Montigny 
Mitrailleurs,” The Journal of the Royal United Services Institution, 1870 (Volume 60), 505. 
13 Gatling, “Machine Guns”, 504. 
14 Gatling, “Machine Guns,” 527. 
15 Gatling, “Machine Guns,” 528. 
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An article by H. C. Fletcher two years later cited Gatling’s article and, using the term 
mitrailleur as a proxy for machine guns in general, debated their successes and failures 
in recent wars.  The article summarised a contemporary debate on the effectiveness of 
machine guns and their role on the battlefield as either replacing, or augmenting, light 
artillery, reflected in civilian articles of the same period.16  Fletcher, who was a serving 
lieutenant-colonel from an infantry regiment, drew on trials and experiences from the 
Franco-German War in his assessment, stating that he wished to demonstrate their 
significance in recent wars.”17  While not quite as much of an enthusiast as Gatling, he 
considered that they had the potential to revolutionise war in the future.  A third article 
written by E. Rogers in 1875 echoed Fletcher’s view that machine guns could act as an 
independent arm, again assessing the relative effectiveness of different types and 
concluding that their use, as well as the increased power of other firearms, meant that 
“modern tactics seem to court immediate contact in the loosest of formations – and the 
sooner the better.”18  The theme of increased firepower and its effects on military 
practice was to become prevalent from the 1890s onward, as discussed in the next part 
of this chapter.   Here, it should be emphasised that the two military officers were more 
conservative that Gatling, although they did share his view that machine guns were 
effective and would change tactics to some extent. 
The specific discussion on machine guns faded after the 1870s, perhaps because of the 
lack of European conflict and a wider acceptance of the weapon into contemporary 
armies; although the Cavalry Journal showed more interest in it the decade before the 
First World War, emphasising their ability to provide the cavalry with increased 
firepower and thereby their ability to conduct offensive action.19  One article from the 
 
16 H. C. Fletcher, “The Employment of Mitrailleurs During the Recent War, and their Use in Future Wars,” The 
Journal of the Royal United Services Institution, 1872 (Volume 66), 29. 
17 Fletcher, “Employment of Mitrailleurs”, 30. 
18 E. Rogers, “The Gatling Gun: its Place in Tactics,” The Journal of the Royal United Services Institution, 1875 
(Volume 82), 419. 
19 See R. V. K. Applin, “Machine Guns with Cavalry,” The Cavalry Journal, July 1907, 320-325.  Applin is cited as 
an expert in machine gun operation, in Timothy Bowman and Mark Connelly, The Edwardian Army: Recruiting, 
Training and Deploying the British Army, 1902-1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 92.  One of the 
themes of the Cavalry Journal is that it discusses the specific impact of a range of technologies on the cavalry, 
such as E. G. Godfrey-Fawcett, “Wireless Telegraphy for Cavalry Use,” The Cavalry Journal, July 1908, 291-299. 
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time was a translation of a German discussion of machine gun use with cavalry, 
demonstrating wider European interest in their tactical utility.20   Taken as a whole, 
these articles are restricted in their scope and broadly conservative.  Gatling saw it as a 
potentially revolutionary (undoubtedly the prospect of commercial gain affected his 
judgement) weapon, and there was some discussion of its use as a fourth arm to 
supplement the infantry, cavalry or artillery, but most military writers – especially those 
of the cavalry in later decades - saw it as augmenting current formations and operations.  
Military writers tended to be more conservative, reflecting both a desire to maintain the 
status quo, but also through being practitioners liable to caution. 
The RUSI Journal presented articles on numerous technical subjects such as 
communication by telegraphy or telephone.  A piece from 1878, written by H. R. Preece, 
stated that “no one can deny the enormous value of the electric telegram…it has 
revolutionised the art of war [and] operations that were a few years ago impossible are 
now essential.”21  The author was – like Gatling - a civilian, and he covered the potential 
application of the telephone to war, through a largely technical discussion of its 
characteristics.  He was at pains, however, to state that it was at an early stage of 
development and that its greatest impact would lie in the future, recognising how 
technology would continue to advance.  Such was to prove the case, and an article by C. 
F. C. Beresford – a serving major in the Royal Engineers - fourteen years later showed 
that the discussion had moved onto the telephone.  He even declared that “the 
discoveries of science that are crowding up the close of the nineteenth century have 
elbowed the telephone out of the company of novelties.”22  Although similarly technical 
in scope to the earlier article, it did place the telephone in the context of the evolution of 
war, noting its potential to affect “the little influence possessed by the commander-in-
chief in choosing the occasion of decisive action [which] is really an element of great 
difficulty in the warfare of the present day.”23  Here, Beresford is expressing the widely 
 
20 P. Boeresen, “Machine Guns with Cavalry,” The Cavalry Journal, January 1912, 34-46. 
21 W. H. Preece, “The Telephone and its Application to Military and Naval Purposes,” The Journal of the Royal 
United Services Institution, 1878 (Volume 94), 209. 
22 C. F. C Beresford, “The Telephone at Home and in the Field,” The Journal of the Royal United Services 
Institution, April 1892, 347. 
23 Beresford, “Telephone”, 362. 
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held view at the time that battlefields were being extended by the increased range of 
new weapons, making communication with dispersed formations, and therefore decisive 
action, more difficult. 
The emphasis of these articles is a focus on technical innovation, with little wider 
analysis, and they do not present a greater synthesis on the possible impact of – for 
example – telegrams and telephones to warfare.  A later article is somewhat more 
comprehensive, as it deals with communication in the Russo-Japanese War, at different 
levels (company, battalion and regiment) on the battlefield.24  This was translated from 
the Russian, thereby showing it reflected direct experience of the Russo-Japanese War, 
and it stressed the importance of communication on the battlefield.  Tellingly, the author 
stated that “owing to the extent of the modern battlefield, higher commanders must 
acquire the habit of forming for themselves a picture of the fight from reports which are 
sent in.”25  These observations once again chime with the recognised difficulties of 
communicating across dispersed battlefields, although it is the particular which is 
usually being discussed, rather than the more general implications on strategy.   
Other technical subjects covered in the RUSI Journal and the Cavalry Journal included 
photography, railways, the use of cyclists, X-ray technology for medical purposes and 
even the phonograph.26  Most were concerned with technical information, although 
some looked to augmenting (although never replacing) existing military formations with 
– for example – cyclists.   The breadth of the subjects covered is telling, and 
demonstrates an openness in the military culture of the time to accept new technology, 
 
24 “The Service of Communication in the Light of the Experience of the Russo-Japanese War,” The Journal of the 
Royal United Services Institution, March 1908, 968. 
25 “Service of Communication,” 969. 
26 For photography, see C. V. Boys, “Of the Photography of Flying Bullets by the Light of the Electric Spark,” The 
Journal of the Royal United Services. August 1893, 855-873.  For railways, see J. L. J. Clarke, “Railways in 
Modern Warfare,” The Journal of the Royal United Services Institution, April 1904, 406-411.  For cyclists, see A. 
H. Trapmann, “Cyclists in Conjunction with Cavalry,” The Cavalry Journal, July 1908, 353-364.  For X-rays, see 
W. C. Beevor, “The Working of the Roentgen Ray in Warfare,” The Journal of the Royal United Services 
Institution, October 1898, 1152-70.  For the phonograph, see G. V. Fosebery, “The Phonograph and its 
Application to Military Purposes,” The Journal of the Royal United Services. September 1893, 989-999.  The 
latter article is interesting because it discusses using the phonograph to record messages and transport them 
across the field, an approach that was certainly novel, although never actually adopted. 
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while all the time suggesting that it would not radically alter the conduct of war.  They 
represented improvements, even in the areas of motor transport or aviation, which were 
much discussed in the military journals.  
There is one article from the nineteenth century on steam transport on roads, noting 
that in the year of publication (1894) there were already 4,000 such vehicles in 
Britain.27  This provides context and illustrates the point that many of the technologies 
reviewed in the RUSI Journal were, like motor vehicles, photography and the telephone, 
largely being developed for civilian use.  Unlike rifles, machine guns or artillery, these 
innovations were being adapted for military use, and many of the articles report on 
progress and their relevance to the army.   The author, Templer, noted their value given 
the recognised shortage of horses in Europe, cited examples of their use in Italy and 
Switzerland, and of the widespread European interest in the military applications of 
steam transport.28  He covered the financial aspects of vehicle ownership, the ability of 
industry to build military vehicles as variants of civil vehicles, and of the need to provide 
an organisation to maintain, train and study them.  In common with the articles on 
machine guns and communications discussed above, however, he did not move onto a 
view of how such vehicles might affect war, in either the short or long term. 
It was the twentieth century which saw the publication of many more articles on motor 
transport, as the technology developed and the army began to use such vehicles more 
widely, and some did start to think ahead to their effect on war, albeit mostly junior 
officers.  The rapidity with which motor vehicles were evolving was understood by the 
authors of these pieces, as can be seen by this statement by C. E. I. McNalty in 1904: “in 
the discussion of a subject in a state of rapid evolution, it is not easy to differentiate 
between the present, past and future.”29  McNalty was a serving major, and his article 
primarily dealt with technical detail, including a view that the deployment of traction 
 
27 Templer, “Steam Transport on Roads,” The Journal of the Royal United Services, August 1894, 829. 
28 Templer, “Steam Transport,” 829. 
29 C. E. I. McNalty, “Mechanically Propelled Vehicles for Military Purposes.” The Journal of the Royal United 
Services Institution, November 1904, 1229. 
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engines in South Africa had resulted in considerable financial savings.30  He did express 
the view that mechanically-powered vehicles could service as transport for officers 
(motor cars), messengers (motor cycles) or the transport of heavy field guns and 
munitions.31  He then looked further forward, suggesting that “in the future we look for 
the movement of motor cars over all surfaces possible to the animal.”32  This led him to 
conjecture that motor vehicles could be used to mass infantry for flank attacks, or for 
concentrating defensive fire.  He even considered the use of light guns or machine guns 
mounted on them to provide supporting fire.  Overall, McNalty was realistic about what 
contemporary vehicles were capable of achieving, but also – unusually - of their 
potential future capabilities.   
A similar article by de Watteville – with the even more junior rank of lieutenant – made 
similar points about the specific use of motor cycles, including potential future roles for 
their use.33  Two years later and Paynter, a retired Naval officer, diligently reported on 
recent developments with motor vehicles and was concerned that little practical 
experience had been gained with the military use of motor vehicles, except on 
manoeuvres.34  He went on – like McNalty - to note the potential usefulness of motor 
vehicles in meeting the challenge of the widely scattered formations of troops resulting 
from modern warfare.35  While he doubted the ability of contemporary vehicles to 
transport large numbers of troops, he argued that they could move small forces rapidly, 
even mentioning the concept of ‘motor infantry’ (the British Army was to become 
entirely motorised by 1939).36  He even considered – in the manner of similarly 
equipped trains – that “the armoured motor will doubtless find a place in the war of the 
future.”37  The debate that follows his lecture is instructive as it demonstrates a measure 
 
30 McNalty, “Mechanically Propelled,” 1235. 
31 McNalty, “Mechanically Propelled”, 1229. 
32 McNalty, “Mechanically Propelled,” 1232. 
33 De Watteville, “Motor Cycles for Military Purposes,” The Journal of the Royal United Services Institution, 
March 1904, 245-254. 
34 Hugh H. Paynter, “The Use of the Motor Car in Warfare,” The Journal of the Royal United Services Institution, 
June 1906, 766. 
35 Paynter, “Motor Car,” 770. 
36 Paynter, “Motor Car,” 770. 
37 Paynter, “Motor Car,” 771. 
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of understanding its potential in the future, but also conservatism, with the Chairman, 
Major General A. H. Paget, inviting a return to further debate in his concluding remarks: 
I have no doubt that on some future occasions, when perhaps the car as a military 
machine is in a more perfect state, and experiments have been tried,  that he will 
give his attention to it,  and go more closely into the question of motor cars being 
used on a very large scale for transport purposes, which I think would be a 
distinct advantage for the rapid movement of troops in the field.38    
The phrasing is illuminating.  Yes, he is saying, the motor car could have an impact on 
war, but not yet as it is too immature and untested.  This form of conservatism can be 
seen to impede experimentation; once more, technical lectures  from junior or retired 
officers were welcome, but did not necessarily lead to a serious effort to test the motor 
car more widely.  Indeed, as is discussed below, there was a particular reluctance on the 
part of the cavalry to see motor vehicles as anything other than a purely supportive arm 
before the First World War.   
It is nonetheless  important to recognise the context of the debate at the time, and not to 
mistake caution for entrenched conservatism.  For example, in 1910 the military had not 
determined whether it would be steam power or the internal combustion engine which 
would come to be more commonly used in military vehicles.  This debate is evident in an 
article from 1910 with the author, Clarkson, believing that steam would win out.39  
Paynter also touched on this subject in his article from four years earlier, although he 
favoured petrol powered vehicles due to the time it took steam vehicles to get moving.40  
With hindsight, and the eventual dominance of the internal combustion engine, this 
discussion seems archaic, but highlights the challenges the military establishment faced 
 
38 Paynter, “Motor Car,” 784.  One of the attendees, Major Lindsay, noted the huge potential of motors and 
calls for greater sympathy from officers, noting that “as the age becomes mechanical that will become a 
natural feature,” Paynter, “Motor Car”, 775. 
39 T. Clarkson, “The Use of Motors for the Transport of Troops,” The Journal of the Royal United Services 
Institution, April 1910, 454. 
40 Paynter, “Motor Car,” 773. 
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with operating motorised vehicles.  The future was an uncertain place, and it was seen 
as risky to allow speculation to alter military structures or practices. 
Later articles, in the years up to 1914, became more prosaic, discussing more detailed 
problems such as the use of motor vehicles to transport ammunition; or the necessity to 
standardise civilian motor vehicles so that they could be more easily taken up for use in 
war.41  These articles illustrate a general tendency to concentrate on practical matters, 
rather than looking forward to their wider effect on future war.  They also mark a 
retreat from speculation to more prosaic treatments as the technology matured, as if by 
focusing on technical detail wider and uncomfortable questions about their future use 
could be avoided. 
The decades to come, and impetus of the First World War, were to show just how  
important motor vehicles were to become for the British army, and no arm was affected 
more than the cavalry, which became mechanised in the interwar years.  There is, 
however, little foresight visible about their use in The Cavalry Journal (especially when 
measured against the number of articles on aircraft, as discussed below).  One of the few 
examples discussed the use of motor cycles in conjunction with cavalry, in an article 
which considered them to be useful as messengers, while adding that they “cannot, and 
should not, be allowed to replace the horse in close contact with the enemy.”42  Another 
article, written two years earlier in 1909, maintained a cautiously positive stance with 
regard to motor cars, considering that as they effect mobility they should be of interest 
to the cavalry, as that was its raison d’etre.43  The authors discussed the attachment of 
motor cars to the Cavalry Division, but they are clearly seen as augmenting their 
operations, rather than being a potential replacement for horsed cavalry; and the 
authors commented that “armoured machine-gun wagons have of course been talked 
 
41 Respectively, H. de Pree, “The Supply of Ammunition and Motor Transport,” The Journal of the Royal United 
Services Institution, August 1912, 1149-1164; and H. C. L. Holden, “The Standardization of Mechanically 
Propelled Commercial Vehicles for Military Purposes in Time of War,” The Journal of the Royal United Services 
Institution, October 1913, 1313-1318. 
42 Lancer, “Motor Cycles with Cavalry,” The Cavalry Journal, April 1911, 148. 
43M. J. Mayhew and Skeffington Smythe, “Motor Cars with the Cavalry Division,” The Cavalry Journal. October 
1909, 442. 
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of…[but] their advantages are small and their practical disadvantages many.”44  These 
two short articles are the only ones in The Cavalry Journal from 1906 to 1914 to discuss 
motor vehicles.  Even more than the largely negative treatment of the potential of 
motorised operations, it is the absence of articles that is most telling.  It indicates a 
denial of progress, especially beyond the near future, by simply refusing to engage with 
the subject. 
It can be seen that mechanically powered vehicles were being widely tested, 
experimented upon, and used by the British Army in the decade or so up to 1914.  The 
focus of articles in the RUSI Journal is on technical detail, and not generally on the wider 
potential implications of the new technology.45  The caution of Army officers must be 
understood as they were dealing with a new and untested technology, but nonetheless 
there was little desire to explore their revolutionary potential, reflecting the lack of 
articles dealing with the strategic impact of technological change.  The cavalry especially 
chose to ignore them, or damn them with the faint praise of being useful adjuncts, but 
not a serious challenge to the mounted horseman.  Similar views pervaded the debate on 
that even more radical of the new technologies at the turn of the century: flight. 
The RUSI Journal published several articles on the subject of flight before it had been 
successfully demonstrated by heavier-than-air craft, and only fitfully by lighter-than-air 
craft.46  A remarkable article from 1885 discussed the theoretical use of  future ‘air 
 
44 Mayhew and Smythe, “Motor Cars,” 440. 
45 The cautious, conservative and (frankly) rather dull treatment of motor vehicles by the British Army contrasts 
with the thesis of Moser that the rise of ‘automobilism’ was one factor contributing to an acceptance of war in 
1914 through rising aggression, in Kurt Moser, “The Dark Side of Automobilism, 1900 – 1930,” The Journal of 
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airships built in the latter half of the nineteenth century.  It was only in the twentieth century, however, that 
airships became both an effective weapon of war and capable of carrying passengers, notably with Zeppelin’s 
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torpedoes’ – the term meant navigable airship – and how their operation might affect 
war.47  What makes this article stand out is that it is far more speculative than the vast 
majority in the RUSI journal, and is a rare example of looking far ahead technologically, 
at a time when powered flight was in its infancy.  The talk was given by the author 
Frederic Gower and was preceded by a brief introduction by the Chairman, Professor 
Frederic Abel, who made the point that the speaker was a “visionary enthusiast” and 
collaborator with Alexander Graham Bell.48  It is hard not to see this as a remark as 
designed to boost the credibility of Gower and prevent any allegations that he was a 
crank.  Much of the article deals with rather speculative technical matters, but moves 
onto more interesting ground when it discusses how ‘air torpedoes’ would operate in 
war, and their potentially disruptive power: 
And I cannot better express the aim of the aerial-torpedo system, as applied 
against armies, than in saying that it seeks to enable you to do in this way at 30 or 
40 miles distance, that which you now effect at 3 or 4. It is upon this point, first of 
all, that your judgment is invited. Would an attack so delivered be likely to add 
very greatly to the destructive effects of war?49 
Gower goes on to discuss their potential use on civilian targets, naval targets, and even 
whether such aerial warfare might be banned by international treaty.  With hindsight, of 
course, he was to be proved right, albeit thirty and more years in the future.  This 
insight, and his clear focus on the effects of aerial warfare, rather than the technicalities 
of powered flight, counterpoints the generally short term and conservative nature of 
articles in the RUSI Journal.  The Chairman framed the discussion by stating that: 
we know in the case of the telephone, for example, that even eight or nine years 
ago it would have been considered almost visionary to believe that friends and 
 
designs, with the successful foundation and operation of DELAG, which flew airships from 1909, and was the 
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47 Frederic Gower, “A System of Air Torpedoes: With Remarks Upon the Late Attempts at Air Navigation for 
War Purposes,” The Journal of the Royal United Services Institution, 1885 (Volume 131), 857-873. 
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business acquaintances would freely converse as they now do from distant parts 
of this metropolis on all subjects with the greatest ease.50   
Few other articles were this forward-looking, however, on warfare in the air or any 
other subject.  It may have helped Gower that at the time he wrote the article, navigable 
flight was still not truly possible, giving him space to speculate. 
Fullerton wrote three summaries of aerial navigation in the RUSI Journal over the course 
of two decades.  The first was written in 1892, when he was an army captain, and had to 
be caveated with the statement that “Hitherto, unfortunately, in this country aerial 
navigation has been looked upon, to put it mildly, with the deepest suspicion, and it is no 
exaggeration to say that the terms ‘aeronaut’ and ‘lunatic’ are at present considered as 
more or less synonymous.”51  This echoes the Chairman’s pre-emptive defence of Gower 
at his lecture of 1885, but what follows forcibly contradicts any thought of lunacy, as the 
article is highly detailed in its coverage of aerodynamics and theories of flight, including 
equations applied to both heavier-than-air and lighter-than-air craft.  The focus is on 
technical detail, underscoring the seriousness of the subject, as is the list of books and 
papers Fullerton cited on the subject.52  In his conclusions he emphasised the 
“importance of making really careful and scientific experiments on the subject, so as to 
obtain thoroughly satisfactory data to work from.”53  Only at the end of the article does 
Fullerton move, in a single phrase, beyond his avowedly technical approach and 
conclude that aerial navigation would have a profound effect on Britain and that “an 
aerial navy of the very first class will be an absolute necessity.”54   
Fullerton wrote another article on aerial navigation in 1907, fifteen years after his initial 
article, by which time he had retired from the army with the rank of colonel.  Baden 
 
50 Gower, “Air Torpedoes,” 857. 
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Baden-Powell was in the Chair (brother of Robert Baden-Powell, founder of the scouting 
movement, and also an Army officer), who had written about feasibility of using manned 
kites for observation in 1895.55  Fullerton’s second article is another technical exercise 
which demonstrates the great advances made in the subject since the late nineteenth 
century.56  He covered development in airships through French, German (particularly 
Zeppelin) and Italian innovators, with a highly technical discussion of their construction 
and the forces acting upon them in flight.  He followed this with a discussion of different 
types of heavier-than-air vehicles, categorising them as gliders, ‘soaring machines’ and 
‘driving machines’, developed by the Wright Brothers, Langley, Phillips and Maxim, 
again with diagrams and technical detail.  He addressed the relative merits of airships 
and aircraft – paralleling the debate on the best way to power motor vehicles, and 
concluded that: 
On the whole, the dirigible balloon does not seem to be a very satisfactory 
solution to the problem of flight.  It must be of considerable size in order to carry 
any reasonable weight, its speed is limited, and there are many difficulties in 
connection with its construction and management.  It also, contrary to popular 
ideas, requires some sort of land harbour for starting and alighting, and cannot 
rise and descend at any time and anywhere as is usually supposed.  Taking one 
thing with another, I believe that it would be better to stop the construction of 
dirigibles [airships] altogether, as the cost of building them is not commensurate 
with the results obtained.57    
This passage illustrates the analytical approach adopted by Fullerton.  As with his 
previous article, it was only in his concluding comments that Fullerton went beyond a 
technical discussion and onto the wider subject of ‘the flying machine in war’.  He 
 
55 B. Baden-Powell, “Kites: Their Use in War,” The Journal of the Royal United Services. September 1895, 887-
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argued, at greater length than in his previous paper, that they would be used in war 
against other airships, land forces and navies; and that aerial battles would be important 
to determine which side secured control of the air.58  He also suggested that they would 
be used to reconnoitre sea forces and attack them, using camouflage to make them 
resemble the sky, and that they would be used to locate and destroy submarines.59  In 
the debate which followed his talk, Colonel Capper (author of another article discussed 
below) noted the danger to Britain of aerial forces or even invasion from the air, 
although he commented that they lay in the unknown future.60  This reinforces the sense 
that RUSI was not comfortable debating what it thought of as less than concrete 
technical issues, although Capper concluded that “[Britain] should be able to rule the 
winds as it now rules the waves.”61   
Fullerton’s third article on aerial navigation was published in 1913.  In it, he continued 
his scientific approach to the subject, beginning with a discussion of how the science of 
fluid dynamics could be used to improve aircraft design.62  He maintained his generally 
dismissive view of airships and discussed aircraft at greater length, including more 
speculative debate on helicopters and ornithopters (aircraft with moving wings 
mimicking the way which birds fly).  He cited the use of wireless telegraphy as being of 
importance to operations in the air, noting that Zeppelins had demonstrated 
communication over distances of 300 miles.63  In his concluding remarks, aside from 
stressing the need for more scientific analysis on the atmosphere, birds and stability in 
flight, he stated that “there is little doubt that the time has come for the separation of the 
‘Air Forces’ from the ‘Land’ and ‘Sea’ services.”64  It is difficult not to be struck by 
perceptive remarks of Fullerton like this, but compared to his previous article there is 
less outright speculation.  The maturing of actual aviation has narrowed his perspective, 
taking him away from thinking of the future to focus on more prosaic technical matters.  
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It seems that when there was little in the way of real aviation to debate, speculation 
came easier.   
Fullerton’s articles were not the only ones on aerial navigation in the RUSI Journal – as a 
nod to the growing importance of aviation to the armed services, July 1911 saw the first 
monthly set of ‘Aeronautical Notes’ to add to the existing Naval and Military Notes.  In 
1906 there was an article on military balloons by Capper, who intervened in the 
discussion on Fullerton’s 1907 paper.  Capper emphasised their value in reconnaissance 
through the use of photography from altitude, albeit noting that that it remained at an 
experimental stage.65  He discussed contemporary developments in aerial navigation, 
but like Fullerton, left his most interesting comment to the end of the article, such that: 
“When [future aeroplanes] become fully developed, war will be so immediately brought 
to the very door of the citizen…[so] that it will become amongst civilized nations a 
calamity far more dreaded than even at present.”66  Capper is seeing war in the air as 
acting as a deterrent, and the aeronaut as a form of peacemaker.  These comments are, 
however, only at the very end of his article and feel almost like marginalia. 
Something similar may be seen in a pair of linked articles published in 1908, which 
discussed the value of airships to the German Navy, translated from the German 
periodical Marine-Rundschau.  Amidst the lengthy practical discussions are some 
broader comments; the first being the suggestion that aerial bombardment might have a 
considerable morale effect on those subjected to attack.67  Another is the perception that 
Germany was significantly in advance of France – and particularly Britain – because it 
has been experimenting with a wider range of airships.68  The German author of the 
original article specifically attributes Britain’s lack of progress to its large Navy.69  Even 
considering the threat of Germany at the time, and the demonstration of the significant 
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efforts it was making with lighter-than-air aviation at the time, the focus of the article is 
resolutely technical. 
The Cavalry Journal published four articles on the use of aircraft with cavalry between 
1910 and 1913.  All of them suggested that there was utility in using aircraft in 
conjunction with cavalry, to discharge one of the traditional duties of that arm – 
reconnaissance.  Although this might be seen as forward looking, the articles are quick 
to assert that aircraft could only augment cavalry, and not replace them in the future.  
Lascelles, a serving captain, suggested that while it is necessary to keep abreast of 
developments in aviation, there was little reason to suggest that aircraft marked a 
revolutionary change in the methods of war.70  Indeed, he concluded firmly that aircraft 
of ‘either type’ (airships or heavier-than-air craft) would not supersede the role of 
cavalry.71 
This argument is repeated by Waldron (another junior officer with the rank of 
lieutenant) in 1913, even though he is cited as being a member of both the 19th Hussars 
and the Royal Flying Corps.  After a discussion of the present capabilities of aeroplanes, 
he concluded that they could not compete with cavalry as – even when they were armed 
– they were incapable of decisive fire and lacked the numbers to effect a battle.72  As 
with Lascelles, he saw aeroplanes as helping little in tactical reconnaissance but being of 
more use in a strategic role; and therefore certainly not capable of supplanting cavalry.73  
As so often, there is little consideration that aircraft would develop in the future, and 
these articles resolutely deny that the traditional role of cavalry could ever be 
supplanted. 74   
 
70 E. F. F. Lascelles, “The Airship and Flying Machine in War: their Probable Influence on the Role of Cavalry,” 
The Cavalry Journal, April 1910, 208. 
71 Lascelles, “The Airship,” 212. 
72 F. E. Waldron, “Aeroplanes and Cavalry,” Cavalry Review, July 1913, 314. 
73 Waldron, “Aeroplanes and Cavalry,” 318. 
74 Brett Holman, “The Phantom Airship Panic of 1913: Imagining Aerial Warfare in Britain before the Great 
War,” Journal of British Studies January 2016: 113, reports on the large number of imaginary airships seen 
around 1913, which he attributes to fear of German aerial superiority.  Certainly there is little in RUSI to show 
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These articles on technical advances share much in common.  They are almost all 
written by junior officers or civilians and focus on technical developments to the near 
exclusion of how they had, or were likely to, effect war in the future.   New technologies 
are presented as interesting but as purely supplementary to existing military practice, 
and there is a determined effort to concentrate on technical matters as a badge of 
seriousness.  What little speculation there is reduces as the actual technologies develop, 
particularly in aviation, leaving a focus on the present time rather than the future.  The 
RUSI Journal, and to a lesser extent The Cavalry Journal, do engage with new 
technologies, but they lack an approach to engage with its possible effects.  The future is 
not really being interrogated, speculation is tolerated only as marginalia, and the 
intellectual framework for examining the impact of technical change is absent.   
The Three Arms 
Contemporary sources frequently discussed the way in which new weapons had effected 
the roles of the three traditional combat arms: infantry, cavalry and artillery.  Of the 
three, the most ferocious debate, as discussed in Chapter Four, was reserved for the 
cavalry, and there were, inevitably, a large number of articles on its role in The Cavalry 
Journal.  These, along with a smaller number of articles in the RUSI Journal, go through 
the well-recognised debate about the armament of the cavalry and whether the 
emphasis should be on dismounted action with the rifle, or mounted action with sword 
and lance.  What many of the articles unconsciously reveal, however, is a sense of 
increasing constraint in the ability of the cavalry to discharge its role on the battlefield, 
often resorting to special pleading for the perceived failure of cavalry in contemporary 
or recent wars; or else making strident statements that the cavalry were more relevant 
in modern war.  Emblematic of this is an article from the first year of publication of The 
Cavalry Journal, by Chares Sydney Goldman, which drew on the experiences of cavalry in 
the Russo-Japanese War: 
 
alacrity at German advances, and once more, the articles focus on the tactical use of aircraft, and not strategic 
issues of Britain’s potential vulnerability to aerial attack 
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It is precisely because of the immense changes which have evolved themselves in 
every sphere of life, not only in armament, that their opportunities for decisive 
action in all branches of their employment have increased, almost in the same 
proportion as the size of the armies involved.75   
Such positions were also reflected in the periodicals, arguing that the increased scale of 
the battlefield, and the size of the armies involved, meant that cavalry were more 
necessary than ever, due to their mobility. 
A review in The Cavalry Journal of Bernhardi’s work Cavalry in Future Wars, published in 
1907, made the same point; writing that “the tactical possibilities open to [cavalry] may 
be somewhat more restricted, but its strategical importance is greatly increased.”76  It is 
interesting that this view stands in opposition to the statements on aircraft published in 
The Cavalry Journal, which considered that flying machines would support the strategic 
reconnaissance role of the cavalry, but not its tactical role in the same sphere.  If the true 
role of cavalry in future was to be strategic, then aircraft – acknowledged as being ideal 
for strategic reconnaissance – would surely be of great utility.  These contradictions 
illustrate the intellectual difficulty the cavalry were having in framing its role on the 
battlefield.   
The book reviewed by the article, Cavalry and Future Wars had first been published in 
1899, but was repeatedly translated and reprinted through to the First World War.  
Bernhardi was a noted military writer, who the peace campaigner and contemporary 
Norman Angell considered, in 1913, to be “probably the most influential German writer 
on current strategical and tactical problems.”77  Bernhardi recognised that war had 
changed the role of cavalry through the introduction of new weapons, and drew on the 
South African War, Franco-German War, Russo-Turkish War and the American ‘War of 
Secession’ as evidence, holding that “if we are to maintain our position as an effective 
 
75 Charles Sydney Goldman, “Cavalry: its True Functions in Modern War,” The Cavalry Journal, January 1906, 
79.  Goldman translated Bernhardi’s “Cavalry in Future Wars” into English for publication, in the same year. 
76 “Review: Cavalry in Future Wars,” The Cavalry Journal, January 1907, 83. 
77 Norman Angell, The Great Illusion (New York and London: G P Putnam’s Sons, 1913), 158. 
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arm we must break with many experiences of the past, and work out for ourselves 
principles of action which must be deduced essentially from the probable requirements 
of the future.”78  As highlighted by the reviewer of his work in The Cavalry Journal, he 
thought that cavalry would have less freedom of action on the battlefield, but that their 
strategic role was even more important for finding ways of manoeuvring to achieve a 
decisive victory.79  It is easy to see why Bernhardi was held in such esteem in The 
Cavalry Journal. 
As well as such reasoned argument about the greater role of cavalry, there were others 
who used more emotional positions such as the anonymous writer Eques (see Chapter 
Four for his writing in the civilian periodicals), who wrote in the Cavalry Review in 1908.  
He acknowledged that cavalry could not charge home against infantry or artillery, but 
that it could be done in conjunction with other arms; and that “the question of 
armament is secondary, the charge has been successful or a failure accordingly as it has 
been tactically well or badly led.”80  This reflected an emphasis on ‘the spirit of the 
cavalry’ which was prevalent in many contemporary articles in the periodicals, calling 
on cavalry commanders to be decisive and enterprising.81  Another more extreme 
example came in an article published by Battine in 1908, this time in the RUSI Journal, 
which discussed the ‘ardour of the horse soldier’ in near mystical terms.82   
Such positive statements on the cavalry are hardly surprising, as most come from The 
Cavalry Journal or cavalry officers writing in the RUSI Journal.  At one level many of them 
reflect an understanding of the problems of contemporary warfare.  On the other, there 
is a sense of the cavalry ‘protesting too much’ and asserting its greater importance in the 
 
78 Friedrich von Bernhardi, Cavalry in Future Wars, trans. Charles Sydney Goldman (New York: E P Dutton & Co., 
1906), 8. 
79 Bernhardi, “Cavalry,” 294. 
80 Eques, “Cavalry on the Battlefield,” The Cavalry Journal, April 1908, 138. 
81 It is telling that the very second article in the first edition of The Cavalry Journal is entitled ‘The Spirit of 
Cavalry’ and includes a lengthy historical analysis of cavalry; see Major G. des Barrow, “The Spirit of Cavalry,” 
The Cavalry Journal,  January 1906, 12-23. 
82 C. W. Battine, “The Use of the Horse Soldier in the Twentieth Century,” The Journal of the Royal United 
Services Institution,  March 1908, 319.  Battine wrote a piece on Britain’s duty to France in The Fortnightly 
Review in 1909. 
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face of growing evidence that its role was becoming diminished on the battlefield. 83   
This is no more evident than in reports on the effectiveness of cavalry in the Russo-
Japanese War, which was of huge interest to the military of the time, and the cavalry in 
particular.84  For example, an article by Wylly in 1911, reported the view of one Colonel 
Nowizki in Russki Invalid, who unflinchingly stated that the regular Russian cavalry 
regiments in 1904-5 had failed completely on the battlefield.85  Nowizki recognised that 
their tactical significance had been reduced, although he considered that they would still 
have a psychological effect and could still operate successfully in twilight, darkness or 
across broken ground.86  Another example is a piece from 1913, entitled ‘How Not to Do 
It’, the title of which says it all, in which the author criticises Cossack performance in the 
Russo-Japanese War.87  Yet another article, this time a translation from the German 
Internationale Revue nach Kavalleristischen Monatshefte, contains an impressive list of 
special pleading for the perceived failures of the cavalry in recent conflicts:  
It will suffice for us to briefly recall the absolutely abnormal conditions under 
which the Anglo-Boer War was waged…..In Asia, the Japanese only disposed of a 
very weak cavalry, while that of the Russians was not at all prepared.88 
While there may be truth lying behind all of these statements, they give an impression of 
increasing practical difficulty for cavalry in the field, requiring greater training, 
leadership or ‘spirit’ to overcome adversity.  Similar comments are applied to the Balkan 
War of 1913 by another article from the same German publication, such that “it may be 
said that in the Balkan War the cavalry did more work than would, from the nature of 
 
83 See, for example, H. Clifton Brown, “The Increased Importance of Training our Cavalry in Mobility.” The 
Cavalry Journal, October 1907, 446-455. 
84 See, for example, the series of four articles published on the subject in The Cavalry Journal in 1908-9; W. H. 
Birkbeck, “The Russo-Japanese War. – I,” The Cavalry Journal, October 1908, 501-517; W. H. Birkbeck “The 
Russo-Japanese War. – II,” The Cavalry Journal, January 1909, 32-46; W. H. Birkbeck, “The Russo-Japanese War. 
– III,” The Cavalry Journal, April 1909, 186-194; and W. H. Birkbeck, The Russo-Japanese War. – IV,” The Cavalry 
Journal, July 1909, 298-307. 
85 W. C. Wylly, “Some Russian Views on the Employment of Cavalry,” The Cavalry Journal,  January 1911, 85. 
86 Wylly, “Russian Views,” 86. 
87 H. M. Johnstone, “How Not to Do It,” The Cavalry Journal, October 1913, 404-414. 
88 Immanuel, “The Importance of Fighting Dismounted for Cavalry, and the Place to be Assigned to it in Action 
and Instruction,” The Cavalry Journal, October 1911, 455. 
PhD Thesis  Interrogating the Future David Bangert 
 
162  
the country, have reasonably been expected.”89  Here it is the terrain that is the culprit, 
and what emerges is the sense of an arm striving to remain relevant and fighting a 
spirited rear-guard action against the evidence of its increasingly limited role.  Articles 
in the military journals do not generally look further than the immediate future, but in 
the case of the cavalry such myopia comes across as a wilful refusal to face what the 
future might bring. 
It is striking that the number of articles in the RUSI Journal dedicated to the artillery is 
far less than that of the cavalry, which is telling with hindsight, given its immense 
significance during the First World War.  Only three articles relating to the future of 
artillery can readily be identified, with the first in 1892, which was a flatly technical 
article on Continental developments of field artillery.90  Of more interest to the future 
direction of war are two later articles, the first of which appeared in 1906.  The first was 
an article by J. F. Cadell,  which was largely technical in nature, although he criticised the 
use of cover and reverse slope tactics (placing artillery behind the crest of a hill to 
prevent it being easily engaged), to suggest instead that it could be placed on the skyline 
to engage the enemy more directly.91  He used the Russo-Japanese War to support his 
position and compared the Japanese forward tactics favourably to the Russians’ more 
cautious approach, suggesting that they preserved their materiel, but did not use it 
effectively.92  Cadell was unwittingly putting forward the tactics used at the start of the 
First World War, which were to prove costly to the British Army, although he 
acknowledged the value of indirect fire in semi-siege operations, which were to 
dominate the Western Front from 1915 onwards. 
A very different stance was taken by E. M. Molyneux in 1909, who drew extensively on 
the experiences of the South African War and the Russo-Japanese War in his discussion 
of artillery fire.  In contrast to Cadell, he saw enormous value in maintaining the 
 
89 “The Work of the Cavalry in the Balkan War,” The Cavalry Journal, January 1914, 77. 
90 E. Lambaet, “The Field Gun of the Future,” The Journal of the Royal United Services Institution, October 1892, 
1155-1170. 
91 J. F. Cadell, “Theories as to the Best Position for Quick Firing Shielded Field Artillery, The Journal of the Royal 
United Services Institution, December 1906, 1477. 
92 Cadell, “Best Position,” 1479. 
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invisibility of artillery.93  He explained how the use of telephones and observation posts 
by the Japanese had enabled them to effectively direct artillery fire.94  What is 
interesting here is that both authors are drawing on the Japanese experience of the war, 
but reaching radically different conclusions.  Molyneux identified the importance of 
telegraphy and potentially, in the future, wireless communication, to relay messages 
between artillery and infantry.  These views show an impressive grasp of what was to be 
important in the future, but his contradictory stance to Cadell also demonstrates 
uncertainty on how artillery should be used in the future.   
There was far more interest in the increasing firepower available to infantry between 
the Franco-German War and the First World War, than the future of artillery.  Captain H. 
Brackenbury, Professor of Military History at the Royal Military Academy, wrote a 
perceptive article about the altered conditions of war as early as 1873, drawing on the 
experiences of the Franco-German War to demonstrate the great difficulties of 
advancing under fire.95  Much of his article dealt with potential new formations for the 
British Army, although he concluded with an ominous point for the future, that “how is it 
that, while the defence is apparently so enormously powerful, the attack will ever 
succeed?”96  He suggested that the answer might lay in preparatory artillery 
bombardment, concentrating fire and choosing the point of attack, and his article is the 
first of many which discussed the challenge of conducting successful attacks in the face 
of improved infantry fire. 
The bulk of articles on improved infantry fire date from after 1878 and the Battle of 
Plevna.  C. B. Brackenbury – the brother of H. Brackenbury - returned to the subject ten 
 
93 E. M. Molyneux,. “Artillery Support of Infantry,” The Journal of the Royal United Services Institution, 
November 1909, 1459. 
94 Molyneux, “Artillery Support,” 1461. 
95 H. Brackenbury, “The Tactics of the Three Arms as Modified to Meet the Requirements of the Present Day,” 
The Journal of the Royal United Services Institution, 1873 (Volume 74), 618.  Brackenbury wrote a piece on 
ironclad field artillery in The Nineteenth Century five years later.  Sir Henry Brackenbury was described as “the 
cleverest man in the Army”, rose to the rank of Lieutenant-General and was involved in the reorganisation of 
the artillery in the latter decades of the nineteenth century.  Biographical details from The Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography, www.oxfordnb.com, entry for Henry Brackenbury (1837-1914), 
https://doi.org/10/1093/ref:odnb/32021..  
96 Brackenbury, “Tactics,” 630. 
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years later with an extensive study of British and Continental military works.97  He 
presented a realistic treatment of warfare, citing French, Austrian and Italian writings to 
highlight the evolution of open tactics in response to increased defensive firepower.98  
He was equally pragmatic about the emergence of a greater level of fortification, noting 
that “[the spade] is now adopted throughout Europe, and the chief point is to practice 
the men in leaving cover quite as much as in making it.”99  He placed an emphasis on 
needing better trained infantry to overcome these challenges, as well as emphasising the 
need for armies to train individuals to have more initiative.100  Similar views on the 
subject of firepower were expressed by many writers after the Russo-Turkish War, 
paralleling its impact on perceptions – and the battle of Plevna in particular – in the 
civilian periodicals.101  The articles in the RUSI Journal tended to be hard-headed and 
concerned with the practical conduct of warfare, and did not share the sense of 
increasing dread at the prospect of war so evident in the periodicals, which is 
unsurprising for what was a professional publication. 
Other articles concerned with infantry firepower discussed the technical development of 
the rifle, specifically with those which promised to deliver even greater volume of fire.  
Most were narrowly concerned with issues such as the potential for troops with more 
effective rifles to use ammunition too quickly, such as one written by Fosebery in 
 
97 C. B. Brackenbury, “The Latest Development of the Tactics of the Three Arms,” The Journal of the Royal 
United Services Institution, 1883 (Volume 120), 455. He also wrote on the subject of using armoured shields on 
artillery in the civilian periodicals, as described in Chapter Three.   
98 Brackenbury, “Latest Developments,” 443. 
99 Brackenbury, “Latest Developments,” 442. 
100 Brackenbury, “Latest Developments,” 453. 
101 See Sir Arnold Kemball, “Lessons from the Late War,” The Journal of the Royal United Services Institution, 
1878 (Volume 98), 942; Walter H. James, “Modern Fire: Its Influence on Armaments, Training and Tactics,” The 
Journal of the Royal United Services Institution, 1880 (Volume 106), 378-403; and then Walter H. James, “On 
Some Changes in Tactics Caused by the Increased Power of Modern Fire,” The Journal of the Royal United 
Services Institution, 1884 (Volume 127), 925-940.  See also – for a more general description of the conflict at 
Plevna rather than a tactical analysis, Francis Welch, “Military Notes Round Plevna and on the Danube, During 
December 1877 to January 1878,” The Journal of the Royal United Services Institution, 1878 (Volume 95), 328-
341; and “The Combat at Plevna,” The Journal of the Royal United Services Institution. 1878 (Volume 96), 745-
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1882.102  Another example by Marsh, written in 1891, focused on the effect of wounds 
inflicted using different calibre weapons, which is unsurprising as he was the Surgeon-
General of the Army Medical Staff.103  The same year, however, Benson wrote a 
comprehensive (as well as prize winning) article which moved beyond a narrow 
technical discussion to the implications of improved rifles, to conclude that “a serious 
frontal attack over open ground, against infantry in position, unless enormous 
superiority in artillery is obtained, will hardly be attempted in future.”104  He concluded, 
like C. B. Brackenbury, that the altered conditions of war would require more highly 
trained troops, greater fire discipline and more staff officers.105 
It is clear from Benson’s paper, and others of the time, that it was well understood that 
all armies would have to be re-equipped with magazine rifles to maintain parity with 
their neighbours and rivals.  In 1912, in the Journal of the United Services Institute of 
India, Freeth moved on to the next logical development in rifles, which was to adopt fully 
automatic models.  Early models were only to be accepted into service in the First World 
War, and then usually only as supplementary weapons to soldiers armed with rifles, but 
he made the telling point that “history has demonstrated that the moral influence 
bestowed upon an army by its possession of a superior weapon, is an asset which no 
country can afford to neglect.”106  He recognised that both the physical and morale 
benefits of improved weapons would mean that they would inevitably be adopted.107  
His article did not discuss the effect of these tactical changes on war at a strategic level, 
and indeed assumed that it would continue as before, albeit with a need for altered 
tactics and improved discipline.  Military and civilian articles shared a recognition that 
war had been altered by the new infantry weapons, but the former restricted themselves 
 
102 G. V. Fosebery, “Magazine Rifles,” The Journal of the Royal United Services Institution, 1882 (Volume 116), 
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to managing change, while the latter saw more clearly the potentially apocalyptic 
consequences of industrial war. 
Another parallel with the civilian periodicals is a reduction in the number of articles 
which are concerned with improved firepower after 1900, at which time there was a 
burst of interest in tactics because of the South African War; but afterwards very little 
was published along the lines of Benson’s article.108  There was some interest in the 
Russo-Japanese War, as the cavalry reports indicate, but these were narrowly focused 
on the conflict and not on any wider consideration of the likely character of a future 
European war.  The particular and real nature of the conflicts in South Africa and 
Manchuria drove away broader speculation on the future of war, in both the military 
journals and the civilian periodicals.  There are parallels between the articles on the 
three arms and those on technical advances: change is acknowledged but not to the 
point the fundamental practice of war might be changed.  The conservatism of the 
writers is evident in the way new developments are controlled and bounded, and in the 
case of the cavalry resistance to change manifests itself as special pleading, finding 
excuses for poor performance in contemporary wars through terrain, training or 
circumstance.  The effect of new weapons was discussed widely in the military journals, 
but never allowed to attack the foundations of military practice. 
Another parallel point must also be made.  For all the measured discussion of the effects 
of new rifles on tactics, as illustrated by the papers of Brackenbury and Benson, the 
South African War was still a shock to the Army, which found that it has to change its 
formations and doctrine to avoid crippling casualties when attacking Boer riflemen.  
Although this can be read as simply the effect of military conservatism, the care with 
which tactics, formations and training were discussed shows that this view is too 
 
108 Bloch had two papers published in the RUSI Journal on the South African War which dealt squarely with his 
theories on a European War, discussed in Chapter Seven.  See Jean de Bloch, “The Transvaal War: Its Lessons in 
Regard to Militarism and Army Re-Organisation (Part I),” The Journal of the Royal United Services Institution, 
December 1901, 1316-1344; and Jean de Bloch, “The Transvaal War: Its Lessons in Regard to Militarism and 
Army Re-Organisation (Part II),” The Journal of the Royal United Services Institution, November 1901, 1413-
1451.  Maude, a vigorous opponent of Bloch in the periodicals, was also present, writing about the War ; see F. 
N. Maude, “Continental Versus South African Tactics: A Comparison and Reply to Some Critics,”  The Journal of 
the Royal United Services Institution, March 1902, 318-354. 
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simplistic.  Instead, the speed with which rifles had changed, even between the Russo-
Turkish and the South African Wars, had blindsided the military theorists.  Rapid 
technological change had proved too much for the existing structures of the Army to 
manage, even though the RUSI Journal continually engaged with tactical matters.  The 
future had rushed forward so rapidly that it overwhelmed the Army’s best efforts to 
adapt to change. 
Strategic Thinking 
It is possible to find articles in the RUSI Journal which do contain more speculation on 
the future of war – they are rare, but significant in that they show that some military 
writers were alive to the possible effects of change.  This final part of the chapter 
discusses a number of examples, including some pieces by senior military officers, who 
were perhaps allowed more freedom to express such views, given their stature within 
RUSI.  It also discusses the way German military theorists were reported in the RUSI 
Journal, as they often looked at war in a more comprehensive way than their British 
counterparts.  Before turning to these, however, it is important to note that the RUSI 
Journal did discuss wargaming around the turn of the century, which reveals much 
about the intellectual climate in the British military of the time.  As discussed in Chapter 
One, wargaming had been taken seriously by the German Army since the early 
nineteenth century for future planning.   While they were played in Britain, as 
demonstrated by articles in the RUSI Journal, interest in them was limited, as shown by 
the fact that the seven articles are grouped around the latter two decades of the 
nineteenth century, with one in the late 1880s and six in the 1890s.   
The earliest paper, from 1888, was presented with C. B. Brackenbury in the chair and 
contained a statement that “the only war game now found to be practicable is a 
manoeuvre on the map conducted by an umpire”109  The reason was telling – the author 
considered that there had been a breakdown of recognised rules with the coming of 
 
109 H. Spencer Williams, “The Practical Value of the War Game,” The Journal of the Royal United Services 
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modern firearms.  There was also a feeling in the lecture that the wargame was being 
neglected, and Major General Moncrieff stood up for its value at the end in the debate, 
which is to be expected as he was President of the Technical and War Game Society.110  
Three articles from a few years later show that the Home District, at least, were 
conducting wargames with regularity, reporting that 38 officers took part in one as 
members of the District Tactical and War Game Society in 1891.111  The wargame in this 
case was not on a tabletop, but instead of what Satterthwaite, the author,  considered a 
novel form, the ‘war game in the open’: 
various methods of acquiring tactical knowledge in peace-time have been 
practised – manoeuvring with troops, war games on the map, the study of 
campaigns from books and lectures and to these must be added the war game in 
the open.112  Satterthwaite reported again on a smaller game in 1892, this time 
with a battalion.113    
These games were conducted in terms of facing an invasion, as was a later war game in 
the field reported in 1893.114   
Of a different sort were two articles relating to the Jane naval wargame, with the first 
being a description of it by its eponymous inventor.  He was clear that its value lay in the 
principle that, unlike exercises, “the enemy is doing something at the same time.”115  He 
argued that it could familiarise naval officers with the characteristics of ships from 
opposing navies and illustrate the principles of combat, and covered its use by the 
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Russian and Japanese navies.116  He described the Russian game as ‘strategic’ but from 
the description it corresponds more closely to an operational or grand tactical game, and 
that is a feature of all the games described; they are not at the level of simulating a war, 
but in looking at tactical or ship actions.  In the debate which followed Jane’s paper, 
pessimism was expressed that only three British naval officers had shown an interest in 
the game, although there were reportedly game sets in many ships.”117  Jane suggested 
wryly  that “the British Navy, as a whole, is opposed to anything that seems to smack of 
theory.”118  Another year on, and Captain King-Hall described a naval game along similar 
lines, although he did not say who had produced it, or for which navy.119   The relative 
lack of articles shows that land and naval games had garnered only peripheral interest 
from serving officers.  Even when they were practised, those mentioned are specifically 
tactical in nature, or operational at the highest level, and not concerned with gaming at a 
strategic level.  Like the articles on future war, they lack the vision to examine how new 
weapons might affect war at a level beyond the tactical.   
The last article to mention wargaming is a piece by Major General Webber, and is more 
interesting, as it suggests a programme of Army reform based on the lessons of the 
South African War, and began by stating that “my contention is that the scientific study 
of warfare during the latter half of the nineteenth century has lagged far behind the 
advance in knowledge which the world had made in the same period.” 120  Webber 
suggested that material advances had outstripped those of personnel and organisation, 
and regarded wargaming as a tool for interpreting future conflict, while being critical of 
its application by the British army121  Webber considered that increasing range in 
warfare was a revolutionary development, such that the organisation and tactics of 
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armies would break down when put to the test of a general war.122  He specifically 
mentioned Bloch’s analysis of future war and, while he was not entirely convinced by his 
arguments that modern warfare would refute the lessons of the past, considered him to 
have adopted a scientific approach to its study.123  Webber’s statements are more 
surprising given his senior rank, and his article is unusual in the RUSI Journal for its 
forward looking attitude.  Once again, technical descriptions were welcomed in the RUSI 
Journal, but wider methods which might be described as ‘scientific’ were not. 
The contrast between the faltering British response to wargaming and that of Germany 
is telling.  Schlieffen used wargaming, alongside staff rides, and exercises, to test his 
plans for invading France in the first decade of the twentieth century, as part of a more 
professional German approach to wargaming.124  Although the RUSI Journal indicates a 
level of intellectual engagement with military affairs, there is an undercurrent of 
hostility towards approaches such as wargaming.  To be fair, British wargames were 
certainly carried out, and Morgan-Owen notes that it was a game conducted at the Staff 
College which led to the decision to commit the BEF to Europe.125  What is lacking is any 
great discussion of the subject in The RUSI Journal. 126 
Given their perceived pre-eminence in warfare, writers in the RUSI Journal often drew 
on German sources, or published translations of long pieces by German writers on the 
modern conditions of warfare, which exhibit something of a love-hate relationship with 
their military rival and its preeminent army.  In 1887, for example, Lonsdale Hale, a 
regular contributor to the RUSI Journal, published a large section of Goltz’s Nation in 
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Arms in 1887.  A. J. Echevarria describes this work as Goltz’s most influential book, and it 
centred on the argument that winning modern wars would require the militarisation of 
the whole of society.127   It was also, inevitably, concerned with future war and Goltz was 
clear that, “technical science…has also placed in the soldiers hand new weapons, with 
which he produces effects never dreamt of his father.”128   Although based on historical 
analysis, he appreciated the changes which had come over warfare, including the 
strategic importance of railways, the increased scale of battlefields because of the range 
of modern weapons, and the impact of modern rifle fire.129  His approach acknowledged 
that change has happened, but for all its scope, like so many contemporary military 
writers, did not consider future change: there is no discussion in Nation in Arms of how 
still more powerful artillery, rifles and machine guns might alter tactics.  Social 
Darwinist in outlook, and rather apocalyptic, Goltz’s has a bleak outlook on the effects of 
a long war:  
Economic resources will break down before the armies are exhausted; for 
instance, operations in France must be very long drawn out.  A war against Russia 
will demand several campaigns before arriving at any result.  We may predict 
that wars cannot terminate other than by the complete destruction or the 
exhaustion of both combatants.130 
It is therefore full of practical suggestions to prepare the German people, marshal the 
resources of the nation and deploy them effectively in war, although Goltz did not 
predict how a long war would be fought in the future.  In a sense it was a response to the 
‘dread’ of war, calling for preparation to weather the storm, and allowing Germany to 
emerge successfully from such a conflict.  The very end of the extract selected by Hale 
was a paean to war and the ability of the German nation to triumph in conflict.131  Hale 
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does not comment on the sentiment, but did state in his introduction that he did not see 
Britain as a ‘nation in arms’, bearing in mind that in 1887 Britain did not consider 
intervention on the Continent as either likely or desirable. 
Nine years after Hale’s translation, Ware reviewed the fourth edition of Captain 
Hoening’s Untersuchugen uber die Tactics der Zukunft over three articles, including 
translations of large sections of the text.  The first article is the most interesting, as it 
discusses the general nature of war, with the author drawing lessons from the Wars of 
1866 and 1870, although he also referred to events in the recent Chilean (sic Chili) 
War.132  Although Hoening expressed the commonly held view that modern weapons 
would make it more difficult to cross the fire zone, his opinion was that “a fixed moral 
will or determination to overcome it at all costs is required.”133  Such opinions were 
typical of the German military and evident in their criticism of the British conduct in the 
South African War, as described in Chapter Four.   In Hoening’s view, battles could only 
be decided by closing with the enemy - with the translator Ware commenting that his  
views reflected the intensely German philosophy of warfare of the author.134  Putting 
aside what Ware rightly considered to the nationalistic tone of the book, the article 
essentially ‘ticks off’ all the tactical impact of improved defensive fire, and yet failed to 
understand the concomitant strategic change.  Hoening had adopted an evolutionary 
approach to tactics but insisted on the continuing relevance of previous wars and 
historical analysis. 135 
A further German piece offered the RUSI Journal a more comprehensive view of future 
war, through the translation and summary of a piece originally published by General 
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Rothe in the Deutsch Review in November 1902.  Aside from presenting a widely 
recognised picture of modern warfare, he added that “practical knowledge cannot 
dispense with the scientific.”136  This, along with an assertion that technical knowledge 
and training would be required, probably reflected Rothe’s status as a General of 
Artillery, a more technical arm than the infantry or cavalry.137  His piece was really 
unusual, however, in that he recognising some of the challenges to war which Goltz, 
Bloch and Angell, the peace campaigner, had raised, such that “for while a nation in arms 
is employing its whole strength to ensure victory, it is threatened by the danger that its 
industries will be languishing, its trade suffering and passing into the hands of rivals, its 
civilising mission at a standstill.”138  German military writers were engaging, at least to a 
limited extent, with the potentially damaging effects of a long war, while their British 
contemporaries tended not to discuss strategic issues at all. 
One of the themes in the German writing was also the use of historical analysis to 
attempt prediction of the future.  Hale, who translated The Nation in Arms, agreed with 
their sentiment and regarded it as “a necessary part of the training of every officer, 
senior or junior, old or young.” 139  Interestingly, he advocated the teaching of 
deliberately archaic military examples to avoid confusion in those being taught 
regarding modern warfare; in other words, teaching Napoleonic warfare would be more 
dangerous to modern officers than instructing them on ancient conflict, due to the 
formers apparent closeness to modern war.140  He illustrated this by saying that “do not 
the field days at Aldershot and manoeuvres show conclusively that it is the absence of 
realisation of this power of modern firearms…that is the cause of the tactical operation 
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being a military anachronism?”141  In the debate which followed his lecture, however, J. 
F. R. Henderson argued using an example with general Sheridan (from the American 
Civil War) that the eternal principles of strategy still held.142  It is indeed a feature of the 
articles in the RUSI Journal that when strategy is discussed, it is usually to state that it is 
based on unalterable and unchanged principles, unlike tactics, which were seen as 
having had to change in the face of improved weapons. 
There are only a few examples of articles presenting truly strategic thinking about the 
future.  Three different pieces are worth examining, to counterpoint their imagination in 
the face of the conservatism exhibited by most writers in the journal.   The first is to be 
found in an article by Captain Harrison of the 1st Volunteer Artillery in 1897, which 
reassessed the possibility of the invasion of England and in particular, “to examine how 
far new discoveries – or new possible combinations of foreign powers – may have 
altered or modified these data.” 143  Harrison explicitly recognised the need to verify the 
assumptions upon which an analysis of invasion had been considered, and went on to 
question if steam and electricity would be favourable to the attack or defence.  Harrison 
went on to report on primary research at the London docks, where he had determined 
the capacity of modern steamers to embark troops.  He concluded that 40,000 troops a 
day could be embarked, and used the example of transport to the Crimea and Mexico (by 
the French) as proof of the ability of steamers to carry large armies, concluding that “the 
introduction of large steamers has rendered the transport of military expeditions an 
easier option than it was in former days.144 
Continuing his theme, Harrison analysed the numerical strength of the defending forces 
in Britain, before moving to cite the difficulties faced by part trained troops (such as the 
British volunteers) in the American Civil War, Russo-Turkish War and Prussian Wars.145  
While being pessimistic as to their value, he concluded that the use of trains and the 
 
141 Hale, “Professional Study,” 693. 
142 Hale, “Professional Study,” 707. 
143 W. H. Harrison, “The Invasion of England: Should London be Fortified,” The Journal of the Royal United 
Services Institution, February 1897, 172. 
144 Harrison, “Invasion,” 174. 
145 Harrison, “Invasion,” 179. 
PhD Thesis  Interrogating the Future David Bangert 
 
175  
telegraph would allow the concentration of defenders more effectively, by stiffening part 
trained troops.   Finally, he used further historical analysis to suggest that building a 
‘polygonal system’ of defences around London would be valuable, including estimating 
costs compared to the £12m spent on protecting dockyards.  The debate which followed 
clearly indicated that the French were still seen as the enemy at this time, and Vice-
Admiral Colomb (one of the authors of The Great War of 189-), as Chair, was critical, 
stating that the money spent on such defences would mean that the Navy would be 
neglected.   The actual validity of Harrison’s argument is, for the purposes of this 
discussion, less important than his approach.  He set out a concept for defending Britain 
and supported it with historical and financial analysis, which are a rare example of an 
approach which would become commonplace in the later twentieth century.  It is also 
noteworthy that he was also looking at least  a decade into the future, as it would not be 
possible to build such a series of fortifications over a shorter period.  He also recognised 
the impact of technical change (railways, telegraphs and steam power for ships) on 
strategic issues, enabling the more effective concentration of defensive forces.   
Another article which discussed the defence of Britain was even more radical than 
Harrison’s work, and came from a senior officer, Vice-Admiral Campbell, in 1908.  He 
began by emphasising (unsurprisingly) the primacy of the Navy in defending against 
invasion, but then said that his secondary purpose was to advocate ”the necessity of a 
carefully prepared, rapid system of concentration on any spot chosen by the invader for 
landing.146  What is unusual is that his suggestion was not to use railways, but to build a 
network based on a new and untested system – the Brennan monorail.147  This was a 
novel concept set out by the Australian designer Louis Brennan, who had developed a 
prototype where gyroscopically stable cars ran along a single track, or even cables.148  
The monorail was never adopted for fears of its stability, but garnered much public 
interest at the time and interested H. G. Wells, who assumed it had been widely adopted 
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in the future history of his novel The War in the Air, as discussed in Chapter Six.  As if this 
were not enough, Campbell went on to suggest an astonishing list of potential 
improvements to not only the Navy, but for the Armed Services as a whole, including 
cutting a canal between the Forth and Clyde on the scale of the Kiel canal in Germany; a 
tube rail to the Continent; internal combustion on battleships (also mentioned in Wells’ 
The War in the Air); improved international arbitration and the conquest of the air.149  In 
contrast to the normally conservative articles in the journal, each one of these points is 
worthy of note, and taken together they form a startling contrast to articles typical of the 
RUSI Journal. 
If Harrison was using something close to what would come to be called operational 
research in his assessment of defending Britain – in terms of calculating the carrying 
capacity of ships for invasion, then Campbell is delivering an examination of possible 
technologies akin to futures studies, looking at how radical new technologies could 
transform warfare.  These are, however, the exceptions which prove the rule – they 
stand out as unusual and were not part of any wider move by either the RUSI Journal or 
the British military establishment to examine the future.  Like wargaming, such 
investigations of the future lay on the periphery, and were not part of official thinking.  
One writer did, however, identify the value of thinking about the future, in an article 
from 1897.  The talk was given by Vice-Admiral Colomb, introduced earlier, and was on 
the future of the torpedo, which was a cause of concern to the Royal Navy as it was seen 
as having the potential to destroy fleets of battleships at relatively little financial cost.  
Before reaching the technical part of his discussion, however, Colomb discussed the 
tension between conservatism and innovation in a technically precocious age; 
reminding RUSI that: 
It is peculiarly the function of this Institution to watch all changes in the material 
with which it is intended to carry on future war, to discuss their nature and 
character, and to endeavour to forecast their exact meaning.  Except in the open 
arena of this theatre, it is difficult to suggest where such a function – of such 
 
149 Campbell, “Training, Organisation and Rapid Concentration,” 1617. 
PhD Thesis  Interrogating the Future David Bangert 
 
177  
immense value to the State – can be usefully exercised.  All those who have been 
concerned in the production of new elements of force, or in the modification of 
old ones, have natural and proper prejudices in favour of the new descriptions of 
material.150   
Colomb was asking the question of where speculation on future war should be situated, 
beyond RUSI itself, and recognising that such a venture could be of great value.  He went 
on to suggest that there were two responses to change, at least as extremes.  Firstly, that 
certain proponents adopted “a certain almost fixed hypothesis of the character of the 
war, into which they endeavour to fit the new developments of material and to discover 
if they are of a permanent or temporary character.”151  Secondly, others adopted a 
position that was “enthusiastic – prophetic – support of material changes, the pressing 
forward and universal adoption of which becomes the be-all and end-all of their 
advocacy.”152  Colomb was stating that neither extreme view was, in itself, sensible.  
Looking at the articles from the military journals, the vast majority took a conservative 
view, and ‘prophetic’ views were rarely raised, and quickly dismissed if they were.  In his 
subsequent evaluation, it is probably fair to say that Colomb erred more towards 
conservative, rather than prophetic, analysis, but he did put forward predictions with 
some accuracy, suggesting the imminent coming of the ‘all big gun’ battleship, first built 
by Britain in 1905 with HMS Dreadnought.153  What is more striking, however, was that 
Colomb was specifically suggesting that there would be value in establishing a research 
body to look at new technologies, which would be “of such immense value to the 
State.”154   Such a body would undoubtedly produce studies such as those of Harrison 
and Campbell, but nothing like it would come into existence until after the First World 
War.  The interrogation of the future by systematic means would have to wait: and of the 
two extreme points given by Colomb, the RUSI Journal almost always veered towards the 
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conservative, seeking to fit new technologies into a fixed conception of war, as he put it 
in his article. 
Conclusion 
There were a huge number of articles on the way technical advances could affect the 
conduct of war in the RUSI Journal and the Cavalry Journal.  The vast majority were 
concerned with contemporary war, or in the near future, and while there was intense 
interest in technical developments, such as new rifles, artillery, motor vehicles and 
aircraft, conservatism dominated the discussion about their impact on war.  The general 
tone of debate is that existing tactics could be modified to continue the effective 
prosecution of war, regardless of the increased power of the defensive.  What Travers 
characterised as the use of ‘moral’ means to overcome technical barriers is evident, and 
nowhere clearer than in discussions of the role of the cavalry, which are filled with 
special pleading to account for its failures in recent wars.  Of course, the British Army 
existed to prosecute wars, and it is not surprising that military writers should be 
concerned with practical matters and focus on how to continue to fight successfully, 
although they showed a realistic appreciation of the challenges they would face in the 
future.  What was lacking was real discussion of what a war might mean for Britain, and 
as Morgan-Owen says, “Britain’s political leadership did not articulate or endorse a 
coherent vision for how it envisaged bringing a future Great Power to a conclusion 
before the outbreak of the First World War.”155 
Where there is speculation in the RUSI Journal, it is often given by junior officers, and the 
ability to comment does not necessarily translate into action; as Bowman and Connelly 
say of RUSI, “many of the most acute criticisms were made by men of relatively low rank 
who were allowed to express their ideas freely, but had no power to follow them 
through.”156  Even in the pieces by more junior writers, the received opinion is that new 
technical advances will augment or supplement current practice, but not revolutionise 
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the practice of war.  The cavalry, for example, wrote about aircraft and motor vehicles 
helping their role, but were emphatic that they could not replace mounted troops on 
horseback.  There was no speculation as to what would happen in a general European 
War, in contrast to the writings of German writers such as Goltz, although even they fell 
short of a full analysis of a future European War.   
A few writers, such as Harrison, Campbell and Colomb, did put forward articles that 
examined the future in new ways, but they are rare.  RUSI was a conservative body and 
the absence of strategic discussion is paralleled by a dearth of views about how future 
technologies might affect war.  These failures reflect the speed with which change had 
come over military matters since 1870, leading to a culture which lacked the means – 
that they would have characterised as ‘scientific’ – to properly interrogate the future.  
The question posed by Colomb in his article on the torpedo is telling – he saw the value 
of a body to examine future developments, but was unsure of how it could be 
established.  His remark recognised the need to develop the means to systematically 
interrogate the future, but it was only after the First World War that the culture, desire 
or means existed for such methods to be adopted. 
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Chapter Six  Stories of War 
The period between 1870 and the First World War witnessed an outpouring of fiction 
dedicated to imagining future war.1  Previous chapters have demonstrated the 
significant interest shown by periodicals and military journals in the future of war over 
the period, so it is essential to contextualise their thinking by evaluating some of the 
contemporary major works of ‘fiction of the future’, as Wells’ termed it.  Previous 
chapters have highlighted a dichotomy between those commentators who saw new 
technologies as only modifying the conduct of war, and those who thought it 
represented a profound disruption with the past.  The former were in the majority, 
especially among military writers, but a significant minority wondered at the impact of 
new weapons and came to fear what a future European Great War might bring, 
especially in the 1890s.  This chapter demonstrates that this dichotomy was not only 
present in the fiction of the time, but that writers deliberately put forward one or the 
other position.  Those who wrote accounts of future war to warn of the threat of 
invasion presented conflict as reassuringly familiar and unchanged from the wars of the 
nineteenth century.  In contrast, those like Conan Doyle, who were critical of the military 
establishment, wrote fiction which deliberately emphasised how technology could 
overthrow the conventional practice of war. 
The chapter also shows that the vast majority of fictional accounts were focused on the 
near future, as were the commentaries of military and civilian writers in the 
periodicals.2  Accounts of invasion grounded themselves in the near future to provide 
authenticity, but even amongst fiction which imagined the dramatic effect of new 
technology, the focus tended to be on the day after tomorrow, and not decades in the 
future.  Again, this usually reflected an attempt to make the fiction more convincing, but 
it left engagement with the future as something tentative, reinforcing the central theme 
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of this thesis, which is that the interrogation of the future, and especially the military 
future, was immature during the period.  As further illustration of this point, where 
progress was the subject of an author’s interest, it was usually portrayed through the 
lens of a single technological innovation.  It is important to recognise, of course, that 
different writers wrote their visions of the future not necessarily to predict the future, 
but to present warnings, critiques of current practice – and for commercial gain.3  
Notwithstanding their motivations, this chapter makes the point that writers faced huge 
complexity when imagining a future, and that ways of understanding the likely impact of 
new technology were themselves embryonic. 
The works of fiction analysed in this chapter have been drawn from the lengthy treatises 
on the portrayal of future war written by I. F. Clarke and A. J. Echevarria, as discussed in 
Chapter One.  Their taxonomies are a useful starting point for framing the analysis, with 
Clarke drawing a distinction between those stories with a political view of the future, 
and those with a technological view of the future.4  From Chesney onwards, who he 
considers to have established the model for realistic depictions of modern war with The 
Battle of Dorking, many stories were plausible accounts of diplomacy, alliances and war 
as the continuation of politics by other means.  In contrast, writers such as Wells and 
Conan Doyle wrote stories focused on technological innovations and their disruptive 
effect on warfare.  Echevarria distinguishes between military writers, who he sees as 
more conservative, and civilian writers, who he sees as more imaginative.  This is a 
position partly supported by the conclusions of Chapter Five, with articles in the military 
journals tending to be less speculative than the periodicals, although this chapter will 
show that ‘imaginative’ fictional writing also generally operated within a narrow 
framework.   
The nine works assessed in this chapter have all been are identified as historically 
significant, immensely popular at the time, or both.  The first part of the chapter looks at 
four works which are political treatments of the future, and being largely disinterested 
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in the impact of technology in the future, or even in the present.  The first of these is The 
Battle of Dorking, was published in 1871, with the remaining novels all published from 
1890 onwards, as interest in future war increased.  All are accounts of either a great war 
in Europe, examples of invasion literature (like The Battle of Dorking itself), or both, and 
they comprise The Great War of 189- (1891-2), The Great War in England in 1897 (1893) 
and The Invasion of 1910 (1906).   
The second part of the chapter explores fiction which saw future war as being 
profoundly affected by ‘science’ and new invention. Two are concerned with the use of 
mechanical vehicles to break trench deadlock, Wells’ The Land Ironclads (1903), and C. 
E. Vickers’ The Trenches (1908); and a third with submarine warfare, Doyle’s Danger! 
(1914).  The final example is a rare look into a more distant – and disturbing – future by 
Jack London, The Unparalleled Invasion (1910).  The stories are all centred on new 
technologies that mark a profound break with the past, generally leading to a wholesale 
change in the conduct of war.  Partly for dramatic effect, and through them all being 
short stories, the technologies are successful to an unrealistic extent, being deliberately 
focused on a single disruptive advance which usually has a shattering impact on the 
conventional conduct of war. 
The third and final part of the chapter looks at a book with a very different take on the 
future, Wells’ The War in the Air (1908).  Although this shares, with his The Land 
Ironclads, a focus on technical advance, it presents a coherent future history centred 
around the dizzying progress of technology, marking it out as a different exercise to the 
other works of fiction discussed in this chapter.  It also presents future war as 
completely different to the present, showing it as uncontrollable and cataclysmic.  The 
analysis of the book is counterpointed by a discussion of his more famous War of the 
Worlds (1898), which shares many of Wells’ views on the power of technology on war.  
As with his Anticipations, Wells’ idea of constructing a future through systematic 
analysis is striking and novel; and the reality of his future is less important that the way 
it has been constructed. 




The story that initiated invasion literature was written after the devastating German 
victory over France in 1871: The Battle of Dorking: Reminiscences of a Volunteer by 
George Chesney, then a serving colonel who was to reach the rank of general later in his 
career.  The work was originally published in Blackwood’s Magazine, before appearing in 
pamphlet form and then in book form.5   It prompted a response from Prime Minister 
Gladstone and was still referenced as the starting point of the invasion genre in 1900.6  
The story tells of an invasion of Britain by the highly professional German Army 
(although they are not named), who are quickly victorious against their ill-prepared 
opponents, including the brave but ill-equipped volunteers who are the focus of the 
story.  The novella is, like many later accounts of invasion, a polemic against Britain’s 
inadequate defences and military complacency.  The narrator complains that the nation 
had gained recent advantage only through – in a disparaging description - importing raw 
materials and re-exporting manufactured goods.7   Although Britain was, at the time, 
close to its apogee of global power, Chesney was more concerned with attacking the 
moral character of the nation rather than its balance of trade.  He was certainly not alone 
in finding the emergence of Germany as the leading power in Europe to be 
disconcerting, changing the balance of power and potentially affecting Britain’s policy of 
relative isolation from Continental politics.  Clarke considers that Chesney’s timing was 
all – he tapped into a concern over the nation being ill-prepared, as shown by pamphlets 
and articles of the time, and his work also coincided with a growing literary response to 
change.8   
The war itself is centred on the land battles in Britain, following an invasion which relies 
upon the Royal Navy being rendered ineffective due to being scattered on colonial duties 
 
5 Biographical details from The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, www.oxfordnb.com, entry for George 
Chesney (1830-1895), https://doi.org/10/1093/ref:odnb/5231.   
6 Clarke, “Voices Prophesying,” 34; for the mention of Gladstone, and Clarke, “Voices Prophesying,” 39; for the 
mention of its continuing fame in 1900. 
7 George Tomkyns Chesney, “The Battle of Dorking: Reminiscences of a Volunteer,” in I. F. Clarke, ed., The Tale 
of the Next Great War, 1870-1914: Fictions of Future Warfare and of Battles Still-to-come (Liverpool: Liverpool 
University Press, 1995), 28. 
8 Clarke, “Voices Prophesying War,” 48. 
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and then, when it faces the German fleet, being largely sunk by underwater mines.9  
Although this dramatic event is outwardly an example of new technology destabilising 
the balance of power and neutralising the most powerful navy in the world, it is really an 
excuse to enable the invasion to take place.  Similar such mechanisms are used in later 
tales of invasion, although Chesney was also making a point about the potential of new 
advances in weaponry, commenting on the mines that “the Government, it appears, had 
received warnings of this invention; but to the nation this stunning blow was utterly 
unexpected.”10  Contemporaries, however, remarked upon the weakness of Chesney’s 
mechanism of removing the navy from play, recognising it for what it was: a means of 
enabling the invasion to occur.11  
Once on land, the invasion causes a run on the banks and the fall of trading houses in the 
City, and the enemy swiftly moves twenty miles inland.  At all points Chesney contrasts 
the clockwork professionalism of the invaders with the disorganised British defence, 
focusing particularly on the ineptitude of their mobilisation, including the hapless 
volunteers.   Once battle begins, the descriptions echo combat as experienced in the 
Franco-German War, with skirmishers shielding attacking troops, dramatic cavalry 
charges and mounted officers leading infantry attacks.12  To ground the invasion and 
add veracity, Chesney roots the battles in descriptions which would have been familiar 
to readers from the recent (real) war, and it is obvious that this future is imminent, with 
new technology only introduced to help neutralise the Royal Navy.   The war ends 
quickly once London and the Woolwich Arsenal have been captured, and there is no last 
minute reprieve for the British defenders, as happens in many of the later novels of 
future invasion.  It is also a swift war after the fashion of the Austro-Prussian and 
Franco-German Wars, as would have been seemed reasonable in the light of those two 
conflicts. 
 
9 Chesney, “Battle of Dorking,” 34. 
10 Chesney, “Battle of Dorking,” 35. 
11 “Review: The Battle of Dorking,” The Saturday Review, May 6th, 1871, 563 and, “Our Defence,” The Illustrated 
News, September 1871, 169. 
12 Chesney, “Battle of Dorking,” 57 
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Britain is, however, forever diminished through defeat, and this illustrates an interesting 
feature of the novel.  It is couched as a retrospective memoir ‘of a volunteer’ written 
some fifty years after the invasion – therefore imagining that it was composed in the 
1920s, as the unstated date of the invasion would have been close to the time Chesney 
was writing.13  Although this is only a framing device to emphasise the magnitude of the 
defeat, it does contain some elements of a future history.14  For example, the defeat of 
Britain results in the stripping away of her colonies, with Canada and the West Indies 
going to the United States, Australia forced to separate, and India lost.15  In this post-war 
world emigration has increased to become a norm, with the middle classes in particular 
leaving Britain.16  The invasion also results in a collapse in trade and industry; worsened 
by the increasing cost of iron and steel, with production moving to America as it was no 
longer worth mining them in Britain.17  Chesney also included interesting peripheral 
statements, such as the fact that “America was not the great power forty years ago that it 
is today.”18  Chesney included these elements of a future history to shock his audience 
and deliver a pessimistic forecast, and it is entirely political and economic, making no 
technological predictions.  This is unsurprising in that Chesney was really emphasising 
the long term effects of the invasion, but the device is noteworthy.  Melby concludes that 
the way this retrospective is couched points towards it coming from the way historical 
novels were constructed, borrowing their phraseology and changing it to a ‘future 
historical’ form. 19   
Th reception in the contemporary periodicals was noticeable; with The Athenaeum 
noting that in August 1871, the same year as its first publication, it had already reached 
its second hundred thousandth publication. 20   A month later and The Musical Standard 
 
13 Chesney, “Battle of Dorking,” 27. 
14 The term ‘future history’ is thought to date to the 1940s and was definitely used by author Robert A. Heinlein 
as the title of one of his stories in 1941, several years after the publication of The Shape of Things to Come by 
Wells. 
15 Chesney, “Battle of Dorking,” 72. 
16 Chesney, “Battle of Dorking,” 28. 
17 Chesney, “Battle of Dorking,” 72. 
18 Chesney, “Battle of Dorking,” 31. 
19 Melby, ”Empire and Nation,” 397.   
20 “Literary Gossip,” The Athenaeum, August 12,  1871, 205. 
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reported that its fame had seen that it was figuring in music, noting that it was a 
“celebrated story.” 21  Some commentators were sceptical of its realism, such as The 
Saturday Review, but hoped it might help to frighten the public and highlight the 
defensive state of Britain.22  The Illustrated News shared something of that scepticism, 
even mentioning a state of ‘invasion panic’, but then going on to more soberly discuss 
the defences of the nation.23  In a pattern which was to follow, there was to be much ink 
expended on invasion in the decades to come, although this did not lead to real action 
from the Government, as emphasised in Chapter One.24 
One of the most prominent accounts of a future war to follow Chesney was originally 
serialised in Black and White in 1891-92: The Great War of 189-: A Forecast, which sold 
well in Britain and was translated into several other languages.25  It was not a piece of 
invasion literature, but instead a detailed imagining of a future European War, with its 
authors stating its purpose clearly: 
in the following narrative an attempt is made to forecast the course of events 
preliminary and incidental to the Great War, which in the opinion of military and 
political experts, will probably occur in the immediate future. 26   
The term ‘immediate future’ is telling as the novel was written during the period of fear 
of a European war identified in Chapter Three, when it was considered very likely 
indeed.27  The panel of authors included three serving officers: Rear-Admiral Colomb 
(see Chapter Five for his contributions to the RUSI Journal), Colonel Maurice and Captain 
 
21 “Review: The Battle of Dorking,” The Musical Standard, September 23, 1871, 258. 
22 “Review,” The Saturday Review, 564. 
23 “Our Defence,” The Illustrated News, September 1871, 169. 
24 Melby, “Empire and Nation,” 391. 
25 A.J. Echevarria, Imagining Future War: The West’s Technological Revolution and Visions of Wars to Come 
1880-1914 (London: Praeger Security International, 2007), 49.    
26 P. Colomb, J. F. Maurice, F. N. Maude, A. Forbes, C. Lowe, D. Christie Murray, and F. Scudamore, The Great 
War of 189- : A Forecast (London: William Heinemann, 1895 [First Published in 1892]), accessed on 23 January 
2020 www.gutenberg.org, x. 
27 The use of the term is explicit: “we have long familiarised ourselves with the thought that the Great War of 
which the world has been in constant dread for some years….”, Colomb, “The Great War,” 2. 
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Maude (set to become a prominent military theorist and vigorous opponent of Bloch in 
later years), and their aim was to “conceive the most probable campaigns and acts of 
policy, and generally to give their work the verisimilitude and actuality of real 
warfare.”28  The work is epistolary, which adds to its realism, and contain incidents 
which are eerily prescient of the First World War, such as the attempted assassination of 
a Crown Prince in the Balkans – albeit a Bulgarian one – when his carriage is attacked by 
assassins.29   
Like The Battle of Dorking, the focus of the novel is on political events, and the sequence 
of events that set it into motion are based on the alliances of the time, with Britain 
eventually entering the War on the side of the Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria and 
Italy) against Russia and France.  Britain uses maritime force to land troops in the 
Balkans to intervene against Russia, as well as to land at Antwerp.30  The war becomes 
global, with the French inciting unrest in Egypt (inciting a battle which foreshadows 
Omdurman), invading Sierra Leone, and Russia attacking India.31  The war concludes 
with victory for the Triple Alliance and Britain, and the whole war happens in less than a 
single year, with little sense of a profoundly changed international order.32  There is 
certainly nothing more than the most sketchy of future histories describing events 
beyond the end of the conflict, which is conventionally short and dramatic. 
The impact of new weapons on warfare is, fitfully, addressed by the novel.  As Chapter 
Five shows, there was intense military interest in the impact of more accurate and 
rapidly firing rifles, smokeless powder and machine guns in the military journals of the 
time.  Such innovations are not, however, obvious from the description of a battle 
 
28 Colomb, “The Great War,” 1.  Vice-Admiral Colomb was a noted naval historian whose 1891 treatise was 
considered to be a ‘scientific’ treatment of history, although he was overshadowed by the works of his more 
famous American contemporary, Admiral Mahan.  Colomb was also an enthusiast for war games.  Biographical 
details from The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, www.oxfordnb.com, entry for Sir Philip Howard 
Colomb (1831-1899), https://doi.org/10/1093/ref:odnb/5981. 
29 Colomb, “The Great War,” 11. 
30 Colomb, “The Great War,” 227. 
31 Colomb, “The Great War”, 248, for the French support for a Mahdist rising.  Colomb, “The Great War”, 280, 
for actions in Africa and India. 
32 Colomb, “The Great War,” 225. 
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between French and German forces, when the fictional correspondent writes in a very 
traditional fashion, stating that he was about to see a Napoleonic battle unfold.33  
Subsequently, the drama of battle is evident, “as the troops approached [the French] 
guns, they formed line and came forward, their drums beating with the strictest 
discipline… for the bullets were flying in showers overhead, and men were constantly 
dropping.”34  In this ‘great German victory of Machault’ there are also successful cavalry 
charges against French guns, artillery duels and a general sense of battle after the 
fashion of the Franco-German War. 
There is, however, a complete contrast between this and the description of the Eastern 
Front on May 7th, which must reflect the fact that different contributing authors wrote 
about distinct theatres of operation.  To emphasise this point, the war correspondent in 
the East states that the “German Army of the Vistula has just inflicted on the Russians 
another Plevna.”35  As identified in Chapter Three, this battle was emblematic of the 
power of modern rifles and repeatedly mentioned in the periodicals through to the early 
twentieth century.   The Russian attackers are massacred by magazine and rifle fire, and 
their last desperate bayonet charge fails when they encounter a barrier of barbed wire.36  
This wire, used in conjunction with searchlights in their night attack, leaves 10,000 
Russian dead due to the “destructive effects of the murderous magazine rifle.”37  The 
account of war in the East also refers to the changing nature of warfare, such as the 
importance of seizing railheads, and the value of fortification with trenches.38  There are 
references to the impact of smokeless powder on morale, by exposing troops to fire 
without cover, and the difficulty of executing command on extended battlefields leading 
commanders to delegate authority.39  The Kaiser himself gives voice to these sentiments 
in a speech reported by a ‘special correspondent’, saying that “within the last few years 
the science of war has been completely revolutionised, and we are about to grapple with 
 
33 Colomb, “The Great War,” 185. 
34 Colomb, “The Great War,” 188. 
35 Colomb, “The Great War,” 79. 
36 Colomb, “The Great War,” 84. 
37 Colomb, “The Great War,” 85. 
38 Colomb, “The Great War,” 75. 
39 Colomb, “The Great War,” 35. 
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military problems which never taxed the powers of our predecessors.”40  Critically, 
however, these tactical changes to war do not affect strategy or the outcome – the 
battlefield may have been revolutionised in the East (if not between France and 
Germany), but the war remains swift and decisive. 
Novel technology is only touched upon only sparingly in the book.  Like Chesney, this is 
undoubtedly deliberate, as grounding the fiction with current weaponry and tactics lent 
it credibility.  Nonetheless, the authors allowed a couple of imaginary technologies to 
play a part.  One is a fleeting mention of ‘lance rifles’ (seemingly a combined gun and 
lance) used in cavalry engagements in the East.41  Another is the use of a French dirigible 
by the Russians to drop a “large dynamite” charge on the city of Varna, which they are 
besieging; although the correspondent present at the battle suggests that this move is 
more from desperation than a serious military tactic.42  To prove his point, the action 
has no real impact on the war, and reads as merely an exciting distraction.  These 
technologies have no effect on the war, any more than the barbed wire, improved rifle 
fire and trenches do on the war as a whole, which remains akin to those fought earlier in 
the nineteenth century.   
One contemporary review, in The Academy, highlighted the widespread conviction that a 
European war was imminent, but was critical of the novel’s approach, considering that it 
failed to reflect historical experience or military practice, and although it thought the 
tactical descriptions reasonable, did not feel that they showed anything new.43  The 
Saturday Review was even more critical, noting the number of invasion stories which 
circulated, and suggesting sarcastically that in this case “they have let it all go, from 
Bulgaria to New Caledonia, war-balloons, torpedoes, electric-lights, lance-rifles – no 
expense has been spared.”44  These response indicate a weariness with the genre and 
criticism of what was perceived as hyperbole, although an imminent great war was seen 
 
40 Colomb, “The Great War,” 34. 
41 Colomb, “The Great War,” 72. 
42 Colomb, “The Great War,” 228. 
43 “Review: The Great War of 189-,” The Academy, September 9, 1893, 204. 
44 “Review: The Great War of 189-,” The Saturday Review, December 31, 1892, 776. 
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as something likely at the time.  In this way the novel fitted into the contemporary dread 
of war, though its swift and decisive outcome did not reflect the catastrophe that many 
writers considered likely at the time.  The new technology which shaped Plevna, and so 
affected thinking on war afterwards, is present in The Great War of 189-, at least in the 
East, but it is not allowed to overshadow the result of the war. 
The Great War in England in 1897 first appeared in serial form in Answers in 1893, three 
years after the work of Colomb et al, and was to go through no less than sixteen editions 
by 1899.45  The author of this sensationalist work was William le Queux, who Clarke 
describes as a “tireless exploiter of any scare or anxiety that would ‘make a story’.”46  
Superficially, this later novel is similar to that of the fictional war of 189-, as both deal 
with a general European War, but the focus of the latter work is an invasion of Britain by 
France and Russia, enabled by the inadequacy of its defences and the complacency of the 
Government.  It comes across as a less realistic portrayal of a future war than that of 
Colomb et al, partly because it is the work of a single author and not a panel which 
included military writers.  Certainly the reviewer in The National Observer thought it “a 
piece of disjointed and inconsequent silliness.” 47 
The novel was also written during the period of ‘the dread of war’ and technological 
change, such that: 
A Great War had long been predicted, forecasts had been given of coming 
conflicts, and European nations had for years been gradually strengthening their 
armies and perfecting their engines of war, in the expectation of being plunged 
into war.  Modern improvements in arms and ammunition had so altered the 
 
45 Clarke, “Voices Prophesying War,” 58. 
46 Clarke, “Voices Prophesying War,” 58.  The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography also described Le Queux 
as a ‘self-publicist’ as well as being an author, publishing 5 novels a year in the 1890s, and being paid at twelve 
guineas per thousand words, the same rate as Thomas Hardy and H. G. Wells.  Le Queux was a member of the 
National Service League and a ‘Germanophobe’.   Biographical details from The Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, www.oxfordnb.com, entry for William Le Queux (1864-1927), 
https://doi.org/10/1093/ref:odnb/37666.   
47 “Review: The Great War of 1897,” The National Observer, September 15th, 1894, 466. 
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conditions of war, that there had been a feeling of insecurity [among the] 
Powers.48 
The novel is, however, only really concerned with the invasion of Britain, with the 
excuse for the failure of the Royal Navy to intervene being - this time - the despatch of 
the fleet to colonial stations via false commands from a spy in the telegraph office in 
Whitehall.49  It is not long before the French land two corps and the Russians one half of 
a corps, rising to a total of 300,000 troops in only three days.50  The identification of 
military units and individual commanders involved are lengthy and detailed, adding 
verisimilitude to the account, and le Queux specifically mentioned a recent piece 
published by the United Services Institution on the possibility of a swift French invasion, 
to provide weight to his work.51  There is still plenty of room for hyperbole, however, 
with cruel Cossacks initiating a massacre at Eastbourne amongst vivid accounts of 
babies impaled on Russian bayonets.52   
The invasion occurs all along the Eastern and Southern coasts of Britain, leading to 
financial calamity and business paralysis.  London is immediately plunged into a crisis 
because of the inability to import food supplies from overseas and enemy action in the 
seas around Britain, causing the price of bread to rise and meat and fish to become 
unobtainable.53  The war itself goes on in Europe – Germany and Austro-Hungary 
engage Russia, and Germany and Italy attack France, but the novel focuses on battles 
fought across the length and breadth of Britain.  In the end, after much heroic but 
seemingly doomed resistance, relief comes in the form of Imperial troops from Australia, 
South Africa and India, who save the Mother country by expelling the invaders.  One 
feature of the book is the deleterious effect ‘anarchists’ have on the country, which 
 
48 William Le Queux, The Great War of 1897 (London: Tower Publishing Company, 1895 [First Published 1894]).  
Accessed on 14 January 2020, www.gutenberg.org, 15.  
49 Le Queux, “Great War”, 55. 
50 Le Queux, “Great War,” 69. 
51 Le Queux, “Great War,” 70.  Further supported by a piece in Blackwood’s Magazine in December 1893 by 
General Archibald Alison; Le Queux, “Great War,” 71. 
52 Le Queux, “Great War,” 66. 
53 Le Queux, “Great War,” 130. 
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Echevarria notes are drawn from the working class, playing on the bigotry of the middle 
and upper classes who formed the majority of Le Queux’s readership.54 
The novel makes mention of recent changes in technology, citing the involvement of 
“newly-discovered modes of destruction that make modern warfare so terrible.”55  
Searchlights are used in battles to illuminate the night, and machine guns – specifically 
Maxims – are mentioned on several occasions, including their use to devastate an entire 
division of Russian cavalry, infantry and artillery.56   There is also, parallel to the 
description in The Great War of 189-, a single intervention by a Russian airship, ‘The 
Demon of War’, in the siege of Edinburgh, which is fortunately destroyed by a novel 
‘compressed air’ weapon, which fires ‘dynamite shells’ to destroy the airship, built by a 
British inventor named Mackenzie.  Yet, amidst the trappings of new technology, the war 
is fought along conventional lines.  For example, the climatic fighting around 
Birmingham is described as follows:  
there was soon a concentric rush for the hill, hundreds of the [Russian] grey-
coats fell back and rolled down the steep slope dead and dying, but the others 
pushed on in the face of the frowning defenders, used bayonets with desperate 
energy…..[and won].57   
There is great loss to the defenders, but this is more down to British determination than 
fire from magazine rifles.  There are numerous examples of hand-to-hand heroism, 
exemplified by the repeated charges of the Bengal Lancers when Imperial 
reinforcements arrive in Britain, and ferocious battles when the Goorkha’s (Gurkhas) 
use their ‘knives’ against the invaders.58  The British infantry fight from trenches in 
Manchester, but like most of the battles of The Great War of 189-, the depictions follow a 
generically heroic pattern and read more like battles of the early to mid-nineteenth 
 
54 Echevarria, “Imagining Future Wars,” 50. 
55 Le Queux, “Great War,” 127. 
56 Le Queux, “Great War,” 220. 
57 Le Queux, “Great War,” 153. 
58 Le Queux, “Great War,” 296. 
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century than the industrial war that was to come in 1914.  Once more, technology does 
not change the character or duration of the war, which is swift, ending in triumph for the 
British Empire, which is enlarged as a consequence.  As with The Great War of 189-, 
contemporary concerns over the likelihood of war are addressed, and new technology is 
referenced, but the imaginary war is rapid and the outcome unaffected by it. 
Le Queux gave life to another fictional invasion of Britain in 1906, thirteen years after 
his first effort.  The Invasion of 1910 was a completely new work, and a more direct 
attempt to influence policy, with a forward by Lord Frederick Roberts’, enthusiastic 
supporter of greater defensive measures in Britain, again forming a diatribe against 
perceived Government inadequacies (Roberts had also penned a forward to the 
imaginary invasion of 1897).  The novel was originally published in serial form in the 
Daily Mail – the largest circulation daily paper of the time – providing it with a great 
opportunity for publicity.59  Like its predecessor, it was ferociously successful, selling 
one million copies and being translated into 27 languages.60  Most of the trappings of a 
wider European War are entirely absent this time, however, enabling le Queux to focus 
on the invasion of Britain by – on this occasion - the Germans, reflecting contemporary 
antagonism between the two nations.  Clarke and Melby explain the rather diffuse 
geography of the invasion, which takes place all across Britain, as a deliberate move to 
include as many towns to provide local, vicarious interest to the national readership of 
the paper, just as the episodic nature of the book reflected the serialisation.61 
On this occasion the Royal Navy is neutralised through a surprise German attack on 
Britain’s naval harbours with blockships and torpedo boats on its fleet.  This may have 
seemed plausible following the Japanese surprise attack by torpedo boats on the 
Russian fleet in Port Arthur in 1904, delivered before formal declaration of hostilities.  
Above all, however, “the real criminals were the British Ministers, who neglected 
 
59 The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, www.oxfordnb.com, entry for William Le Queux (1864-1927), 
https://doi.org/10/1093/ref:odnb/37666.    
60 Clarke, ed., “Tale of the Next Great War,” 122. 
61 Melby, “Empire and Nation,” 408.  
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precautions [and] permitted the British Fleet to be surprised.”62  The Navy is spared 
criticism, as it had been in the fictional war of 1897, with the real vitriol being focused 
on the Government.  The naval sections of the novel, including the early German attacks, 
were written by a naval expert, H. W. Wilson, and come across as more measured than 
those in Le Queux’s earlier work.  Nonetheless, the Royal Navy proves unable to prevent 
the German invasion and their army is swiftly established on shore.  The invasion – 
again - causes financial crisis with a panic on the Stock Exchange and the Bank of 
England suspending all specie.63  This measure is contrasted with German judiciousness 
in raising a ‘war chest’ of gold to fund their war effort for a year. 
The description of the land war itself has moved forward from that of the imaginary war 
of 1897.  The German infantry are still “green and blue clad” which was accurate for 
1906, as is the description of uhlans in sky blue uniforms; with the advantages of the 
British khaki uniforms for concealment highlighted.64  The South African War is 
mentioned, if only to note that its lessons had been completely forgotten by the ever-
hapless Government.65  There is also a specific reference to the Russo-Japanese War, in 
relation to fighting in Essex, discussing the changed character of war, such that: 
nowadays a soldier need not expect to be either victorious or finally defeated by 
nightfall, and although this battle, fought as it is between much smaller forces and 
extending over a much more limited area than the great engagement between the 
Russians and Japanese at Liaoyang.66   
There is a statement in the novel that military thought held that an attacker must 
outnumber a defender by six to one to succeed, figures mentioned in contemporary 
 
62 William Le Queux, The Invasion of 1910 (Toronto: Macmillan, 1906), accessed on 17 January 2020, 
www.gutenberg.org, 85. 
63 Le Queux, “Invasion of 1910,” 21. 
64 Le Queux, “Invasion of 1910,” 198. 
65 Le Queux, “Invasion of 1910,” v. 
66 Le Queux, “Invasion of 1910,” 187. 
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writing in the periodicals and military journals67  German barbed wire entanglements 
are mentioned, so the trappings of ‘modern’ warfare are present, such as in this 
description of warfare around Royston: 
[the German] close formations offered an excellent target to the rifles of the 
Volunteers and Militia lining our entrenchments.  The attackers had lost men in 
the thousands, and were now endeavouring to dig themselves in….68   
Later in this battle a charge by German cavalry is stopped by magazine rifle fire from 
mounted infantry.  Then, as the war moves on, a huge work of more or less continuous 
entrenchments is put in place around London, with wire, zig-zag communication 
trenches and mines; although all this proves unable to prevent the German advance.69  
The novel also mentions the use of German motor-cycles, armoured cars and even – to 
use the precise term used in the text - ‘motor infantry’; while the British defenders press 
omnibuses into service to move troops.  In contrast, there is no mention of airships, 
unlike the rather fanciful account of 1897, which is perhaps surprising given the 
advances in aviation that had occurred since 1893, although the reason could again be to 
maintain the illusion of reality.  Overall, therefore, this imaginary war of 1910 is fought 
on terms much closer to reality than that of 1897, informed as it was by the South 
African and Russo-Japanese Wars.   
None of the innovations of new weapons or tactics, however, have any real bearing on 
the way the war unfolds.  The Germans take London after a fierce battle, only to 
eventually be overwhelmed by ‘the League of Defenders’, who are civilians practising 
irregular warfare like franc-tireurs in 1870-71.  Whereas in 1897 the Empire came to the 
aid of the nation, this time salvation comes from its own population turning on its 
invaders.  Nonetheless, this war leads to a weakened Empire because “the struggle had 
been fought on British soil, British trade had been ruined, British finances thrown into 
 
67 Le Queux, “Invasion of 1910,” 188. 
68 Le Queux, “Invasion of 1910,” 233. 
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utter disorder, and a great stretch of territory added to the German Empire.”70  It has, of 
course, been a short war, and while Le Queux acknowledged the tactical impact of new 
technology, it did not have any strategic effect: the war is decisive, just as the other three 
imaginary accounts described above. 
The Invasion of 1910 met with a negative response from reviewers in the periodicals.  
The Saturday Review was sure of its likely appeal but was clear that “this novel is sure to 
command a wider attention than it is entitled to on its merit.  The idea is not new, the 
style of redundant and cheap.” 71  The reviewer went on to criticise the end of the novel, 
considering it to be melodramatic and pandering to popular sentiment, with the heroic 
overthrow of the Germans by patriotic British subjects.  The Athenaeum saw it as a thinly 
described plea for the ‘rifle clubs’ favoured by Lord Roberts, and did not see it as having 
any great merit, although it thought it could instil interest in a discussion on the future 
defence of Britain.72  The New London Journal rather wearily noted that it belonged to a 
legacy stretching back to The Battle of Dorking and that le Queux’s previous invasion had 
not come to pass, “the year 1897 arrived, but the only invasion of our shores was a 
peaceful one, effected by those foreigners who came to see Queen Victoria’s Diamond 
Jubilee.” 73 
The hostile reception from the periodicals towards the later examples of invasion 
literature is palpable, as is their recognition that they would sell well.  Part of that 
success was down to their grounding in contemporary realities, with their imaginary 
wars being set only a few years from the present, and the conflicts reflecting 
conventional thinking about contemporary war.  They all reflect the received wisdom 
that wars would be short: all take less than a year, and while the later accounts (from the 
1890s and 1900s) include references to technological change, it is not allowed to alter 
the picture of heroic battles and decisive conflict.  The novels are written both for 
polemic effect and entertainment, and are not necessarily meant to be predictions, but 
 
70 Le Queux, “Invasion of 1910,” 547. 
71 “Review: The Invasion of 1910,” The Saturday Review, August 4, 1906, 148. 
72 “Review: The Invasion of 1910,” The Athenaeum, August 11, 1906, 156 
73 “Review: The Invasion of 1910,” The New London Journal, May 10, 1906, 10. 
PhD Thesis  Interrogating the Future David Bangert 
 
197  
they exhibit the same limitations in understanding about what a future European War 
would be like as the bulk of articles in the periodicals and military journals.  Technology 
barely effects tactics in these imaginary wars, and does not touch strategy at all. 
Technological Futures 
The stories described above are all examples of works warning Britain of the dangers 
which – the authors argued – it faced from invasion, or at least military unpreparedness, 
and so formed accounts rooted in a future which deliberately resembled the present.  
Each set a few years in the future, they did not allow new technologies, even of 
imaginary airships, to impact their narratives.  In contrast, other writers chose to write 
stories where the impact of future technology on future war was the entire purpose of 
the narrative.  Unlike the political visions which delineated the fictional wars of Chesney, 
Colomb et al and Le Queux, these are stories of technical advance and change, and 
provide a different way of interrogating the future.  All are from the early 1900s to the 
1914, and while there were earlier tales of this sort, their dates of publication illustrate 
the quickening pace of interest in the future evident as the period advanced.   
The first story, chronologically, is Wells’ “The Land Ironclads”, which was published in 
The Strand Magazine in 1903.  As will be explored in Chapter Seven, Wells’ had a very 
clear vision that the future would be different to the present, and that it would be 
dominated not only by science, but also by a new type of ‘efficient’ operator.  Written 
almost contemporaneously with his work forecasting the future, Anticipations, this story 
exemplifies his views, while simultaneously providing a way of breaking the trench 
deadlock that he believed would result from the use of more effective rifles.  Wells’ 
explicitly references the work of Bloch in the story, and his conviction that the next 
European War would lead to stalemate: 
The young lieutenant lay beside the war correspondent and admired the idyllic 
calm of the enemy's lines through his field glasses. 
“So far as I can see”, he said at last, “one man.” 
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“What's he doing?” asked the war correspondent. 
“Field-glass at us,” said the young lieutenant. 
“And this is war?” 
“No”, said the young lieutenant; “it's Bloch.”74 
The story itself is not set in a specific location, nor are the combatant nations named, 
although the war has duly reached stalemate.  The setting is essentially contemporary, 
except for the introduction of the eponymous ironclads, which dramatically break the 
deadlock by advancing across the lines of trenches with impunity and scattering the 
defenders, who are accompanied by the war correspondent who narrates the story.  
Wells described the onset of the ironclads as follows:  
There on the southern side was the elaborate lacework of trenches and defences, 
across which these iron turtles, fourteen of them spread out over a line of 
perhaps a mile… methodically shooting down and breaking up any persistent 
knots of resistance.75   
Wells’ ironclads are infeasibly larger than the actual tanks which followed their fictional 
antecedents more than a decade later, and emerge fully formed and perfect onto the 
battlefield.76  This was unrealistic – Wells did the same with his airships in The War in 
the Air  - and although secrecy was achieved by the deployment of real tanks at the 
Somme in 1916, they were mechanically unreliable and the Army suffered from a lack of 
experience as to how they should be deployed.77   Wells, of course, is really telling a fable 
of how an ‘efficient’ society could conquer that of a conservative military culture unable 
to harness technology to its ends.  There is a didactic tone to the story, and in this case 
his point is that those who wield the new weapons must be as ‘scientific’ as their 
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technology.  He contrasts the antiquated defenders, in love with heroism, with the 
‘efficient’ town-dwellers who man the ironclads, “[the Captain] and his engineers and 
riflemen all went about their work, calm and reasonable men.”78  Wells’ war is a fable 
with perfect machines and cool operators, all the more to make his point clear.   
Wells’ does, however, allow his imagination to demonstrate other ways that technology 
might change warfare.  For example, and this is shown in a feature usually unremarked 
upon in critiques of the story: his ironclads are armed with rifles controlled remotely 
through cameras.79  Fed automatically with ammunition, they are aimed and fired from 
an operations room at the heart of the ironclad.  Wells’ even has these rifles provided 
with sights which compensate for changes in direction of the ironclad.80   These 
developments would all come to pass in the future, but what is more significant is his 
recognition that technology would transform warfare.  Historiographical attention is 
often focused on Wells’ vision of future society, at the cost of ignoring his conception of 
war dominated by mechanical innovation.  Although not always accurate, his vision of 
the future of war in this short story goes much further than the ironclads themselves.   
“The Land Ironclads” was not the only story to develop a fictional means of breaking 
trench deadlock in the period, however, with Vickers publishing “The Trenches”, in 
1908.  As with Wells’ better known story, this war – between Britain and an unnamed 
adversary - has also become a vindication of Bloch, as put by the war correspondent 
who (once more) narrates his story:  
for the moment things seem to be at a deadlock: the armies have been at grips, 
but have had to draw off without any advantage gained on either side.  It almost 
 
78 Wells, “Ironclads,” 168. 
79 Wells, “Ironclads,” 167.   
80 Wells, “Ironclads,” 168. 
PhD Thesis  Interrogating the Future David Bangert 
 
200  
seems as if the conflict were likely to resolve itself into pseudo-siege 
operations.81   
Vickers was an engineering officer with experience of the South African War and his 
descriptions of trench warfare are vivid, like his statement that the fighting in the 
trenches was a brutal and bloody business.82   The story has ‘The Snail’ as its 
technological marvel; a machine that does not climb over trenches like Wells’  land 
ironclads, but instead digs new ones towards the enemy line.   The War Office has been 
indifferent to the value of this innovation (a common theme in many of these stories), 
but it proves highly effective when used, although Vickers’ invention is not infallible – 
when deployed, like the first real tank, “some of the machines have been wrecked and 
some of the gallant drivers have been sacrificed: but a wonderful network of trenches 
have been accomplished.”83  His story culminates in the Snail helping to take a hill, but 
ends on a more pessimistic note, “we have pushed the enemy back, we have gained a 
stage on the road, we have at last been able to cry ‘Check!’ [but] war is a complex and 
terrible game.  And the end is not yet in sight.”84  Unlike Wells, Vickers is allowing for the 
development of new countermeasures and a continuing struggle between offence and 
defence in warfare. 
Arthur Conan Doyle’s short story “Danger!”, was published in The Strand magazine in 
1914, as the July crisis unfolded across Europe.85  The story is a fable not unlike the “The 
Land Ironclads” and “The Trenches”, but Doyle’s focus is war at sea.  The story tells of 
the conflict between Britain and a small fictional nation, Norland, which is identified as 
being one of the smallest powers in Europe, and modelled on one of the Low Countries 
or Scandinavian nations.86  When war breaks out between Britain and Norland, the 
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latter possesses a navy said to have been built at a total cost less than that of a single 
dreadnought battleship.87  Its Government feels that it has no choice but to come to 
terms with Britain, until one of its navy’s officers, Captain Sirius – the fictional account is 
written by him – calmly puts forward his conviction that his dozen submarines will be 
able to bring the war to a successful conclusion.  Allowed his way, he then sets out to 
conduct what would be called, a few short years later, unrestricted submarine warfare 
against Britain’s merchant marine, sinking ships carrying food and passengers to its 
shores.88 
While the Royal Navy quickly destroys Norland’s surface fleet and takes their capital, 
Blankenburg, Sirius’ small fleet wreaks havoc with their merchantmen, leading to 
increased food costs, riots and starvation.”89   Eventually, Britain sues for peace and 
Norland is victorious.  In the light of the German submarine campaign which was to 
come in the First World War, the story is uncannily prophetic.  Norland’s fleet even 
challenges international law, as Germany was to do, by attacking a neutral American 
merchantman carrying ‘contraband’ food.90  Although Sirius exhibits some sympathy for 
the passengers and crew of the ships he torpedoes or destroys by gunfire, he and his 
compatriots maintain their ruthless tactics to the end, replenishing supplies in secret in 
fishing villages, and losing only a few submarines in the fictional war. 
Doyle’s war is set in contemporary times, and its aim is to demonstrate the myopia 
which he felt permeated the Britain naval establishment, with Sirius commenting at the 
end of the story that “war is not a big game, my English friends.  It is a desperate 
business to gain the upper hand….”91  From the perspective of imagining future war, 
however, it is interesting that Norland’s submarines are not technologically futuristic 
weapons. Sirius comments – and the descriptions attest – to them being typical of 
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contemporary submarines.92  What is novel is the ruthless way in which they are used, 
bringing a technological edge to commerce raiding often predicted to be a feature of 
future war in the periodicals.  Like Wells’ ironclads, however, Doyle’s submarines are 
unrealistically reliable, and cannot be effectively countered, but his point is that new 
technology could disrupt conventional ways of fighting war.  As shown in Chapter Four, 
Doyle was a prominent critic of the British Army in the South African War, and the 
cavalry in particular.  He wanted revolutionary change, castigated the Government for 
failing to implement it, and was of the opinion that the lessons of the past were 
irrelevant. 
A reviewer writing in The Review of Reviewers noted that the story had divided the 
opinion of naval officers at the time, although it saw his vision as prophetic, which is 
unsurprising as The Review of Reviews was always keen on flagging the dangers of war, 
as its support for Bloch a decade earlier demonstrates. 93  Six months later and The 
Academy, during the War, noted that his prophecies of submarine warfare had been 
fulfilled, although the blockade was far from being very effective at that stage in the 
war.94   As with “The Land Ironclads” the impact of new technology on actual war was 
less impressive than in fiction; although Wells, Vickers and Doyle were right in the long 
run.  It is important to emphasis this point: a focus on what they got ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ 
can miss the point.  They were suggesting that new ways of waging war would disrupt 
its character, in contrast to the more pedestrian accounts of the invasion stories and 
articles in the military journals. 
The final story with a technological edge is quite different: Jack London’s story “The 
Unparalleled Invasion”, which was written in 1910 and describes events of the late 
1970s which are, to put it mildly, disturbing to a modern audience.  It played on the 
contemporary fear of the ‘Yellow Peril’ and tells, without any obvious moral revulsion, of 
 
92 Doyle, “Danger!” 295. 
93 “Review: Danger!” The Review of Reviews. August 1914, 110. 
94 Lucius, “War Risks of the Future,” The Academy, February 27, 1915, 132. 
PhD Thesis  Interrogating the Future David Bangert 
 
203  
the complete genocide of China in 1976 through the use of bacteriological warfare.95  
London was a socialist and eugenicist with complex views on race, and John Swift 
identifies a historiographical debate on whether “The Unparalleled Invasion” was an 
ironic exercise (Swift thinks not).96  London’s story was shaped by the genetics of 
Mendel, which were being absorbed into Darwinian evolution, feared for Western non-
fecundity, and of the perceived danger of China and Japan. 97  These views fed into what 
Swift considers to be a cold and impersonal story, which he thinks possesses an unusual 
degree of stylistic impersonality.98 
The background to the cataclysmic annihilation of China is framed by London’s 
relatively sketchy future history, which extrapolates the contemporary international 
situation of a dominant Europe and America into the late twentieth century, taking its 
jumping off point as the victory of the Japanese over the Russians in 1905, which he 
considers to be indicative of a major geopolitical shift.99  It is then the Japanese – who 
London had respected during that war - who first awaken to the greater threat of China, 
whose population starts to rise inexorably, causing them to attack their larger 
neighbour, but they suffer such a complete a defeat that they retreat into isolationism.100  
China spends the following decades expanding its power through population growth, 
crowding out France from Indo-China (the indigenous population are not allowed to 
exhibit any agency).  This first leads to the bombardment of China by France, which 
proves futile, and then the utter destruction of a French expeditionary force which 
simply disappears into the interior without a trace, as though absorbed by a miasma.  
London’s Chinese are explicitly identified as being completely incomprehensible to the 
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Western nations, making them seem rather more alien, and less realistic, than Wells’ 
Martians. 
Eventually, facing being out-populated, Europe and America quarantine China and use 
aircraft to drop glass phials containing infections to eradicate the population.  In this 
they are successful and London writes that: 
China had laughed at war, and war she was getting; but it was ultra-modern war, 
twentieth-century war, the war of the scientist and the laboratory….hundred-ton 
guns were toys compared with the micro-organic projectiles of death.101   
After the war, a golden age follows until the ‘Great Truce’ – called to battle the Chinese – 
collapses in 1982 due to a quarrel between Germany and France over the ownership of 
Alsace-Lorraine.  Contemporary concerns from 1910 are shown to have survived, 
therefore, although the ‘civilised’ nations undertake never to use bacteriological warfare 
against one another.  New technology changes warfare utterly, works perfectly and 
successfully completes its horrific task.  London explicitly identifies the heroes of the 
war as the scientists who developed the means of waging bacteriological war, and also 
the statisticians who warned the West of the population growth of China.102  Science has 
proved the victor and is presented as having made the ordinary conduct of war 
irrelevant.  Like Wells, Vickers and Doyle, London is writing of a future where science 
and technology have the power to overturn assumptions about how war will be fought, 
and take it to a new level of dislocation and destruction. 
Future History 
It was left to Wells to fuse together the elements of the political and technological tales 
of the future, and present a novel centred on the disruptive power of technology, but 
also rooted loosely in the tradition of ‘invasion literature’.  The War in the Air was first 
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serialised in The Pall Mall Magazine in 1908, and envisaged a conflict fought a decade or 
so in the future, dominated by newly built air fleets which wreak havoc on centres of 
population, leading to the collapse of civilisation.   In contrast to the pedestrian conflicts 
of Chesney, Colomb et al and Le Queux, Wells’ account bears no resemblance to the wars 
of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  The War in the Air occurs in a world 
transformed by a decade of swift material progress, and Wells was not writing a few 
years into the future as a simple device, but instead to present a coherent history of the 
future.103   Wells himself was, however, rather dismissive of The War in the Air, which he 
wrote in  4 months, considering it to be simply a ‘potboiler’.104  It did, however, 
encapsulate his views that a dangerous combination of nationalism and technology 
would lead to the collapse of civilisation.105  His view was that modern society was 
unable to absorb the shocks of a pre-modern society, echoing the opinion he expressed 
in Anticipations, that mechanical invention was moving faster than intellectual and social 
organisation.   
Wells specifically named the great powers of the time of The War in the Air: Germany, 
the United States, Britain, France, Russia and a confederation of China and Japan.106  So 
far, fairly predictable, but his future is dominated by the success of the Brennan 
monorail, a real invention attracting considerable interest around 1908, which using 
gyroscopically stabilised cars running on a single rail.  This was seen as having the 
potential to transform transport, and Vice-Admiral Campbell wrote an article in the RUSI 
Journal at the time that suggested using it as a strategic network to protect Britain from 
invasion, as described in Chapter Five.107  In practice the invention failed to catch hold, 
but in Wells’ future cables carrying cars came to dominate the British landscape and 
enabled the Channel to be bridged.  Although the pace of his change is infeasibly swift, 
Wells nonetheless adroitly mixes fact and fiction in the development of technology over 
the next decade or so, and his key theme is disorientating change.  Wells posited 
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imaginary inventions such as ‘Charlottenburg Steel’ and ships equipped with ‘explosive 
engines’ (as opposed to oil burning engines), inserting them alongside airships clearly 
descended from contemporary Zeppelins.108  His future even includes an initial failure of 
heavier than air flight, something conceivable in 1908, and his air fleets comprised of 
airships.  In fact, it is the invention of a successful  heavier-than-air machine which 
initiates the story.  A British inventor, Butteridge, develops a successful ornithopter, a 
craft powered by flapping wings, which is a type mentioned as being theoretically 
possible in writings on aeronautics in the RUSI Journal in 1913 (see Chapter Five).   He 
offers it for sale to Germany, after the British Government refuses to buy it, in a show of 
parsimony and conservatism which would have been just at home in the works of Le 
Queux. 
The ‘everyman’ protagonist of the novel, Bert Smallways, manages to be carried to 
Germany in a balloon which was intended to carry Butteridge over the Channel.  He 
lands at a park where an enormous air fleet of some eighty craft are about to set out to 
bombard New York, which Wells identifies as the commercial centre of the world, 
having supplanted London in the previous decade.  Led by Wells’ personification of the 
Prussian military spirit, Crown Prince Albert, the fleet crosses the Atlantic, supports the 
German Navy in their destruction of the American naval fleet, before reaching the 
Eastern seaboard of the United States.  The German airships have been constructed in 
great secrecy but are highly capable; when the battle in the Atlantic occurs they are able 
to destroy the American ships with impunity – enabling Wells to criticise the vast sums 
spent on dreadnought battleships by the Great Powers.109 
Although Wells’ airships are infeasibly fully formed for what is evidently a secret and 
experimental design, his account is significant in demonstrating the ability of technology 
– this time in the air – to change warfare.  Although the timescale of a decade from 1908 
makes the dominance of aircraft over ships unrealistic, precisely this change was to 
come over naval warfare by the Second World War.  Wells also foresaw the use of 
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tankers pumping oil to refuel American ships at sea, at a time when the Royal Navy had 
only recently trialled the first such system in reality.110  These various points, made 
almost casually, demonstrate Wells’ conviction that progress would change war, such 
that it would be fought under a completely different basis in the future.  This is nowhere 
more apparent than when the German air fleet reaches New York, when the City, facing 
bombardment, surrenders.  The authorities have not, however, considered the attitude 
of the general population who revolt against the surrender and commence what 
amounts to guerrilla warfare.111   
As a consequence, the airship Bingen is brought down by a shell from a gun hidden by 
partisan fighters, and lands on Staten Island.  The airmen try to repair it, but are 
besieged by the local population until two other airships intervene.  As they withdraw, 
however, the population overwhelms and kills the defending Germans, which illustrates 
the inability of the airships to hold ground.112  As Wells puts it, “[New York] was the first 
of the great cities of the Scientific Age to suffer by the enormous powers and grotesque 
limitations of aerial warfare….it was impossible to subdue the city except by largely 
destroying it.”113  Such destruction duly follows, but the German air fleet is then attacked 
by American aeroplanes and scattered in a storm.  Shortly afterwards, vast air fleets 
from China and Japan invade America and Europe.  General war follows and within a few 
months civilisation begins to crumble.  Wells’ future has every nation building air fleets, 
which are simple to construct, destructive but unable to achieve a decisive and lasting 
victory.114   
Wells’ constructed a coherent future history in The War in the Air, prefiguring his later 
and more comprehensive efforts in Shape of Things to Come (the earlier novel is 
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similarly framed in terms of a future ‘scientific’ culture looking back on the war)115.  The 
future history is mainly about the development of technology, with the only political 
innovation being the rise of China and Japan, and the novel sees new technical advances 
driving war forward to unanticipated outcomes, and negating comfortable assumptions 
about its controllability and likely outcome.  This is emphasised by its anti-heroic tone, 
presenting war as confused and costly.  There is, presumably out of a desire not to 
clutter the story, no discussion of war on the ground, or wider events as the world slides 
into barbarism as the economy collapses.  In that sense, Wells is expressing the 
prevailing view that a long war would be unsustainable, as discussed in Chapter Seven.  
His war is, nonetheless, a break with the past, made unpredictable by new technology, 
and Wells’ is issuing a warning to those who would unleash war to fear its 
consequences, as the hapless – and originally overconfident - Germans find after 
retreating from New York and being overwhelmed by Asian airships.116 
There was a considerable reaction to The War in the Air in the press, with some seeing it 
as unlikely, such as the reviewer in The Bookman who was unconvinced by the idea that 
such a general war, involving many combatants, could come to pass.117  The review 
thought it interesting, albeit rather didactic and a typical ‘Wells book’ in which a 
cataclysm was brought about by scientific invention.  The Saturday Review was in 
agreement, questioning the invincibility of the airships and suggesting that counter-
measures would have been developed, as well as considering it to “over-reaches its 
effects by imagining a catastrophe too tremendous to be adequality realised.” 118  
Similarly, The Athenaeum, while praising Wells’ description of the war in the air and the 
clarity of the battle scenes, concludes that he did not entirely persuade the reader of a 
war bringing with it Armageddon. 119  For all these reviewers, the story was unrealistic, 
and Wells’ future too different from the present to be believable.  Only The Review of 
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Reviews took a different line, rather breathlessly commenting that “it is no nightmare 
dream of a sensationalist romancer.  It is a prophetic forecast of what may happen in the 
next ten years.”120  The Review of Reviews tended to be anti-war and concerned with 
what a European War might bring, so such a view is not surprising.  More generally, 
however, reviewers saw the story as too fantastical to be taken seriously as a warning, 
by being set in a future both near and yet almost unrecognisable,  
Wells’ vision of war is shared by his more famous War of the Worlds, written a decade 
earlier (it is easy to see why the reviewer in The Bookman saw his later work as another 
example of a cataclysm brought about by science).  Although this is perhaps the 
apotheosis of the invasion genre, it also says much about future war.121  Wells’ Martians 
land in England, in what is identified as the early twentieth century, although there is no 
future history to speak of in the novel, and set to conquer Earth with a mixture of 
ruthlessness and advanced technology which utterly negates resistance.  For example, 
after their first disastrous encounters with Martian Fighting Machines and their heat 
rays, there is a powerful marshalling of British defensive forces to protect London, such 
that “altogether one hundred and sixteen were in place…never before in England had 
there been such a vast or rapid concentration of military material.”122  The Martian 
response, having lost one of their number through a lucky shell disabling a Fighting 
Machine at Weybridge, is to use chemical warfare to destroy the opposing batteries at 
range.  With the defensive forces annihilated the War is effectively lost, with the 
commander-in-chief bleakly announcing that flight is the only hope for the 
population.123   
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Widespread flight indeed follows and the fleeing millions foreshadow the refugees 
escaping German invasion in the World Wars.  What Wells describes would later be 
called Blitzkrieg, such that his Martians: 
Do not seem to have aimed at extermination so much as complete demoralization 
and the destruction of any opposition.  They exploded any stores of powder they 
came upon, cut every telegraph, and wrecked the railways here and there.  They 
were hamstringing mankind.124   
Their arsenal also includes aircraft: “something rushed into the sky out of the greyness, 
rushed slantingly upwards and very swiftly….something flat and broad and very 
large.”125  There is no description of it in use, but the implication is that the invaders 
have other scientific methods of destruction at their disposal than the heat ray and the 
black smoke.   Here is scientific war at its most destructive and Wells also identifies the 
Martians as being creatures of mind, having dispensed with their bodies, becoming 
coldly intellectual and ‘efficient.’  Horrific though he portrays the Martians to be, he also 
established them as the consequence of technological advancement. 
The War in the Air continues some of the themes of The War of the Worlds, but puts the 
destructive technology in the hands of humanity.  Unlike the wars of Chesney, Colomb et 
al and Le Queux, Wells’ war is not decisive, being instead uncontrollable once it begins.  
It is not necessarily more accurate, than The Invasion of 1910, with no mention of the 
war fought on the ground, or an explanation of how civilisation collapses, but the central 
point is Wells’ conviction that technology would change war in unexpected ways, which 
it shares with his land ironclads, albeit magnified to global conflict.  The point is not how 
‘right’ his predictions were, but his mode of engagement with the future.  The very 
concept of a ‘future history’ was not necessarily new, but Wells’ produced one which 
foregrounded constant technological change.  
 
124 Wells, “War of the Worlds,” 113. 
125 Wells, “War of the Worlds,” 121. 




Looking across these works, some common themes may be identified.  Almost all of 
them are concerned with war in the immediate or close future.  This is, at one level, 
hardly surprising, as the imminent future is bound to be of interest to a contemporary 
audience, as well as it acting as a device to ground the stories in perceived reality.  Only 
London’s grim tale about the extermination of China, and The War in the Air, are set 
further into the future, and the latter is only a decade or so from the present.   The key 
distinction, however, is between those which are concerned with the disruptive effect of 
new technology, and those that use it only as window dressing for what are conventional 
descriptions of warfare.  In the case of the invasion stories of Chesney, Colomb et al and 
Le Queux, new weapons and tactics are mentioned but do not change the outcome of 
their swift and traditional wars.  In contrast, the short stories of Wells, Vickers, London 
and Doyle all use technologies to overturn assumptions about war (although Vickers’ 
account is more nuanced), although they are each limited to putting forward the effects 
of a single new technology.  The War in the Air is different in that it attempts to 
synthesise technological change into a coherent vision of the future.  The fact that it 
stands out emphasises the tendency of contemporaries to think of future wars in 
traditional terms, and not to see how a combination of technological, demographic and 
social change would make the next great war in Europe quite different to the wars 
fought in Europe and the Far East between the industrialised nations in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
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Chapter Seven  The Wood and the Trees: Bloch and Wells 
Previous chapters have demonstrated that the impact of new weapons on warfare was 
widely discussed in the civilian periodicals, military journals and fiction of the period.  
There was intense interest in the subject, and the overwhelming evidence is that 
military theorists understood that tactics had to change in the face of increased 
firepower.  Calls for troops to show greater initiative, and for attacking formations to be 
dispersed, were reasonable responses to a situation where troops had to face potentially 
devastating fire from breech-loading rifles, machine guns and improved artillery.  
Nonetheless, the military were largely focused on tactical solutions, concerned with how 
to deliver attacks successfully on the battlefield, rather than on how strategy might be 
affected by a combination of more powerful weapons and larger armies.  Consideration 
of what this might mean in a Great War in Europe was left to civilian commentators, and 
this research has identified the Battle of Plevna as the turning point when it was realised 
that war had been transformed by new rifles.  As a result, the late 1880s and 1890s saw 
a peak of writing in the periodicals on future war, expressing fears about a war in 
Europe which were as vague as they were apocalyptic.  The South African and Russo-
Japanese Wars then refocused debate on tactics and the performance of the British 
Army, leading to less discussion on what a Great War might be like after the early 1900s.  
The British Army and military establishments in Europe had worked hard to develop 
tactics to fight the next Great War, but the effect of new weapons and armies on war at 
the strategic level had not been properly understood when it finally came in 1914. 
What emerges from the vast majority of writing about future war during the period is 
either a focus on specific aspects, or else a formless fear of its potentially apocalyptic 
consequences.  To use an analogy, if the future can be envisaged as a wood, then every 
attempt was made to inspect individual trees, or to fear at the darkness which sheltered 
under its canopy, but hardly any writers attempted to describe the wood itself.   Two 
who did were Jean de Bloch and H. G. Wells (whose fiction on future warfare has already 
been discussed in Chapter Six), both of who published their key works on the future 
around the turn of the century.  They presented systematic approaches to forecasting 
which were recognised as being revolutionary by contemporaries, but others did not 
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follow their lead, such that when war began in 1914, it unfolded in a way that most had 
not even imagined.  Bloch and Wells lie at the centre of this chapter because they were 
the exceptions which proves the rule; they sought to forecast the future in ways that 
were so novel that they met with incomprehension, or outright hostility.   Their 
predictions may have been imperfect, but throw into sharp relief the more limited and 
tentative ways in which others tried to interrogate the future. 
Jean de Bloch, as he was commonly known in Britain and Western Europe, was born in 
1836 in Poland – then part of the Russian Empire – with the name Ivan Stanislavovic 
Bloch; and died in 1902, aged 66.1  His six volume treatise entitled The Future of War in 
its Technical and Political Relations was published in Paris in 1898.2  A year later, an 
English translation entitled Is War Now Impossible?, comprising the sixth summary 
volume, was published.3   There was considerable interest in Britain in Bloch’s work, 
which was magnified because of the outbreak of the South African War in the same year.  
Bloch’s central thesis was that the use of modern weapons in a European War would 
result in deadlock and the collapse of entire economies, making its prosecution self-
destructive.  Such a bleak hypothesis necessarily led to criticism from the British 
military establishment, whose raison d’etre was to fight wars.   It certainly fed into the 
dread of war expressed by many writers in the British periodicals, and the publication of 
the full version was one of the factors which led to Czar Alexander to convene the Peace 
Conference at the Hague in 1899. 
Only a few years later and H. G. Wells published a series of articles in The Fortnightly 
Review in 1901, with the overall title Anticipations: An Experiment in Prophecy, which 
were later brought together in book form.4  Wells, who was born in 1866, was already 
 
1 Nicolas Murray, “Jean de Bloch”, The Encyclopaedia of War, Wiley Online Library, accessed April 29, 2017, 
doi:10.1002/9781444338232. 
2 Murray, “Jean de Bloch”. 
3 J. S. Bloch, Is War Now Impossible? Being an Abridgement of “War of the Future in its Technical, Economic and 
Political Relations (London: Grant Richards, 1899).   
4 Starting with H. G. Wells, “Anticipations: an Experiment in Prophecy – I – Locomotion in the Twentieth 
century,” The Fortnightly Review, April 1901, 747-760.  The most relevant article to the discussion in this 
chapter is H G Wells, “Anticipations: an Experiment in Prophecy – VI – War,” The Fortnightly Review, September 
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famous for his scientific romances, following the initial success of The Time Machine in 
1895.5  That short novel included up-to-date scientific thinking on Darwinism, as well as 
being suffused with turn of century pessimism about science, technology and the future, 
traits shared by some of Wells’ most significant subsequent works, such as The Island of 
Doctor Moreau (1896) and The War of the Worlds (1898).  Anticipations marked a 
turning point for Wells, as he moved away from his early fiction towards a mix of more 
conventional novels, polemic journalism and scientific romances, often concerned with 
war, such as The War in the Air (1908).  Wells was a member of the Fabian Society and 
the political dining club, the Coefficients, whose members included R. B. Haldane, whose 
reforms restructured the British Army after the South African War.  After a long career 
Wells died in 1946, and David Smith identifies him as a particularly significant figure to 
both contemporaries and generations growing up during the first half of the twentieth 
century.6  Unlike Bloch, Wells was looking forward many decades in the future, so his 
views – including the section of Anticipations about war – did not generate animosity 
from the British Army, although it did lead to a wider intellectual debate on the ability to 
predict the future.   Wells knew and agreed with Bloch’s views, but thought that new 
technology and a society designed to use it would prove able to break the deadlock he 
predicted. 
Is War Now Impossible? was not only different to other contemporary books on the 
future of war because of its length (although the abridged English version is much 
shorter than his full work), but also its numerical approach, relying as it did on the 
assessment of economic statistics and ballistic data.  Bloch was certainly not alone in 
moving towards a greater use of quantification at the time, and this chapter frames his 
approach within the context of other articles which did so in the periodicals.7   While still 
relatively infrequent, their existence marks a growth in the use of numerical 
 
1901, 538-554.  The ninth and final article was H. G. Wells, “Anticipations: an Experiment in Prophecy – IX – The 
Faith, Morals, and Public Policy of the New Republic,” The Fortnightly Review, December 1901, 1063-1082. 
5 Biographical details of Wells from the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/ref.odnb/36831. 
6 David C. Smith, H G Wells: Desperately Mortal (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1986), xi. 
7 The complete Future of War was an immense work in its full form, running to 3,084 pages. Even in the shorter 
Is War Now Impossible?, the contents pages of maps and tables runs to four pages. 
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information, and fits within the context of coming age of ‘science’, which was often 
remarked upon in the periodicals of the time.   Bloch’s synthesis of information was 
impressive by any standard, and Michael Howard describes his book as “the first work of 
modern operational analysis, and nothing written since has equalled it for its 
combination of rigour and scope.”8  Operational analysis (also called operational 
research, which is the term used throughout this thesis) is the use of mathematical 
methods and analysis to assess military operations, and widely considered to have come 
into being during the Second World War, as described in Chapter One.  The scale of 
Bloch’s quantitative analysis does indeed dwarf those of his contemporaries, and this 
chapter demonstrates that they recognised it as little short of revolutionary, although 
military commentators tended to be disparaging of his use of ‘ballistics’ to explain what 
they saw as the art of war, best reserved for study by professional soldiers. 
In contrast to Bloch, Wells’ Anticipations adopted a systematic but more familiar 
narrative approach, looking at the twentieth century to come, through extrapolating 
current trends.  Nonetheless, its scope was extensive, looking at the social changes 
which Wells believed would be brought about by continuing technological advance.  As 
with his fiction, Wells’ vision of the future betrays his personal opinions and desires, but 
it is the breadth of Anticipations which marks it out, and in the opinion of Wagar, it was 
the first attempt at the practice of future studies, a now well established discipline that 
attempts to forecast technical and social change on the extrapolation of present trends.9  
As described in Chapter One, future studies is considered to have begun in the 1960s, 
half a century after Anticipations, so it too – like Is War Impossible? - can be seen as 
innovative, which contemporaries also recognised (as did Wells, who subtitled his work 
An Experiment in Prophecy).  There has been much historiographical debate on 
Anticipations, centred round what it reveals of Wells’ social views, but this chapter will 
 
8 Michael Howard, “Men Against Fire: Expectation of War in 1914,” International Security  9 (1984), 41.  This 
may have been independent of, or derived from, a similar statement that Bloch’s work was “the first 
operational research investigation in the history of warfare,” I. F. Clarke, The Pattern of Expectation 1644-2001 
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1979), 187. 
9 W. Warren Wagar, H. G. Wells: Traversing Time (Wesleyan University Press: Middleton, 2004), 6, however, 
considers Wells’ as having invented it in Anticipations. 
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argue that attention should also be focused on the approach he adopted, which can all 
too easily be overshadowed by discussion on eugenics and his vision of an ideal society. 
The chapter is not, however, restricted to an examination of these two writers and 
reaction to their work.  The bulk of criticism levelled at Bloch was aimed at his idea that 
trench deadlock would be the outcome of a Great War; there was less criticism of his 
idea of such a conflict leading to economic collapse.  On the contrary, many leading 
commentators thought that a Great War could only be short, for fear of just such a 
collapse.  This chapter therefore compares Bloch with a number of other influential and 
disparate writers; Norman Angell, the prominent peace campaigner; F. N. Maude, British 
military theorist and vigorous opponent of Bloch in the press; the noted German military 
writer Friedrich von Bernhardi (already referenced in Chapter Five) and Alfred von 
Schlieffen.10  The chapter will reinforce the point that there was a consensus over the 
necessity of a ‘short war’ in the years before 1914 between peace campaigners and 
military theorists, even if they thought the outcome likely to be very different. 
Overall, this chapter will demonstrate the importance, radical character and relevance of 
Is War Now Impossible? and Anticipations to the question of why commentators failed to 
predict the character of the First World War.  It will show that while attention is 
ordinarily focused on the accuracy of their predictions in both works, their real 
significance lies in the novel approaches they adopted to anticipating the future of 
warfare.  As previous chapters have demonstrated, there was no shortage of 
commentators interested in looking ahead to war in the future, including writers of 
fiction, but it is the methods of Bloch and Wells which mark them out for special interest.  
Critically, it was decades before these became widely adopted when interrogating the 
future, and their very novelty led to their views being of limited influence.  Bloch, in 
particular, was largely forgotten by 1914, and it will be argued that their approaches 
demonstrate the difficulties of prediction at an age of spectacular advances in weaponry, 
which is why contemporaries failed to foresee what was to become the First World War.  
 
10 Chief of the Imperial German General Staff before the First World War, and architect of the eponymous plan 
to knock France out of the war, the failure of which was to lead to trench deadlock in the West 
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To return to the analogy adopted at the start of this chapter, while others were looking 
at individual trees, Bloch and Wells found ways to see the wood. 
Bloch and Future War 
In Is War Now Impossible?, as with his longer, complete work, Bloch assessed how recent 
changes in weaponry, finance and trade would affect warfare, and concluded that a 
future European war would lead to stalemate on the battlefield, followed by the collapse 
of nation states unable to either feed their populations or continue to pay for the war.  
His first assertion was based on the conviction that modern weapons had come to favour 
the defender, and his second on the increasingly inter-related nature of the global 
economy. 11  Mirroring these two assertions, the first part of Is War Now Impossible? 
dealt with military and naval developments, while the second was concerned with what 
Bloch termed ‘economic difficulties in time of war.’12  Bloch himself made it clear that he 
saw his work as a synthesis of widely accepted military thought, rather than novel 
research.  This is borne out by the content of articles in the periodicals and military 
journals identified in Chapters Three, Four and Five, many of which clearly understood 
the impact of new weapons on war, and on the strengthening of the defence in 
particular. 
Bloch was not, for example, presenting a contentious view when he stated that “in the 
opinion of competent military writers the war of the future will consist primarily of a 
series of battles for the possession of fortified positions.”13  Similarly, he expressed 
received wisdom that the scale of the future battlefield would confound commanders 
and make it difficult for them to concentrate their troops.14  Yet again, he discussed the 
targeting of officers on the battlefield, which was also recognised to be an increasing 
 
11 A useful summary is provided by Niall Ferguson,  The Pity of War: 1914-1918 (London: Penguin Books, 1998), 
9. 
12 Bloch, “Is War Now Impossible?”, 163. 
13 Bloch, “Is War Now Impossible?”, 11. 
14 Bloch, “Is War Now Impossible?”, 39. 
PhD Thesis  Interrogating the Future David Bangert 
 
218  
problem in the periodicals.15  What made Bloch’s work different was his approach, 
which was to draw on specific data at the tactical level and construct a synthesis of what 
future war would be like on a European scale.  For example, Bloch referenced the work 
of Professor Gebler and his assessment of the effectiveness of contemporary rifles, who 
he cited as a ‘specialist.’16  He repeated Gebler’s assessment, which showed – although 
the basis of his calculation is unclear – that the rifles of the 1890s were between four 
and thirteen times as effective as the Mauser rifle of 1871.  Bloch’s strength was to draw 
on this detailed analysis and conclude that such improvements would extend the 
battlefield, strengthen the defence, lead to a greater number of casualties amongst 
attackers, and result in strategic stalemate.17  Bloch also pointed to the likelihood of 
future weapons being yet more effective, further strengthening the thrust of his general 
argument.  There are numerous other examples of such inferences in his work, such as 
drawing on the writings and statistics of military experts like the French officers, 
Colonel Mignol and General Luset.18   
The second part of Is War Now Impossible? comprised individual chapters on the 
economies of Russia, Britain, Germany and France.  The chapter on Britain (like the 
others) contained a daunting number of tables of food production and imports, in terms 
of individual crop types or livestock – such as the number of sheep, cows and pigs in 
England in 1895.19  It covered issues of savings and stocks, and demonstrated the trend 
towards a greater reliance upon imported foods, as well as a rise in the cost of 
armaments.  Bloch’s conclusion was that commerce raiding would reduce food imports 
to the point that famine could occur; leading to insurrection.20  As is often the case with 
Bloch, his analysis was partially borne out by subsequent events, and partially 
confounded.  Submarine warfare – commerce raiding in a twentieth century context - 
did indeed pose an existential risk to Britain in the First World War, with enormous 
efforts required to protect foodstuffs being imported into the country to prevent 
 
15 Bloch, “Is War Now Impossible?”, 42. 
16 Bloch, “Is War Now Impossible?”, 4. 
17 Bloch, ‘Is War Now Impossible?’, 5. 
18 Bloch, ‘Is War Now Impossible?’, 25-26. 
19 Bloch, ‘Is War Now Impossible?’, 255.  
20 Bloch, ‘Is War Now Impossible?’, 264. 
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shortages.  There was, however, to be no insurrection in Britain, although the blockade 
of Germany by the Royal Navy did lead to unrest in 1918.  The key point, it must be 
emphasised, is not the accuracy of his predictions, but the way in which he marshalled 
information to generate a coherent argument. 
Bloch linked developments in armaments, the size of armies, their cost, and broader 
economic trends to provide a ‘scientific’ prediction – to use the term widely used in the 
periodicals of the 1890s - of the future.  Many military observers such as F. N. Maude – 
who was a prominent critic of Bloch – attacked Bloch for being an amateur and on his 
focus on statistics, calling his book a triumph of ‘ballistics’ over military expertise.  
Maude’s view was that numbers could not capture the subtleties of military practice, and 
that matters such as morale had to be factored into warfare.  This view, however, 
ignored the subtleties of Bloch’s analysis and his incorporation of elements of morale; 
for example, Bloch explicitly stated that when attacking “in loose formation…the spirit of 
armies has a much greater importance than before.”21  Similarly, in a phrase which also 
echoed Wells’ views on warfare in the later Anticipations, Bloch wrote that “courage 
required no less than before, but this is the courage of restraint and self-sacrifice and no 
longer scenic heroism.  War has taken a character more mechanical than knightly.”22   As 
evident in previous chapters, these views echoed many writers on warfare in the 
periodicals, who had begun to see an increasing role for science in warfare. 
With hindsight it is indeed tempting, and interesting, to focus on what Bloch got ‘right’ 
and what he got ‘wrong’.   Historians have usually framed their views on Bloch in this 
light.  A. J. Echevarria, for example, considers his arguments to be rather one-sided 
because he “discounted the possibility that even newer technologies might appear in the 
not-to-distant future to solve [the] problems, as they had in naval warfare.”23  This 
seems overly harsh, however, in that it was not until 1917, three years into the First 
World War, that armies began to develop the technologies and tactics to break trench 
 
21 Bloch, ‘Is War Now Impossible?’, 159. 
22 Bloch, ‘Is War Now Impossible?’, 352. 
23 A. J. Echevarria, Imagining Future War: The West’s Technological Revolution and Visions of Wars to Come 
1880-1914 (London: Praeger Security International, 2007), 44.    
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deadlock, almost twenty years after Bloch had published his work. 24  Similarly, even 
Ferguson, who is more positive about his work, points out that he was wrong to assert 
that the entire economic system would collapse in a matter of months.25  These 
statements are true, but it is necessary to look beyond Bloch’s specific predictions and 
understand the novelty of his approach.  Bloch’s work embodied the very idea of 
‘scientific warfare’ because his analysis was based on facts, figures and inference, rather 
than presenting a narrative, however well-constructed.   Just as war itself was becoming 
a complicated matter of timetables, planning and industrial production, its prediction 
required new methods of assessment, which Bloch provided. 
There was a significant response to Bloch’s work from British observers in the press and 
periodicals.  The publication of Is War Now Impossible? in 1899 coincided with the 
outbreak of the South African War, so he gained a measure of increased recognition 
around the turn of the century, which can be seen in the number of references made to 
him in the periodicals, made apparent though a search for ‘Bloch’ on the British 
Periodicals Online database.26  In 1898 only two articles are identified, but in 1899 there 
are 58 references.  In 1900, during the first full year of the South African War, there are 
44 references; then 54 references in 1901 and 34 references in 1902.  This rise in 
references parallels the conduct of the War, ending with peace and Bloch’s death at the 
start of 1902.  It is impossible to say which is more important for the fall off in the 
number of articles, but Bloch was extremely active writing letters and responding to 
critics between 1899 and 1901, so it may be due to him no longer being able to argue his 
case.  The number of articles then falls away to between 2 and 8 annually between 1903 
and 1914, with no articles returned in several individual years.  Care must be taken with 
 
24 Jonathan Bailey, “The First World War and the Birth of Modern Warfare” in The Dynamics of Military 
Revolution 1300-2050, edited by Knox Macgregor and Murray Williamson, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001), 132. 
25 Ferguson, “Pity of War,” 10.  The peace campaigner Normal Angell took a similar stance to the economic 
consequences of a European War in his 1909 work The Great Illusion. 
26 A search was conducted of the keywords ‘Bloch’ AND ‘War’ AND ‘Future’ within the British Periodicals 
database between 1898 and 1914.  These keywords were selected to capture references to Jean de Bloch 
through reference to future war, to minimise identifying other people with the name Bloch.  The search was 
conducted across the following categories: article, back matter, front matter, fiction/narrative, front matter, 
graphic, letter, obituary, poem and review. 
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the precise numbers, as some of the articles may refer to other individuals with the 
surname Bloch, but the trend and its peak are clearly evident.27 
Even before the South African War, there was an almost immediate response in the 
press to the publication of Is War Now Impossible?  This was in part due to Czar 
Alexander convening the Peace Conference at the Hague from May 1899 onwards, an 
event considered by some contemporaries to have been prompted by the publication of 
Bloch’s work in its unabridged form.   For example, one of the earliest mentions of Bloch 
in a British periodical or newspaper appeared in Jackson’s Oxford Journal in March 1899.  
The journal carried an article sympathetic to the Czar’s Peace initiatives, issued on 29 
August 1898, reporting on a gathering at Oxford Town Hall to support the proposals.28  
The article criticised negative responses to his entreaties, and attributed the driving 
force behind it to be “the work of a Polish writer, Bliokh [sic] by name, [which] made a 
deep impression on the Imperial mind.”29  The article cited Bloch’s views that the cost of 
a war would be ruinous, and that the finances directed to the maintenance of large 
armies in Europe should be redirected to more useful purposes.  As so often with articles 
in the 1890s, it considered that a future war was an inevitability unless action to prevent 
it, along the lines of the Conference, were to be taken.30   
Written in the same year, Low’s article in The Nineteenth Century on the Peace 
Conference at the Hague also mentioned Bloch and his effect on it, as well as his “famous 
work”.31  Although he broadly accepted Bloch’s position, Low concluded that 
disarmament could lead to the prospect of war being more palatable, and that large 
 
27 A number of the later references, in particular, are to other people with the surname Bloch. 
28 “Oxford’s Response to the Czar’s Message,” Jackson’s Oxford Journal, March 11, 1899, 7.  The article only 
mentions the manifesto being released in but August, Arnold White, “The Tsar’s Manifesto,” The National 
Review,  October 1898, 201, gives it as 29 August 1898.  For mentions of Bloch in relation to the conference, 
see also M.A.M., “The War of the Future,” The Leisure Hour, June 1899, 500; and Sydney Low, “The Future of 
the Great Armies,” The Nineteenth Century, September 1899, 386. 
29 “Oxford’s Response,” 7. 
30 “Oxford’s Response,” 7. 
31 Low, “Great Armies,” 386. 
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armaments guaranteed peace.32  Views such as these can be found in other periodicals of 
the time, as shown in Chapter Three.  Many of the articles on the Czar’s initiative do not, 
however, mention Bloch, being in general more concerned with Russian motivations, 
often criticising the Czar of hypocrisy when Russia possessed a vast standing army, or 
questioning his diplomatic motives.33  The Peace Congress itself was widely reported in 
the press; for example in an article in The Standard covered reports from various 
national capitals including Vienna, Paris and St. Petersburg.34   
The English language translation and summary of Bloch’s work received notice in the 
provincial press, reproduced from the national press.  For example, The Shields Daily 
Gazette & Shipping Telegraph cited the May article in the Review of Reviews and was 
complementary regarding the power of Bloch’s arguments over the likely character of 
future war.35  Similarly, The Walsall Advertiser highlighted Bloch’s key arguments about 
the likelihood of a stalemate during a future war, and of national collapse due to 
economic stress.36  Even those who were less than completely supportive of Bloch 
tended to recognise the value of his work; an article from The Sheffield & Rotherham 
Independent contained a critique of his work through three primary arguments which 
were to be repeatedly levelled against him, although the author of this article considered 
him to be a shrewd and a careful writer.37   
The first argument, it asserted, was that it was well understood that modern battles 
would be less destructive, which was a viewpoint commonly expressed at the time.  This 
was based on the idea that the growth of the battlefield, due to the greater range of 
 
32 Low, “Great Armies,” 386.  Deterrence theory gained prominence with regard to nuclear weapons in the Cold 
War, but writers at the turn of the century understood its principles and contradictions, without using the term 
explicitly.  
33 A Soldier, “The Tsar’s Appeal for Peace,” The Contemporary Review,  October 1898, 504.  Other sceptical 
articles include White, “Tsar’s Manifesto,” The National Review, October 1898, and Sydney Low, “Should 
Europe Disarm,” The Nineteenth Century, October 1898, 521-530 
34 “The Peace Congress,” The Standard, May 15, 1899, 7. 
35 “Current Literature,” The Shields Daily Gazette & Shipping Telegraph, May 29, 1899, 4.  The article referenced 
by the newspaper is W.T. Stead, “Has War Become Impossible?” The Review of Reviews, May 1899, 2. 
36 “The Future of War,” The Walsall Advertiser, October 21, 1899, 6. 
37 It is interesting that the writer notes that Bloch’s work had been renamed Modern Weapons and Modern 
War and assumed that it was the sixth volume of his full work. 
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modern weapons, led to less decisive outcomes, longer battles and, therefore, lower 
casualties.  The historical analysis of battles bore this out, particularly after the Russo-
Japanese War, as an example from 1905 attests, reported in The Review of Reviews.  The 
original article of interest was written by General Bliss of the US Army, which assessed 
the casualties from a series of battles from the Seven Years War onwards, and is worth 
citing at length: 
In the twelve principal battles of the Seven Years' War the average losses were 
victors 14 per cent., defeated 19 per cent.  During the Napoleonic epoch an  
average of twenty battles gives victors 12 per cent. loss, defeated 19 per cent.  
The average loss in four principal battles in the Crimea was for the victors 10   
per cent., for the defeated 17 per cent.  The average of four principal actions  in 
the Franco-Austrian War of 1859 gives for the victors 8 per cent.  loss, for the 
defeated 8·5 per cent.  In  twelve principal  battles of the Civil  War the losses  of 
the Union army amounted to 19·7 per cent. and of the Confederate armies to 19·6 
per cent.  The average of six principal actions in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 
gives for the victors 7 per cent., for the defeated 9 per cent.  The  average of eight  
principal actions of the first period of the Franco-Prussian  War of 1870 gives for 
the victors 10 per cent.,  for the defeated  9 per cent.    The average of three 
principal actions in the second period of the Franco-German War gives for the 
victors 2·5 per cent.,  for the defeated 3·5 per cent.  In fourteen battles in the 
present Russo-Japanese War (excluding the siege of  Port Arthur) the average 
loss was for the Russians 9·5 per cent., for the Japanese 4·6 per cent. 38 
This article used statistics to make a rational point, and formed part of a general trend 
towards greater quantification during the period.  Bloch himself responded to the 
argument around the destructiveness of war in a letter to The Times early in 1901.39  He 
commenced with the refrain that he was presenting his argument “in the interests of the 
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scientific study of warfare.”40  Bloch’s argument was that he had concluded that lower 
losses would occur, and therefore act to prolong war, creating the stalemate he believed 
would result; and noting that the full argument had been set out in Volumes 2 and 4 of 
his full work, The Future of War, which had not been translated into English.41   
The second argument against Bloch’s reasoning was perhaps the most frequent defence 
mounted by military writers who disagreed with his conclusions, namely that he did not 
consider the impact of ‘moral’ factors in warfare, or as the article put it “does not take 
sufficient account of the human element of war.”42  Maude, as noted above, attacked 
Bloch for considering war simply to be a matter of ‘ballistics’, and his assertion can be 
seen as an assault on the notion of reducing military theory to a matter of science.  The 
third and final argument, that Bloch was an economist and not qualified to critique 
military matters, was also used by others to undermine his credentials, by attacking the 
man and not his ideas, and was commonly used by military commentators 
A number of articles in the periodicals directly addressed Is War Now Impossible? such 
as M.A.M., writing in The Leisure Hour in 1899.  He considered it to be a remarkable book 
and although he was not without criticism, saw it as ground breaking.  In particular he 
drew attention to Bloch’s “dry scientific method of marshalling his facts and figures, his 
freedom from emotion and passion.”43  He considered this to be at least as convincing as 
the moral arguments of other writers who were opposed to war, although he thought 
Bloch’s arguments were deficient in literary merit.  His article summarised Bloch’s work, 
included both tables and diagrams, and focused more on his military than economic 
predictions.44  Other writers highlighted his ‘scientific’ approach, such as an article 
published in November 1899 in The Morning Post which focused on Bloch’s contribution 
to the wider debate on future war, noting that he used documentary material and 
reasoned argument “not to appeal to the sentiment but rather to the intelligence of the 
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public.” 45   The article also cited the opinion of the German military historian, Colmar 
von der Goltz, that a future European War could not be terminated except through the 
individual or mutual destruction of the combatant nations.  Bloch certainly agreed with 
the latter sentiment and  stated that he had drawn on the assessment of contemporary 
military writers, including Goltz, and also Generals Rohne and Muller. 46 
A review in The Academy offered a similar viewpoint, pointing out the differences 
between Bloch’s work and other works advocating peace.47  Specifically, its “very 
effectiveness …lies in its cool scientific spirit of enquiry.”48  The author was extremely 
supportive of Bloch’s views, but the key point is the reviewer’s  recognition that his 
work was different by applying a ‘scientific’ approach to war.  It is also interesting that 
the author drew parallels with the conflict envisaged by Bloch and the Thirty Years War, 
rather than the more recent Napoleonic Wars or those of the nineteenth century.49  This 
is a striking comparison, and notable because very few articles in the periodicals looked 
back so far into history for parallels.   The author also mentioned the Battle of Plevna, 
that touchstone of recognition that modern weapons had changed war since 1878, as 
identified in Chapter Three.   
Yet another positive account of Bloch, albeit a shorter one, can be found in The Review of 
Reviews, later in 1899.50  All the articles in that publication, however, must be viewed in 
light of the fact that its editor was W. T. Stead, a notable peace campaigner who knew, 
admired and interviewed Bloch. 51  It is not surprising, therefore, that his periodical 
reported favourably on other peace campaigners, such as its account of an article by 
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Émile Zola in the April edition of the North American Review.52  Zola did not mention 
Bloch, but he was supportive of the Peace Conference at the Hague and believed that any 
future conflict would ruin the combatants and thereby – perhaps optimistically – end 
war.  Like many of the writers of the 1890s, and unlike Bloch, however, his position was 
based on one of moral and narrative argument rather than of quantitative economic or 
military analysis.   
Many of the periodicals, therefore, highlighted Bloch’s work as being unusual, or even 
ground-breaking, through its foundations of ‘scientific’ analysis.  Although the epic scale 
of Bloch’s work was unique, the periodicals do contain examples of the increasing use of 
such analysis to underpin arguments, as noted with Bliss’ work on historic wars cited 
above.  Others  mentioned the likelihood of future wars leading to fewer casualties, such 
as in a report in The Review of Reviews on an article by Milliard in 1905, on the likely 
outcome of the Russo-Japanese War.  The report read that: 
On the whole, he is confirmed in a long-growing conviction that war is growing 
relatively less dangerous to human life, by which he means that modern man-
killing devices slay fewer men in proportion to the duration of engagements than 
at any previous time in the history of war.53   
Tellingly for a periodical that was extremely supportive of Bloch’s work, the Review of 
Reviews considered that the article’s conclusions “only partly bear out M. de Bloch’s 
predictions.”54   
One of the factors which influenced writers who considered that casualties would be 
less in future wars was the way in which rifle calibres had reduced in recent decades.  
For example, Coulthard, in 1900, discussed the nature of wounds in the South African 
War and concluded that “no war in the past can attempt to compare with this South 
 
52 “M. Zola on War,” The Review of Reviews, August 1900, 167. 
53 “War of the Future,” 46. 
54 “War of the Future,” 46. 
PhD Thesis  Interrogating the Future David Bangert 
 
227  
African war of ours on the general grounds of humanity.  For every man killed there 
are….3.7 wounded, but of these only about 5% die.”55  Coulthard’s argument was that 
the smaller calibre bullets in contemporary rifles were more ‘humane’ and that surgeons 
had gained experience in treatment of such wounds, being more careful to keep them 
clean, and therefore leading to fewer amputations.  What is significant about the article 
is that Coulthard used statistics to underpin his argument, and not simply narrative. 
A much more comprehensive use of statistics is evident in an article written by Theodor 
von Sosnowsky in The Fortnightly Review in 1900.  He compared the population of the 
European powers with the size of their peacetime armies, and calculated the number of 
soldiers per square kilometre for selected nations.  His assessment extended to the cost 
of each army per soldier, noting that Britain was spending twice per soldier when 
compared with Austria-Hungary and Italy.56  He concluded that what he called a 
‘mercenary army’ necessarily cost more than an army of conscripts, so that introducing 
a more Continental system would not be as expensive as it might seem.  Although his 
article was a polemic against Britain introducing conscription, his analysis was well 
supported with data, and his approach more interesting than his conclusion: he sought 
to use (although he does not use the term) ‘scientific’ methods to underpin his 
argument, albeit with a fraction of the number of tables and charts used by Bloch. 
These are only, however, a few articles which used such approaches, out of the large 
number interested in the future of war.  The overwhelming majority of articles remained 
purely narrative and made little or no use of numerical information.  In fact, there is a 
sense that the discussion on the coming of ‘scientific’ methods far outweighed the 
number of practitioners applying them in reality.  The idea that Bloch was breaking new 
ground with his work reinforces this point, as the magnitude of his analysis struck 
reviewers with added force.  There was a move towards greater quantification in 
assessing the likely character of a future war, but Bloch was very different in the scale of 
his work, and this was recognised by contemporaries. 
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Bloch had his critics, however, and none so more than Maude, as noted above.   One of 
the earliest articles in what was to become a long standing dispute in print was Maude’s 
piece in the Pall Mall Gazette in 1900.57  Here, he used the argument that recent wars 
had been less destructive to criticise Bloch, arguing that “in spite of all the 
improvements in the mechanism of the modern magazine rifle, its destructive power has 
steadily declined, until nowadays it takes ten to twenty times as many shots to kill a 
man…”58  What underpinned his argument was data that the percentage of casualties 
had fallen from the American Civil War, at 50%, to 36% in the era of the breech-loaders, 
paralleling the article by Bliss discussed above.59  Maude was using statistics to argue 
against Bloch, fighting, as it were, fire with fire.  Nonetheless, he ended his article in a 
more defiantly militaristic tone, suggesting that decisive and bloody action would be 
required to achieve victory and that “the greater the loss in a victorious fight the greater 
the honour.”60  Maude was putting forward the contemporary belief that success in war 
required decisive action, coupled with the will to achieve victory regardless of the cost, 
which was something advocated by prominent German military theorists.   
In 1901, and this time in The National Review, Maude continued his criticism, pulling no 
punches with statements such as “even the childish conclusions of a most extensively 
misinformed amateur like M. Bloch can obtain even a limited circle of adherents.”61  As 
before, Maude took Bloch to task through the presentation of facts, using an analysis on 
the volume of bullets in flight to conclude that the introduction of improved rifles 
favoured the attacker.62  His main argument, however, was based on the importance of 
‘moral’ factors in war and the continuation of the eternal principles of warfare.  As 
Chapter Four shows, other writers in the periodicals wrote about the enduring strategic 
principles of war, and therefore the relevance of studying historical wars, with Maude 
contending that “the essential features of warfare remain much as they have been for 
 
57 F. N. Maude, “M. Bloch’s Fallacies,” Pall Mall Gazette, May 18, 1900, 4. 
58 Maude, “Bloch’s Fallacies,” 4. 
59 Maude, “Bloch’s Fallacies,” 4. 
60 Maude, “Bloch’s Fallacies,” 4. 
61 F.N. Maude, “M. Bloch as a Prophet,” The National Review, March 1901, 102. 
62 Maude, “Bloch as a Prophet,” 110. 
PhD Thesis  Interrogating the Future David Bangert 
 
229  
the past two centuries.”63  The article was, accordingly, full of references to the 
Napoleonic Wars and the Franco-German War and asserted that heavy casualties had 
always been a feature of war, specifically citing the destruction of the Imperial Guard at 
Waterloo as an example, and not a recent development.64   
The argument between Maude and Bloch continued throughout the South Africa War.65   
Their positions reflect the difference in opinion between those – generally military – 
observers who saw war as essentially unchanged, and those like Doyle and Bloch, who 
saw technology as having revolutionised its practice.  Bloch was explicitly dismissive of 
the use of historical reflection to assess modern warfare, considering that in relation to 
problems in South Africa “the clue to the enigma is to be found in the altered conditions 
of warfare.”66  Bloch was suggesting a rupture with the past: history could not provide 
answers to the course of a future war because technological change – as well as the 
impact of social change which increased the size of armies – has rendered its lessons 
irrelevant.67   This fact was one of the cornerstones of his articles on the Transvaal War, 
as he tended to refer to it.  To be fair to the military writers, they did recognise a need 
for changed tactics, but not necessarily strategy.  Maude’s argument for greater morale 
in the attack was not a unique position, and nor was it irrational, so long as it was not 
carried to extremes.  Bloch and Doyle saw all aspects of war has having been 
transformed, while Maude and other military theorists saw it as modified, tactically, but 
still subject to unchanging strategic principles. 
Maude was negative about Bloch but The Review of Reviews had been positive about 
Bloch’s writings from the very beginning.68  It is not therefore surprising that it 
contained a supportive piece on Bloch’s article ‘The Transvaal War and Its Problems’, 
published originally in the French Revue de Revues.  This article itself was later 
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translated into English and sold in pamphlet form, and in it Bloch called for a scientific 
study on the conditions of the War in South Africa, referring back to Plevna for evidence 
of the value of entrenchments.  Bloch’s article, contained other interesting excursions - 
firstly, he concluded that turning manoeuvres had been made far more difficult due to 
modern rifles and that they must in the end result in frontal attack.69  This point foresaw 
the ill-fated ‘race to the Sea’ of late 1914, when both the German and Anglo-French 
armies attempted repeatedly to outflank one another after the Battle of the Marne, 
which ended in trench deadlock from the English Channel to the Alps.  Secondly, he 
explicitly tackled the issue of lower casualties in modern war and linked it to the 
phenomena of British troops surrendering after what he quoted as “trifling casualties”.70  
He attributed this to the rate at which casualties had been taken, rather than the 
percentage inflicted, which adversely affecting morale, illustrating once again, logical 
insights absent from the thinking of most commentators. 
Bloch published other articles on the South African War between 1899 and 1901, and 
the importance of Plevna as an indicator of modern war was yet again emphasised in a 
piece in The Contemporary Review in April 1900.71  Bloch did not think that the quality of 
the British Army had been an issue in South Africa, but that the setbacks instead 
reflected the unavoidable consequences of modern warfare.  He analysed Boer strategy, 
noting that their failure to press attacks even in successful circumstances arose out of a 
need to preserve their forces.72  His opinion was that they realised that they had to fight 
defensively because of the asymmetric nature of the conflict, and he went on to discuss 
the potential of modern weapons to greatly enhance guerrilla warfare, in an astonishing 
premonition of colonial wars of the twentieth century.  Although Bloch was not always 
correct in his assertions, his articles continually showed a willingness to raise – and 
provide evidence for – new ways of thinking about conflict.  Although historians have 
rightly criticised Bloch for his errors, such as his view that nations would collapse in 
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months, it is his methods which remain most impressive, as does his ability to think in 
new ways about war, as in his views on guerrilla warfare. 
A further article in the Review of Reviews, reporting on an article published by Bloch in 
the New Liberal Review in early 1901, included a quote from him which encapsulated his 
vision of how future war should be investigated, such that “a need exists for a thorough 
and scientific enquiry into all the complex questions involved in warfare…in which not 
only military men, but statesmen, scholars and economists should participate.”73   Such a 
view stands in contrast to the opinions of the military professionals, as they implicitly 
considered the others not to be ‘professionals’ in their own right.  In modern, and 
therefore anachronistic terms, Bloch is suggesting a cross-disciplinary approach to the 
analysis of warfare, which came to pass later in the twentieth century.  As he believed 
that a European war would involve entire societies, with implications wider than those 
of a purely military conflict, he called for the involvement of a wider range of 
professionals to assess warfare.  Admiral Colomb, as noted in Chapter Five, suggested 
that just such a body should be formed to investigate the effects of new weapons, in an 
article of 1897 in The RUSI Journal.  This was not to happen until decades later, however, 
as it was difficult for contemporaries, as Colomb said, to even identify to which 
organisation such a body should be attached. 
Bloch faced his military critics head on when he gave a lecture at RUSI in Summer 1901, 
which was divided into two parts due to its length, and read on 24 June and 1 July.  The 
lecturer was introduced, reflecting his role with the Czar and the Peace Conference, as 
“His Excellency M. Jean de Bloch, Russian Councillor of State.”74  In the first lecture Bloch 
discussed the relevance of the South African War to his general theory of a European 
conflict, noting that it was the result of twelve years of work.75 He went on to insist that 
British difficulties were not down to any deficiency in the Army or its tactics, and was 
very critical of German attitudes to British performance in the conflict.  He emphasised 
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the similarity of German, British, Russian and French doctrine before the South African 
War and systematically dismissed excuses made for what had happened in the South 
African War, such as the terrain or the distance Britain was fighting from its home 
base.76  Overall, the first part of the lecture was very much about the fighting in the 
Transvaal, and deliberately designed to support the British Army and its performance. 
The second part of the lecture, given a week later, turned to the familiar topic of a 
possible war in Europe, and Bloch noted by how much the armies in Europe had 
increased – from 6.75 million in 1877 to 15.5 million in 1897, before pointing out that 
these larger armies would make it impossible for the Germans to turn the French flank 
should the two countries go to war.77  He emphasised the way in which modern 
weapons – as demonstrated in South Africa – enabled fewer defenders to hold a section 
of line because of increased firepower, and that attackers also had to spread out to avoid 
being annihilated in an attack.  Consequently, any war would become deadlocked and 
Bloch, therefore, suggested that Britain should not go to war in Europe.78  He concluded 
that the only course of action open to the Great Powers was to settle their differences 
through tribunal.79 
The audience for his lectures contained a number of  senior military and naval officers, 
to judge by those who spoke in the subsequent debate, including Admiral Bowden-
Smith, Major-General C. E. Webber and Admiral Sir E. R. Fremantle.  All the speakers 
recorded in the written account of the lectures were critical of Bloch’s argument, albeit 
politely.  For example, Admiral Bowden-Smith argued that the Boer fighters were 
irregulars and it was this which differentiated the war from a potential conflict in 
Europe.80  Inevitably, one officer – Colonel F. J. Graves – took exception to Bloch’s view 
that cavalry had to fight dismounted and would be incapable of turning flanks, arguing 
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that it had, as many commentators did at the time, a great future.81  Admiral Fremantle 
adopted the familiar argument that modern weapons led to fewer casualties, although 
Bloch had also discussed the effect on morale of military units taking a high proportion 
of casualties in a short period.82  The debate, therefore, followed the same pattern as 
that in the periodicals, with an emphasis on tactical matters rather than strategy, and a 
continuing conviction from the military audience that it was possible to wage successful 
offensive wars.  
Bloch died at the end of 1901, less than six months after his lectures at RUSI, even as the 
debates on his work and its relevance to the South African War continued to rage.  R. E. 
C. Long published a piece in The Fortnightly Review in January 1902 which acted as a 
retrospective on his work; and one of its key points was to criticise the way in which 
British readers had only been able to see his full work in “an absurdly abridged form.”83  
He cited H. G. Wells, who had noted that cases like this led to an impoverishment of ideas 
through a failure to deliver a full translation of works into English.  The article was 
fulsome in its praise of Bloch and made a number of points about his work; firstly he 
disagreed with British observers who thought that his work had been rejected by 
Continental military observers.  Instead, he noted that Goltz had agreed with him that 
economic exhaustion was likely to be the outcome of a general European war; and that 
the Russian General Staff held positive views of his work.84  Secondly, that although 
Bloch had been drawn into the debate on the South African War, he had always 
maintained that his work related to the economic impact of an indecisive war between 
the then Triple Alliance and the Dual Entente.85  Nonetheless, Long suggested that his 
tactical predictions had proved to be sound in relation to the South African War and that 
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his pamphlet Lord Robert’s Campaign had correctly predicted the guerrilla war which 
came about after 1900.86 
The number of articles dedicated to Bloch inevitably declined after his death and the end 
of the South African War.  He was, nonetheless, remembered by the peace movement, 
with the only article cited in this study to have a definitively female voice (noting that 
anonymity was the rules for many articles), written by Jane Addams, remembering his 
legacy in 1907.  This confirmed that his memory was still alive, and Addams cited him as 
an example of one of two approaches to the proportion of peace.  She considered the 
first to be a ‘literary impulse’ as exemplified by Tolstoy, while the second was that of 
Bloch and the Tsar (at least in terms of his call for a Peace Conference) who exhibited a 
“sense of prudence.” 87 This distinction echoed writers who saw Bloch as presenting a 
rational and scientific argument for peace, as opposed to purely moral or rhetorical 
argument.  Nonetheless, by 1914 Bloch was no longer discussed in the periodicals, 
belying his importance at the turn of the century, which can be seen in an example 
written in 1899, which referenced a speech by the Liberal leader, Sir Henry Campbell-
Bannerman, supporting Bloch and being positive about his South African predictions.88   
Writing on a Great War in Europe had diminished after the South African War, as 
described in Chapter Four, and Bloch’s ideas disappeared from the periodicals. 
What was different about Is War Now Impossible? was the huge amount of evidence used 
to build its central arguments, and the way it synthesised that information into a 
coherent position.  It moved from purely tactical issues surrounding modern rifles, 
which were widely understood by military writers, and built them into a strategic 
picture.  This is nowhere better demonstrated than the example of flank attacks.  
Military writers realised that the difficulties of frontal attacks against an enemy armed 
with magazine rifles and machine guns made it necessary to find, and attack, the flanks.  
The cavalry used this to assert their greater importance, being the mobile arm able to 
find and exploit the flanks.  Bloch, however, argued that the battlefield had become so 
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attenuated, and armies so large, that flanks would cease to exist, being replaced by a 
continuous line of defenders.  This was indeed to become the case in late 1914 on the 
Western Front.   
As Long pointed out, the South African War was a distraction for Bloch’s theories, 
obscuring the fact that Is War Now Impossible? was about a European War and the 
consequences of coalition warfare.  The increased power of the defensive was 
demonstrated in the Transvaal, but – for example – the smaller scale of the armies 
meant that continuous trench lines could not develop.  The South African War itself 
focused British attention on matters of practical improvement with the army, and 
reduced thinking about the problems associated with a European War.  Similarly, 
Bloch’s real focus was obscured by the lengthy debate on his theories as tested in South 
Africa.  Other aspects of his work, such as the view that a war in Europe would have to 
be short for economic reasons, became less debated, and yet it was here that he found 
agreement with other military commentators and peace campaigners, as shall be 
explored next. 
Bloch’s Contemporaries 
Bloch was not working in a vacuum; other military theorists and peace campaigners 
published books on future war.  The works of four prominent writers are examined 
here, to counterpoint Bloch’s approach to interrogating the future.  The first is Maude, 
indefatigable opponent of Bloch, who published War and the World’s Life in 1907, which 
put forward his views on how Britain should prepare for a future European war, 
including meeting the threat of invasion.  His work had strong foundations in Social 
Darwinism, with the second chapter being titled ‘Sociology with Regard to Military 
History’.  Maude agreed with the German conception of war as a struggle of wills, and 
concluded that the South African War should have been fought with more ruthlessness 
and disregard for casualties, which he summed up with the philosophical statement that 
“The [future] War must end soon: only decisive victories can end it: and only a resolute 
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offensive gives hope of decisive results.”89  In any case, he considered that the South 
African War was a poor model on which to base the likely character of a future European 
conflict. 
As with the German military theorists, Goltz and Bernhardi, Maude was concerned with 
fighting a war in the immediate future, and preparing Britain and its Empire for an 
imminent war.90  He was not, however, in agreement with them – or the general 
consensus - over new technology aiding the defence, concluding instead that modern 
breechloaders had reduced the effectiveness of the defence, citing examples of charging 
‘savages’ reaching British troops equipped with such rifles, and suggesting that their fire 
was highly variable and ineffective.91  He supported this with casualty figures from 
historical conflicts to show that modern warfare was less dangerous, as in his debates 
with Bloch.   In this regard he was using quantitative methods, but in general his book 
was based on argument and the use of selected examples, such as the comment above, 
drawn from colonial warfare. 
Maude did, however, agree with the accepted wisdom of the time that “we know that the 
first result of a War must be a run upon the banks, a tremendous drop in the value of 
securities and a corresponding advance in the price of food.”92  Such views were 
common in the fictional accounts of future war discussed in Chapter Six, up to and 
including Wells’ War in the Air.  Maude emphasised the threat of food shortages and 
stated that “no one seriously questions that at least a third of our population will be 
reduced to absolute want by a War within a very few weeks.”93  Here, Maude is in broad 
agreement with Bloch, although this is not evident in their debates, which focused 
instead on the military aspects of his thinking.   Nonetheless, Maude did not hold that a 
war would necessarily lead to insurrection and collapse, stating that “the War cannot 
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well last for less than two years.”94  Even more remarkably, Maude contended that 
Britain would require two years to develop its army and would only be able to fight 
Germany in Europe in concert with France, defending Belgium; and that in the meantime 
it would only be able to exert financial and naval force on the conflict.  He therefore 
emphasised the need for the Government to safeguard food supplies and prepare the 
State’s finances for conflict, but what is lacking from his analysis is any deep assessment 
of what would be required to build a Continental army or prevent food shortages.  There 
remains a sense of war still being conducted along conventional lines, rather than 
ending in either disaster of a radical outcome.  Maude does not make clear why the war 
would last two years, especially as he was convinced that decisive action was required 
to achieve victory.  What is also lacking from his work is a sense that changed 
technology and demographics would transform the next war. 
The German military theorist Bernhardi, who Bloch saw as a leading practitioner, has 
already been discussed in Chapter Five, in relation to his work Cavalry and Future Wars.  
He concluded that work, translated into English in 1906, with a call to Germany to take 
up arms, and to make the necessary sacrifices to achieve victory on the battlefield. 95  His 
later book, published in 1911, long after Bloch’s death, Germany and the Next War, was 
centred more fully on the need for Germany to prepare for, and then embrace, war, so as 
to fulfil its destiny.  More bluntly, as Bernhardi put it: “World power or downfall!”96  Like 
his contemporary, Goltz, he called for the nation to be fully militarised and ready to 
mobilise to face the coming war, including stating that “we must therefore prepare not 
only for a short war, but a protracted campaign.”97  Like Maude, he was willing to 
consider the possibility of a long war. 
He also focused on the need for the nation to be financially prepared, asking that “the 
national finances must be so treated that the State can bear the tremendous burden of a 
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modern war without an economic crash.”98  He did not consider himself an expert in 
financial matters, but called for the ‘national household’ to be maintained in good 
condition.99  He went on to discuss the need to grow and store foodstuffs, calling for 
agricultural production on wasteland, and increased deep sea fishing.  These statements 
are interesting in a context of the time, when total mobilisation for a long war was 
anathema to German war planning.100  Like Maude, however, Bernhardi is essentially 
putting forward a philosophical position, rather than discussing the likely character of a 
‘long’ war in the future, either in financial or military terms.  He is preparing Germany to 
fight a war, which might be long, but not suggesting how it might be fought, or even 
endured.  This parallels Maude’s thinking - there is a vagueness around the concept of a 
‘long war’ which stops at the level of general principles. 
Schlieffen, architect of the plan to which Germany marched to war in 1914, penned a 
much shorter piece on future war in the Deutsche Revue in 1909.  Unlike Goltz and 
Bernhardi, Schlieffen was not a theorist and the editor of his papers, Foley, states that 
this short essay “is the closest thing to a single theory of war that Schlieffen 
published.”101  It began by stating how war has changed utterly with the coming of 
modern rifle fire and light artillery, and Schlieffen used examples from the Franco-
German War, South African War and Russo-Japanese War to support the conviction that 
“no unit in close order, no man standing upright, can expose themselves to the rain of 
shot.”102  He went on to express the received wisdom of the time, which was that 
battlefields would be greatly extended, battles would last much longer, and that the use 
of entrenchments and night attacks would be essential. 
Schlieffen also held to the consensus by stating that these long lasting battles would not 
necessarily be bloodier than those fought historically, citing statistics from the Battle of 
Mukden in the Russo-Japanese War, where 2-3% casualties occurred in a day, compared 
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to 40-50% in a day in a typical Napoleonic battle.103   He went on to say that the Russo-
Japanese War had proved that it was possible to conduct successful attacks against 
modern rifle and artillery fire, but that the results could be inconclusive, with a danger 
of lengthy battles leading to attritional warfare.  He discounted this form of warfare, 
nonetheless, because “a strategy of exhaustion is impossible when the maintenance of 
millions necessitates the expenditure of milliards.”104  Unlike Maude and Bernhardi, 
Schlieffen is suggesting that war would place a huge strain on a nation’s finances, 
making a long war impossible.   
Schlieffen’s account is unusual in that he actually looked forward to war further in the 
future than most theorists, in a short but interesting set of passages.  He noted that, 
whereas historically cavalry had worked to find the flanks of an enemy, that in the future 
dirigible airships would perform this mission, as they would possess a better view of the 
battlefield.105  Their use, he felt, would lead to air-to-air combat and battles to achieve 
superiority in the air.  Schlieffen characterised such combats as ‘air against air’, like 
‘cavalry against cavalry’ and ‘infantry against infantry’.  Therefore, although writing 
about change  brought about by technology, he framed it within an existing conception 
of warfare.  As seen in Chapter Five, aircraft and motor vehicles were seen as 
augmenting war by the British Army, but not transforming it completely.  Schlieffen’s 
vision of the future saw war as continuing along conventional lines, with new weapons 
fitting into an existing framework. 
The final writer examined here stands in complete contrast with the others.  Norman 
Angell was a peace campaigner, whose work The Great Illusion, was first published in 
1909 (the same year as Schlieffen’s essay), and he put the case that war was no longer 
rational as it would not provide financial benefits to the aggressors.106  He stood against 
the Social Darwinist narrative, contending that the interdependence of trace and finance 
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made war implausible, such that “war has no longer the justification that it makes for the 
survival of the fittest; it involves the survival of the unfit.”107  The Great Illusion was, 
however, first and foremost an economic analysis, and Angell set out arguments against 
the value of colonies and conquest – essentially concluding that peaceful trade was more 
effective than confiscation; based on examples such as estimates of the financial costs 
and benefits of the Franco-German War.108  He considered that this was the result of 
historical change, and cited the example of how an Italian bombardment on a British city 
would now result in a run on its banks; whereas several centuries ago Italian pirates 
could have extorted physical wealth without any impact on their own finances.109 
Angell explored what he called ‘Human Nature and Morals’ in the second part of the 
book, discussing the way in which changes in warfare reflecting the evolution of society, 
and stating that the physical element of warfare has diminished.  Excusing his pejorative 
terminology and assumptions, this is be summed up in his statement that: 
“not that Fuzzy-Wuzzy is not a fine fellow.  He is manly, sturdy, hardy, with a 
courage and warlike qualities generally which no European can equal.  But the 
frail and spectacled English official is his master, and a few score of such will 
make themselves masters of teeming thousands of Sudanese.”110   
He added – without specifically mentioning Maxims and magazine rifles – that superior 
armament was the result of superior thought, and not physical force.  Angell also 
criticised the vision of war as an adventure and concluded that contemporary war was a 
matter of thought, paralleling Wells’ views (although not mentioning him), in that “the 
real soldiers of our time – those who represent the brain of the armies, have a life not 
very different from that of any intellectual calling.”111 
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Angell did not mention, or reference, Bloch in his book, although it must be remembered 
that a decade had passed since he had published his treatise; nor did he use his 
argument about changed weapons technology preventing decisive war.  He echoed the 
title of his work, however, in his closing statement that “war is not impossible…it is not 
the likelihood of war which is the illusion, but its benefits.”112  It is hard not to be 
impressed by Angell’s work – hindsight would clearly show the price paid for the World 
War (not to mention the collapse of many regimes) by its European combatants, and the 
changed world order which followed.  His argument was based on a mix of data and 
reasoning, setting out the consequences of such a conflict very clearly. 
Bloch is also not mentioned by Maude - unsurprisingly given their adversarial positions - 
or the German military writers.  Angell shared Bloch’s view that a long European War 
would be impossible on economic grounds, as did Schlieffen.  This view was also 
expressed by writers in the periodicals such as Battine, who wrote a piece advocating 
support for France during a war, writing that “the maintenance of one and a half million 
soldiers on a war footing, while the business, trade and agriculture of the State is 
paralysed for want of workers…will tend to shorten wars.”113  Maude and Bernhardi did 
discuss, not unreasonably from a military viewpoint, the need to prepare for a longer 
war, but these statement were somewhat vague, and contrast with their positions on the 
need for decisive action to rapidly conclude war.  This lack of detail on how a long war 
might be executed parallels the lack of strategic engagement in writing on war at the 
time.  The principles of war were put forward, but the consequences of coalition war 
were not generally discussed.  
Angell, Maude and Bernhardi all made use of statistics in their discussions of economics 
or casualty rates, but the magnitude of Bloch’s work was unique.  Angell is closest to 
Bloch, both in terms of his conclusions and approach to economic analysis, but lacking in 
what contemporaries saw in the former’s work – its ‘scientific’ approach.  As for the 
military theorists, they still maintained a view that the Great War, even if long, would be 
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fought within a familiar framework of military practice.  As has been stressed in 
previous chapters, they knew that tactics had to change to meet the challenge of new 
weapons (even Maude, who saw new weapons as enhancing the chance for offensive 
action, knew that formations would have to be dispersed) but failed to see what would 
happen in a European War.  Strategy was seen as something unchanging, because the 
means of predicting the future of war were still at an immature stage, and military 
culture was not yet ready to embrace ‘scientific’ war. 
Wells and Foresight 
In April 1901, as the South African War was being fought, H. G. Wells published the first 
instalment of Anticipations in The Fortnightly Review.  Over the course of the next nine 
months Wells’ set out his predictions of the future, as well as his scheme for how the 
world would – and in his opinion should -  be governed.  The work was phenomenally 
successful and already in its third edition in book form before its serialisation was 
complete.114  Churchill wrote to Wells to commend him, complaining only about the 
estimated rate of change in Anticipations, to which Wells retorted that the upper classes 
did not understand the pace of change, as their lives changed less than others.115  The 
sixth of these instalments addressed the future of war, and while it lacked Bloch’s 
numerical assessment, represented a systematic attempt to foresee how war would be 
fought in the future.116  As with the other instalments, Wells’ was preaching as well as 
predicting, and the article is couched in terms of the emergence of “the coming State” 
which is portrayed as being both inevitable and ideal.   
A significant historiographical debate surrounds Anticipations, and one of his 
biographers, Adam Roberts, singles out the last instalment, in which Wells presented his 
ideas of a New Republic, as having generated more controversy than any other element 
of the work.117  Another of his relatively recent biographers, Michael Sherborne, also 
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notes the historiographical battle over Wells’ ideas, while also remarking that he 
recanted many of his more extreme views in his later writing.118  In particular, Arthur 
Conan Doyle and G. K. Chesterton made him rethink his position following the 
publication of Anticipations.119  Sherborne cites a previous biographer of Wells, Michael 
Coren, considering him too harsh in his criticism of Wells, noting the way that many 
contemporaries actually welcomed the last chapter as it aligned to their own 
attitudes.120  Coren is indeed unremittingly negative, seeing it as a profoundly eugenicist 
work, which “presented a novel and terrifying picture of a Wellsian utopia.”121  Coren’s 
biography is generally harsh on Wells’ opinions, although he identifies positive (Sidney 
Webb, Arnold Bennett) as well as negative (J.B. Priestley and G.K. Chesterton) 
contemporary critics of Anticipations, which he sees it as “the swirling hybrid of 
predestination and Marxist gleanings and his own radical ideas which Wells had been 
groping towards in his earlier books.”122   
There is a danger of this debate overwhelming the purpose of Anticipations, which was 
to attempt a broad forecast of the future over the next fifty to a hundred years.  The 
argument about his views on eugenics and race should not obscure the fact that Wells 
generated the first consistent analysis of how technological change might drive society 
and government in the future.   As Sherborne puts it: “the book was widely hailed as a 
triumph in part because systematic thinking about the future was rare at the time and 
Wells was a gifted pioneer in the field.”123  The analysis which follows, therefore, is 
focused on the novelty of his approach, and not the political or social observations 
within Anticipations.  Wells himself considered it to be a novel exercise, remarking that 
there had only been to that date a limited number of forecasts for the future: 
a suggestion of Mr. Herbert Spencer’s, Mr. Kidd’s Social Evolution, some hints 
from Mr. Archdall Reid, some political forecasts, German for the most part, and 
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such isolated computations as Professor Crookes’ wheat warning, and the various 
estimates our coal supply, make almost a complete bibliography.124   
This was not necessarily true, as shown in Chapter Two, although the accounts that had 
preceded Anticipations lacked the scale of his endeavour.  Wells went on to stress that 
there was, in contrast, an abundance of fictional works concerned with the future, 
including The Battle of Dorking and his own work, but that “very much of the Fiction of 
the Future pretty frankly abandons the prophetic altogether, and becomes polemical, 
cautionary, or idealistic.”125  Seen in the light of Wells’ tendencies in that direction there 
may have been a hint of self-awareness (or hypocrisy) in his statement .  Nonetheless, he 
clearly set out what he saw as a new form of ‘scientific’ analysis of the future, 
highlighting the fact that his approach was different to those who had attempted 
prediction in the past. 
The most striking features of the chapter in Anticipations about war are, of course, its 
specific predictions, which the historiography has used to emphasise both its accuracy in 
some cases, and inaccuracy in others.  For example, one oft-quoted extract is that Wells’ 
“imagination refuses to see any sort of submarine doing anything but suffocate its crew 
and founder at sea.”126  Similarly, and quoted just as frequently, is his claim that “long 
before the year 2000AD, and very probably before 1950, a successful aeroplane will 
have soared and come home safe and sound.”127  Once more, the dates point to his 
failure to predict the future accurately, but this was not the aim of Wells’ articles. He 
himself looked back from the vantage point of 1914 and pointed out where his 
predictions had been unsuccessful (as with flight), as well as successful.128  As with 
Bloch, what Wells got ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ tends to be emphasised, rather than the fact 
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that it was his approach which was novel, which led him to believe that the future would 
transform war. 
His view was that technology and social change would indeed bring about a complete 
revolution in the nature of warfare, such that “the new war will probably have none of 
those features of the old system of fighting.”129  Wells was agreeing with Bloch that the 
nature of war has changed, and fell squarely with others like Doyle who saw new 
weapons as having completely altered the character of war.  Wells’ views were just as 
evident in his fictional works, The War of the Worlds, ‘The Land Ironclads’ and The War 
in the Air, as discussed in Chapter Six.  His assessment in Anticipations included both 
firm predictions based on current weaponry, and more speculative predictions of aerial 
combat and other innovations.  He directly quoted Bloch and contended that “even along 
such vast frontiers as the Russian and Austrian…where M. Bloch anticipates war will be 
begun with an invasion of clouds of Russian cavalry and great cavalry battles, I am 
inclined to think this deadlock of essentially defensive marksmen may still be the more 
probable thing.”130  His assessment went further into the future than Bloch, however, 
with Wells’ stating that aerial warfare would become critical in breaking deadlock once 
the initial phases of a war were over, as could mobile artillery.131   His recognition of the 
importance of control of the air was far more impressive than either the dates he 
attributed for achieving successful flight, or his images of dirigibles ramming one 
another.  Like Bloch, it was his approach which was impressive, although its novelty can 
be obscured by memorable quotations demonstrating just how wrong his timescales 
were.  Prediction remains difficult even in the present day, and looking backward to 
point out how ‘wrong’ individual claims turned out to be, is an example of hindsight 
triumphing over contingency.  As is evident in Chapter Five, military writers were 
debating the relative superiority of airships and aircraft, and steam power and the 
internal combustion engine, right up to the outbreak of War in 1914.  The ‘winners’ are 
obvious with hindsight, in a way they are not at the time. 
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Wells instinctively realised that technology would continue to change the circumstances 
of war.  He also predicted total war, with the targeting of non-combatants, and the 
involvement of society in fighting for the State.132  In his view, war would become a 
highly organised matter and those nations which failed to include their whole 
population and material assets into the war effort would be defeated.  This outcome, 
although couched in terms of an ‘effective’ society and the emergence of the New 
Republic, is accurate when viewed against the way in which total war was waged during 
the World Wars, and especially the Second World War, when Allied victory owed much 
to their ability to marshal resources more effectively then the Nazi State.133  War was 
indeed to become a matter for the State, and for scientific organisation and efficiency, as 
started to happen during the First World War. 
Compared to Bloch’s predictions of the dire consequences of a war fought at his time of 
writing, Wells’ predictions are concerned with a future fifty to a hundred away.  Unlike 
almost all his contemporaries, he was not looking at an imminent conflict but at a war 
far further into the future.  Even though his successes in prediction were mixed, he was 
unafraid to speculate, as with aerial warfare, rather than simply staying with a 
discussion of current infantry and cavalry tactics.   As Travers puts it, his success was in 
“ignoring the conventional method of preparing for war – the study of past campaigns 
and tactics – and instead provide an original approach to future war based upon an 
understanding of the inter-relationship between science, war and society.”134  Wells was 
a civilian who saw war transformed by technology and he looked further ahead, and 
more systematically, than his contemporaries. 
The turn of the century had seen the publication of many predictions of the future, as 
demonstrated in Chapter Two, but its depth of analysis made Anticipations stand out, 
and Smith considers it as having had a significant impact on intellectuals of the time.135   
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Immediate responses to it were widespread but varied, although there was little direct 
reaction to his thoughts on war; which is not surprising given that it formed only one 
chapter of nine, and the military could not feel threatened by speculation on war so far 
in the future it seemed irrelevant.  An article in The Academy, entitled ‘AD2000’, 
considered it to be a serious and important book and stressed that “Mr Wells follows 
sanely and soberly the lines of present development.”136  The article focused on the 
philosophical aspects of war, but the author was clear that predicting the course of the 
next century would be immensely difficult given the huge changes which had occurred 
between 1800 and 1900.137   
J. E. Hodder Williams which wrote a review of Anticipations in The Bookman which was 
antithetical to Wells’ ‘mechanical’ view of the future.138  His argument was against 
neither his approach nor his conclusions, but his philosophy, echoing Maude’s critique of 
Bloch as merely being interested in ‘ballistics’.  Williams concluded that “this world of 
ours is, and will ever be, something incomparably finer than the perfect machine, and 
man is, and will ever be, something incomparably grander and nobler than the most 
perfect mechanism.”139  Williams is reacting against science, and presenting doubt and 
concern over the consequences of the ‘scientific’ age.  Wells welcomed change, and there 
was certainly interest in the ‘mechanical’ in articles in the future in the periodicals, but 
there was also widespread fear – as in the dread of war so evident in the 1890s.  Chapter 
Two also describes how Anticipations gave rise to speculation over the ability to predict 
the future effectively, with commentators differing in their opinions over its efficacy.  
Wells believed unequivocally that prediction was possible, as set out in a lecture at the 
Royal Institution a entitled ‘The Discovery of the Future’, given a year after the initial 
publication of Anticipations.140   
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Wells began the lecture by suggesting that there were two sorts of people, at least in 
terms of extremes; those who were ‘retrogressive’ and thought mainly of the past and 
those who were ‘progressive’ and thought mainly of the future.141  His view was that the 
world was shifting towards the progressive, moving from a position such that “three 
hundred years ago all people who thought at all about moral questions…deduced their 
rules of conduct absolutely and unreservedly from the past, from some dogmatic 
injunction, some finally settled decision, as the great mass of people do so today.”142   
Wells contended that a very different challenge faced his contemporary audience, such 
that “this present time is a period of quite extraordinary uncertainty and indecision 
upon endless questions – moral questions, aesthetic questions, religious and political 
questions.”143  He regarded the pull of the past, while still extremely powerful, of little or 
no use in envisaging or predicting the future.  Although he was not explicit regarding 
warfare, he was echoing the views of Bloch and others that there were limitations on the 
value of historical enquiry when looking at the future of war.  Wells’ solution to the 
problem was – predictably – to use scientific enquiry to anticipate the future.144   In fact, 
Wells was explicit that the future could be understood as readily as the past, such that 
“the man of science comes to believe at last that the events of the year 4000AD are as 
fixed, settled and unchangeable as the events of the year 1600AD.”145  This phrase, 
approaching near-mystical predestination, is cited as such in Coren’s rather dismissive 
view of Anticipations (although he does not address ‘The Discovery of the Future’).  Even 
Sherborne, who is generally more positive regarding Wells’ views on the future, 
considers that the lecture began with rational enquiry and then moved to a quasi-
religious position.146   
Wells supported his assertion about the predictability of the future with a lengthy 
passage on the successes of science in uncovering the deep geological and historical past 
over the previous hundred years, considering Darwin’s The Origin of  Species as a 
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turning point in human knowledge.147  Essentially, the scientific method – which he 
identified as the analysis of facts and not merely the accumulation of facts – would 
enable the future course of history to be deduced with some certainty.  He regarded the 
impact of ‘great men’ on history, citing Napoleon as an example, as less important than 
that of the mass of humanity, echoing Marx’s thinking.  The lecture concluded with a 
conviction that human affairs were changing more rapidly than ever, and that there had 
been more change in the past hundred years than in the previous three millennia. 
The lecture provides valuable context to Anticipations, as it demonstrates that Wells’ 
approach was based on induction.  In essence he was attempting to ‘discover the future’ 
through reasoned analysis, and his later lecture made it clear that he saw it as something 
which would emerge in due course through the scientific method.  It is to be noted that 
the prediction of a certain future is not now considered feasible in future studies, which 
is more concerned with assessing different future scenarios, or possible future histories, 
rather than suggesting that there is a single future waiting to be revealed through 
careful analysis.148  Nonetheless, Wells was putting forward ideas centred on the 
rational assessment of current trends, even allowing for the fact that his tone veered 
towards the prophetic.  Like Anticipations, ‘The Discovery of the Future’ was a 
something of a sensation and Smith considers that it went on to transform Wells’ 
standing and his reputation, changing his life and greatly raising his profile.149  Joseph 
Conrad was one who spoke positively about the lecture and stated that it showed the 
differences between the approaches of science and art, particularly when responding to 
critics of the article.150   
Direct links can be seen between these two works and Wells’ fiction.  His scientific 
romances, which he tellingly called ‘Fiction about the Future’, addressed the same issues 
 
147 Wells, “The Discovery of the Future,” 49, and 27-33. 
148 Wendell Bell, Foundations of Futures Studies Volume 1: History, Purposes, and Knowledge (London: 
Routledge, 2017), 80.  He states that “there are central questions of future studies…that involve systematic and 
explicit thinking about alternative futures.” In fiction, the idea of alternative futures came into being with 
Murray Leinster’s Sidewise in Time in 1934.  Like the idea of mechanical time travel put forward by Wells, 
alternate futures had to be conceived, supporting a more complex conception of the future. 
149 Smith, “Desperately Mortal,” 97. 
150 Smith, “Desperately Mortal,” 96. 
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as Anticipations and ‘The Discovery of the Future’.151  In The Time Machine, published in 
1895, Wells’ set out the first fully-formed scientific vision of travel into the future, as 
opposed to earlier stories which had used the medium of dreams or supernatural sleep 
achieve the same aim, and dealt with the impact of evolution on humanity.152  Chapter 
Six covers the ways in which his fiction echoed his views on the future of war, which he 
saw as representing a complete break with its past. 
Bell considers that Wells stands out as the progenitor of futures studies with the 
publication of Anticipations in 1901.153  He also notes that a radio talk given by Wells’ in 
1932, he called for ‘Professors of Foresight’ to be employed to predict and manage the 
future.154  They were not, however, to emerge in reality for another generation, with 
futures studies only becoming a discipline in its own right until the 1960s, highlighting 
the precociousness of Wells’ Anticipations and the ideas he extolled in ‘The Discovery of 
the Future’.  The failure of these ideas to be established earlier highlights the fact that 
society was not yet ready to take them as more than a curiosity, rather than a tool for 
examining the future – including that of war.   Contemporaries recognised that Wells had 
created something new in his interrogation of the future, but there was to be no 
equivalent assessment before the First World War, just as Bloch’s monumental work 
was not to be followed by anything comparable. 
Conclusions 
Bloch and Wells approached the challenge of rapid technological change by developing 
new ways of forecasting its future.  Bloch was focused on the near future, and largely on 
the prospect of a Great War in Europe.  Wells wrote about a more distant future and war 
was only part of his interest, enmeshed as it was in his vision of an ‘efficient’ society.  
What they had in common was that they were  ‘discovering the future’ through what 
they characterised as scientific means.  Their individual predictions, while still startling 
 
151 Smith, “Desperately Mortal,” 57. 
152 Smith, “Desperately Mortal,” 56. 
153 Bell, “Futures Studies Volume 1,” 7.   
154 Bell, “Futures Studies Volume 1,” 7. 
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in some cases, can obscure the more important fact that their methods were novel to the 
point of being unique.  This meant that they could easily be misunderstood, or 
discounted by contemporaries.  Bloch met fierce resistance from military critics such as 
Maude, who felt their professionalism threatened by someone they categorised as an 
amateur.  There was no real engagement with Wells’ ideas of future war from the 
military, although there was wider intellectual debate, leading to an outburst of interest 
in the question of whether or not it was possible to predict the future.   
Their different approaches to forecasting the future were only to become established 
decades later, and the failure to exploit them illustrates the challenge facing those who 
tried to predict the future of war in the decades leading up to the First World War.  
Individual predictions were common enough, but they tended to be limited, vague or 
purely tactical in nature, and lacked the efforts at synthesis attempted by Bloch and 
Wells.  They tried hard to see the wood, and not the trees, and thereby came much closer 
to successfully predicting the future than their contemporaries.  But they also came too 
early, and the culture of the time, particularly in the military, did not embrace their 
methods, so Europe went sleepwalking towards a very different war to the one most had 
predicted. 




In the legends surrounding the fall of Troy, the priestess Cassandra, daughter of the 
Trojan King Priam, was cursed with the ability to foretell the future truthfully, but never 
to be believed.  Her story has become emblematic of those who foresee accurately, but 
whose warnings are not heeded.  There were many prophets of war writing in the 
decades before the First World War, and the predictions of those who foresaw disaster 
should Europe go to war did not prevent the conflagration.  Historians accept that a 
willingness to go to war, and a false belief in its controllability, played their part in the 
decisions which led to the War beginning in 1914.  This makes it easy to berate those 
who failed to see what would happen, and judge predictions in terms of those who were 
‘right’ and ‘wrong’.  In reality prophecy, as the story of Cassandra exemplifies, is a 
difficult business, as it requires both an accurate forecast and an audience willing to 
listen.   This thesis has shown that many contemporary writers made telling predictions 
about the future of war, but they largely  focused on particular aspects such as 
battlefield tactics, or expressed indistinct apocalyptic fears.  Bloch and Wells were 
almost alone in attempting to create comprehensive visions of what war in the future 
would be like, although as Wells was looking further ahead, so it was left to Bloch to 
engage with contemporary military theorists.   The failure of most commentators to see 
only detail is central to why most prediction was to fall short of the reality of the First 
World War.  Forecasting was difficult in the face of the changes in weaponry since the 
mid-nineteenth century, and the military establishments of the time lacked the 
institutions and intellectual outlook to predict what would happen when Europe went to 
war. 
This thesis has used the systematic examination of the British periodicals and leading 
military journals from 1870 to 1914 to advance the historiography in a number of ways.  
The approach has certain limitations, as the authors of the articles and books it has 
examined were drawn from a socially narrow group, as well as being overwhelmingly 
male, with an intended readership from the upper and middle classes.  Nonetheless, 
opinion and political action lay in the hands of this group, as shown by the number of 
prominent historical figures who are cited in this thesis.  War and its future were 
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important to the decision makers of the time, as the debates in the periodicals 
demonstrate, illustrating engagement with the subject, as well as deep unease about the 
consequences of technological advance.   
The thesis has clearly identified the significance of the Russo-Turkish War, and the 
Battle of Plevna in particular, as a catalyst for debate on the power of new rifles and 
their impact on war.  The havoc wreaked by the Turkish defenders at Plevna stuck in the 
imaginations of contemporaries and acted as the foundation for a widespread dread at 
the prospect of a European war, which peaked in the early 1890s.  This promoted talk of 
peace treaties and gave impetus to Bloch’s The Future of War, which sought to persuade 
readers of the likelihood of military deadlock and economic collapse should the great 
powers go to war.  Bloch presented his arguments through logical and systematic 
analysis, and impressed his contemporaries through his appeal to reason, but he was not 
alone in fearing the consequences of a European War. 
The thesis has added weight to the arguments of those, like Travers and Howard, who 
see the British military of the time responding rationally – although not always 
successfully – to the challenge of new technology.   The vast majority of articles on future 
war in the military journals and the periodicals show a keen appreciation of the realities 
of ‘modern’ warfare, and suggest practical ways of overcoming increasingly powerful 
defensive fire.   The idea of ‘the cult of the offensive’, put forward by Van Evera and 
Synder, who suggested military theorists were retreating into a near-mystical belief in 
‘moral’ solutions to solve problems on the battlefield, looks overstated in the light of the 
articles researched in this thesis.   The issues which were to bedevil commanders in the 
First World War were well understood from the 1880s onwards, including the dispersed 
nature of the battlefield, the need for troops to show greater initiative, the vulnerability 
of officers to enemy fire, and the need to avoid frontal attacks in the face of powerful 
new rifles.  There was also nothing eccentric in those articles which called for greater 
initiative and morale, as these were recognised as a valid part of warfare.  Only a 
minority of pieces edge into more mystical or ill-founded territory, and these are often 
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associated with articles on the cavalry.  These are quotable but rare in comparison to the 
more hard-headed analyses.1   
The thesis has also shed new light on the debate on the armament of the cavalry, which 
featured so prominent in the periodicals and military journals from 1900 onwards.  
There are far more articles on the cavalry than on the artillery, and their number 
approaches that of the infantry, reflecting the social pre-eminence of the mounted arm.  
Articles often seek to explain why the cavalry had failed in recent wars, citing either 
training, terrain, lack of initiative or failure of leadership.  Taken together, they come 
across as exercises in special pleading for an arm facing imminent obsolescence.  Those 
military theorists like Friedrich von Bernhardi who wrote of the increased importance of 
cavalry, read – with hindsight - as particularly desperate to assert its continued 
relevance.  The considerable historiography on the cavalry demonstrates, perhaps more 
than anything else, their continued importance in social terms, obscuring their relative 
insignificance in military terms, as was to be demonstrated forcibly in 1914.  
Above all, however, this thesis has made clear a dichotomy between the majority of 
commentators, who focused on particular aspects of war, and a small minority who 
attempted a broader synthesis.  In the former category were the military writers who 
were interested in what new technologies could offer, such as aircraft and motor 
vehicles, but saw them as only augmenting existing military practice, and not driving 
revolutionary change.  The RUSI Journal is full of commentary on the technical aspects of 
aircraft, motor vehicles and new models of rifle, but only rarely examines how these 
 
1 History was to show that the military theorists were wrong when the First World War unfolded, but it is 
interesting to entertain a counterfactual digression.  Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War: 1914-1918 (London: 
Penguin Books, 1998), 458, suggests that had Britain not intervened in the First World War, France would have 
been knocked out of the war, such that even if the German Army had been checked at the Marne, they would 
almost certainly have succeeded in overwhelming the French army in the absence of substantial British 
reinforcements.  If this had happened, then the War would have been much more like the Franco-German War, 
presumably with a settlement in the East.  Amongst the huge differences which this would have made to world 
history, military historians would have looked at the pre-war theories of war and considered them right in their 
prognosis.  They would have surmised that the careful examination of the South African and Russo-Japanese 
Wars had led to the development of tactics capable of meeting the challenge of increased defensive fire, 
resulting in a short and decisive war.  Far from being seen as deluded, the theorists would have been 
vindicated.  If nothing else, such a counterfactual shows the difficulties of predicting the future if contingency is 
to be accepted. 
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might affect military practice.  In fact, imaginative prediction tends to occur in the 
earliest articles on new technologies, such as aircraft, and narrows once it is better 
established.  Writers in the periodicals would also often use historical assessments as a 
form of comfort blanket, turning to a conviction that the underlying rules of war were 
unchanging in the light of new weaponry.  To use the military expression, most 
observers focused on tactical, rather than strategic, issues. 
Relatively few writers went further and attempted to synthesise a picture of what 
‘modern’ war would be like, chief of which was Bloch, although there were others, such 
as W. W. Knollys in 1890, or the anonymous writer in The Academy, writing in 1899, 
who both thought it likely that the next European war would be more like the Thirty 
Years War than the Napoleonic Wars.2  Military theorists like Bernhardi and Maude also 
generated cohesive pictures of future conflict, but when they discussed the concept of a 
European war, they thought in terms of general principles rather than pressing concrete 
predictions.  The focus was on a short war and the need for decisive action to facilitate it, 
for fear of economic collapse, which was one of the few areas of common agreement 
between Bloch and Angell, as peace campaigners; and contemporary military theorists.  
There was a widespread failure to understand that a long war would arise as a 
consequence of a conflict between industrialised coalitions, or to heed the warning of 
the Elder Moltke, military architect of the Wars of German Unification: “woe to him who 
sets Europe ablaze.”3 
Another telling aspect of the interrogation of the future of war was that writers 
generally thought of it as not years away, but imminent.  Fictional wars were also 
ordinarily placed – for the good reason of engaging the readership – a few years in the 
future, and in most accounts these were essentially the last war refought with slightly 
modified weapons.  These imaginary wars were controllable and conventional, and 
reflected a broader intellectual current in the periodicals.  Wells plotted a different 
 
2 W. W. Knollys, “War in the Future,” The Fortnightly Review, August 1890, 274-281; and “War is Suicide,” The 
Academy, October 7, 1899, 363.   
3 Dennis Showalter, “From Deterrence to Doomsday Machine: The German Way of War, 1890-1914,” Journal of 
Military History 64 (2000), 683. 
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course, and what marks his work out - in fact and fiction - was the systematic 
examination of a more distant future, with recognition that it would be completely 
different to the present. 
Wells was rare in trying to piece together a complete picture of how the future, including 
that of war, might be, and it is easy to overlook the fact that the mentality required to 
understand technological change was only just emerging.  The structures, methods and 
intellectual framework were still being developed to interrogate the future.   This is 
where Bloch and Wells, in different ways, stand out, producing works which presaged 
much later means of looking at the future (specifically, operational research and futures 
studies).  Bloch’s huge work on future war took individual elements and pierced them 
together into an impressive military and economic synthesis, while Wells tried to 
extrapolate current trends fifty to a hundred years into the future.   Both of their works 
were recognised as ground breaking at the time, with commentators on Bloch speaking 
of him as having discovered a new ‘scientific’ method and even a new ‘law’ with his 
work.4  Yet, nothing similar to his work was to be published for decades.   The same was 
true of Wells, who was still forlornly calling for ‘Professors of Foresight’ in the 1930s.5  
In general, and especially in the 1890s, there was much talk of the rise of ‘science’ and 
yet there was little sign of its implementation by the military at the time, although there 
was a subtle increase in the use of quantification in the periodicals, and calls for a more 
scientific approach in the Army.  For the British military, however, the use of wargaming 
as a tool to look into the future of war actually decreased in the twentieth century, and 
while the content of the military journals go against the notion of a profoundly anti-
intellectual military establishment, their conservatism still prevented new methods of 
examining the future from gaining a lasting hold.   Bloch and Wells were often wrong in 
their predictions, but demonstrated ways of looking into the future that were ahead of 
their time.  As exceptions, they counterpoint the bulk of prediction at the time, which 
 
4 G. G. Thomas “The Bloch Museum of Peace and War,” Chambers Journal LXXX (1903): 258, quoted in   
Michael Welch, “The Centenary of the British Publication of Jean de Bloch’s Is War Now Impossible (1899-
1999),” War in History 7 (2000). 
5 Wendell Bell, Foundations of Futures Studies Volume 1: History, Purposes, and Knowledge (London: 
Routledge, 2017 [First Published 1997]), 7. 
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was focused tactically, on particular issues, or aimed at the near future.  Prediction of the 
future is never easy, but it was particularly difficult at the time, when contemporary 
observers faced unprecedented change.  The South African War did produce soul 
searching and change – the view that the British Army was hopelessly conservative as 
put forward by DeGroot is a simplification – albeit within an existing framework of 
military expectation.  The uncertainty of the future precluded radical change, as it was 
an unknown, so such conservatism is explicable not only on social grounds, but also 
from the perspective of the difficulty of knowing where future technologies might lead.  
In 1897 Admiral Colomb suggested to RUSI that there would be value in establishing a 
research body to look at new technologies, but struggled to see where it would fit within 
the existing organisation of the Army, Navy or Government.6   
The introduction to this thesis quoted I. F. Clarke, who wrote that “the great paradox 
running through the whole of [the] imaginary wars between 1871 and 1914 was the 
total failure of army and navy writers to guess what would happen when the major 
industrial nations decided to fight it out.”7   The answer to this question is that neither 
civilian and military writers were equipped to predict what would happen, as shown by 
the limited ways in which they interrogated the future.  Wells and Bloch demonstrated 
how it was possible to build a more incisive and compelling picture of the future, but the 
intellectual climate was not yet ready to accept their methods.  To be fair, it is easy to 
forget how novel change was, and how the methods of prediction, including fictional 
modes of engagement, had to be learned.  Cassandra spoke and was not believed, 
because her language had not yet been deciphered. 
 
6 P. H. Colomb, “The Future of the Torpedo,” The Journal of the Royal United Services Institution, December 
1897, 1465. 
7 I.F. Clarke, Voices Prophesying War 1763-3749 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 81. 
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Appendix A  Assessment of British Periodicals 
This Appendix provides context to the British periodicals which form the key research 
resource of this thesis.  Articles have been cited from 47 different periodicals, including 
one non-British periodical (the US Fortnightly Review), three professional journals (The 
Journal of the Society of Architects, The Magazine of Music and The Musical Standard), and 
three religious magazines (The Quiver, The Wesleyan-Methodist Magazine and The 
Leisure Hour).  In total, there are 234 specific citations from the periodicals, in contrast 
with 18 from newspapers.  This Annex contains a detailed assessment of the twelve 
most cited periodicals (all are cited at least six times) in this study; all of which are 
referenced by Sullivan’s methodical analysis of the contemporary market, excluding The 
Speaker.1   
The periodical which has the most references, numbering 52, is The Review of Reviews, 
which was published on a monthly basis.  This is not surprising, as it was a wide-ranging 
compendium of reviews on articles in other British, European and North American 
periodicals.  The Review of Reviews ran from 1890 to 1953, and its early years were 
dominated by its founder and initial editor, W. T. Stead, until his death on the Titanic in 
1912.2  Stead had been the editor of the Pall Mall Gazette in the decade preceding the 
foundation of The Review of Reviews and was seen as something of a sensationalist with 
an eye for interesting ideas.3  His drive and centrality to the periodical can be seen from 
his authorship of the annual ‘Progress of the World’ in the periodical, which strongly 
reflected his views, and the estimate that “Stead personally wrote or dictated over 
80,000 letters during the years 1890-1912.”4   
 
1 Alvin Sullivan, British Literary Magazines: The Romantic Age, 1789-1836 (London: Greenwood Press, 1984).  
Alvin Sullivan, British Literary Magazines: The Victorian and Edwardian Age, 1837-1913 (London: Greenwood 
Press, 1984).  Alvin Sullivan, British Literary Magazines: The Modern Age, 1914-1984 (London: Greenwood 
Press, 1984).   
2 Sullivan, “Victorian and Edwardian,” 356. 
3 Sullivan, “Victorian and Edwardian,” 351. 
4 Sullivan, “Victorian and Edwardian,” 354. 
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The Review of Reviews is referenced so extensively in this thesis for two reasons.  The 
first is, as noted above, its character as a summary of other periodicals – both national 
and international, making it a rich source of material from which to draw citations.  The 
second is that many of the issues relevant to future war, and the future in general, were 
of personal interest to Stead.  These included the limitation of armaments, as seen in his 
tireless championing of Bloch; support for the Boer Republics – leading to his criticism 
of the South African War; and Anglo-American alliance and reunion – which was a 
concern shared with many contemporary writers facing the relative decline of Britain.5  
He supported women’s suffrage (paying identical wages to his female staff) and his 
unstinting championing of many unpopular causes, such as that of the Boers, was out of 
choice rather than a desire for greater circulation, as they severely decreased 
advertising and sales.6  After his death his sons took up the editorship of The Review of 
Reviews, but with notably less success.7 
The articles from The Review of Reviews referenced in this study frequently reflect 
Stead’s interests.  Bearing in mind that his editorship began in 1890, all the relevant 
articles date from the period 1890-1910, with a single article from 1914 reviewing 
Arthur Conan Doyle’s short story Danger!  Seven relate to the South African War, no less 
than eleven to Bloch (two overlap both of these categories), and a further eleven to 
different aspects of the future, including nations such as America, institutions like the 
church, and new technology.  The other commonly referenced subject is the relative 
decline of Britain, cited in nine articles.  Of the others, three are focused on the War in 
the Soudan, two others on the German military at the end of the 1900s, and five on 
different aspects of the peace movement.  The subject of two of the later articles is Bloch; 
who is mentioned in Stead’s Progress of the World for 1910, and in an appeal to fund the 
peace museum established in Switzerland after his death.8  Both are unusual, being 
published long after interest in his work had waned in the periodicals.  The conflict in 
the Soudan is mentioned in the ‘Progress of the World’ for 1898, with the other two 
 
5 Sullivan, “Victorian and Edwardian,” 354. 
6 Sullivan, “Victorian and Edwardian,” 356. 
7 Sullivan, “Victorian and Edwardian,” 356. 
8 “The Progress of the World,” The Review of Reviews, October 1898, 327-335. 
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articles focused on casualties on enemy combatants in that war, which was vigorously 
debated at the time.9  In summary, these large number of referenced articles indicate 
Stead’s interest in war – or rather its curtailment or prevention.  This also extended to 
interest in Wells’ The War in the Air in 1908, with four articles dedicated to reviewing its 
serialisation. 
The Saturday Review was a weekly publication which began its life in 1855, and is cited 
32 times in this study, between 1870 to 1912.  Sullivan characterises it, at least in its 
early decades, as “addressing the educated and privileged classes, generally [taking] a 
moderate line.”10  With an anti-socialist and anti-suffrage stance, it became a dependable 
supporter of the Conservative Party in the 1880s, but then went through something of a 
renaissance under the editorship of Harris, who moved from The Fortnightly Review (see 
below) and recruited Wells to its stable of writers.11  After his tenure the periodical 
began a decline and had periods of losing money, although it finally ended publication 
much later, in 1938. 
The Saturday Review showed a consistent interest in warfare and the British Army 
throughout its period of publication, including citations in this thesis of four articles on 
the Franco-German War, two on the Russo-Turkish War of 1878, three on the Soudan, 
and one on the Russo-Japanese War.  A further nine articles cited discuss a wide range of 
more specific military subjects, including long-range rifle fire in the 1880s and 1890s; 
field artillery and tactics.  What is surprising, in the light of these references, is the 
relative paucity of articles on the South African War.  In contrast, there was a great 
interest in the armament and tactics of the cavalry.  Ten articles cited are concerned 
with this subject, with some having a passing interest in the South African War, and they 
are all on the side of the argument that sword, lance and shock action should remain the 
primary role of the cavalry in battle.  Four articles were penned by the indefatigable 
Grey Scout, who wrote throughout the period on the ‘true cavalry spirit’ and the primacy 
of traditional armament.  He was not, however, alone, with others agreeing (noting that 
 
9 “The Progress of the World,” The Review of Reviews, November 1910, 417-435. 
10 Sullivan, “Victorian and Edwardian,” 379. 
11 Sullivan, “Victorian and Edwardian,” 381. 
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there are nuances) with his viewpoint.  Regardless of the wider politics supported by the 
periodical, there is certainly conservatism on display over this aspect of military matters 
in The Saturday Review.  Other articles, later in the period of interest, dealt with Wells’ 
lecture on ‘discovering the future’ at the Royal Institute; and a piece by Colonel Maude 
(Bloch’s critic from the turn of the century) on French military strategy two years before 
the First World War.  The Saturday Review also contained four articles on different 
examples of ‘invasion literature’ from Chesney in 1870 to Wells and The War in the Air in 
1908. 
The Fortnightly Review has the third highest number of references in this study, with 
seventeen.  The periodical was founded in 1865 with (ironically, given its title) monthly 
issues after 1866, and was established in an attempt to be non-partisan and to inform its 
readers with ‘cultivated’ articles on science, art, literature, politics and finance.12  From 
1886 to 1894 its new editor, Harris, who later joined The Saturday Review, took what 
was already seen as a liberal periodical in a more radical direction, which included 
publishing work by Wells and Kipling.13  From 1894, all the way through to 1928 (The 
Fortnightly Review ceased publication in 1954), the editor was William Leonard 
Courtney who, in Sullivan’s opinion, brought back an emphasis on publishing political 
and intellectual articles. 
This is evident in the articles referenced in this study, most of which belong to the 
period 1900 to 1914, and which tend to be lengthy ruminations on all aspects of 
warfare.  Two of the three articles cited from the nineteenth century discuss war of the 
future, on land and at sea, with a third discussing cavalry.  Of the later articles, two deal 
with the South African War, and one of them, published in 1903, discusses the outcome 
of the official inquiry into the War.  Bloch is also discussed in a lengthy obituary 
published in 1902, but the bulk of the articles deal with issues such as military theory or 
the utility of Britain fielding an expeditionary force.  Two deal with German military 
affairs, including a reaction to Alfred von Schlieffen’s work on future warfare, discussed 
 
12 Sullivan, “Victorian and Edwardian,” 131. 
13 Sullivan, “Victorian and Edwardian,” 133. 
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in Chapter Seven.  Finally, and most notably, The Fortnightly Review published Wells’ 
Anticipations in 1901, which was nothing short of revolutionary, as also discussed in 
Chapter Seven. 
Fourteen articles cited in this study are from The Nineteenth Century and its later 
incarnation The Nineteenth Century and After (predictably, this change in title happened 
from 1900 onwards).  Taken as whole, the monthly periodical ran from 1877 to 1961, 
but was edited by James Knowles from its foundation until his death in 1908.14  Knowles 
was a prominent figure over his long editorship, orchestrating a series of campaigns on 
diverse subjects such as opposition to a Channel Tunnel in 1882, and a focus on religious 
matters later in that decade.15  In 1898 he launched a critique of the British Army and 
Navy, which is evident in the articles cited in this study, with three articles published in 
1900-01 which were critical of British military performance in South Africa (two by 
Hale).  Two earlier articles discussed the War in the Soudan and were also critical of 
British policy and conduct in the conflict. 
The period 1898-99 sees three articles cited which argued for disarmament (two are by 
Sidney Low), broadly contemporaneous with the Czar’s conference on the limitation of 
armaments.  Two earlier articles cover military affairs, with a third on the future of 
Anglo-American affairs.  The other later articles include a retrospective by Field-Marshal 
Roberts in 1905, and a piece on the future of Great Britain in 1906, which illustrates 
Sullivan’s observation that Knowles was increasingly interested in Imperial policy in the 
last few years of his editorship.16 
Twelve articles are cited from The Contemporary Review, which was first published in 
1866,  on a monthly basis.  Although established as a periodical with a specific interest in 
theology, it grew into a journal with a wide coverage of subjects, and Sullivan considers 
 
14 Sullivan, “Victorian and Edwardian,” 269; and Sullivan, “Modern Age,” 465. 
15 Sullivan, “Victorian and Edwardian,” 270-71. 
16 Sullivan, “Romantic Age,” 23.  
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it not to be a narrowly focused literary periodical.17  This is demonstrated by the broad 
range of relevant articles cited from The Contemporary Review, all of them published 
between 1891 and 1901.  Two cover the Soudan and two others the South African War – 
one of which was written by Bloch.  Three are on the theme of the ‘dread’ of war in the 
1890, discussed at length in Chapter Three, including one on the Tsar’s Peace 
Conference.  One article cited is directed at the future of maritime warfare, written in 
1894. 
Twelve articles from the monthly The Athenaeum are cited in this study; a periodical 
which Sullivan characterises – until the twentieth century – as following “a moderate 
path in literary criticism.”18  After the turn of the century he considers that it began to 
publish significant contemporary fiction and poetry, until it ceased publication in 1915 
after nearly a century in print.  As perhaps understandable for a literary periodical, four 
of the references in this study relate to reviews on books about the South African War.  
There is also a review of Wells’ The War in the Air in 1908, although there are no 
references to other examples of fiction on future war.  The other articles are spread 
throughout the period 1870 to 1905, and cover the Franco-German and Russo-Japanese 
Wars.  One piece written in the late nineteenth century discussed the history of cavalry 
and another future fuels.  Altogether, the articles are more diverse than many of the 
other periodicals mentioned above, which often concentrate on specific issues or causes 
of one sort or another. 
Ten articles from The Academy are also cited in this study; which was a weekly 
publication after 1871; it began publication in 1869 and ran until 1915 – with a short-
lived resurrection in 1916.19  Wells characterised the periodical (under a pseudonym) as 
dignified, worthy and representative of British intellectual culture, in his novel Tono-
Bungay.20  This changed in the late 1890s and early 1900s, however, as the periodical 
had numerous editors.  The articles cited in this study range from 1876 to 1913, and are 
 
17 Sullivan, “Victorian and Edwardian,” 77. 
18 Sullivan, “The Romantic Age,” 1. 
19 Sullivan, “Victorian and Edwardian,” 3. 
20 Sullivan, “Victorian and Edwardian,” 4. 
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very varied in their subject matter.  They include an analysis of artillery after the Franco-
German War, an early review of cavalry – in 1877, long before the outpouring of interest 
in the subject after the turn of the century, a review of the novel The Great War of 189-, 
and a treatise on Bloch in 1899.  After 1900 there is a review of Wells’ Anticipations; a 
piece on the Russo-Japanese War in 1905; another on the role of cavalry in the First 
Balkan War in 1913; and a review of Beca’s book on military tactics in 1911 (which 
eccentrically advocated the use of columnal assaults on the eve of the First World War). 
The Speaker was established in 1890 as a Gladstonian liberal intellectual weekly 
periodical, after The Spectator shifted its political stance to Unionism.21  It carried a wide 
range of political articles but was never very successful, and ceased publication in 
1907.22  The eight articles cited here illustrate its liberal interests, including four articles 
in the 1890s on fears of a European Great War, and one concerned with the perceived 
decline of society and the future, entitled ‘A Senile World’.  Those from the 1900s are 
more diverse, with one on colonisation of Africa, another on the rising economic 
importance of the United States, and one on German criticism of British military 
performance in South Africa. 
Macmillan’s Magazine is cited seven times, and ran from 1859 to 1907, with only four 
editors throughout its lifetime.23 It was a monthly periodical and one which attained a 
reputation for publishing works of literary value in the 1880s, although it began to be 
seen as conservative (in taste rather than politics) in its latter decades, and not moving 
with the times.24  It included, as a matter of course, articles on politics, history and 
literature.  The two articles from the 1890s both deal with ‘the dread of war’ while the 
remaining five are from the 1900s, focused on the South African View, and particularly 
French and German views of its conduct.  One of the others is a review of Le Queux’s 
 
21 Laura Brake, ed. Dictionary of Nineteenth Century Journalism (London: Academia Press & British Library, 
2009), 587. 
22 Brake, “Dictionary,” 587. 
23 Sullivan, “Victorian and Edwardian,” 215. 
24 Sullivan, “Victorian and Edwardian,” 218. 
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Invasion of 1910, and the articles show the range of the interests of Macmillan’s 
Magazine. 
The Monthly Review had a short life compared to most of the periodicals discussed 
above, only from 1900 to 1907.25  Under its first editor, Newbolt, the South African War 
and military reform were topics of particular interest, which is noticeable in five of the 
seven articles cited in this study.  These include four on the use of cavalry following the 
South African War, although three of them are the work of two authors (under the 
pseudonyms Cavalry and Eques) arguing over cavalry armament, as discussed in 
Chapter Four.  The only later article, falling during the period of Hanbury-Williams’ 
editorship, is concerned with potential formation of a national army. 
The National Review began its life in 1883 as a broadly Conservative periodical, although 
it had no formal ties to the party.26  Conservatism pervaded the periodical, in terms of 
literary criticism and politics, although its considerable interest in women’s suffrage in 
the 1880s covered both sides of the argument.  From 1893 Leopold Maxse became the 
editor, a position he was to hold until the 1920s, and he advocated tariff reform, a 
militarily strong Britain, and friendship with France to counterbalance what he saw as 
the rising threat of Germany to European peace.27   As with The Contemporary Review, 
the articles cited from The National Review are largely clustered around the turn of the 
century, with four of the six cited being specifically interested in the South African War, 
Bloch (written by his nemesis, Colonel Maude) and the Tsar’s efforts at peace.  A fifth is 
concerned with England’s vulnerability at time of war to its food supply, while a sixth - 
written shortly after The National Review began publication – bemoaned Britain’s 
unpreparedness for war. 
Six articles are cited in Chambers’s Journal, which was founded in the 1830s and was to 
remain in publication until 1956.  Sullivan considers it a significant periodical which 
 
25 Sullivan, “Victorian and Edwardian,” 229. 
26 Sullivan, “Victorian and Edwardian,” 242. 
27 Sullivan, “Victorian and Edwardian,” 245. 
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published a wide range of articles on literature and science, and fiction, throughout its 
long life.28  This is evident in the articles cited, which cover the Russo-Turkish War, the 
fear of war in the 1890s, and the potential impact of telegraphy and Lyddite shells in 
warfare.  One article is concerned with the museum established in Bloch’s name after his 
death, in Switzerland. 
Although it is clear that certain of the periodicals discussed above focused on particular 
issues, such as on Bloch in The Review or Reviews or the armament of the cavalry in The 
Saturday Review, it is more striking that subjects such as the wars in Soudan and South 
Africa, or the ‘dread’ of European conflict in the 1890s, reached across multiple 
publications, regardless of their political allegiances.  In that way, they represent a 
window onto contemporary concerns about the future, and especially that of war, 
between 1870 and 1914. 
 
28 Sullivan, “Romantic Age,” 93. 
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